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This thesis contributes to an in-depth understanding of the concept of soft power, which 
according to Joseph Nye indicates the ability to achieve foreign policy goals through 
cultural attraction. For the purposes of this study of Russian cultural influence in Ukraine, 
soft power is rearticulated to highlight the ability to engage in mean-making and cultural-
ideational leadership on the international stage.  
A critique of Nye justifies a reframing of soft power, which is supplied by drawing on the 
analytical power of post-Marxist hegemony and discourse theory. The methodology 
through which this concept is operationalised empirically emphasises outcomes over 
inputs, thus appraisals of soft power must account for whether the discourses promoted 
by mean-making initiatives resonate favourably with target audiences. Desk-based and 
field research supports an argument that Moscow acknowledges the need for soft power, 
understood here in terms of ‘sovereignty of spirit’. This civilisational approach is explored 
further, and the target narratives advanced by significant proponents of the discourse, 
namely the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Russian Orthodox Church and foreign policy 
officials, are identified. Insights into the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the 
Moscow Patriarchate to promote spiritually-infused discourses are provided, and new 
developments observed. Finally, the extent of Russian ‘civilisational’ soft power is 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1. Background and Overview 
 
This study takes an in-depth look at Russian soft power, that is, the influence that stems 
from an ‘attractive’ culture. It starts from the assumption that Russia is attempting to 
embrace soft power means of conducting its foreign policy, that is, developing the 
capacity to employ co-optive means of achieving foreign policy goals, rather than relying 
on the more direct leverage with which it has been associated. To explore how far Russia 
is mobilising its capacity for soft power, this study focuses on the case of Russia’s use of 
soft power in relation to neighbouring Ukraine. This country has in recent years been on 
the receiving end of Russia’s ‘hard power’ capabilities, particularly in the energy sector, 
and so it is an excellent case for analysing how far Russia has effectively shifted to softer 
mechanisms. 
Publishing in 1990, Joseph S. Nye responds to the pessimistic ‘declinist’ outlooks on 
America’s role in the world prevalent at the time (e.g. Kennedy 1987) with the argument 
that although America’s ‘hard power’ relative advantage may be declining, the country 
retained its hegemonic place in the global system since it is American culture that is 
shaping the aspirations of millions of people across the globe. Although inadequately 
acknowledged by those framing power in traditional, limited, statist terms, this claim 
offers the United States the possibility to exercise global leadership and shape the 
international system to perpetuate that status. Nye named this ability to co-opt others to 
go along with policies that reflect your interests and values on the basis of cultural 
attraction in international politics ‘soft power’. In Nye’s words, ‘soft power is the ability to 
attract and attraction often leads to acquiescence’ (2004: 5-6). This co-optive power is 
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counterposed to ‘hard’ forms of ‘command power,’ such as those generally stemming 
from military and economic resources (Nye 1990: 32). 
However, while Nye’s definition of soft power might arguably be suited to examining the 
demonstrable effects of America’s cultural attraction, it is less helpful for an analysis of 
Russian soft power. Indeed, although the fact that Russia’s initiatives to renew its soft 
power capacity are still on-going makes it a fascinating case study, it means that in order 
to capture these developments for analysis, a concept of soft power that casts light on 
the ways in which attraction is constructed is required. 
Consequently, for the purposes of this study, the following, re-articulated working 
definition will be used, in which soft power is understood as: the ability of a sovereign 
polity to be perceived as attractive and to set the agenda for foreign citizens in support of 
its foreign policy goals. 
1.2. Research Questions 
 
The aim of this thesis has been a desire to probe deeper into the anecdotal evidence 
about Russian soft power in Ukraine, which seemed contradictory. On one hand, one 
heard of significant attraction among the culturally-close, Russian speaking, still 
somewhat ‘sovietised’ population of Ukraine. On the other hand, the word was of Kyiv 
leading the country whole-heartedly towards the West, seeking to integrate in its 
institutions and turn away from Russia (Reid 1997; Pachlovska 2009; Kononov 2011). 
Further, surveys on political issues suggest a population divided along a historical, 
linguistic, cultural and economic East-West axis. 
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Thus this study has sought to explore these cleavages in more detail and bring a more 
nuanced understanding to the debate through the following main research question: To 
what extent does Russia have soft power in contemporary Ukraine? 
Since Ukraine has a large and diverse population, the focus was narrowed to one 
particular demographic, namely among higher education students. Nevertheless, prior to 
approaching an answer to this question, it was necessary to respond to several sub-
questions. Firstly, how is soft power understood in the Russian context? This is important 
because without knowing what Moscow is seeking to achieve, one cannot identify the 
most appropriate object of analysis. Secondly, since soft power is seen to function 
through discourses of meaning, it is necessary to understand which discourses are being 
projected in the case study country. Thirdly, what means do Russia and its 
representatives have in Ukraine to disseminate these messages? Understanding the 
strength of the tools in Russia’s soft power arsenal can help us to understand the success, 
or otherwise, of initiatives to cultivate soft power. Finally, and most importantly with a 
view to answering the main research question: how are Russian soft power discourses 
negotiated in Ukraine? Methods for the analysis of audience reception of the target 
discourse should indicate the extent to which the narratives projected by Russia are 
accepted as attractive and frame interpretations of the world in Ukraine.  
1.3. Contribution 
 
This thesis essentially makes three key original contributions to academic knowledge. The 
first is theoretical; an innovative reframing of the concept of soft power as coined by 
Joseph Nye (1990), which results in a working concept that might effectively be applied to 
explore other cases studies of polities seeking to exercise cultural influence beyond their 
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borders. Where Nye’s concept successfully expresses American soft power as a more or 
less accomplished phenomenon whose attractive effects might be observed, analysis of 
Russia’s nascent soft power – like that of other rising powers – requires a framework with 
theoretical tools capable of capturing the communicative process by which that attraction 
is constructed. Nye’s essentialist concept is silent on this subject; seeing communication 
as a means of spreading the word about phenomena and ideas whose favourable 
reception is a reflection of their own apparently self-evident ‘attractive’ attributes. This 
thesis offers an original approach to soft power, integrating literature not yet applied to 
the study of soft power into an analysis of this International Relations (IR) concept; 
namely insights from Cultural Studies, discourse theory and post-structuralism. This 
facilitates an examination of the way in which attraction is constructed through culturally-
specific narratives. This step is grounded in an exploration of existing literature and 
elaborated upon in the conceptual framework. 
The second original contribution of this thesis follows on from the first and consists of a 
case study of the Russian approach to soft power. Previous studies of Moscow’s soft 
power have tended to analyse Russia using a model based closely on Nye’s, examining an 
eclectic mix of purported markers of attraction and proposed ‘tools’. Instead, 
operationalising the concept developed above, a systematic examination of an aspect of 
Russian soft power work from start to finish is undertaken; from the vision, to the 
contours of the civilisational discourse, to a set of tools of their promotion in Ukraine, 
namely the outreach of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), to an analysis of their 
reception by an audience there. The empirical analysis presented explores the specific 
motivations for Moscow’s attempt to embrace soft power in its own terms. The iterative 
process of interaction and development between the theoretical and empirical aspects of 
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the thesis has resulted in a working definition that emphasises cultural sovereignty: in the 
case study, Russian soft power is concerned with the cultural dimension of national 
security; ‘sovereignty of spirit’. This understanding can give nuance to discussions of 
Russia’s role in the world, and especially in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which have 
tended to be funnelled into a narrow imperialist perspective. This study argues that 
Russian attempts to consolidate Ukraine’s place in its ‘sphere of influence’ through 
traditional ‘imperial’ means are recognised to have been ineffective in the Kremlin. 
Consequently, a turn towards softer, networked means based on attraction and influence 
exercised through the construction of meaning, is underway. Chapters five and six 
approach an analysis of one of Moscow’s approaches to soft power, and also the target 
narratives and the networked methods employed to disseminate them. 
The third contribution is also represented by a case study, namely one in which the 
success of Russia soft power initiatives is evaluated in the target country of Ukraine. This 
element answers the main research question of this thesis, and accordingly debates the 
extent to which Russia has soft power – attraction and agenda-setting potential – in 
Ukraine, by operationalising the conceptual framework as outlined in chapter four. 
Accordingly, this sophisticated methodology examines a selected target audience’s 
reception of Russian cultural, value-oriented and foreign policy narratives and grounds its 
conclusions in original quantitative and qualitative fieldwork findings. The resulting 
analysis helps facilitate a diversified understanding of how Russia is perceived in Ukraine. 
Rather than the East-West, Black-White picture suggested by some projects, this study 
contends that debates about Russia and the values it seeks to advance go on not only 
between individuals, but actually within individuals. Further, acknowledgement of the 
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attraction of Russian culture does not necessarily imply a positive disposition towards 
Russian foreign policy. 
1.4. Motivation and Researcher Qualification 
 
Drawing on critical notions of security, the genesis of this thesis was motivated by the 
desire to explore the interaction of identity and security encapsulated by the concept of 
soft power. Russia represents an under-researched and fascinating case study of a re-
emerging power striving to secure itself by, among other means, re-articulating its 
identity, not only domestically but also on the international arena. 
This study has been facilitated by the author’s knowledge of Russian and Ukrainian 
languages, which made possible extensive use of Russian language sources and the 
processing of large volumes of primary empirical research data. The research was further 
aided by its author having spent the greater part of a year working in Nizhnevartovsk, 
Khanti-Mansiisk AO, which helped develop understanding of and openness to Russian 
culture before the research was formally initiated. 
1.5. Synopsis 
 
The second chapter, that is, the first substantive one, explores the existing conceptual 
literature on soft power. It sets the term soft power in historical context by examining its 
antecedents and attempts to provide clarity by differentiating the term conceptually from 
the ideas with which it is often used interchangeably. In-depth analysis of Nye’s 
understanding of soft power locates the main problem in the way that, in essentialising 
the notion of attraction and thereby delimiting the nature of the attractive, Nye elides 
examination of the processes whereby certain phenomena, and not others, become 
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constructed as appealing. Wider power dynamics are deeply implicated in the processes 
of the social construction of value, in ways that are obscured from view by Nye’s 
suggestion that certain phenomena are simply naturally and inherently more universal 
than others. The existing research on Russian soft power is also investigated. 
Whereas Nye’s notion of soft power focuses on the purported effects of manifestations of 
a state’s attraction, the conceptual framework presented in the third chapter shifts the 
focus onto the way power may be underpinned and legitimated through the 
dissemination and perpetuation of interpretative discourses and how this may be 
achieved through processes of communication. The definition of soft power stated above 
articulates well with Aletta Norval’s reading of Gramscian hegemony(2000), whereby the 
concept assumes a dual aspect, both as practices of cooperation rather than coercion, 
and as a substantive achievement marked by the ability to generate consent by exercising 
leadership in the ideational sphere. It is the latter aspect that is the particular concern of 
this thesis. Now, the notion of leadership presupposes followers; in the case of Russian 
soft power, this refers to those who would identify with the transborder civilisational 
project articulated. Consequently, the processes of cultural meaning-making on the 
international stage acquire a competitive dynamic. Further, it will be argued that Russia 
seeks to participate in this contestation of cultures; a point that will be elaborated on in 
the second half of the thesis. In order to facilitate this, a post-foundationalist ontology is 
posited. Accordingly, the notion of essential truth, such as the claim to the inherent 
attraction of the ‘American Dream’, is rejected in favour of acceptance of a rationale for 
belief framed by discourses of meaning. Accordingly, those with sufficient economic 
resources, and other ‘hard’ power required in the particular circumstances, may engage 
in large-scale communicative activities, thereby exercising a decisive influence over which 
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values, ‘truths’ and meanings come to be accepted as common-sense under particular 
circumstances and provide closure (‘suture’), albeit contingent, to ultimately 
undecideable frames of meaning. However, soft power is not generated automatically as 
a direct effect of communication; rather the message must be favourably received by the 
audience, which entails their active negotiation of the discourses promoted. The extent to 
which an audience finds a discourse ‘attractive’ – that is, credible, sensible and morally 
proper – defines the extent to which the ideas and value represented are able to ‘set the 
agenda’ by providing the framework to interpret particular phenomena. On this basis, the 
extent that a state exercises civilisational leadership reflects its ability to draw the citizens 
of other states into a shared interpretative ‘soft power’ discourse. A shared worldview 
provides fertile ground for cooperation in other, ‘harder’ sectors, thereby facilitating the 
perpetuation of power of more traditional kinds. 
The fourth chapter outlines the methodology and research design employed to 
operationalise the concept of soft power developed in the previous chapter, that is to say, 
it will articulate how this concept will be applied to answer the main research question: to 
what extent does Russia have soft power in Ukraine? Soft power is deemed to be present 
to the extent that the discourses promoted resonate among the target audience, i.e. the 
degree to which they evoke positive emotions, are accepted as common sense and 
become reproduced as the participants’ own. In order to examine the extent that the 
ideas are thus favourably negotiated, surveys and focus groups were conducted among a 
segment of the Ukrainian population, namely higher education students in four cities 
across the country. The surveys provide a quantitative picture of the approval rating of 
Russia’s narratives, while the focus groups offer more in-depth insights into how 
participants negotiated these ideas. This triangulated approach allowed comparison 
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between the selected cities, while also giving insight into the collective dynamics at play 
in the negotiation of meaning. Details of the interviews and desk-based research 
conducted to establish the foundations for this empirical research will also be given. 
The understanding of soft power as articulated in the conceptual chapters of this thesis 
serves as a framework for the analysis of the empirical case study; Russia and its cultural 
influence in Ukraine. However, it is important to note that phenomena interpreted in 
terms of soft power by the narrative of this thesis is not necessarily applied to describe its 
manifestations in Russia by relevant in-country actors. Chapter five argues that there are 
five broad approaches to ‘soft power’ in Russia, and explores in depth the one 
corresponding most closely to the re-framed concept articulated above, namely that of 
soft power as the dissemination of a Russian civilisational discourse. Accordingly, Russia 
seeks to reinforce state power by renewing the cultural dimension; its ‘sovereignty of 
spirit’ or the ability to exercise cultural leadership or hegemony not only domestically but 
on the international stage. The participation of ‘brotherly’ Ukraine is particularly 
important for Russia’s ability to live out its civilisational project, and therefore the 
identification of Ukrainians with ideational contours of this civilisational discourse are a 
determining factor in the realisation of this ambition. With attraction and agenda-setting 
deemed to be two sides of the same coin, in order to evaluate the salience of congruent 
views among a target population, one must first understand what notion of ‘value’ – 
positively weighted discursive elements shaping interpretation – is being promoted. This 
chapter explains the background to the discursive strands promoted by three significant 
bearers of the Russian soft power discourse; the Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Moscow 
Patriarchate and Russian foreign policy speeches. In principle, these represent what Nye 
terms the cultural, values-based and foreign policy ‘resources’ of Russian soft power 
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respectively, although in practice they are not so much discrete packages as mutually 
reinforcing strands reflecting different aspects of a worldview, summed up as ‘sovereign 
democracy’. 
Chapter six zooms in on the role of the Orthodox Church as an agent advancing what is 
argued to be Russia’s civilisational soft power discourse, with an emphasis on the values 
aspect. This examination provides grounds for the suggestion that as an institution 
conscious of sharing Russia’s fate, the Church is developing networked ways of working 
with partners in Ukraine, as well as becoming more attuned to popular hopes, needs and 
expectations. Light will be shed on the structures and communicative processes being 
instantiated in order to facilitate renewed participation in the construction of meaning by 
the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine. The discourses promoted are not seen as inherently 
attractive, as per Nye’s definition, but the dissemination over time and from a variety of 
sources in Ukrainian society may lead to their shaping the common-sense notion of value 
and truth drawn upon by Ukrainians in their negotiations of the world. 
Approached from the perspective of its ability to exercise civilisational leadership, 
Russia’s soft power is evaluated on the basis of how far participants accepted the 
discourses representing the contours of the ‘russkii’ civilisational idea. Chapter seven thus 
presents the findings of the audience reception research conducted in Ukraine and is 
divided into four principal sections. The first three present the key contours of the 
audiences’ negotiations of the discourses as manifested in the findings of the surveys and 
focus groups. The first three sections of this chapter suggest that there is some significant 
sympathy for the ideas advanced. However, the fourth part homes in on the main 
discourses drawn upon in resistance to Russia’s discursive overtures and highlights the 
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obstacles in Russia’s path to rekindling soft power. Indeed, while the core elements of the 
discourses resonated with the students to a considerable extent, the soft power 
generated was limited by the fact that the agents representing these narratives were 
perceived as too close to Moscow’s centres of influence, which placed significant barriers 
to their credibility and acceptance among many participants. 
Overall, the survey findings allow us to conclude that Russia had soft power among the 
audiences in three of the case study cities; Donetsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv, although there is 
significantly more contestation on this issue in the latter city. In L’viv, attitudes towards a 
‘russkii’ cultural zone and Russian foreign policy positions were far more critically received, 
although when it came to the notion of values, there was greater harmony. In the focus 
groups, Russian narratives were most stridently contested in the national capital, Kyiv and 
among students in Galicia, where Ukrainianisation has been the order of the day since 
independence. However, it is important to recognise that in the other groups, criticism 
often drew on fundamentally the same negative discourses of ‘what is Russia like,’ albeit 
expressed in a less non-negotiable manner. While Moscow may desire to live out a 
civilisational leadership role, little desire was observed in any of the case study cities to 
see Ukraine acceding to the role of younger brother in tow. Official discourse, particularly 
that articulated by the Russian Orthodox Church, is careful to frame Ukraine not in terms 
of a junior partner but more complementarily, as an equal or even as a spiritual trailblazer. 
Judging by the findings to be presented in this study, Moscow still has significant work to 
make this vision a reality for the target audience of this study, although noticeable 
progress has been made. 
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Chapter Two: Exploration of the Literature on Soft Power 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Despite Nye’s succinct definition as ‘the ability to get what you want in international 
politics through attraction’(2004: x), the notion of soft power is highly contested. Thus, 
prior to applying the concept to the case of Russian influence in Ukraine, it is necessary to 
clarify the term itself; a process that reveals a number of difficulties to be resolved. Firstly, 
the concept will be set in historical context and placed in relation to the parallel concepts 
with which it is often confused. With the background context established, the following 
section looks at Nye’s work more closely, revealing, alongside the concept’s merits, 
contradictions and a certain lack of conceptual clarity. Examination of the wider literature 
inspired by Nye’s work points to the consequences of his attempts to straddle both the 
academic and policy communities: its apparently parsimonious and intuitive appeal has 
meant that the concept is nowadays widely known and has had political impact in terms 
of learned discussion and policy shifts. Yet its conceptual haziness means significant work 
must be undertaken in order to operationalise it rigorously in an empirical study. The 
discussion concludes with a response to the understandable question of why, in spite of 
its weaknesses and overlaps with related concepts, the notion of soft power still has a 
significant role to play in IR and policy debates. 
In this chapter it is argued that by encouraging the assumption of American culture and 
values as, in principle, universally and ‘essentially’ attractive and as a catalyst for global 
change and an indicator of power, Nye is too quick to identify the direction of causality. 
The fact that he does not embrace a full constructivist approach, and sidelines the neo-
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Gramscian concept of hegemony means that he cannot conceptualise how power is not 
only a result of attraction, but is in fact inherent in the ability to constitute the very 
notion of how attractiveness itself is defined, and against which empirical phenomena are 
then judged. As a consequence of this perspective, the role of harder forms of power in 
the process of ideational construction may go neglected in Nye’s analysis, with the result 
that an overly sanguine view of ‘soft’ foreign policy may be conveyed. 
The second, shorter part of the chapter proceeds with a review of how the concept has 
thus far been applied in the secondary literature to explore the case of post-Soviet 
Russian soft power. Thus it prepares the ground for the discussion of the post-
structuralism inspired, discourse theoretical content with which the re-articulated 
concept will be developed in the second chapter. It is this concept that will then be used 
to explore Russian soft power in Ukraine in subsequent chapters. 
2.2. The Attraction of Soft Power for Policy-Makers and Citizens in the 
Contemporary World 
 
At the outset it is useful to explore briefly why soft power – despite its theoretical lacunae 
– has become such a popular, even ‘fashionable’ term in both academic and policy 
debates. This seems likely to stem from the fact that soft power ways of working are 
rather suited to the generally stable contemporary international political environment. 
Soft power does not replace hard power. Political actors still try, as in previous times, to 
leverage influence through a variety of means; as Nye notes ‘in an anarchic system of 
states where there is no higher government to settle conflicts and where the ultimate 
recourse is self-help, [military force] could never be ruled out’ (1990: 30). Yet the political, 
economic and social costs of military intervention are generally considered too high to 
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sustain formal, direct control over foreign states and populations, as was the case in the 
age of empire. This is not just due to the political pressures associated with overseas 
military presence and potential casualties; post-modern democracies have often focused 
on cultivating the socio-economic welfare of the citizenry rather than the pursuit of 
martial glory (Kagan 2003). As such, there is an absence of a ‘prevailing warrior ethic… 
[meaning] that the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification to ensure 
popular support’ (Nye 2004: 19). The peaceful precepts of soft power thus appear in tune 
with the intuitive common sense of contemporary populations living under liberal 
democratic government.  
Furthermore, today’s global economy is deeply interlaced and consequently the upheaval 
caused by military conflict produces destabilising ripple effects, including financial 
uncertainty, disruption to supply lines, social unrest and erosion of public morale, not to 
mention the ‘opportunity costs’ of resources directed towards coercive interventions at 
the expense of societal development. Hence cooperative approaches to resolving 
international disputes are generally the favoured means of getting things done in 
international politics today. Working together with other political actors also has 
multiplicatory benefits in terms of burden sharing and greater political weight in the 
pursuit of common interests. As Nye notes, ‘[i]n the information age, “cooperative” 
advantages will become increasingly important… [S]ocieties that improve their abilities to 
cooperate with friends and allies may also gain competitive advantages against rivals’ 
(Nye 2004: 20). 
While the degree of cooperation between states is still presumed to be in good part 
determined by self-interest, according to Nye, the extent of cultural attraction also affects 
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the willingness of others to collaborate (2004:29).1 Further, countries aspiring to the same 
values, perhaps embedded in international institutions, can work together more easily 
(Nye 2004b). As Castells puts it ‘[t]he more the construction of meaning on behalf of 
specific interests and values plays a role in asserting power in a relationship, the less the 
recourse to violence (legitimate or not) becomes necessary’ (2009:11). Thus, costly 
material inducements of one sort or another may be avoided if intangible cultural 
influence, such as shared values, can be leveraged as an aid to co-option. 
Bohas (2006), like Nye, also draws attention to the fact that the public may draw a 
distinction between a polity’s culture and its policies. Assuming its culture is found to be 
attractive, in terms of popular understanding and sympathy towards the values informing 
a polity’s political position, this may serve to deflect criticism or resistance to more 
coercive measures. The extent to which such policies are seen as threatening by third 
parties may be mitigated by their framing in relation to familiar, positively-weighted 
cultural values. For instance, while people may have opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003, this resistance was likely attenuated by general approval of the values – freedom, 
democracy, human rights – in whose name the war was ostensibly prosecuted. 
Thus there are compelling reasons to take the impact of soft power into account as an 
‘important reality,’ (Nye 2004: 8), one that neoliberal institutionalist Nye insists is of no 
less significance than hard power (Nye 1990: 32). This position is, however, not taken for 
granted by neo-realists in both policy-making and academia. Donald Rumsfeld, known 
more for his hawkish stance within the US administration of George W. Bush once claimed 
                                                          
1
 For instance, as Nye notes, ‘[b]ecause of American arrogance, the democratic Turkish government refused 
to see the war as legitimate and wouldn’t allow US troops to launch from their soil. That undermined the 
hard power strategy of the US in a very concrete way’ Nye, J. S. (1999)., "When Hard Power Undermines 




‘not to know what [soft power] means’ (Nye 1990a)2. Likewise, leading IR realist John 
Mearsheimer (1995: 91) summarises the orthodox view of how power is defined within 
the neo-realist paradigm in the following statement: ‘Realists believe that state behavior is 
largely shaped by the material structure of the international system’ [my italics]. Thus, it 
may be hard for IR realists to account for soft power in their models, even though soft 
power can be understood easily within the terms of a realist outlook as the extension of 
interest maximisation and ‘self-help in an anarchic world’ into the domain of culture as a 
complement to material forms of influence (Bilgin and Elis 2008: 11). This seems 
surprising when we consider that notions of ‘softer’ non-military forms of power have 
long been articulated by historical thinkers deemed from the contemporary perspective to 
represent key figures in the classical realist school of international relations. 
2.3. Historical lineage of non-material forms of power 
 
Some scholars seem to suggest that soft power constitutes a rather novel form of power, 
casting it as ‘post-modern’ (Cooper 2002). In this section, however, it will be argued that 
although the term soft power was coined by Nye only in about 1990, this contemporary 
formulation has a long historical lineage. Indeed, notions of an immaterial, co-optive way 
to get things done in international politics can be traced back around two and a half 
millennia. 
Perhaps the first recorded conceptualisation of the softer side of ruling was by China’s 
Confucius3 (551-479 BC), who advocated ‘governance by dezheng (reign by virtues) – the 
application of soft power by the ruler to win the hearts and minds of the people’ (Cao 
                                                          
2
 Apparently, Rumsfeld has now somewhat moved away from this position. See: Nye, J. S. (2010). 
Responding to my critics and concluding thoughts. Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. I. Parmar and M. Cox. 
Abingdon, Routledge. (p. 224). 
3
 For this reason, China’s international institutions of cultural diplomacy are named ‘Confucius Institutes’. 
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2007: 436). In Ancient Greece, Thucydides (460-395 BC) similarly recognised the need for 
‘hegemonia’, understood at that time as legitimated leadership (as opposed to hegemony 
as often understood today as political control, which he referred to as ‘arkhe’) in order to 
gain the free consent necessary for sustained power. This concept emphasised ideology 
and notions of justice as much as material capability in the maintenance of stable and 
enduring rule. Associated with ‘hegemonia’ was ‘time’ – the gift of honour, which was for 
example voluntarily bestowed upon the Athenians by other Greek polities because of 
their admiration for the courage, heroism and high quality leadership displayed by Athens 
in repelling Persian invasions and endured for many years thereafter and made inferior 
political status more acceptable to many states and peoples (Lebow and Kelly 2001).  
More recent classical realist theorists have also argued for a more nuanced understanding 
of power than the narrow, materialistic conception than is typically attributed to their 
contemporary fellows. For instance, Carl von Clausewitz (1984: 186) in his seminal work 
published originally in 1832 On War distinguishes between two necessary ways to defeat 
an enemy: using 'moral qualities and effects' and 'the whole mass of the military force,' 
which may be seen to correspond to an immaterial ‘soft’ form of power and the military 
facet of 'hard’ power. 
Following the rise of industrial capitalism, E.H. Carr led the way in proposing a tripartite 
conceptualisation of political power. This consists of military power, economic power, and 
power over opinion, which are closely interdependent and separable primarily for 
analytical purposes rather than in practice (2001: 102). He understands power over 
opinion in terms of the ‘art of persuasion’ and propaganda. In this he is substantially 
correct, although, as will be shown, there is more conceptual potential to soft power than 
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the unidirectional information campaign suggested by today’s usage of the term 
propaganda (Carr 2001: 120-30).4 He also noted that ‘[m]orality is the product of power’ 
(2001: 63, 75), a notion that seems to reflect the ideas of Michel Foucault (Williams 2005: 
109) and will be developed in the discussion of knowledge, truth and power in the 
conceptual framework. 
Hans Morgenthau also understood power in broader terms, as comprising ‘anything that 
establishes and maintains the power of man over man … from physical violence to the 
most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another’ (1965: 9). 
Furthermore, while he does stress the prevailing importance for power of armed forces, 
he observes the even greater significance of a nation’s character, morale and quality of its 
governance (Morgenthau 1965: 186).  
Thus we may conclude that ‘softer’ forms of power are not strictly a novel idea. In 
fairness, Nye himself recognises this (2010). Yet, we should not assume, as some do, that 
soft power is straightforwardly a new name for the old concept of propaganda that had 
assumed a negative taint (Cowan and Cull 2008: 6) due to its perceived unilateral 
imposition of views. Indeed, it must be admitted that it is only with the spread of 
information technologies enabling cheap and easy communication with others around 
the world, that using soft power means to co-opt foreign publics has become feasible as 
part of a systematic, sustained strategy in international relations (Mattern 2005: 589). 
Furthermore, previous conceptualisations of non-material forms of power were relatively 
rudimentary in terms of their conceptual basis. During the Cold War innovations were 
likely hampered in part due to the ontological limitations of neo-realism and the 
                                                          
4
 Carr does not explore the reception aspect of information drives, however. 
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preoccupation with military issues pertaining to the state that characterised that era. The 
insights of modern scholarship, however, gathered from beyond the disciplinary 
boundaries of IR, should enable a more sophisticated approach to soft power to be 
developed. In an information age when ‘[p]olitics has become a contest of competitive 
credibility in which whose “story wins”’ affects political outcomes and material victory 
too (Nye 2008: 10), soft power is not only an interesting element, but an essential 
consideration in a more ‘realistic’ and complete view of contemporary dynamics in 
international relations. 
2.4. Detangling Soft Power from Parallel Concepts 
 
Since being coined as a term by Joseph Nye more than two decades ago, soft power has 
enjoyed considerable prominence in discussions of international politics. Yet, despite its 
popularity, considerable confusion remains as to what exactly the term soft power means. 
The general cloud of confusion surrounding this concept has been in no way dispersed by 
the presence of a number of related and parallel concepts that perpetuate obfuscation, 
particularly as they are often used interchangeably. Hence, in order to understand the 
nature of soft power, it is helpful to have a clear idea of what it is not.  
A useful starting point for structuring ideas close to soft power is presented by Yun and 
Toth, citing Tuch, for whom public diplomacy refers to ‘a government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics’ (Tuch 1990: 3, cited in Yun and Toth 2009: 493). 




Yun and Toth (2009) describe realist approaches to public diplomacy as possessing statist 
assumptions, and preoccupations with national security prevail. Accordingly, ‘the 
objective is to influence the behaviour of a foreign government by influencing the 
attitudes of its citizens’ (Malone 1988: 3, cited in Yun and Toth 2009: 494). Furthermore, 
due to the key assumptions of the realist school, the perceived utility of public diplomacy 
remains focused on war propaganda and psychological warfare, and played a ‘less grand-
strategic and more operational role’(Yun and Toth 2009: 494-5). 
This narrow understanding of public diplomacy, with its suggested focus on supporting 
military goals, seems to resemble the concept of ‘smart power’ also coined by Nye (2008). 
This concept seems to have emerged as a reaction to the sceptical attitudes of neo-
realists, dominant in the American foreign policy establishment, towards the need for 
state-led public diplomacy following the disappearance of the Cold War ideological 
enemy against which previous cultural-diplomatic campaigns were directed. Nye 
describes ‘smart power’ as a strategy which ‘melds hard and soft power. My point is not 
that soft power replaces hard power. But that you need to be able to use both in a way 
that they reinforce each other’ (Nye 2008). 
Unfortunately, however, Nye does not go into detail on how smart power combines hard 
and soft forms of power, beyond stating that it is not necessary to choose between the 
two (2008). A further step is taken by Ernest Wilson (2008). Although he doesn’t go into 
detail on how this might work conceptually, he notes that smart power is being explored 
by the sections of the Pentagon to see how soft power techniques might be used to 
‘advance traditional war-fighting,’ for example, through developing soldiers’ cultural 
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competencies (language and local knowledge) to gain the respect of hostile populations 
and make public details of enemy brutality (Wilson 2008: 121). 
Thus, in this realist approach to public diplomacy, soft cultural approaches are tied closely 
to the facilitation of hard power goals. While some aspects of this approach could 
potentially improve the ‘attractiveness’ of US forces, the emphasis is quite narrowly 
focused on the achievement of operational objectives in the theatre of war. Accordingly, 
the suggestion appears to be that the benefits accrued would tend to be of a zero-sum 
nature, with any progress on an informational plane made by one side liable to be 
detrimental to the other.  
 By contrast, liberalist public diplomacy focuses on creating ‘attraction for a country’s 
culture (values), ideals (political, economic, social systems), and policies to build an 
enabling environment for national interests’ (Yun and Toth 2009). The liberalists hold a 
broader understanding of national security and interests than realists, and focus thereby 
on ‘transnational, economic, social and ecological issues emanating from the growth of 
globalism’ (Yun and Toth 2009: 496). There is also emphasis on the conditions (defined as 
credibility and legitimacy) necessary for realising soft power from one’s available 
resources. As well as being clearly a broader and more progressive approach to public 
diplomacy, the liberalist approach provides a useful conceptual umbrella sheltering 
several terms that are frequently, but, I argue, erroneously, used interchangeably with 




Firstly, nation-branding can be seen as an example of a liberalist approach to public 
diplomacy. Describing this concept, Fan observes that, 
To some, [nation branding] is simply another term for country-of-origin effect or place 
marketing (Kotler 2002). In a globalised world countries must manage and control their 
branding if they are to compete effectively with other countryies. Active repositioning of a 
country through branding can give a country competitive advantage over other countries 
(Gilmore, 2002) and bring the benefits of tourism and foreign investment. To others, it 
refers to a consistent and all-embracing national brand strategy [his emphasis], which 
determines the most realistic, most competitive and most compelling strategic vision for 
the country, and ensures this is supported, reinforced and enriched by every act of 
communication between the country and the rest of the world (Anholt, 1998)’ (Fan 2008: 
155). 
 
As such, nation-branding draws on explicit insights from business-related disciplines such 
as advertising, marketing and psychology. For Fan, nation branding equally ‘provides a 
more focused, culturally unbiased and more useful approach to creating international 
influence in the world’ (2008: 156-7). While Fan mentions ‘every act of communication’ it 
is likely this refers more to a polity’s consciously promoted official materials, than a reach 
for a ‘hegemonic’ approach to overseas information dissemination across the board. 
Nation-branding is thus something that all states can engage in and hope for positive 
results for their tourism and business sectors. 
Cultural diplomacy is also often used interchangeably with public diplomacy and soft 
power. Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, for instance, use the term to ‘[denote] a national 
policy designed to support the export of representative samples of that nation’s culture in 
order to further the objectives of foreign policy’(2010: 13). Cultural diplomacy is 
described more specifically by Milton C. Cummings as ‘“the exchange of ideas, 
information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster 
mutual understanding”, which forms an important component of public diplomacy, which 
basically comprises all a nation does to explain itself to the world’ (cited in Schneider 
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2004: 1). Here we see that cultural diplomacy should foster mutual respect and sympathy 
as a means to facilitate closer cooperation in a variety of spheres. Accordingly, the tools 
of cultural diplomacy include libraries, publications, radio and television programming, 
the provision of internet access and online resources, cinema, cultural performances and 
festivals, literature and poetry, music, art, sports, exchanges and so on.  
Thus, practices such as nation-branding and cultural diplomacy may be seen as 
components of liberalist public diplomacy. What unites these approaches is that their 
logic is about creating an international environment conducive to the achievement of 
national policy goals. Liberalist public diplomacy is perhaps to be understood in terms of 
its potential to produce positive-sum gains, as the mutual understanding generated by 
such initiatives may facilitate increases in bilateral trade and other forms of mutually 
beneficial socio-economic cooperation. In this sense, liberalist public diplomacy can be 
seen to focus more on the promotion of what Arnold Wolfers has termed ‘milieu goals’. 
Milieu goals are pursued by nations not ‘out to defend or increase possession, but [aiming] 
instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries’ as a means to increase 
security in the long-run’. By contrast, realist public diplomacy seems to be more akin to 
using cultural knowledge in support of narrower ‘possession goals’; those relating to the 
preservation or advancement of scare things to which a nation attaches value (Wolfers 
1962). 
Soft power may be understood in terms of the promotion of milieu goals. However, its 
conceptual potential is not exhausted by the terms described thus far. Indeed, in 
answering sceptics, Nye himself insists that soft power is more than just propaganda, 
persuasion or PR (2004b; 2008: 95-101). For the purposes of this thesis it will be assumed 
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that while public diplomacy, nation-branding, cultural diplomacy and the like are 
techniques, with soft power, the emphasis is on the result gained from the application of 
those practices. 
The key factor differentiating soft power from the practices of public diplomacy is 
arguably most clearly indicated by the title of the book, in which Nye first presents the 
concept of soft power: ‘bound to lead’. Thus soft power may be said to be about 
ideational and cultural leadership on the international level, and is thus conceptually 
distinct from nation-branding and cultural diplomacy, which may be seen to aim to 
position a nation in an appealing and favourable way within existing value narratives. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that empirical discussions of soft power tend to focus 
on countries staking a claim to international leadership such as the USA and the EU and to 
a lesser extent China and Russia, rather than countries with more modest ambitions that 
nevertheless engage in high-quality nation-branding and cultural diplomacy. 
However, it must be noted that in later works, Nye himself rather muddies the water with 
regard to the relationship between international leadership and soft power, which he 
uses to refer to the efforts of ‘small’ countries such as Norway and Canada to promote 
human rights (Nye 2004: 112). It is debatable whether this should truly be seen as soft 
power, since although these countries may appear to be taking the lead in promoting 
these issues, they are in principles working within the ideational discourse of the West, 
even if certain Western actors may not at times follow through in practice. Furthermore, 
these states do not have the independent 'hard power' capacity to enforce these issues 
and are unlikely to be able to incite others to do so on their behalf. 
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Thus, while the distinction is not absolute, these parallel concepts contribute to a useful 
and nuanced conceptual vocabulary to describe and analyse cultural, non-military means 
of supporting state policy. Yet while there are terms used unjustifiably in the place of soft 
power, there are also ideas articulated under different terminology that sound very close 
to soft power. 
Indeed, some of the most insightful discussions on soft power have been those which 
don’t use the exact terminology, but that equate the spread of American cultural mores 
and products with a form of neo-imperialism, which scholars have various described as 
‘empire by invitation’ (Lundestad 1999), the ‘irresistible empire’ (Grazia 2005) or ‘empire 
of fun’ (Wagnleiter 1999). Here the emphasis is on voluntarism, the extent of which 
distinguishes the American ‘empire’ from other generally more unilaterally imposed 
regimes of influence. US military hegemony was invited in order to ensure security in 
inter-war and, to a greater extent, post-war Europe, which ushered in American culture in 
its wake. Yet, the economic basis was ‘probably the single most important element and 
provided much of the underpinning for the other factors’ (Lundestad 1999: 194). US 
involvement in post-war European reconstruction was arguably driven by pursuit of 
commercial interests and benefitted the US film industry, through the creation of markets 
for US products (Stephan 2006: 2-3). Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, comparable 
processes of Sovietisation were underway after 1945 (Rees 2008), albeit with apparently 
less emphasis on invitation than in the American case. 
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While the concept of soft power arose in America, European scholars have developed a 
parallel concept that articulates European specificities.5 The soft power debate in Europe 
originates in a 1973 article by Françoise Duchêne, who advocated the development of 
Europe’s ‘civilian power’. This emerged as a response to Europe’s military reliance on 
American might during the Cold War, when the EC was ‘long on economic power and 
short on military power’ and hence needed policies ‘which can establish a political peace, 
that is civilian values, out of the technical peace… provided by nuclear statement’ 
(Duchêne 1973: 20). Compensating for its limited military capacity, the EC gained 
experience and credibility as a non-military actor in international politics. For Duchêne, 
(1973: 19), civilian power as a practice stands for the, centrality of economic power to 
achieve national goals; the primacy of diplomatic co-operation to solve international 
problems; and the willingness to use legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve 
international progress. Given the emphasis placed on the economic attraction of civilian 
power, we cannot be sure that this concept meets Diez’s stipulation that to make sense 
as a separate category, namely it should be irreducible to economic and military power 
(2005: 616). Although Stavridis (2001) suggests that Duchêne in fact does imbue his 
concept of civilian power with further, normative content, most often the emphasis rests 
on civilian power as a primarily economic way of working which helps to facilitates 
international cooperation.  
Yet more recently, Ian Manners has taken the lead in conceptualising the nature of the 
EU’s power, focusing in particular on its normative aspects. While some scholars have 
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 Diez argues that the EU’s normative power also relates to its desire to articulate an identity distinct from 
that of the USA to distinguish European citizenship. It conveys the notion of the EU – Kagan’s post-modern 




disputed that the concept of normative power represents a ‘new kind of power’ (Diez 
2005), Manners is insistent that there is a crucial difference between the notion of the EU 
as an actor working through civilian means, and the EU as what he terms a ‘normative 
power’. With his concept of normative power, Manners’ seeks to articulate a concept that 
goes beyond the ‘civilising’, neo-colonial associations he attributes to the ‘normative’ 
aspects of ‘civilian power’ (Manners 2006). This particular understanding of ‘civilian 
power’ possibly derives from that of Knut Kniste and Hanns Maull who envisage a polity 
‘whose conception of its foreign policy role and behaviour is bound to particular aims, 
values, principles, as well as forms of influence and instruments of power in the name of a 
civilisation of international relations (cited in Diez and Manners 2007: 177). 
Manners proposes that the European Union, by virtue of a combination of its historical 
context, hybrid polity and legal constitution, ‘exists as being different to pre-existing 
political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative 
way’ (Manners 2002: 239-41). Its behaviour, he argues, is defined by ‘what it is’, namely a 
sui generis international actor, constructed on a normative basis (2002: 240-252). As such, 
Europe is a more cosmopolitan polity, one that pursues more altruistic policies having 
transcended ‘modernist’ (Cooper 2002) concerns with realpolitik, and committed to 
improving the lot of its citizens, neighbours and inhabitants of planet earth through 
peaceful, socio-democratic means.  
Yet there seems to be some merit to Diez’s argument that the notion of ‘normative power 
Europe’ constitutes a response to a search for a European identity, whereby the EU’s 
embrace of the ideas and language of normativity fosters a sense of distinction to 
American realpolitik. Yet while the USA does not shy away from less normatively desirable 
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military interventions, it invariably frames such actions in discourses of norms and 
values.6 Hence, for the purposes of this thesis we may place an equal sign between the 
respective claims to attraction and normativity of Nye and Manners’ concepts. In the 
terminology of soft power, we may see Manners’ distinction between civilian and 
normative power as corresponding to an understanding of soft power as, on one hand, 
non-military practices in international relations and, on the other hand, as a 
transformative potentiality functioning through ideational discourses. This will be 
discussed further in the conceptual framework. 
Thus it is clear that a certain amount of the confusion surrounding soft power as a 
concept is terminological. There are concepts used synonymously with soft power that 
might usefully be differentiated on one hand, and others that effectively demonstrate 
soft power in action, but are not linked in to this literature. 
2.5. Nye’s Concept of Soft Power 
 
Now the focus will shift to a close examination of Nye’s work, which forms the starting 
point for the particular, interpretative approach of this thesis that will be articulated in the 
following chapter. In his early book Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American 
Power (1990), Nye seems quite explicit about his intentions with soft power and its role as 
part of a broader political project. He refers to Cox’s neo-Gramscian perspective and 
writes, 
The most critical feature for a dominant country is the ability to obtain a broad measure 
of consent on general principles – principles that ensure the supremacy of the leading 
                                                          
6
 Scholars such as Hyde Price (2004; 2006), Eriksen (2006) and Zielonka (2008) also question the extent to 
which the EU’s norm-shaping policies truly represent a departure from coercive politics. Indeed, Hyde-Price,  
for instance, notes that the threat of exclusion from EU membership is represents a ‘very tangible source of 
hard power’ (2008: 31). 
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state and dominant social classes – and at the same time to offer some prospect of 
satisfaction to the less powerful. (1990: 32) 
Although here Nye writes of ‘consent’, generally he frames this in terms of ‘co-option’, 
which he contrasts with command power; ‘the ability to shape what others do’ (1990: 
267f). The latter thereby corresponds to the carrots and sticks of military and economic 
forms of hard power (Nye 1990: 31), and seems to indicate a directly observable, ‘first 
dimensional’ (Dahl 1957; Bachmann and Baratz 1962) way of exercising power (Nye 1990: 
31). As such, it is indicated by ‘the ability of state A to get state B to do what it would 
otherwise not do’ (Dahl 1957), through threats and sanctions, and positive stimuli such as 
monetary incentives and other rewards. 
Such a behaviouralist understanding of power, with its emphasis on causality, poses 
challenges to conceptualising the influence yielded by soft power, however, which 
includes indirect forms of power that are hard to observe. Nye observes with regard to 
soft power that, 
[a] country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries 
want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is 
just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to 
get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – that is, getting others 
to want what you want – might be called indirect or co-optive power.[…] Co-optive power 
can rest on the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a 
way that shapes the preferences that others express. (Nye 1990: 310) 
Thus soft power functions on the level of thought, not deed, which is hard to observe as it 
may lie dormant as a nascent potential rather than being manifested in immediate action. 
Further, it appears that even within the co-optive end of the spectrum there is a scale of 
softness. This goes right to the heart of the contestation and confusion about soft power. 
Soft power, apparently, has two aspects; agenda setting and attraction, whose 
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functioning is conceived by Nye of in terms of a coercion-co-option continuum (1990: 
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Although Nye asserts that soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive 
end of the spectrum, and hard power assets with command behaviour, he admits that the 
relationship is imperfect, noting that ‘sometimes countries may be attracted by myths of 
invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that 
later come to be regarded as legitimate’ (Nye 2004: 7).  
Going into greater depth, Nye describes agenda-setting as, ‘the ability to manipulate the 
agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some 
preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic’ (Nye 2004: 7). He acknowledges 
(Nye 1990: 31, 2008: 108f) that this corresponds to the ‘second face of power’ coined by 
Bachrach and Baratz, who note that, ‘[t]he extent that a person or group – consciously or 
unconsciously – creates barriers or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy 
conflicts, that person or group has power’ (1962: 949). 
Soft power in this sense has the potential to make a ‘significant difference in obtaining 
favourable outcomes in bargaining situations’ (Nye 2004: 16) as weaker states consciously 
realise they are unable to get issues related to their own interests on to the international 
political agenda. Thereby, international decision-making is limited to non-controversial, 
innocuous issues; those not of great import to the more powerful ‘State A’ (Bachrach and 
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Baratz 1962). For Lukes (2005), this position does not depart sufficiently from that of 
behaviourist Dahl (1957). 
However, in places Nye’s understanding of ‘soft power’ does appear to go beyond this 
second dimensional understanding of power. Indeed, with regard to the component of 
attraction, Nye notes that a state with soft power, ‘may obtain what it wants in world 
politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to 
its level of prosperity – want to follow it’ (Nye 1990: 5). This ability to engage in 
preference shaping, as both Lukes and Nye term it, approaches the third face of power, 
about which Lukes ponders, ‘is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or 
others to have the thoughts you want them to have – that is, to secure their compliance 
by controlling their thoughts and desires’ (Lukes 1974: 23-4). 
Yet while Lukes (2005: 483) notes the centrality, profundity and ethical nature inherent in 
assertions of a particular notion of the ‘good life,’ Nye fails to problematise this issue; 
seeming to assume a priori the advantages of the American model. Indeed, Bially Mattern 
offers a constructivist critique of the fact that, despite the centrality of ‘attraction’ to 
Nye’s notion of soft power, one must ‘read between the lines’ (Bially Mattern 2005: 591) 
to gain insight into how he truly understands the concept. Further, Bially Mattern points 
to ‘disappointing inconsistencies’ (2005: 591) in the approach to the key concept of 
attraction, to which ‘Nye assigns two ontological statuses’ (Bilgin and Elis 2008: 11). On 
one hand, by noting the possibility of ‘”converting foreigners" so that they become 
attracted to one’s own values’ (Bially Mattern 2005: 591, Nye 2004: 11) and stressing the 
length of time needed to succeed in this task, Nye implies that the attraction is a result of 
social interaction (Bially Mattern 2005: 591), and thereby reflects a process of social 
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construction. On the other hand, however, Nye more commonly suggests that the 
attraction of US values, such as democracy, human rights and individual opportunities 
(2004: x) is natural and universal; in short he attributes them with an essentialist 
character. Indeed, followers of Nye have suggested that America is the soft power par 
excellence, implying that no other country could hope for such a high level of cultural 
attraction, because America’s culture and values are the most universal. Desire for all 
things American is presented as spontaneous, and reflective of the inherent superiority 
and universality of the American model. Such perspectives have given rise to numerous 
critiques accusing Nye of ethnocentricism (Fan 2008). 
Although Nye does occasionally admit that American culture is not attractive to everyone, 
his staple examples of those not attracted consist of the followers of Osama bin Laden, 
and young Iranians, who are frequently reported in his texts to ‘want nothing more than 
an American DVD to play in the privacy of their homes’(Nye 2008). He thereby gives 
implicitly the impression that apparent imperviousness to American attractiveness is due 
to the manipulative and distorting influence of fundamentalist and authoritarian 
leadership, which echoes Lukes’ realist epistemological defence of the concept of false 
consciousness (1974). Thus, while Nye has moved along the ontological scale relative to 
the behaviouralists Robert Dahl, and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, he appears to 
remain wedded to the objectivist tenet that knowledge of, in this case, the ‘best model’ is 
‘out there’ and knowable, even if some people remain in the dark about it.7 
In his numerous publications on soft power, Nye consistently maintains his parsimonious 
theoretical approach and devotes most of the space in longer texts to empirical 
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 Nye (2010: 217) denies that he asserts the absolute universality of the American model, stating ‘otherwise 
there would be far more universality of view than now exists’. Yet, one cannot ignore that he seems to give 
this impression in his policy-friendly publications on the topic. 
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observations of how American cultural products give rise to the attraction reaping 
tangible foreign policy benefits. Conceiving of the attraction of the American model as 
objectively given, and thus as inherently, naturally and potentially universally ‘attractive’ 
(Wilson 2012), for Nye the attraction permeates out of American cultural manifestations 
themselves:  
The soft power of a country rest primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where 
it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and 
abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority. (Nye 2004: 11; 2008: 96) 
 
Later, he observes that soft power relies on communicative means (2004b; 2008: 101-2), 
but his conceptualisation of this is limited to the need to make foreigners aware of one’s a 
priori alluring attributes, with the note that ‘if the content of a country’s culture, values 
and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that “broadcasts” them cannot produce 
soft power’ (Nye 2008: 95). He understands the popularity of American films abroad as 
indicators of US soft power, but declines to recognise that the distribution of such films is 
a force in creating the attraction whose a priori existence it purports to reflect.8 As such, 
his account of soft power is not able to offer a satisfactory explanation of the origins of 
either attraction or legitimacy, since attraction is depicted as essentialised with legitimacy 
springing forth organically from it. For instance, Nye notes that, 
[w]hen countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less 
resistance to their wishes. If a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, others more 
willingly follow. If a country can shape international rules that are consistent with its 
interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others. If 
it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit 
                                                          
8
 ‘Nye (2004: 16) has similarly noted that ‘soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of 
willing interpreters and receivers’, with the implication being that soft power depends on their being there 
to intercept communication. In the concept articulated in this thesis, such receivers are not necessarily 
perceived passively to be ‘out there’, but are actively created over time through the communications that 
they interpret and receive themselves. 
34 
 
their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks. (Nye 
2004: 10)  
The logic of Nye’s argument is that countries will follow others more willing if the power 
upon which the claim to leadership is based is legitimate. Concurrently, that legitimacy 
can stem from the fact that countries find the leading country’s values and culture. 
attractive and according give their consent to that leadership. The leading country may 
then shape ‘rules’ for international society that are consistent with those values, but also 
with its own interests, which are closely tied up with those values. When a country 
follows policies in line with the attractive, legitimated values, its ‘soft power in enhanced’ 
(Nye 2004: x). This argumentation is, however, problematic as it seems to suggest a 
tautological, circular relationship (Bially Mattern 2005: 595-596, Fan 2008); it hints at the 
potentially self-perpetuating nature of soft power, but elides analysis of the ultimate 
origins of attraction, and thus of soft power as a whole. 
In the context of the US policy-making community, it is easy to see the normative and 
empirical appeal of Nye’s approach, which appeals both to idealists through its apparent 
voluntarism and to open-minded realists on the grounds of its capacity to empirically 
demonstrate the benefits of American public diplomacy. However, from a more scholarly 
perspective, Nye’s theory has been roundly criticised as confusing (Fan 2008), shallow 
(Bilgin and Elis 2008: 6; Bohas 2006: 410) and as resting on a ‘shaky theoretical 
foundation’ (Kroenig, McAdam et al. 2010: 412). 
Indeed, while Nye rightly criticises ‘self-styled’ IR neo-realists who ‘don’t understand the 
power of seduction’ and ‘succumb to the “concrete fallacy” that espouses that something 
is not a power resource unless you can drop it on a city or on your foot’ (Nye 2008: 96), 
he still falls into the same foundationalist ontological impasse as epistemological realists. 
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In assuming certain phenomena to be essentially attractive, he can’t really conceive of 
how such perceptions come to be socially constructed. 
Nye’s concept of soft power thus vacillates between the second and third faces of power 
(Bilgin and Elis 2008: 12, Nye 2010). While his reference to Lukes’ preference shaping 
enables him to draw upon the valuable concept of ‘ideological power’, his foundationalist 
ontology prevents him from adequately responding to questions about the origination of 
attraction and exploring soft power’s role in the social construction of meaning to the full 
extent (Bilgin and Elis 2008: 11). Indeed, Nye’s concept of soft power makes a highly 
useful contribution to understanding the role of culture and values in contemporary 
international relations. Yet, the concept may fulfil its conceptual potential only when 
expanded to account for a Foucauldian so-called ‘fourth face of power’ (Digeser 1992), 
which will allow the theoretical depth and sophistication to answer his critics. This, as a 
number of scholars (Zahran and Ramos 2010) have suggested, may be facilitated by the 
integration of neo-Gramscian insight and a fuller embrace of the concept of hegemony. 
Although sharing elements in common and indeed appearing to draw some inspiration 
from Cox’s notion of ‘emulation’ (1993), Nye distances himself from these perspectives, 
arguing that Marxist interpretations are too ‘procrustean’ (1990a : 182-90; 2010); that is, 
too bound by economic determinism. This problem is addressed, however, in the next 
chapter of this thesis through the de-essentialisation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
undertaken by Laclau and Mouffe (2001). Such a perspective on soft power will also 
facilitate an understanding of how soft power interacts with and depends upon the 
harder, more tangible forms of economic and political influence elided in Nye’s approach. 
Thus, in the next chapter, scholars of power and discourse such as Foucault, Derrida, 
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Laclau, Mouffe and Norval will be drawn upon to underpin the re-articulation of soft 
power as working through discourse.  
2.6. The Intangible Softness of Soft Power: Or, What Makes Soft Power 
‘Soft’? 
 
Thus far we have placed soft power in historical concept, distinguished this concept from 
related, parallel concepts and elaborated in-depth on Nye’s understanding of the concept. 
However, full clarity remains elusive as the diversity of the phenomena to which the label 
soft power has been applied has stretched the term almost to the point of 
meaninglessness. Indeed, while a considerable body of literature evokes the concept of 
soft power, the lack of definitional precision beyond the vague yet somehow compelling 
‘power of attraction’ means that scholars often talk past each. This may be a result of the 
fact that Nye himself has not really elaborated on the substantive theoretical content of 
his concept of soft power since its major presentations (1990; 2004), although he has 
remained fairly constant in his articulation of what constitutes soft power (Tulmets 2007: 
199). The conceptual diversity of the wider literature inspired by the notion of a ‘softer’ 
form of power points to the fact that soft power is a contested concept, around which the 
discussion is as diverse as that on the notion of power itself. In particular, the lack of 
conceptual common ground is demonstrated by the absence of shared perspectives on 
fundamental issues such as what precisely characterises soft power’s softness. 
Soft power is frequently used as a synonym to describe approaches posited in contrast to 
the use of ‘hard’ and unilateral military force in achieving foreign policy goals. As Layne 
sceptically notes, soft power is just a ‘pithy term for multilateralism, institutionalism, the 
democratic peace theory and the role of norms in international politics. In other words, it 
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is liberal internationalism’ (2010: 71). Yet this thesis argues soft power can contribute 
much more to our understanding of international politics if one accounts for not only how 
the intangible attraction of culture, values and ideas supports international cooperation, 
but also how attraction is constructed on the international stage. This requires greater 
conceptual clarity. 
Currently, however, soft power suffers from a lack of fixity of meaning demonstrated in 
its fluidity of meaning. Thus, on occasions, the term is defined by the simple absence of 
existential threats to life and coercion. Particularly salient in this respect is economic 
leverage, working in Tsygankov’s terms, ‘if not by tanks then by banks’ (2006), and 
drawing on ‘dollar diplomacy’. Although in his earlier work Nye himself explicitly frames 
such tangible factors as ‘hard’ economic power, later, responding to criticism he admits 
that ‘economic resources can produce soft power behaviour as well as hard’ (Nye 2011: 
52). Even before this, some commentators had considered energy leverage and even 
arms exports policy as examples of soft power, particularly in the Russian case (Tsygankov 
2006; Yoshihara and Holmes 2008; Chatham House 2011). Here, however, even taking 
into account Nye’s clarification, it is argued that these should be considered hard power, 
as their effects tend ultimately to play on disparities in economic standing, although 
potentially the impact of, say, turning off the gas taps, could pose a much ‘harder’ 
physical-existential threat were it implemented in mid-winter in an area depending on 
one source for energy. Similarly, the implementation of a more restrictive migration 
regime in Russia could have quite coercive political effects. With many of the former 
Soviet states to a significant degree economically dependent on remittances from their 
citizens working in Russia, being deprived of employment opportunities and forced to 
return home could provoke social unrest in the home-state. 
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Some scholars also contest the idea that even power manifested through cultural means 
is not without an element of coercion, albeit of a subtle, intangible kind. Radical critics 
point to the threat of ‘violence of representations’ (Escobar 1995: 103) or 
‘representational force’ (Bially Mattern 2005). Accordingly, the immaterial nature of soft 
power does not rule out subjectively violent effects, since soft power is a form of power 
that ‘operates through the structure of a speaker’s narrative representation’ (Bially 
Mattern 2005: 586). Representational force threatens ‘harm to the victim’s own 
ontological security,’ whereby domination in communicative exchange may result in the 
actor’s subjectivity being ‘erased piecemeal by alternative contending or contradictory 
“realities”’ (Bially Mattern 2005: 601). Representational force ‘aims to close off its victims’ 
options by promising them unthinkable harm unless they comply in word and deed with 
the force-wielder’s demands’ (Bially Mattern 2005: 602). Rather than physical existential 
pressure, representational force threatens the ability of the subject to structure 
narratives of self as desired.9 Indeed, this has been a significant preoccupation of Post-
Colonial Studies, which reflects on how the experience of imperial subjection affects 
subaltern conceptions of self, even once formal empires have been disbanded (Fanon 
1986; Escobar 1995; Loomba 1998). Similarly, French scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu, 
have tended to discuss phenomena resembling soft power engagement in the negative 
terms of ‘symbolic power’ and cultural colonisation (Bourdieu 1992). 
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 As an example, one could consider the ‘yur with us or yur against us’ rhetoric of George W. Bush’s in 
building a coalition of support for America’s ‘war on terror’ in Iraq. Although the threats here occur initially 
at least on a sociolinguistic rather than physical plane, Bially Mattern (2005: 603-610) draws our attention 
to the coercive potential of such rhetoric, which obviates the nuanced middle ground and offers only 
dichotomised identities of good and bad, friend and enemy. States unwilling to support the invasion of Iraq 
risked stood to having an unappealing identity imposed upon them by the United States and its allied media 
(tools of soft power!) such as ‘appeaser’, ‘Old Europe’ and ‘cheese eating surrender monkeys’  – with all the 
historically weighted significance and emotive power such terms bear. While initially occurring on a 
representational level, such discourses have potential to translate into political practice; justifying punitive 
measures and toppling governments. 
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Indeed, Nye’s analysis, it is noted, fosters the false impression that ‘soft power’ is a nice 
and cuddly surrogate to ‘hard power,’ when it can have highly uncomfortable, if 
intangible effects. Furthermore, Nye is also accused of underestimating the extent to 
which US soft power is ‘produced and expressed through compulsion’ (Bilgin and Elis 
2008: 12). Hedley Bull (1982) sees the parallel notion of ‘civilian power’ as a 
‘contradiction in terms’. This is because drawing implicitly on a traditional, ‘first face’ 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Dahl 1957) notion of political influence, he considers that 
‘civilian powers’ like the EC don’t actually have ‘power’, but are rather ‘conditional upon a 
strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they [do] not 
control’ (1982: 151). In this case, there is said to be no ‘real’ power as there is ultimately 
no independent capacity to enforce compliance.  
In a similar vein, Noya, argues that ‘soft power is not a type of power at all’ (Noya 2005: 
54), and that potentially any power resource can be ‘soft’ provided it is perceived as 
having society’s approval, in short, is seen as legitimate. The classic example given is that 
of military intervention for humanitarian ends, whereby hard power – if perceived as 
legitimate - has ‘a soft side.’(2005: 56) Manners’ has likewise argued that the 
militarisation of the EU would not necessarily diminish its ‘normative’ credentials, so long 
as the process were characterized by ‘critical reflection rather than the pursuits of “great 




Another issue relates to who or what ‘does’ soft power. In some cases, the apparent hard-
soft dichotomy is presumed to indicate a division of labour, with the state responsible for 
hard power matters, and civil society taking care of the soft power. There are certainly 
benefits to be accrued from the involvement of civil society in soft power as Nye notes, 
 
[p]ostmodern publics are generally skeptical of authority, and governments are often 
mistrusted. Thus it behooves governments to keep in the background and to work with private 
actors. Some NGOs enjoy more rust than governments do, and though they are difficult to 
control, they can be useful channels of communication.’ (Nye 2008: 105) 
 
Yet Nye and Owens (1996) certainly do not insist upon this point, since they recognise the 
issue of soft power as too important to be left to the free market and that ‘the market and 
private individuals cannot fulfill all the information needs of American foreign policy’ 
(1996: 34). While Nye’s institutional background possibly pushes him into foregrounding 
the role of the state in soft power (2010), due to the dispersed nature of power presumed 
by soft power as articulated in this thesis, civil society actors are typically assigned a 
significant role in generating attraction, even if their separation from the state is at times 
questionable (Parmar 2010).  
2.7. Evaluating Soft Power 
 
This thesis has the ambition to evaluate Russian soft power. Yet this, as has been 
demonstrated, is problematic since soft power is a famously intangible concept. Thus is it 
not surprising that attempts to assess the extent of soft power in a range of contexts have 
so far proven unsatisfactory. In his 1990 publication, Nye states that  
[p]ower conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, 
to realized power, as measured by the changed behaviour of others. Thus one has to know 
about a country’s skill at power conversion as well as its possession of power resources to 




Kroenig (2007) adopts such an approach, seeking dependent and independent variables 
to measure the extent of soft power influence. Yet this must invariably lead to 
accusations of committing the ‘exercise fallacy’, whereby ‘power can only mean the 
causing of an observable sequence of events’ (Lukes 2005: 477-478). Indeed, while the 
behaviourist insistence on observed decisions (or ‘non-decisions’) resulting from the 
application of soft power may appeal to the policy community, it is unhelpful in assessing 
the salience of Lukes’ third dimensional ideological power with its long-term remit, as will 
be explored in the next chapter. 
Another problem with Nye’s approach is that it relies on ‘minds changed’(Nye 2008: 101) 
as an indicator of the presence of soft power. However, if an individual or groups are 
exposed to a polity’s soft power from birth, the effect of preference shaping may be not 
so much changed attitudes, as the very constitution of the person’s perception of reality.  
Yet, despite having dismissed ‘dollars spent on slick production packages’ (Nye 2008: 101) 
as criteria to measure the effectiveness of public diplomacy, Nye proceeds elsewhere to 
state that ’measuring power in terms of resources is an imperfect but useful shorthand’ 
(Nye 2004b). Indeed, an assessment of the ‘tools’ of soft power at a polity’s disposal is 
certainly a crucial part of examining its soft power potential, and necessary to understand 
how a soft power strategy works in practice. However, in proposing certain proxy 
indicators of soft power, Nye fails to acknowledge significant differences between these 
potential gauges of measurement. For instance, he suggests analysts might look at foreign 
immigrants, asylum seekers, international students, tourists, book sales and music sales, 
popular sports, Nobel prize winners, life expectancy, overseas aid, number of internet 
hosts, spending on public diplomacy (Nye 2004: 7-8). Noya (2005) also makes this error. 
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The lack of conceptual consensus and clarity manifests itself in confusion as to whether 
soft power may be judged on the basis of ‘inputs’ – communicative tools aimed at 
generating soft power, or ‘outputs’ – successfully achieved outcomes of these processes. 
The presence of the former, while indicative of an interest in developing soft power, is by 
no means evidence of the latter. Blurring the distinction between the two, Noya (2005: 
55), for instance, in his list of soft power ‘indicators’ includes various input-side ‘tools’ 
such as public diplomacy spending alongside what might more arguably be seen as 
demonstratable outcomes of attraction, namely the popularity of a country’s cultural 
products, or as a destination among tourists and asylum seekers. These indicators and 
more are clumped together uncritically as though they stood in equal relation to the 
processes creating soft power, without asking whether they are the cause or effect of 
‘attraction,’ not to mention how exactly they indicate attraction and how geopolitically 
useful that might be for a state.  
There are a number of problems demonstrated herewith, not least that ‘the concept has 
been so stretched that the term comes to mean almost everything and therefore almost 
nothing’ (Fan 2008: 149-50). Firstly, although an inflow of foreigners does suggest a 
certain ‘pull factor’ we cannot know whether their reasons are culturally-based, or as is 
often suggested, economic in nature or even security-related. A similar critique may be 
leveled at the suggestion of the Rand corporation that the single best indicator of soft 
power is the answer to the question: ‘where would you like to live other than your own 
country’ (Fan 2008: 150). Furthermore, while tourists may flock to a country’s tourist sites 
(e.g. in Egypt, Italy), there is little evidence that their wider cultural preferences are 
shaped to the host country’s geopolitical advantage. Furthermore, it seems 
methodologically unsound to straightforwardly equate possible markers of cultural 
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attraction with the tools involved in their creation. In short, these indicators do not stand 
in comparable relation to the notion of soft power. Furthermore, while Nye is correct that 
resourcing, in the form of media of communication, is quantitatively important, modern 
media theory (see conceptual framework) holds that one should not take the qualitative 
reception of their output for granted. Indeed, many studies of Russian soft power list 
under soft power tools strident compatriot associations that are actually more likely to 
alienate the greater part of the Ukrainian population with their irredentist rhetoric and 
overt pro-Russianness, rather than rekindle ‘friendship between the peoples’. 
Furthermore, cultural products may not be received in line with the purveyor’s intentions, 
which may result in a hybridisation of meaning with consequences potentially at crossed 
purposes to the communicators’ intentions.  
Thus, Nye is right to identify surveys and focus groups as a possible means to ‘[measure] 
whether a particular asset is an attractive soft power resource (Nye 2008: 95, Nye 2004). 
If not limited to assessing the attractiveness of a particular cultural marker, this approach 
has potential. It may give the researcher insight into how audience members receive the 
target resources – culture, values and foreign policies, and what meanings they attribute 
to them. This is, however, only a rough yardstick of how successful the polity has been in 
presenting itself and what it stands for as attractive and legitimate, since while polls 
indicate favourable opinion, they don’t reveal if this is actually a result of conscious public 
diplomacy, for instance (Wilson 2012). Positive emotions offer fertile ground for 
cooperation, whereas hostility, disgust and resentment often prove a barrier to closer 
relations. It is for this reason that soft power should be considered a potential, to be 
approximated through attitudinal analysis. In places, Nye (2004b) appears to recognise 
this, stating that,  
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attraction often has a diffuse effect of creating general influence, rather than producing an 
easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of 
storing up political capital to be drawn upon in future circumstances. 
 
However, probably due to his attempts to straddle the policy-academia divide (Nye 2010), 
Nye’s position on this issue is not consistent, as he vacillates between a positivist 
approach that stresses observable impact, and an at times more radical acceptance of 
ideological factors that are harder to measure. 
2.8. Review of Secondary Literature on Russian Soft Power 
 
In this section, an overview of existing studies of Russian soft power will be provided, 
although there are relatively few in-depth scholarly studies alongside the fair number of 
journalistic commentaries on this theme. Indeed, until at least the mid-2000s there was 
no such object of study since Russia was considered to face significant limitations to any 
initiatives to cultivate influence based on attraction (MacFarlane 2006)10, beyond those 
rooted in leveraging ties of the past. This view was shared by some critical commentators 
within Russia even today (Wilson 2012).11 Nowadays, however, a number of reports and 
academic articles acknowledge Moscow’s interest in soft power and seek to familiarise 
readers with the variety of tools created to this end over the past six years or so 
(Feklyunina 2008; Pelnēns 2009; Feklyunina 2010). 
Since the object of enquiry has developed significantly even over the five years since the 
research proposal for this thesis was penned, it is difficult to acknowledge progress as this 
requires in-depth examination, beyond headline-grabbing measures and citations. Few 
studies appear to have engaged in qualitative fieldwork to explore this topic, with 
significant exceptions (Feklyunina 2010). Whereas Western and Chinese soft power is said 
                                                          
10
 Andrew Wilson, comments at conference at Birmingham University in November 2009. 
11
 Interviews with A. Piontkovskiy and A. Okara in Moscow, July 2011. 
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to be based on an attractive vision of the future, Russian soft power is frequently 
discussed in terms of ties to the past and the instrumentalisation of shared culture 
(Chatham House 2011: 10). Yet, as this study will show, that is not the whole story. Today, 
Russian soft power initiatives are running in tandem with expressions of Russia’s growing 
economic power such as discussions on political and economic integration12 and might 
feasibly be framed as attempting to prepare the meta-political ground for such projects. 
The richness of Russian cultural heritage and its potential for attraction is readily 
acknowledged and encouraged (Chatham House 2011). Yet there seems to be a very 
blurred distinction made in the Russian case between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ public diplomacy 
that doesn’t seem to occur in the case of other states (see Maliukevicius 2007; Kivirähk, 
Maliukevičius et al. 2010). For instance, Kivirähk, Maliukevičius et al state that ‘[o]n one 
side of this line, these activities remain only cultural and educational; but on the other 
side, the use of these humanitarian activities for political goals and influence on foreign 
countries commences’ (2010: 11), without providing us with tools for judging the 
difference.13 Indeed, this study will argue that the differences between soft power and its 
‘evil twin’ propaganda lies less in the ‘true’ intention of the instigator or the measures 
themselves(‘inputs’), but rather whether they are perceived as attractive or obtrusive by 
a given audience(‘outputs’). Further, perceptions, as will also be argued in the chapter 
three, depend not only on the message and the actor themselves, but also on external 
                                                          
12
 Later, multilateral cooperation will identified in terms of soft power as a practice. This study will focus on 
soft power as a potential. 
13
 Often, for instance, coverage of Russian soft power engagement provokes the impression that such 
activities are inherently inappropriate. For instance, Kudors (2010) repeatedly uses the phrase “so-called 
Russian speakers”, which is curious in the absence of explanation since such persons undoubtedly speak 
Russian. Further, where the audiences of Western soft power may be ‘attracted’, those targeted by Russian 
initiatives are seen as ‘susceptible’. The resulting impression of these renderings is entirely different. 
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factors that shape the environment in which those communications are received.14 In 
addition to personal experience, such influences also include the soft power narratives of 
other actors, which may be contestatory. Despite being covered in the media and 
communications literature (see section 3.10.), this issue has not been accounted for in the 
existing Western literature on soft power, although competition in the sphere of 
information is very much a feature of the Russian discussion (see section 5.4.). This study 
makes a contribution by stepping into this niche. 
This is not to say that Russian soft power initiatives are not seen in implicitly competitive 
terms. Indeed, Russian forays into the world of soft power are frequently – though not 
necessarily mistakenly – cast as a security threat. Commonly, ‘imperial complexes’ and a 
national mentality inconducive to soft power mechanisms (Chatham House 2011) are 
often diagnosed. The focus thereby rests on the assertion of minority rights as a means to 
exert leverage over neighbouring states and the alleged cultivation of a fifth column 
(Pelnēns 2009). Indeed, there is an assumption of ‘pro-Russian’ citizens and elites in 
Ukraine and elsewhere who will loyally serve Moscow’s interests (STRATFOR 2010) that 
may not strictly be upheld since in some cases, despite sometimes having accepted funds 
from Moscow, compatriot groups have undertaken measures that have actually 
undermined the Kremlin’s position; to the extent that a Russian study recommended the 
distancing of such ‘marginal’ groups (Bespalov, Vlasov et al. 2007). Concern was also 
                                                          
14
 For instance, although covered in other bodies of literature, the cultivation and instrumentalisation of 
anti-Russian sentiment by nationalising elites as an ‘other’ against which a new national identity of post-
Soviet states might be defined, is not linked in to discussions of soft power. Similarly, one sometimes gets 
the impression of the positing of Russia as a negative ‘other’, against which the West might also be 
positively defined. For instance, a report on Russian soft power by Chatham House states (2011)that ‘[i]n 
the West, power is a means to achieve a positive end. In Russia, there is much more respect for the simple 
power to harm, that does not ask what comes next’ and ‘[i]n the West, there is a tension between the 
political framework and business – in Russia they reinforce each other.’ While there may be some truth to 
these claims as regards Russia, the positing of such as sharp, essentialising contrast serves to construct the 
West as a virtuous opposite and elide the question of whether it might also exhibit such characteristics.  
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expressed in the discussion at Chatham House that a common business culture involving 
corrupt practices puts the West at a competitive disadvantages when trading in the 
region.15 Although the notion of the Russkiy Mir is covered in some studies (Kudors 2010), 
it is usually given short shrift, without in-depth exploration of some interesting 
philosophical debates of the related ideational narratives. 
There are studies in English by Russians that play down the imperialistic drivers of soft 
power in favour of explanations focussing on the need for soft power to support domestic 
modernisation, such as that by Tsygankov that cites Putin as saying ‘the main aim of our 
policies is to achieve favourable external conditions for the development of Russia (2006). 
Yet such arguments do not seem to be shaping the general tone of the Western political 
discussion, which remains sceptical. Indeed, such is the lack of trust in Russia that 
although Moscow might sometimes be acknowledged as a promoter of norms 
(Shapovalova and Zarembo 2010; Makarychev 2011), such drives are attributed to 
Machiavellian reasons, thus precluding consideration of the notion that Russia might be 
seeking to achieve positive-sum ‘milieu’ goals through its ‘humanitarian’ policies. Thus 
the impression arises of Russia as being driven by ruthless pragmatism, on one hand, and 
primordialist emotional impulses on the other. 
Thus we see that studies of Russian soft power to date have typically focused rather more 
on the tools and narrowly defined ambitions of Russian soft power. While some potential 
attractive resources are acknowledged, instances of their usage beyond the most limited 
cultural diplomatic practices incur the risk of being pigeon-holed as ‘neo-imperialistic’. 
Indeed, if competition is a virtue in the spheres of economics and politics, then this does 
                                                          
15
 ‘Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad’, a roundtable discussion held at Chatham 
House, London, on 31
st
 March 2011 attended by the author. Also see Chatham House 2011. 
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not seem to be the case with regard to values and culture, at least not from the point of 
view of Western commentators on Russian soft power: Russian attempts to re-articulate 
the values held up as universal by the West have not been well received in the West itself.  
2.9. Concluding Remarks 
 
Soft power is attractive to policy makers and scholars partly because of its normative 
appeal; it presents a credible view of how we would like international politics to work. It 
is also appealing because, at least in Nye’s version, it seems possible to empirically 
demonstrate the link between American attractiveness and foreign policy benefits; hence 
it serves as a rallying call for further investment in this area. 
However, the definitions provided thus far do not seem appropriate to facilitate the 
rigorous operationalisation of soft power when applied to the empirical case study of 
Russia. Indeed, in Nye’s work the key concept of attraction appears to be excessively 
objectivist and essentialised. Consequently, the analytical framework to be outlined in 
this thesis should facilitate a more critical perspective on the mechanisms of soft power. 
This will be achieved through integrating a post-Marxist take on Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony and the insights of discourse theorists such as Laclau, Mouffe and Norval and 
scholars of post-structuralism like Foucault and Derrida into the concept of soft power. 
Thus, in attempting to transcend the meta-theoretical limitations that confine Nye, this 
thesis will operationalise an understanding of soft power informed by an post-
foundationalist ontology and anti-essentialist epistemology, which facilitates the 
exposure of the power at play in the social construction of ‘attractiveness’ and the role 
thereof in international politics. 
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 In order to evaluate soft power in any given case, a clear, consistent and coherent 
working definition must be provided. Given the fact of soft power’s theoretical and 
methodological controversies and ambiguities, as well as its relative novelty in the face of 
long-standing awareness of its key points, the question arises as to why we need the 
concept at all. Is it not perhaps a faddish, trendily-styled label on an old barrel? Might it 
not be more useful to simply apply the familiar terms of public diplomacy, neo-Gramscian 
hegemony and even propaganda rather than fermenting a new formula of dubious 
vintage? 
This thesis will argue that the term and concept of soft power do indeed make a useful 
contribution since besides its core content, soft power itself does important work in IR 
practice. As the conceptual framework will suggest, soft power functions as a ‘speech act’ 
(Austin 1962): to proclaim a polity as having or being a soft power is to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of its cultural-ideational work by way of recognising its attraction. By contrast, 
to couch the same activities in terms of ‘propaganda’ is to convey a much more 
circumspect, indeed negative by contemporary usage, appraisal of the agent concerned. 
As neo-Gramscians Zahran and Ramos incisively note, ‘[t]he idea of soft power is not a 
neutral concept but part of the struggle’ (2010: 28-9).  
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Chapter Three: Conceptual Framework  
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the preceding exploration of the literature the main task was to outline the debates 
and theoretical contours of the existing body of literature on soft power. The chapter 
concluded that, while soft power has become a rather fashionable term in recent years, 
the lack of consensus about certain key conceptual issues has meant that the academic 
conversation on this theme has often resembled a series of monologues, with the various 
scholars talking past one another in the absence of even common understandings about 
the nature of the key debates at stake. In particular, the notion of what defines soft 
power’s very ‘softness’ remains obscured, and consequently the possibility of realising a 
consistent, conceptually grounded operationalisation has thus far remained elusive. 
Building upon the foundation laid down by Nye’s work, this thesis aims to offer a 
corrective to the theoretical shallowness alleged by some scholars (Bohas 2006). 
Accordingly, this chapter presents the core theoretical contribution of the thesis. The 
originality of the contribution lies in the innovative integration of the insights of post-
Marxist discourse theorists such as Foucault, Laclau, Mouffe and Norval and 
communication studies scholars such as Stuart Hall and Norman Fairclough into the 
conceptual framework of soft power. Elaborating on this body of literature, it is argued 
that the concept of soft power can usefully be developed with reference to a post-Marxist 
reading of Gramsci’s hegemony theory as articulated by many of these scholars, and 
which was actually touched upon briefly by Nye himself, but not pursued in adequate 
depth. The thesis represents an attempt to extrapolate Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
developed to understand the consolidation of power on the national level, to 
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international arena, which is necessary if we follow Fairclough’s conviction16 (2001: 203) 
that ‘the primary terrain of domination is now global rather than national’. Soft power – 
the power of cultural attraction - is particularly relevant to contemporary politics if we 
also believe those who state that international competition is increasingly assuming a 
cultural dimension. 
The previous chapter argued that Nye’s concept of soft power centred mistakenly on an 
essentialised notion of attraction which causes an augmentation in the agent’s power 
resources. By contrast, this study argues that the ability to determine the nature of 
attractiveness is above all an effect of power. Indeed, this chapter will outline the concept 
to be applied to the case study of Russian soft power in Ukraine. It will highlight how, 
having stabilised its hard power bases, Moscow is striving to extend its renewed capacity 
to the cultural-ideational sphere. The extent of its soft power may serve as a measure not 
only of cultural rejuvenation, but also of sufficient economic stability to facilitate political 
will, elite consensus and discipline, organisational capacity, as well as ensuring the 
material bases of attraction. In short, it is a measure of national well-being for a 
developed country, where hard power methods are the exception, and a condition for the 
civilisational radiance that Moscow desires. 
3.2. Ontological and Epistemological Foundations 
 
Prior to elaborating upon the concept of soft power to be operationalised in this thesis, it 
is necessary to expound upon the ontological and epistemological assumptions and key 
concepts that provide the foundations for the claims to knowledge to be explored.  
                                                          
16
 The approaches of Foucault, Derrida, Laclau, Mouffe and Kristeva are significantly different from those of 
Fairclough and Critical Discourse Analysis, however, as observed by Hansen (2006: xviii) there are 
‘significant points of convergence… particularly in [CDA’s] concern with media representations.’ 
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In order to increase the analytical power of Nye’s signature contribution, the concept of 
soft power will be inlayed with specific theoretical content. Post-structuralist discourse 
theory in the post-Marxist tradition has been selected as highly appropriate for this 
purpose as it facilitates the linking of discursive conceptualisations of power with the role 
of tools of communication in creating hegemony. It helps to explore the role of culture, 
identity and values in foreign policy (Campbell 1998) as it is concerned to reveal the 
workings of power, which neo-liberal institutionalist Nye’s essentialised concept tends to 
obfuscate. While in some places Nye appears to acknowledge the constructed nature of 
reality, this is not consistently pursued and for the greater part he accepts certain ‘facts’ 
as ultimate truths (e.g. the attractiveness of the ‘American Dream’). The apparent 
parsimony of this step perhaps explains some of the popularity of his concept of soft 
power. However, it imposes limitations on his concept’s analytical power. Taking 
‘attraction’ as a self-evident property precludes investigation of how certain values and 
cultural attributes come to be perceived as attractive, while others are denigrated, at a 
given point in time and under particular circumstances. Whereas scholars of soft power 
following Nye have conventionally focussed on manifestations of attraction of a priori 
‘attractive’ cultural phenomena, here the discussion will analyse the power to construct 
meaning. This relies upon a particular understanding of the nature of power, which will 
be outlined further. 
As will be shown, the concept of soft power may comfortably be understood in the light 
of Michel Foucault’s understanding power as productive (Sheridan 1980: 219) of subjects, 
not merely as a repressive force. As such it ‘produces knowledge [and] power and 
knowledge directly imply one another… There is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
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presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ (Sheridan 1980: 220, cites 
Foucault).17 It is for this reason, too, that a stark delineation between the natures of soft 
and hard power cannot be drawn, since hard power resources are equally enmeshed in 
powerful discourses governing their application (Clifford 2001: 98). Furthermore, rather 
than resembling a top-down, centralised force, power is thus conceived of as decentred, 
diffused and discrete, and invests ‘the entire social field’ (Clifford 2001: 42, 108). In this 
sense, there is no possibility of true liberation from the effects of power, and ‘the 
destruction of a system of power can only mean the construction of a different power’ 
(Laclau and Zac 1994: 27). Yet, as will be shown, since hegemony is never truly complete 
nor meaning is never truly sutured, but ever remains contingent, there is always the 
possibility of resistance (Clifford 2001: 121) and change. 
This thesis assumes the presuppositions of the analytical perspectives applied, namely an 
anti-essentialist ontology and a post-foundationalist epistemology (Torfing 2005: 13; 
Glynos 2001: 193; Marchant 2007: 14). Reflecting this ontological stance, post-
structuralist discourse theory holds that ‘while the world exists out there, truth does not’ 
(Rorty 1989 cited in Torfing 2005: 13). Truth is,  
conditioned by a discursive truth regime which specifies the criteria for judging something 
to be true or false. Within a certain vocabulary we can assess the truth claim of different 
discursive statements in relation to the different states of affairs that we perceive. 
However, reality does not determine the kind of vocabulary and truth regime that we will 
construct. (Torfing 2005: 14) 
Essential meaning is, therefore, impossible because it is constructed within relational 
ensembles that are subject to endless displacements (Torfing 2005). Thus, attempts to 
establish stable discourses of meaning remain faced forever by contingency; eliding 
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 Torfing makes a similar point: ‘power and discourse are mutually constitutive and we cannot have one 
without the other’ (2005: 8). 
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ultimate closure, and could always be constructed otherwise. However, in spite of the 
assumption of the ‘impossibility of final ground’ (Marchant 2007: 2), meaning is also 
necessary, since ‘without the ability to confer meaning on social phenomena and political 
events we would not be able to orient ourselves and act upon our orientations’ (Howarth 
2000: 89; Fairclough 2001: 23; Torfing 2005: 2). Thus, while the assumption of an 
essential foundation for beliefs is rejected, post-foundationalist approaches maintain that 
a rationale for belief may nevertheless be found within discourses of meaning, to the 
extent that such rationale may assume the appearance of essential truth or self-evident 
fact. The constellations of discourses of meaning reflect ‘hard’ power dynamics, reflecting 
what Foucault has termed ‘power-knowledge’, whereby power and knowledge imply one 
another.  
Contrary to the apparent assumption of Nye and his adherents, the implication of these 
approaches for soft power is that any particular model of development is not to be seen 
as inherently or universally attractive, but is rather constructed as such as a result of the 
salience of a particular discourse of rationality. Rather than an essential property or 
reflection of an ultimate truth, perceptions of attractiveness are the result of a particular 
constellation of power dynamics, projecting the interests of one or more influential actors 
on an international stage. Indeed, as Castells observes,  
value is what the dominant institutions of society decide it is. So, if global capitalism 
shapes the world, and capital accumulation by the valuation of financial assets in the 
global financial markets is the supreme values, this will be value in every instance, as, 
under capitalism, profit-making and its materialization in monetary terms can ultimately 
acquire everything else. (2009: 27) 
For instance, Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) well-known ‘end of history’ thesis appeared 
discredited with the identification of prominent opposition to the Western model of 
development (e.g. Islamism, the rise of China), which seemed to disprove the hubristic 
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notion that international society would now proceed towards the ‘victorious’ model of 
liberal democracy and free market economics in the wake of the apparent triumph of the 
USA and its allies in the Cold War. Yet the focus on resistance characteristic of such 
critique belies the fact that what was once one of two competing global ideologies has to 
a significant degree now been normalised as a common sense standard of universally 
applicable, state ‘good behaviour,’ with other models viewed as autocratic, parochial and 
retrogressive deviations. The poststructuralist soft power theory presented here 
inevitably calls into question the insisted-upon universal attraction of the Western, or any, 
model, by exposing the claims to truth upon which is based as contingent and political. 
Global society could ever develop differently, based on alternative conceptualisations of 
truth about what constitutes ‘the good life’. Instead of the current model of wealth 
creation, individuation and lifestyle consumption (Gripsrud 1999: 10; Kress and Leeuwen 
2001: 36), societies might conceivably posit an ‘attractive’ Archimedean point in terms 
that would orient politics towards the preservation of the environment, equality for all, 
spiritual elevation, order and security or any other as yet unimagined set of values. 
However, due to the pre-existing discourses which inform individuals’ and groups’ 
construction of meaning and the ‘members resources’ thus at the disposal of meaning-
making actors, there is, despite the inherent contingency, a pre-disposition towards some 
degree of continuity in worldview narratives.  
3.3. The Power of Discourse 
 
Whereas military and economic power trade in weaponry and financial clout respectively, 
the currency of soft power is culture, specifically discourses of meaning that inform 
human experiences of the cultural world. According to Laclau, a discourse is ‘an 
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articulated set of elements’ (Laclau 1990: 32). Such elements can be understood as the 
general terms of reference or engrained societal organising principles drawn upon when 
talking about diverse topics, and which lend coherence and meaning to communication. 
Elements of the discourse must not necessarily in themselves be entirely homogenous, 
coherent or consistent.18 Thus defined, discourses are assumed to be limited. Beyond the 
limits of the set, elements are no longer within the discourse and do not constitute a 
meaningful statement. In this way, discourse represents the bounded area of what is 
sayable about a particular topic at a particular point in history, or the ‘limits of acceptable 
speech’ (Butler 1997: 34). Outside the ideational boundaries of a discourse, statements 
are not merely incorrect, but may also not appear to make sense, be ridiculous or even 
offensive. Such limits are not static in time, and may not be well defined or manifested, 
only becoming visible in encounters with elements outside the discourse, at which point 
they may solidify to become a political frontier against which ‘Others’ beyond ‘our’ 
discourse may be identified. In this way, discourses exercise a significant disciplinary 
function on what can meaningfully be said, and therefore on what is actually said. For 
instance, in contemporary politics, liberal democracy and its attendant values have 
become sedimented as a positively-weighted normative discourse in international politics 
to the extent that to argue otherwise in public appears not merely misguided, but 
potentially threatening and hence liable to provoke a securitised response. The notion of 
articulation reflects the post-foundationalist, anti-essentialist presuppositions of this 
approach; a discourse does not exist in and of itself, but needs to be articulated to 
                                                          
18
 Indeed, as Curran (2002: 112) has reported, research indicates that ‘in most eras, the dominant ideology 
dissolved under close inspection into a miscellany of inconsistent and even contradictory themes, and they 
were rarely dominant in the sense they were uncritically accepted by the subordinate classes.’ 
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become a reality. The idea of articulation 19  also reflects the contingency and 
undecideability of the discourse; it could always be articulated otherwise, thus there is 
the inherent and constant possibility of change. While a range of different views on 
societal organisation may start out as a set of contrasting ideas or 'ideologies', they 
become discourses as their assumptions become naturalised to the point of common-
sense (Fairclough 2001: 76), at which point their ideological nature becomes invisible; and 
the ideas commonly accepted as neutral truths. Hence, we can speak of discourses of 
truth as ‘forms of rationality’ (Clifford 2001: 100) about particular topics. 
In a given information space, a large number of competing myths may be in circulation. In 
this sense a myth refers to an understanding that shapes the way some people think 
about an issue. An imaginary represents a sedimented myth, which has become an 
overarching horizon for discourse, establishing limits. While myths ‘operate at the level of 
the interests of a particular group’, imaginaries refer to those cases ‘where a particular 
group succeeds in moving beyond its particular interests onto a universal terrain’ (Norval 
2000: 229). Thus ‘[w]hile a social order may be characterized by the presence of many 
competing myths, it is less clear whether the same may be true of imaginaries’ (Norval 
2000: 228). A hegemonic discourse indicates the capacity to impose one’s will – 
simultaneously incorporating the interests of other actors - so that one’s own particular 
imaginary horizon or worldview becomes universalised; consensually accepted as valid, 
the impossibility of the full achievement of this process notwithstanding. Accordingly, 
social and political relations are characterised by ‘hegemonic struggles that aim to 
establish a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning 
                                                          
19
 Here, the notion of articulation does not always imply a verbal or even textual method of communication; 
other semiotic modes may be employed, drawing on the same discourses but expressing them visually, 
auditorily, etc (Kress and van Leeuven 2001: 40).  
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and identity’ (Torfing 2005: 15). It is ‘in and through’ (ibid) such hegemonic struggles that 
historically specific discourses are constructed, which in turn provide a background for all 
forms of social practice. 
However, this should not be taken to suggest that all potential discursive imaginaries are 
equal. Some myths are certainly more equal than others, namely those with a less 
particularistic logic who are likely to experience greater ease in promoting identification 
with the ‘instituting power’ (Kalyvas 2000). Indeed, Castells among others admits that 
some phenomena may indeed have a relative advantage over others since those with a 
‘structural impediment to exist globally are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis others whose logic 
is inherently global’ (Neuman 1991: 86; Castells 2009: 28). For instance, a life of material 
impoverishment, asceticism and self-denial can be constructed as having a certain appeal 
when framed in discourses of spirituality or environmental sustainability, and has 
historically been practised by many esteemed religious figures, at least in part because 
this challenging lifestyle sets its practitioners apart from the greater mass of humans. 
Much as it may be admired by others, this manner of being is unlikely to become widely 
practised if alternatives are available. Indeed, in order for a particular vision to become 
hegemonic, in Gramscian terms, it has to ‘show something more than a spontaneous 
attractiveness or moral superiority. It has to show its ability to become a realistic 
alternative for the organization and management of the community’ (Laclau and Zac 1994: 
16). 
Furthermore, despite the associations with ‘domination’, hegemony as understood in this 
thesis, that is, along post-Gramscian lines, is eternally an unfulfilled, incomplete condition. 
As previously noted, Nye himself has made various nods to the Gramscian notion of 
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hegemony, yet declines to pursue these fruitful insights on the grounds of Marxist 
thought being ‘too procrustean’ (1990a: 182-90; 2010). However, through the post-
Marxist interpretations supplied by Laclau and Mouffe and others, the limitations of this 
essentialised, economically-determinist view can be overcome. Indeed, where even the 
‘most “superstructuralist” conceptions [have] retained a naturalist vision of the economy’ 
Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate that the ‘space of the economy is itself structured as a 
political space, and that in it, as in any other ‘level’ of society, those practices we 
characterized as hegemonic are fully operative’ (2001: 76-7). The implication for this 
study of soft power is that while economic hard power certainly has a role, as discussed, 
essentialist notions of economic interests do not play a deterministic role in hegemony.20 
One may refer to the establishment of hegemonic consent, but that should not suggest 
homogeneity, omnipotence or absolute conformity. On the contrary, hegemonic 
discourses are in constant competition with other discourses as well as challenged by 
changing circumstances that may rupture the façade of timelessness and inevitability that 
lends the political order behind it its stability.21 At that moment, the contingent and 
                                                          
20
 Torfing (2005: 21) takes issue with the possible complaint that claim that ‘the stipulation of the absence 
of essences is an essentialist stipulation,’ and thus represents a liar’s paradox. He rejects this on the 
grounds that it represents a ‘fallacy of equivocation’. He notes, 
‘When discourse theorists claim that there is no essence they take issue with the metaphysical idea of a 
positively defined essence that is given in and by itself and from which it is possible to derive a whole series 
of determinate effects. Now, for the claim that there is no such essence to be an essentialist stipulation it 
requires that the affirmation of the absence of a deep ground of social identities produces a series of 
determinate effects. This requirement is exactly what is not fulfilled. Whereas it is possible to derive a 
whole series of effects from a positively defined ground, nothing follows from the affirmation on an abyss 
of pure negativity. An economic structure is logically speaking capable of determining the structure of 
society, but nothing follows by logical implication from the dislocation of the economic structure. In other 
words, the rejection of an essentialist grounding of the social world cannot fulfil the role of a new 
essentialist ground.’ 
21
 See Aleksei Yurchak’s excellent 2005 book Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation, Princeton University Press, for an example of how the rigid ‘hegemony of form’ characteristic of 
public discourses during the period of ‘late socialism’ crumbled with speed during perestroika. 
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ideologically constructed nature of reality may become visible, simultaneously exposing 
unequal relations of power. 
It should also be noted that following from Derrida’s assertion that there is ‘nothing 
beyond the text’ (Derrida 1976: 158-9), recent discourse theory breaks with previous 
approaches distinguishing between the discursive and non-discursive realms, and asserts 
that holds that ‘[d]iscourse no longer refers to a particular part of the overall social 
system, but is taken to be coterminous with the social’ (Torfing 2005: 8). In terms of the 
categories of this thesis, the implication of this position is that, while soft power is often 
framed as a motivation for action, ultimately it is not possible for even the actors in 
question themselves to truly distinguish between factors relating to the ‘soft’ discursive 
realm and hard, material non-discursive motivations for behaviour. 
Accordingly, it follows from the absence of a ‘pre-given, self-determining essence that is 
capable of determining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and 
totalizing structure’ (Torfing 2005: 13) that identities – like other structures of meaning - 
are inherently undecideable; it is impossible to attribute essential meaning to them. 
However, there is a tendency for social meaning and identities to become partially fixed 
‘in and through’ discourse (Torfing 2005). While such constructed meanings are 
inherently contingent and open to the possibility of change, they are lent structure by 
‘decentred discursive systems’, whereby a discourse acts as ‘a relational system of 
signifying practices that is produced through historical and ultimately political 
interventions and provides a contingent horizon for the construction of any meaningful 
subject’ (Torfing 2005: 8). 
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Indeed, although defined by contingency, discourses are in practice not random, rather 
they refer back, intertextually, to previous texts, albeit not necessarily explicitly citing 
them. In this way they may draw on the established legitimacy of existing discursive 
elements, while rearranging and rearticulating them to suit contemporary circumstances 
(Kristeva 1980, cited in Hansen 2006: 56). 
While stressing the contingency of identities, discourse theorists follow the insight of 
mainstream theorising in the field in assuming that identity construction is associated 
with political limits or frontiers, that is, the discursive parameters by which “we” are 
distinguished from “them”. Thus while identities are built on some positive elements 
accepted as characterising the self, meaning equally coagulates in knowing where the 
limit or frontier lies, which enables the distinction of what is not meant by ‘us’ (Norval 
2000: 226). 
The bounded nature of discourses of meaning emerges as a result of a Derridian ‘ethico-
political decision’ (Torfing 2005: 12) – presumably taken by a ‘hegemon’ - which privileges 
particular formations, inscribing them with some level of ‘contingent decideability’; a 
stability of meaning, albeit one that is constantly open to renegotiation. Indeed, in 
contrast to essentialist or even some constructivist conceptualisations, this tradition of 
discourse theory proposes that despite ‘the force with which [identities] are usually 
asserted and maintained’ we should not allow ourselves to be misled into ‘believing that 
they are immutable, unchangeable and simple’ (Norval 2000). Demonstrating the 
misconception of the unalterability of even discourses that seem to be deeply rooted, 
Norval(2000) points to the ‘surprising ease’ by which Marxist-Leninist conceptions of 
economic democracy were subverted by neo-liberal discourse, which shifted in a 
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relatively short time from being one myth among several to become an effective 
imaginary on the global stage. Thus, the simplicity and straightforwardness of political 
identities suggested by apparently clear-cut ‘us-them’ boundaries is problematised, and 
suggested to potentially be the result of complex discursive movements, re-articulations 
of relations and continuous renegotiations (Norval 2000: 227). This has profound 
implications for the case study of post-Soviet Ukraine. 
3.4. Assumption of the Dual Nature of Soft Power 
 
The preceding theoretical discussion provides a basis for the following elucidation of soft 
power as it is to be operationalised in this thesis. Hegemonic discourses from various 
sources have long given meaning, structure and orientation to human societies. Soft 
power concerns the extension of this theorising to the international realm, where, often 
in the absence of the relative political hegemony (domination) that has characterised the 
domestic situation, geo-political powers strive to extend their influence through cost-
effective means that appear to be compatible with the contemporary discourse in the 
Western-influenced world that, in principle at least, condemns unsanctioned coercion as 
potentially destabilising and ethically unsound. 
This thesis assumes a dual understanding of soft power. On one hand, it is argued, soft 
power can be seen to refer to the practice in international politics of achieving foreign 
policy goals by co-optive (as opposed to coercive) means, often in the form of multilateral 
cooperation, diplomacy, and international organisations. On the other hand, soft power 
refers to the potential (actual ability) to shape meaning on the international stage.  
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This dual conceptualisation of soft power articulates well with Aletta Norval’s post-
Marxist framing of Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony: 
In Gramsci, hegemony denotes both a type of political relation, and a substantive 
achievement. In the former case, one is concerned with a type of articulatory 
relation where persuasion predominates over the use of force, while in the latter, 
one is concerned with whether or not a particular force has managed to achieve 
supremacy by imposing its will on to the rest of society through the creation of 
consent and the incorporation of interests of rival forces. In talking about myth and 
imaginary and their relation to hegemony I am concerned with the latter, that is, 
with the types of substantive hegemony that may be achieved in any given social 
order. (2000: 229) 
 
So, on one hand, Gramsci’s earlier notion of hegemony as a political relation based on 
persuasion; ‘the tactical and instrumental need of building… alliances and of constructing 
a unitary political bloc’ (Kalyvas 2000: 353)22 coincides with soft power as a political 
practice of international cooperation motivated by a range of factors on some common 
basis. On the other hand, there is the understanding of hegemony as the ability to 
generate consent and exercise moral and intellectual leadership, and like Norval, this 
study is interested in exploring this latter aspect. Thereby soft power is conceptualised as 
a substantive achievement; the ability to create shared meaning in the context of 
international politics in broad support of the interests, objectives and ‘milieu goals’ 
(Wolfers 1962) of those doing the creating. However, it must be noted that these two 
aspects are often in practice inextricably bound together in the contemporary world, 
which may be explained in several ways.  
Firstly, the ability to shape meanings and thus to win others over to your way of thinking 
provides the pre-requisite basis of shared values and norms from which cooperative 
                                                          
22
 Gramsci’s neo-Marxist approach is indicated by his preoccupation with inter-class struggle and the need 
for the working class to ‘challenge the dominant position of the ruling class’ (Kalyvas 2000: 353). However, 
from a post-Marxist perspective and for the purposes for this thesis, there is no reason to restrict the 
analysis to these confines. 
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interactions can proceed. Without some commonly understood reference points, there is 
no foundation for a basic level of mutual trust or shared expectations which support 
cooperation to achieve respective goals. Such conditions of insecurity establish a pre-
disposition to conflict and coercive approaches towards the pursuit of interests. Soft 
power potentiality can pave the way for cooperative engagement as its focus is on 
promoting understanding of one’s own worldview and thereby coopting others to one’s 
values and norms as legitimate, common grounds for cooperation. 
Secondly, by exercising meaning-making potential by means of communicative 
engagement or attracting others to one’s ideas, a political entity is already engaging in 
soft power practice since the more it is capable of coopting others and winning them over 
to its worldview, the less it will need to apply hard power means to achieve its ends. This 
may even come down to simply persuading an opponent of one’s overwhelming 
superiority in wielding tools of violence as a means of facilitate the accommodation of 
one’s interests since this is also meaning making.  
However, ultimately it must be maintained that hard and soft forms of power are 
mutually interwined: soft power cannot come into being without a ‘hard’ material basis 
to facilitate the production and dissemination of discourses, while hard power without 
soft power’s capacity to generate the consent of the ruled may not endure long or only at 




3.5. A Working Definition of Soft Power 
 
This conceptual framework takes as its starting point the assumption that soft power is 
coterminous with cultural-ideational leadership on the international stage, whether that 
be realised in global, regional or diasporic terms. Accordingly, for the purposes of 
operationalisation in this thesis, soft power will be understood as the ability of a 
sovereign polity to be perceived as attractive and to set the agenda for foreign citizens in 
support of its foreign policy goals .This definition requires some unpacking. 
Ability 
Rather than focusing on ‘resources’ – the cultural equivalent of ‘tanks and banks,’ this 
definition places the emphasis on the extent to which ‘soft’ tools of influence actually 
have societal impact. Soft power is deemed to be present to the extent the agent has the 
ability to exert such cultural-ideational influence. This follows the Gramscian insight that a 
‘political entity is hegemonic when it has managed to articulate’ a particular discourse 
(Kalyvas 2000: 361) [my italics]. 
The methodological implication of this approach is that outputs, more than inputs, must 
be evaluated if we are to understand the extent to which a polity may be seen to have 
soft power among a given target audience. 
Sovereign 
Rather than indicating formal political independence, sovereign here should point to a 
Schmittian notion of being the subject taking the original ethico-political decision; or, in 
Gramscian terms of hegemony, ‘involving the instauration of a new political reality’ 
(Kalyvas 2000: 354). Indeed, Kalyvas argues that Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty and 
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Gramsci’s notion of hegemony represent two distinct variations on a single theme, 
namely the idea of the political as the instituting moment of society (2000: 345). For 
Schmitt, the essence of sovereignty resides in ‘its creative, instituting power to set new 
systems of fundamental laws, to instaurate new political and social orders, and to bring 
into being novel constitutions’ (Kalyvas 2000: 348). Rather than adhering to the order and 
value structures instituted from without, a ‘true sovereign decision is never subsumed 
under any rule or norm because, in fact, it constitutes their ultimate origin’ (Kalyvas 2000: 
348). It may be argued that this rendering depicts a decisionism and voluntarism out of 
character with post-structuralism. This concern is, however, easily refuted on the basis of 
a reading of Laclau, for whom taking a decision is ‘like impersonating God’ (1996: 56, 
cited in Norval 2004: 144), where God is that being ‘who has not to give [an]account of 
his actions before any tribunal of reason, because He is the source of rationality’. Yet, 
while space is found for human agency, it nevertheless remains the case that all decisions 
are taken within a certain structural context (Norval 2004). Human agency is admitted on 
the premise that social beings are located in a ‘“symbolic order” that both shapes their 
identity and structures their practices’ (Glynos and Howarth 2008: 164). These structures 
are ontologically incomplete (‘dislocated’), can never achieve complete suture of meaning, 
and can hence never fully determine the identity of agents, or their ability to act (Glynos 
and Howarth 2008: 164). Thus, individual agents may act within the constraints of the 
discourse of practice, which may ‘change over time, [be] determined by changing 
relationships of power at the level of the social institution or of the society. Power at 
these levels includes the capacity to control orders of discourse’ (Clifford 2001: 23-25). 
As will be argued in chapter five, it is such an understanding of sovereignty that prevails in 
the Kremlin, understood as ‘the ability to compete’ – konkurentosposobnost’ in Surkov’s 
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terms (2006). It implies not merely following pre-existing trends, but the ability to engage 
internationally as a cultural leader, making contributions which transcend national 
borders and are able to compete successfully in the global dialogue and steer 
understandings of human civilisation. Frequent references are made to the need for 
‘creative work’, reflecting the notion that ‘the sovereign is less an absolute commander 
than a founder’ (Kalyvas 2000: 348). 
Thus I argue that soft power represents the cultural facet of great power; indicated by the 
power to implement the political decision as to what should be ‘attractive’ in a given 
cultural context.23 Thus, rather than simply presenting itself as corresponding to widely-
held standards of ‘attractiveness’ in the manner of nation-branding, a polity with soft 
power engages creatively in engendering the values referenced by others in their 
constructions of meaning. This is not to say that there is no mutual interaction and 
influencing between sovereigns on a cultural level; on the contrary, information about 
‘the other’ challenges foreign citizens’ understandings of attractiveness. Thus while the 
Soviet ‘classless’ way of life and social provision seemed attractive in the 1950s, by the 
1980s the consumerist West had taken the lead in defining what constituted an attractive 
lifestyle, and with the USSR unable to even keep abreast of innovations, it thus suffered 
declining relative attraction and legitimacy.  
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 Critics might argue that the values of freedom and democracy shouldn’t be touted as a specifically 
‘American’ soft power discourse, since they are also represented and effectively advanced by the European 
Union, for instance, and hence America may not claim authorship.  Nye himself (2004: 82) accounts for this, 
observing that European soft power can also be a ‘source of assistance and reinforcement for American soft 
power and increase the likelihood of the United States’ achieving its objectives. Soft power can be shared 
and used in a cooperative fashion. European promotion of democracy and human rights helps advance 
shared values that are consistent with American objectives,’ Indeed, although having European pedigree, 
the contemporary manifestations of such ideas have been largely implemented under America leadership in 
the post-war period, as noted by de Grazia(2005) and Stephan(2006). Further, as Bull (1982) has already 
been noted to have commented, the EU has existed under the American military umbrella. Hence one 
might launch a counter-argument that Europeans agents are co-opted into American discourses, with 




The typical bearer of soft power today is the state, since it is also capable of wielding the 
economic and military forms of hard power essential to the creation of hegemonic 
discourses and serves as a focal point undergirding this collective expression of the will to 
power (Nietzsche 1966). However, the medieval Catholic Church (Curran 2002) and the 
radical Islamist network al Qaeda can also be seen as examples of non-state soft power 
actors as they have also presided over the triad of military, economic and cultural 
power.24 
Precursors of the soft power concept have included ‘civilian power’ and it is often 
associated with notions of civil society, rather than state activity. Kalyvas (2000: 366) 
notes that, ‘secured by a stable hegemonic ideology’, the state may wither away leaving 
‘an increasingly expanding and democratically organized civil society’ presiding over 
transparent self-administration. In such a society, discursive ‘disciplinary technologies’ 
and governmentality have become entrenched, eliding the need for the hard power 
spectacle (Foucault 1995). However, given the eternal contingency of discursive regimes 
of truth and their proneness to rupture and dislocation, the hard power of the state must 
remain the guarantor of last resort. Indeed, Castells (2009: 109) and Nye concur that soft 
power and its modus operandi, communication, are too important to be left to the 
vagaries of the market and private enterprise. For a leading state, soft power is important 
for maintaining an international environment favourable for policy and interest 
maximisation, not to mention the fact that in a globalised world, a state’s reputation 
                                                          
24
 It is also not to be excluded that big corporations with access to not only huge economic and 
informational resources but also having private military contractors at their disposal might again in the 
future come to play such a role. 
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abroad frequently reverberates on the domestic mood, although this is truer of some 
countries than others.  
In this thesis, the polity under study may be referred to in the text as ‘soft power centre’ 
or ‘agent’. 
Perception 
As the ability to engender a given perception, soft power can only be said to exist to the 
extent that a particular sovereign political entity’s soft power – cultural, value-based and 
political - discourses find resonance or at least tacit acceptance among a target audience. 
In this sense, the presence of soft power is not determined by the array of public 
diplomacy structures or other communication tools at a polity’s disposal or even 
necessarily the number of times any foreign audience encounters a discourse, but rather 
depends on the audience’s negotiation of the message. A positive reaction may not 
necessarily be a result of a reflexive process of evaluation, but may be diagnosed if an 
individual implicitly accepts the discourse, evidenced by their referencing it as a frame of 
reference in their thinking and normative interpretations, and reproducing it and 
perpetuating it in their own utterances. The notion of perception also indicates the 
possibility of seeing otherwise. 
Foreign Citizens 
While comparable dynamics are at work in the domestic context, soft power’s interest 
lies with the international realm, whether this be defined in terms of a global or regional 
remit, or with reference to diasporic communities (Dayan 1999).  
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As such, soft power implies the ability to shape the ‘hearts and minds’ of the intended 
audience. This indicates sufficient 'economic power' resources to engage in a multi-
faceted information campaign to convey the message to audiences. However, one must 
also be technically able to access those audiences. Under the current global conditions 
this is in many cases relatively easy (although certain regimes resist, remaining closed to 
these informational inflows, notably North Korea, and to a lesser extent China). On one 
hand, the liberal-democratic logic of freedom of information casts aside normative-
ideological barriers to the open diffusion of information.25 On the other hand, the borders 
of national information spaces have been rendered relatively porous as a result of the 
spread of communication technologies such as the internet, VOIP, telephones, satellite 
and cable television, but also letters, and traditional printed media. Where in the past 
states might only have been able to commence large-scale efforts to legitimate their 
power among subjugated peoples once territorial control had been achieved through 
military power, now the door is much more easily opened to a Gramscian meta-politics; 
the establishment of cultural hegemony as a lead-in to political influence on the 
international arena. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that unlike traditional forms of cultural imperialism, soft 
power is more likely to be ‘networked’ (Castells 2009); it will not necessarily reflect a 
mono-centric source of power, but rather reflect the Foucauldian diffusion of power 
characteristic of much of the contemporary globalised world. 
 
                                                          
25
 Of course, states do undertake measures to limit this when it suits them, either through traditional 
censorship as practiced by China, or through what Wikileaks founder Julian Assange has described as the 
'privatisation of state censorship'; the application of pressure on to private corporations to interpret 
their term and conditions of service in particular ways and act accordingly to exclude transgressors. 
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Attraction and Agenda-Setting  
While the literature often associates soft power with the attraction exercised by 
interesting, fitting and otherwise desirable cultural phenomena, this thesis argues for a 
broader understanding of ‘attraction’ and ‘attractiveness’. It is contended that soft power 
is not merely about manifesting an appealing image, but is ultimately about the creation 
of meaningful knowledge on the international stage; knowledge of value, knowledge of 
good and evil, knowledge of ‘our own’, knowledge of what defines ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is 
working within the framework of such broadly defined and potentially emotive meta-
narratives that policy is formed. 
Indeed, the ability to set the agenda indicates leadership, but this capacity should be 
understood not simply in terms of defining what is discussed in international fora, but 
also how; that is to say, which values are reflected in the terms of reference applied.26 In 
becoming hegemonic, such values will be recognised as attractive, infuse foreign policy 
discourses and provide a legitimating framework for political action, the caveats provided 
by this conceptual framework notwithstanding. Ultimately, agenda-setting in a soft power 
sense is about a political entity being able to make its values attractive to other entities. 
Yet in order to successfully set this agenda, the soft power aspirant must itself be 
‘attractive’; legitimate, understandable and persuasive. It must possess the credibility to 
make claims to knowledge in order to construct such regimes of truth. Thus, rather than 
being positioned as more co-optive and less co-optive on the soft end of Nye’s hard-soft 
spectrum respectively, the processes of attraction and agenda setting are engaged in a 
                                                          
26
 My broader understanding refers moreover to the ability of a political entity to play a decisive role in the 
definition of the values referred to in international debates; the ‘rules of the game’. A classic example of 
agenda-setting in this sense was the discussions prior to the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, where the 
long held principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty was effectively subordinated to the notion of 
human rights, which has a relatively short history as a significant value in international politics. 
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mutually constitutive relationship like two sides of the same coin. As Fairclough 
notes,‘[h]aving the power to determine things like which word meanings or which 
linguistic and communicative norms are legitimate and ‘correct’ or ‘appropriate’ is an 
important aspect of social and ideological power, and therefore a focus of struggle.’ 
(Fairclough 2001: 73) 
Foreign Policy Goals 
As a potentiality, and often as a practice, soft power functions in an interactive 
relationship with hard power resources in the creation of an enabling environment for 
foreign policy. Soft power attracts foreigners; integrating them into one’s own value 
discourses, which are drawn upon in providing a framework to legitimate policy. 
Soft power stands in a mutually dependent relationship with hard power capacity, and is a 
means of easing the perpetuation of a polity’s predominance by reducing the costs co-
opting foreigners into a particular constellation of discourse. 
3.6. Implications for the Study of Soft Power and Research Questions  
 
Post-structuralism is sometimes chastised for being far from the ‘real world’ but actually 
its research programme is based on assumption that policies are ‘dependent upon 
representation of the threat, country, security problem, or crisis they seek to address’ 
(Hansen 2006: 5-6), that is, the success of political action may hinge upon the extent to 
which the discourse in which it is embedded is hegemonic. This in turn determines the 
level of resistance a given polity may face, or the coalitions of support it may co-opt 
behind it.  
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However, a poststructuralist approach has certain implications for the claims to truth that 
can be aspired to by researchers seeking to operationalise empirical studies informed by 
this perspective. Most significant is the inability of poststructuralist discourse theory and 
analysis to provide a foundation for assertions about cause and effect. It is not possible to 
assert whether ‘attraction’ is elicited by a country’s hard or soft power resources, or 
whether a given policy was the result of soft power or material incentives, as it is 
ultimately impossible to distinguish between the discursive and non-discursive realm. 
Such decisions will always implicitly be informed by discourses of value without which 
‘objective interests’ cannot be conceived. Thus it is not possible to credibly distinguish 
between soft power variables and other factors. 
This has implications for the research questions posed as the researcher must simply 
accept and assume that levels of legitimacy are supported by discourse, and that if 
discursive hegemony becomes ruptured, it should be re-sutured through a re-articulation 
of the discursive elements.  
This thesis strives to respond to the following research question, which is supported by 
the sub-questions below: 
 Does contemporary Russia have soft power in Ukraine? 
o How is soft power understood in the Russian context? 
o What ‘soft power’ discourse is Russia disseminating? 
o What means do Russia and its representatives have in Ukraine to 
disseminate these messages? 




3.7. Soft Power as an Indicator of Civilisational Vigour 
 
The significance of culture for soft power needs to be explored in more detail than 
undertaken by Nye’s articulation of the concept. By his reading, culture is a ‘resource’; a 
focal point for the attraction of foreign citizens. Similarly, as noted in the review of the 
literature, discussions of soft power often examine the popularity of cultural products, 
and see this as evidence of power. Yet while this may be accurate, it is not the fully story. 
Indeed, as argued, above the relationship between a given cultural product and its 
recognition as appealing is not as straightforward as Nye’s approach tends to suggest. 
Delight at a nation’s cultural products (Latin-American music, Japanese animation, English 
Morris dancing, for instance), does not necessarily imply the osmotic absorption of the 
social values underlying these phenomena in their indigenous setting. Rather a process of 
hybridisation of the old and new may take place (Curran 2002: 170, Fairclough 2001: 207). 
Such manifestations of cultural diplomacy do not, as noted previously, necessarily 
indicate soft power’s ambition of cultural leadership as defined by this study, but may be 
focussed on familiarising audiences with an attractive image and demonstrating 
achievement and prestige. The logic is that positive-sum absolute gains are accrued by all. 
Such a logic, it is argued, does not characterise soft power, and sets it aside from parallel 
concepts in this regard. Indeed, following the Gramscian insight that social and political 
relations are characterised by ‘hegemonic struggles that aim to establish a political and 
moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning and identity’ (Torfing 
2005: 15), then soft power may be understood in terms of the cultural contestation 
foretold by Huntington (1993) and others as likely to become a major arena of 
geopolitical competition. In contrast to cultural diplomacy, soft power – whether or not it 
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is publically acknowledged as such – is concerned more with accruing relative gains at the 
expense of other worldviews. In this sense, while soft power may be progressive in terms 
of advancing human physical security, its application of non-military tools of engagement 
does not transcend the realist ontology of competition in an anarchic world. It implies the 
ability to compete successfully in the international competition for meaning making, and 
may well entail perceptions of threat to the identity security (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998) 
of a target audience, which has indeed been securitised in Russia. 
As previously hinted and argued by Gramsci, hegemony is about the creation of some 
level of collective identity; involving the ‘transformation of a fragmented people into a 
new effective political force’ (Kalyvas 2000: 353), as a basis for collective political 
participation and accordingly consent to the leaders. Hegemony thus gives rise to an 
‘imagined community’, the sense of a culture shared with individuals one has never met 
(hence ‘imagined’), which ‘commands profound emotional legitimacy’ (Anderson 1983: 4) 
and can thus be seen as arguably the ‘most universally legitimate value in the political life 
of our time’ (1983: 3). The printing press expanded possibilities for the distribution of 
knowledge, although ‘its potential for spanning space was limited by the entrenchment of 
vernacular languages’, hence communications circulated primarily on the national level, 
fostering nationalism, rather than internationalism (Curran 2002: 52). Although 
Anderson’s argument focuses on national identities, there is thus little reason why his 
logic cannot be extrapolated to the supranational level, with certain provisos to be 
discussed further. Indeed, building on Curran’s observations one may state that media 
can make groups of individuals ‘knowable as a community and also as a familiar object of 
affection’ and encourage a ‘“we-feeling” through its shared news values’ (Curran 2002: 30) 
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that is potentially as applicable to a wider transborder community where multilingual 
services are available. 
Expanding the project of cultural identity formation to the supranational level broadens 
the referent object of such campaigns to, in the main, civilisational identity. Huntington 
(2002: 43) defines civilisations as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the 
broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans 
from other species.’ Accordingly, a civilisation’s soft power ‘content’ reflects the broad 
cultural attributes; the 'set of values and beliefs that inform, guide, and motivate people’s 
behaviour’ (Castells 2009: 36), shared by adherents of that civilisation which distinguish it 
from other civilisational groupings. This notion of identifying with foreign citizens with 
whom one imagines shared values may provide a sense of common purpose, and thus a 
legitimate basis for policies to realise goals in their name.27 
Indeed, while to some extent the concept of soft power allows us to extend theorising 
and analyses of identity construction and cultural value dissemination to the international 
realm, certain distinctions should be observed. Although the emergence of parallel 
civilisational identities may reflect the gradual expansion of the human communicative 
horizon, a soft power community or civilization still encompasses many different nations 
and national interests, and hence the cultural attributes defining that community must be 
more broadly formulated than within a nation, providing meta-narratives within which 
individual, affiliated cultures can construct their self-understandings and relationship to 
the broader discourses. For instance, the individual rights discourse is very different in 
Germany and the USA. While some elements of cultural convergence are certainly 
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 Although identities are often multiple, a civilisational sense of belonging must vie for loyalty by engaging 
in a hegemonic struggle with other foci of identity formation. This is particularly problematic for European 
identity, for instance, as the EU is often cast as an ‘other’ by national elites. 
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observable, it is not presently possible to speak of civilisational homogeneity and the 
notion of national sovereignty retains discursive power, if less and less actual power 
under conditions of globalisation. 
The preceding discussion may appear to foreground the force of ideological power. 
However, recalling the impossibility of ultimate closure that overshadows discourses of 
meaning, ‘even when a ruling coalition [and by extension its hegemonic discourses] 
appear[s] to be firmly in control, its ascendency is rarely complete in practice and always 
needs to be renewed’ (Curran 2002: 141). Indeed, as observed, a hegemonic discourse 
may become dislocated when confronted with developments that it ‘it cannot explain, 
represent, or in other ways domesticate’ (Torfing 2005: 16). The political struggles to 
define the nature and objectives of the new realities continue still; hegemony, in the 
sense of societal consent, has not truly been achieved in post-Soviet Russia, evidenced by 
the tendency towards over-reliance on hard forms of power, although this thesis suggests 
an awareness of the need to move towards softer forms of influence. 
3.8. Tools of Soft Power Influence 
 
The first half of this chapter has outlined the theoretical premises informing this 
exploration of soft power in the Russian context. Now the framework will draw on 
research on the empirical side; outlining more closely how communication with 
audiences creates meaning and the factors affecting the efficiency of this process.  
Much has been written about the establishment of regimes of truth on the domestic level, 
often under the rubric of the study of the spread of religion or nationalism, and the logic 
and assumptions underpinning this theorising offers fruitful analytical potential for the 
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international angle addressed by soft power. If we understand that valuable political 
commodity of ‘attractiveness’ as emerging simultaneously with the actual (rather than 
merely intended) agenda-setting capacity of a political entity, then in order to explore the 
internal workings of soft power we must examine the ways in which discourses are 
brought into being. This necessitates a thorough examination of the workings of the 
cultural apparatus, or in my terminology the ‘tools of soft power’, whose communications 
are so profoundly implicated in the socialisation of populations. Indeed, as Foucault has 
observed; 
No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, 
records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and 
which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. (cited 
in Sheridan 1980: 131)  
Reflecting on identity forming trends within a national context in his seminal thesis, 
Anderson traces how nationalisms emerged in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, which he attributes in large part to ‘print-capitalism’; the convergence of 
capitalism and printing technology (Anderson 1983, Curran 2002). Book printing gave rise 
to unified fields of communication, and a growing sense of a shared culture with persons 
otherwise unknown. Wind forward several hundred years and a plethora of instruments 
of mass communication are available to those seeking to share and advance their 
worldview, including aspirant ‘soft power centre’. Writing in the 1930s, Gramsci refers to 
the non-coercive ‘civil society 28apparatuses’ such as the Church, schools, trade unions, 
political parties, cultural associations, clubs, the family etc., which perform the task of 
producing and reproducing cultural hegemony; the winning of consent for leadership. 
Similarly, Curran (2002: 139) speaks of ‘socialising agencies’ and Said (1981: 43) of 
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 Gramsci’s understanding of civil society is counterpoised to ‘political society’: the police, army, legal 




‘cultural apparatus’ to describe the agents involved in processes of socialisation and 
enculturation; the process of reproducing norms in society. Often operating in tandem 
with state institutions, whether in a coercive or co-optive capacity, such associations play 
a role in developing, shaping, disseminating and maintaining discourses bearing the 
culture, philosophy and morality of the nation’s ruling or, in Gramsci’s terms, hegemonic 
elite.  
Today the range of communication tools at the disposal of political elites is wider than 
ever. However, in the case of soft power, where the interest lies in shaping the worldview 
of persons beyond one’s own national borders, the situation is somewhat different as an 
aspirant soft power actor may not have direct access to the substantive opinion forming 
instruments of third states, in particular the education system and domestic media.29 
Nevertheless, in an era of globalisation, this is far from an insurmountable barrier to 
wielding influence abroad, provided a polity can rally sufficient material resources to 
implement an appropriate campaign. Indeed, as Fairclough observes, there is today a 
sufficient mass of ‘global’ – what he sees as North Atlantic’ – discourses, that in many 
different countries, people have a ‘constant external point of reference and horizon for 
their own discursive practices’ (2001: 206). 
Although the following list is by no means exhaustive, it provides an overview of the 
means of communicating with foreign audiences that, depending on the institutional and 
legal framework in the state of residence, may enable a polity to access target 
populations in ways that circumvent the oversight of the said state.  
                                                          
29
 The case may be the reverse, however. A political entity may have established hard power domination 
over a peripheral entity and desire to stabilise and facilitate its authority by legitimating it; encouraging 
foreigners to see its power as beneficial, responsible, legitimate, necessary and otherwise attractive by 
drawing them into accepting the centre’s value discourses as their own. 
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 Charities, NGOs and other civil society organisations, particularly those which 
promote values, such as religious institutions, human rights organisations or offer 
‘technical assistance’ 
 Educational schemes (language training, exchanges, scholarships, textbook / 
learning resource publication, conferences, skills training sessions, summer camps) 
 Mass media, press agencies, internet resources, social networks, blogs 
 Idea formation institutes; academic institutions, think tanks, consultancies, polling 
organisations, seminars 
 Traditional diplomacy, kin-state policies, legislation on diaspora rights and 
privileges, diplomatic assistance 
 Public diplomacy: cultural diplomacy, sport, science 
 Entertainment industry; books, film, TV, radio and music production, cinema 
 Private corporations and advertising, nation-branding 
The situation among such nodes is very diverse. Some unofficial proponents of the official 
discourse may be obviously state-supported and acknowledged as operating in line with 
its agenda, if not in so many words. Others may insist on their independence. Significantly, 
the most successful soft power strategies will succeed in co-opting third party agents to 
their agenda without the provision of material or hard power incentives; thus is the co-
optive charm of soft power. Indeed, it must be the ultimate aim of soft power strategies 
that entities on the periphery become socialised into the values of the centre and 
reproduce the main elements of its discourse spontaneously in their own policies, 
rhetoric and activities. Indeed, there are other agents beyond the official instruments of 
public diplomacy which are actively and significantly engaged in promoting a political 
entity’s overall worldview. These may be conceptualised in terms of a loose spectrum, 
according to the degree of dependence upon, and determination by the soft power agent: 
 Official state public diplomacy apparatus, presumed to follow state line without 
question 
 Unofficial diffusers of general state position, at least partly directly state-funded 
but this is not generally acknowledged, or they are still considered as formally 
distinct 
 Co-opted – not state funded but still generally promotes overall perspective, may 
be based in the target country rather than the centre 
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 Free-agents – consider self ‘pro-country X’, but don’t necessarily promote the 
official vision, and may even provoke contrary effects 
We may not know which category on this spectrum a given outlet falls into, and this 
position may change through time.  
Furthermore, when considering a political entity’s soft power measures, a conceptual 
distinction needs to be made between (i) tools of communication and their activities and 
(ii) other ‘content’ measures who would only touch a relatively small number of people 
were it not for the multiplier effects of communication tools. For instance, a polity may 
implement policies which assist people living beyond its borders, or pursue excellence in 
the arts. Yet the potential attraction of such policies and events isn’t fully realised until it 
receives wider diffusion, which may lead to it becoming part of the polity’s image. 
Similarly, the potential sympathy established through the provision of scholarships for 
elite foreign students to study in one’s country may take years to bear fruit in statements 
that significantly advance one’s worldview to a wider audience. 
3.9. Discursive Strategies 
 
It has been argued that with its soft power work, Russia seeks to promote its civilisational 
worldview and attract others share its vision. Yet what does this mean, more precisely? 
And how do these aims articulate with wider policy goals? It is proposed here that by 
using informational-communicative means to promote certain narratives, a soft power 
agent tries to achieve three core goals. Firstly, it strives to promote its agenda as 
attractive in the world; its positive contribution to the international market place of ideas 
and what comes to mind primarily when speaking of soft power. Yet this set of potentially 
attractive narratives is accompanied by less-discussed narrative elements whose purpose 
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is to undermine the ideational hegemony of others, on one hand, and to provide a 
rationale to help deflect criticism of the agent in question itself, on the other.  
In the terminology of discourse theory, what Russia seeks to incite may be termed a 
‘moment of antagonism,’ whereby the ‘undecideable nature of the alternatives and their 
resolution through power relations becomes fully visible constitutes the field of the 
‘political.’” As Norris notes, ‘[a]ntagonism has a revelatory function, in that it shows the 
ultimately contingent nature of all identity’. In the terms of Laclau’s political theory of 
hegemony, this moment constitutes the first phrase of a process of a Wittgensteinian 
‘aspect change,’ which occurs ‘where our established ways of doing and seeing have run 
out and a new set of corrections is established between things not previously linked 
together’ (Norval and Mijnssen 2009: 44). In this first stage, soft power ‘tools’ seek, 
through their communicative activities, to provoke ruptures in the hegemonic – i.e. above 
all, Western, but also Ukrainian nationalist – discourse. This is done, for instance, by 
highlighting contradictions that draw attention to the political nature of norms that have 
assumed the appearance of common sense. In the Russian case, one can observe 
consistent efforts to highlight interpretations of incidents whereby Western activities 
cannot adequately be explained by the West’s own normative discourses. Accounts 
pointing the audience towards the conclusion of hypocrisy, double-standards and self-
interest dressed up as humanitarian concerns must contribute towards an erosion of 
legitimacy, hence trust and hence the ‘attraction’ of the given international actor as a 
credible meaning-making agent. In this way, Russian communications may be viewed as 
attempts to chip away at the hegemony of the soft power discourses underpinning the 
Western political model. Not only does Russia resist integration into this order, its 
counter-hegemonic activities also make it easier for others to do likewise.  
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Pro-active communication leading to sustained antagonism of this nature might 
ultimately bring about dislocation30, whereby it becomes apparent that phenomena 
cannot be explained by current hegemonic discourses, thereby necessitating the 
construction of new discourses of meaning. Norval and Mijnssen advise that ‘[a]ny 
attempt to respond to a condition of dislocation will have to be able both to respond to 
existing conditions and to offer something by way of novel forms and terms of 
identification’ (2009: 44). As Laclau has observed, ‘the acceptance of a discourse depends 
on its credibility and this will not be granted if its proposals clash with the basic principles 
informing the organisation of a group’(1990: 66). Hence, rather than trying to impose 
entirely foreign, radical and new discursive solutions, it is far easier to start with concepts 
that are already familiar and in some way acceptable and ‘attractive’ to the target 
audience. For instance, the Russian soft power narratives draws on certain elements of 
critique articulated by post-colonial scholars, whose frequent recourse to Marxist-
inspired theories means the discourse has the added benefit of intuitive familiarity – and 
hence the ultimate ring of truth31 – both to citizens of the former Soviet republics, as well 
as a potential wider global audience in the formerly ‘second world’ and non-aligned 
countries. This is important domestically as well. The thinking of Russian philosophers of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has provided specifically ‘national’ 
inspiration to identity narratives.  
As already noted, an information strategy must also take into account the need to 
response to external criticism. As Hayoz (2009: 127) notes, the concept of ‘sovereign 
                                                          
30
 Dislocations are events that cannot be symbolized by the existing discursive order and function to disrupt 
that order (Laclau, 1990:39-59) Ruptures are essentially less fundamental incidences of the same, which just 
require an adjustment of the discourse, not its complete reconstruction. 
31
 Media research shows people prefer to follow their ‘gut feelings’ or prejudices, regardless of strong 
evidence to the contrary. 
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democracy’, which will be examined in detail in chapter five, “sutures” social divisions and 
hides dislocation’. Thereby it provides a discursive basis upon which to rearticulate the 
discourse to account for and integrate antagonistic elements; the ruptures done to 
Russia’s own discourses regarding legitimacy, its human rights record, political system, 
living standards, etc. In this sense, critics are correct to see the sovereign democracy 
concept as a ‘smoke screen’ for ‘authoritarian’ practices, but to view is as only that is not 
to appreciate its wider potential, as will become clear. 
3.10. Transmission Effects vs. Audience Reception 
 
The following section explores how tools of communication shape the discursive 
imaginaries that give meaning to people’s lived experience. Castells proposes that, 
we can assert that the most important sources of influence in today’s world is the 
transformation of people’s mind. If it is so, then the media are the key networks, as the 
media, organized in global conglomerates and their distributive networks, are the primary 
source of messages and images that reach people’s minds. (2009: 27-8) 
 
While this study does not question that primacy of the role of the mass media, it is 
asserted that meaning-making is undertaken not only by the mass media, but is rather 
something to which any medium of communication may contribute, proportionate to the 
scale of its activity. Given the relative weight of its impact, most communication theory 
has focused on the role of the mass media in this regard, rather than the way in which 
NGOs32, for instance, shape the discursive landscape in which target audiences interact. It 
is assumed, however, that many of the processes and debates are equally relevant for 
other methods of communication. As Neuman observes, there is ‘no evidence of 
consistent or significant differences in the abilities of different media to persuade, inform, 
                                                          
32
 Arturo Escobar’s ‘Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), in which a ‘development discourse’ is identified and its implications 
explored, is an excellent exception to this. 
85 
 
or even to instill an emotional response in audience members’ (1991: 99). Additionally, in 
the most successful cases, their activities and messages are likely to receive wider 
diffusion through the mass media, and thereby benefit from multiplicatory effects. Thus, I 
will draw on the media and cultural studies literature with the assumption that although 
diverse kinds of communication media may have different social effects, the 
communicative mechanisms and effects are nevertheless analogous. That is to say, these 
tools of communication in the broadest sense strive to perform the essential task not only 
of disseminating information but also engage in competition to convert such information 
into knowledge. 
The Communication Studies literature reports that there are two main approaches to the 
study of the workings of the mass media. The first – known sometimes as the ‘bullet’ or 
‘hypodermic-needle model’ (Neuman 1991: 87) – seems to take response of the ‘passive, 
attentive and gullible’ (Neuman 1991: 79, 87) audience largely for granted, focusing on 
the ways in which the media work on audiences; their 'transmission effects'. The second 
shifts the focus on to the audience, who are seen as active negotiators, and examines the 
factors affecting the extent to which the communication process functions as intended. 
Indeed, while the media are held up as a great source of power given their capacity to 
reach unprecedentedly large audiences, some scholars argue that this power is by no 
means as absolute as some give it credit, and is rather at best contested (Dyczok 2009), 
and hence reception should be explored (Castells 1997: 311; Dayan 1999: 30). Livingstone 
(1991: 101) argues that it is necessary to abandon such dichotomised thinking, and it 
indeed appears to make sense to consider both the ways in which the media strive to 
influence the audience’s constructions of knowledge, and also the factors informing the 
audience’s negotiations of the messages they encounter. Therefore, a two-pronged 
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approach to understanding the role of communications in generating hegemonic power 
will be taken. 
3.10.1. Transmission effects  
 
Firstly, the ways in which the media are theorised to work in society will be examined. 
According to Castells (2009: 157), the media play a highly significant role in forming 
people’s interpretative frameworks which structure how they perceive the world. He 
highlights three major processes which are involved in communications with the public 
and shape how populations are encouraged to perceive the issues covered; agenda-
setting, priming, and framing. From the point of view of my conceptualisation of soft 
power, I would argue that these processes can be considered functions of Nye’s more 
broadly defined ‘agenda-setting’. The ability to set the agenda on the international 
political stage is the result of such engagement with such processes in communications by 
political actors. 
3.10.1.1. Agenda setting [prioritising] 
 
For Castells, agenda-setting ‘refers to the assignment of special relevance to one 
particular issue or set of information by the source of the message (e.g. a specific media 
organization) with the expectation that the audience will correspond with heightened 
attention to the content and format of the message.’ (2009: 157, cites McCombs and 
Shaw 1972, 176). To avoid terminological confusion, I will refer to this as prioritising. 
Essentially, this involves suggesting to audiences what the relevant issues are at a given 
moment in time, an action which inevitably entails a selection process and the exclusion 
of certain, potentially significant issues from the main discussion fora. This selection 
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process reflects the priorities identified by wider discourses of meaning and value, and 
naturally the preponderance of influence and interests in the society concerned. 
3.10.1.2. Priming 
 
Castells (2009: 157, refers to Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007: 11) states that priming 
occurs ‘when news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific 
issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments. It is 
often understood as an extension of agenda setting… By making some issues more salient 
in people’s minds (agenda setting), mass media can also shape the considerations that 
people take into account when making judgments about political candidates or issues 
(priming).’ Thus, by producing and reproducing discourses of value (shared 
understandings of what constitutes ‘good’, ‘praiseworthy’ and ‘aspirational’ and 
correspondingly bad, reprehensible and worthy of sanction), media of communication 
contribute to the shaping of the normative criteria that audiences apply in their 
interpretations of the world. 
3.10.1.3. Framing 
 
Finally, Castells (2009: 158, refers to Entman, 2004: 5) notes that ‘framing is the process 
of “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections 
among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution.” […] 
Framing as a chosen activity by the sender of the message is sometimes deliberate, 
sometimes accidental, and sometimes intuitive. But it always provides a direct connection 
between the message, the receiving brain, and the action that follows.’ Sometimes, the 
process of framing does not even need to be direct and explicit, instead the process may 
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‘[operate] by leaving gaps in the information that the audience fills with their 
preconceived schemas’ (Entman 2004, also Castells 1997: 314). Such guided discovery 
may enhance the message’s credibility by appearing to be an independent, individual 
conclusion. In this way, media of communication may draw intertextually on associations 
that implicitly support audiences in reaching a particular emotional state on a particular 
issue. Such intertextual framing may also allow information outside the mainstream 
discourse on a given topic to be conveyed, thereby boosting perceptions of openness and 
hence credibility, but then be trumped through association with subtle intertextual 
references, leaving audiences with an impression that remains ‘on discourse’. For 
instance, articles conveying more contemporary, progressive stories about Russia may 
conclude with reference to the Soviet period that seem to frame recent positive 
developments as an exception to an enduring negative constant without even stating as 
much and thereby ‘inoculating’ audiences against the potential effects of the preceding 
information (McGuire 1961). 
These processes of agenda-setting support the assumption that, even if the media may 
not be able to tell people how to think, they have a major role in influencing what they 
think about (Cohen 1963). Dominant media have the capacity to affect the ‘closure of the 
debate’ (Curran 2002: 38) by ‘imposing terms of reference’ concerning what is important 
to consider with regard to any given relevant issue. Consequently, it may become taken 
for granted what the main problems or issues are, while alternative understandings may 
be largely excluded or expressed as subordinate, marginalised elements within this 
dominant framework. Indeed, as Curran (2002: 165) notes ‘the principal way in which the 
media influence the public is not through campaigning and overt persuasion but through 
routine representations of reality. The power of definition influences public 
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understandings of the world, and in an indirect and contingent way, public attitudes and 
behaviour.’ 
3.10.2. Audience Reception 
 
The previous section has detailed how media of communication can in principle shape 
audience perceptions, views and self-understandings, including engendering soft power. 
However, the measures above do not always yield the result predicted by the theory, as 
audiences respond in different ways to the same stimuli. Thus, these transmission effects 
arguments must be balanced by insights suggesting that audiences, rather than behaving 
like passive, tabula rasa receptacles awaiting filling with informational content, 
themselves exert friction on the transmission process, which thereby assumes 
characteristics of an active process of negotiation (Neuman 1991: 88, Fairclough 2001: 
207). Stuart Hall (1973), for instance, has produced a schema indicating that between the 
message sent by the sender and the message received by the recipient a complex process 
of interpretation is at play, with the consequence that the message received may differ 
considerably from the message intended by the sender. By way of explanation, Castells 
(2009: 132) refers to Umberto Eco's notion that 'senders and addressees interpret the 
codes and subcodes [of media messages] by involving their own codes which decouple 
the relationship between signifier and the signified in the message that was sent, and 
filter the signifier to obtain a different signified’. Thus, in Neuman's words, ‘the audience 
member is both passive and active at the same time. The mind is such that new 
information, ideas and impressions are taken in and evaluated and interpreted in the light 
of cognitive schema and the accumulated information from past experience’ (Neuman 
1991: 114, cited in Castells 2009: 128).  
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Considering audience reception, Kinder (1998, cited in Castells 2009: 153) has asserted 
that ‘[t]he basic materials that form public opinion are of three kinds: values, group 
dispositions, and material self-interests’. In line with Nye’s assertion(2004b) that soft 
power is less about rational persuasion, available research shows that predispositions and 
values (the ingredients of symbolic politics) have a greater say in the formation of political 
opinion than material self-interest. Curran (2002: 62) concurs that influence works not by 
imposition of opinion, in the manner of blunt ‘propaganda,’ but by playing on feelings. In 
the case of soft power’s contestation of values, all other things being equal, the prevailing 
'regime of truth' may not be that which presents the best arguments, but the one that 
elicits the right feelings (Westen 2007: 125, in Castells 2009: 154). In this way, soft power 
may thus be partially understood as relying on receptivity to the emotional pull of the 
reference points of a soft power centre's cultural tags. Touching upon a neuro-
psychological angle, Castells (2009: 145) states that the ‘activation of our brain through 
neural patterns indiced by mirror neurons is at the source of empathy, identification with 
or rejection of narratives in television, cinema, or literature and the political narratives of 
parties and candidates.’ Communication may be deemed successful if it inspires the 
desired response in the audience. 
Further to this, Castells (2009: 116) observes that ‘for communication to happen, senders 
and receivers need to share codes’. 'Code', or what Fairclough names ‘members’ 
resources’ (2001: 65) can be understood in terms of the cultural reference points, 
expectations and assumptions that are shared between groups and allow often 
unconscious access to emotional effects among the audience, for instance, references to 
topics that evoke guilt through 'appeasement', a duty to 'protect the innocent', fear of 
'Soviet imperialism', or the righteous defence of individual rights 'because I'm worth it'. 
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Thus, we can understand 'codes' as reflecting 'regimes of truth': a message is more likely 
to achieve the intended reception if it is rooted in common value pre-assumptions and 
plays on cultural reference points familiar to the target audience. 
Some scholars explain the ineffectiveness of the media to persuade audiences of their 
agenda by reference to the 'engrained' attitudes of individuals. In this regard, Castells 
(2009: 154) refers to partisanship as an emotional constraint with both institutional and 
emotional features. Such partisanship is institutional as it is historically rooted and is a 
factor of continuity. Emotional factors relate to the way that 'experiences of partisanship, 
often received from the family during childhood, are wired into the brain as they are 
associated with a number of emotional events’ (Castells 2009: 154). As Curran (2002: 133) 
observes, ‘media influence also increases if the mediated communication accords with 
audience members’ prior dispositions’. Simply put, audiences tend to ignore information 
that doesn't fit with their world view.  
This conclusion articulates well with the notion that the influence of the media is long-
term; cumulative and accruing (Fairclough 2001: 43). Shared codes, a sense of 
commonality or 'shared destiny', rather than being intrinsic and primordial are the result 
of often life-long exposure to the same experiences and cultural attributes that are 
reproduced, albeit with updates, generation after generation. Soft power must thus be 
about preserving and developing shared emotional reference points that derive from, and 
simultaneously reinforce, self-understandings. Thus, a soft power strategy must not 
simply focus on the dissemination of a particular message, but also take into account the 
preservation, and development of shared cultural 'codes' upon which messages will then 
draw to gain power. In order to ‘prevent the death’ (Dayan 1999: 30) of existing identities, 
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like, in the Russian case, the Eastern Slavic Orthodox discourse, there is a need for 
particularistic media to continue articulating an identity narrative, rather than assuming 
that centuries of shared cultural-linguistic heritage will perform this perform by virtue of 
their existence alone. 
Scholars critical of the notion of an omnipotent media may return agency to audiences, 
stressing their capacity to call upon their own faculties in interpreting media messages. 
Yet Livingstone (1999: 100) qualifies the potential of this capacity, noting that ‘audience 
reception theory… assume[s] that viewers’ interpretative resources (i.e. knowledge and 
ways of knowing) are constructed entirely independently of the media’. Thus she suggests 
that what appear to be individuals’ own insights are themselves conditioned by 
information flows, shifting the emphasis away from self-generated knowledge. This is not 
to completely discount the significance of personal experience in assessing media 
messages, indeed, as noted, meaning is never fully sutured, but simply to recall that those 
impressions of personal experience are themselves shaped by discursive regimes of truth 
that may be more or less favourable to the perpetuation of the status quo.33 
  
                                                          
33
 In addition to alternative narratives gained through access to oppositional media, the interpretation of 
soft power messages may be affected by personal experience with the polity in question; how far does 
reality correspond with rhetoric. This may affect a state's attractiveness and thereby its credibility in the 
eyes of individuals to make claims to truth. In this sense soft power is not just about images of 
attractiveness, but  asserting a viable claim to actually be attractive. Thus, credibility is a core issue in soft 
power. (USSR communication protocols foster cynicism today still). 
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3.11. Competitive Communication 
 
In addition to the advantages of long-term, repeated exposure to particular cultural codes, 
another highly significant factor affecting audience reception of soft power messages 
must be identified as ‘access to oppositional discourse’(Curran 2002: 158). Although 
generally not taken into account in the soft power literature, this is very relevant as 
individuals existing in an information space dominated by one discourse of rationality 
have less ready access to other codes of interpretation, and may thus be considered less 
likely to subvert the ‘regime of truth’ embodied in the ‘code’. This aspect points again to 
the zero-sum nature of soft power. Soft power is often considered to function on a 
'positive sum' basis in that individuals can appreciate and draw upon the codes of more 
than one soft power centre simultaneously and as such may possess multiple identities. 
However, if the presence of oppositional discourses in a given information space 
diminishes the capacity of a particular message to be received as intended, then advances 
of the capacity and effectiveness of one soft power centre will undermine the receptive 
potency of the discourses of another soft power centre. Indeed, commenting on 
communication networks, which characterise large-scale communication possibilities, 
Mulgan notes that such networks are ‘created not just to communicate, but also to gain 
position, to out-communicate’ and thereby place the interests and values they embody in 
a more advantageous position in the mind of audience (cited in Castells 2009: 20). 
It therefore follows from the zero-sum logic argued to reside at the heart of the concept 
that a soft power strategy entails not only positive measures to promote the 
enhancement of a polity’s absolute attractiveness, as per the approach of cultural 
diplomacy. Rather, ratcheting up one’s relative soft power vis-à-vis competitors may 
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entail negative communications designed to provoke ruptures in the hegemony of their 
discourse, and hence their attraction and agenda-setting capacity. 
A strong soft power strategy will likewise provide for the defensive measures against 
attempted ruptures. A sophisticated and effective communication strategy is required to 
handle high-profile incidents – such as the August 2008 war with Georgia – to explain 
such challenging events in terms of codes well-received by target audiences, thereby 
framing potentially dislocatory discursive moment ‘on’ or ‘within’ the prevailing discourse, 
and hence ensuring their acceptability, or at least diffusing the most extreme 
manifestations of opposition. Russia is widely judged to have lost the information front in 
the early days of the war against Georgia in August 2008. However, since then it has 
fought back, construing Georgia and in particular President Saakashvili as an unreliable 
ally ill-suited to NATO membership, and thereby maintaining a significant strategic goal of 
halting US military penetration into the region. 
Finally, in order to effectively engage in such political struggles for the definition of 
meaning on the international stage, an agent must itself be ‘attractive’, here in the sense 
of credible and legitimate. Soft power messages make claims to truth about the nature of 
politics and society. As with other speech acts (Austen 1963; Buzan et al 1998), if 
members of the audience do not have trust in the authority of the agent of soft power to 
make such claims to truth, then they are correspondingly less likely to accept the message 
disseminated. This credibility relates both to the 'tools' and the 'centre' of soft power 
itself. Neuman(1991: 85) recommends a diversified strategy for this purpose, since 
‘[r]epresenting the official point of view in government-controlled newscasts is one thing; 
it is easily recognized and interpreted by audiences. But more subtle cues regarding what 
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is and is not politically acceptable, carried as part of main-stream advertising, comedy, 
and action-oriented entertainment, can be more effective.’ Indeed, promoting a 
consistent – or at any rate discursively compatible – message via a selection of non-
official media helps occupy the information space and create a sense of critical mass, 
conducive to the emergence of new rationalities of ‘common sense’. In order for the 
centre to be able to disseminate and reinforce its core values and metanarratives by way 
of apparently distinct tools, it is highly desirable for aspirant soft powers to have access to 
a wider network of communication outlets.34 Accordingly, an entity may use both 
financial and psychological incentives (i.e. patriotism, pride in being part of an attractive 
movement) to coopt a wider network of partners. 
Furthermore, the perception of the tools themselves being independent, non-biased, and 
fair is also an important asset as otherwise a sense of being a propaganda target may 
emerge, inciting an effect contrary to that intended. To this end, coverage of 'subordinate 
elements' – i.e. contending views - rather than their complete exclusion is also an 
effective strategy. Accounting for alternatives and oppositional arguments by framing 
them in a way that tacitly accepts the assumptions of the powerful about what is 
important, necessary, possible (Castells 2009), may point to their inappropriateness or 
irrelevance; radical ideas may simply not make sense within a dominant discourse, 
particularly when its reference points are strictly disciplined by meaning-making elites. In 
this way, while a range of opinions may apparently be debated, the underlining value 
assumptions framing the discussion remain unchallenged. This approach to covering 
alternative views not only has the capacity to neutralise opposition by subtly discounting 
them as marginal and thereby ‘inoculating’ (McGuire 1961) audience members against 
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 Castells (2009) details the networking of the most powerful business empires. 
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their potential effects, but may even lend credibility to the dominant view through 
cultivating the impression of the tool in question being fair, open and democratic. 
3.12. Concluding Remarks 
 
This conceptual framework has argued that the alleged ‘shallowness’ of Joseph Nye’s 
theory of soft power can be well remedied by the integration of insights and analytical 
concepts from post-structuralist discourse analysis, and a post-Marxist understanding of 
Gramsci’s hegemony. The anti-essentialist epistemology and post-foundationalist 
ontology problematise the notion of ‘attraction’ seen to be at the conceptual core of soft 
power, and expose claims to truth as not only constructed as an effect of power but ever 
lacking in closure of meaning. Identities are similarly contingent upon Foucauldian 
discursive articulations, which are themselves a significant marker of power relations. As 
such, soft power is the ability to influence these discursive constellations in such a way 
that particular policies, worldviews and interpretations are framed as ‘common sense’. 
Chapter six will examine in-depth the narratives that Russia seeks to promote as the 
defining contours of its contribution to the marketplace of civilisational ideas, while the 
final chapter will provide insights into how the selected target audience negotiated these 
discourses. Indeed, following from the conceptual framework outlined here, whereby soft 
power is understood as the ability to not only construct oneself as attractive in the 
international arena, but also define the very criteria for judging attraction, Russia will be 
deemed to have soft power to the extent that these ideas received a positive reception. 
Soft power is more complicated to ‘wield’ effectively than the direct forms of influence 
offered by economic and military resources. In this chapter, soft power was argued to be 
the result of successful communication. In order to understand how this works, the two 
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main perspectives on the influence of the media have been examined, exploring both the 
purported effects of the media on audiences, and how messages conveyed are actively 
negotiated by those audiences. While communication outlets may present information as 
so to structure audiences’ responses, whether these cues are taken is informed by the 
audiences’ interpretative resources, which may be shaped by discourses suggesting 
alternative meanings. The penultimate chapter will explore the networks of ‘soft power’ 
influence that are being constructed in Ukraine, focusing on the informational activities of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate’s activities. The next chapter 
will now detail how the definition of soft power outlined here will be operationalised in 
the empirical research. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology  
4.1. Introduction 
 
The concept of soft power and its discontents were explored in depth in the second 
chapter. Certain conceptual ambiguities were identified, and the definitions presented by 
Nye and others were argued to be problematic with regard to the ability to facilitate the 
rigorous and coherent operationalisation of an empirical research project. In order to 
help resolve this impasse, a working definition was proposed, according to which soft 
power is understood as ‘the ability of a sovereign polity to be perceived as attractive by 
and to set the agenda for foreign citizens in support of its foreign policy goals.’ This 
rearticulated concept was given theoretical content by drawing upon neo-Gramscianism 
and post-Marxist insights from discourse theory, particularly as approached by those who 
may be labelled post-structuralist. By this rendition, soft power may be understood as 
cultural leadership; expressing the capacity to successfully engage in the formulation of 
meaning on the international stage. 
The task of this chapter is to outline how the rearticulated concept of soft power was 
operationalised in the fieldwork study of contemporary Russian soft power in Ukraine. It 
likewise aims to provide the reader with insight into the methodological choices that 
were made in the design and implementation of the main part of the empirical research, 
the results of which are presented in the final chapter. This, essentially, will provide a 
road map to how the central research question of the thesis will be answered: ‘To what 






The issue arises of how to assess the prevalence of the soft power discourses advanced. 
As noted in the discussion of the literature, the proponents of the first and second faces 
of power (Dahl 1957, Bachrach and Baratz 1962) have stressed observable change in 
terms of decision-making and non-decision-making as criteria to evidence power. 
However, inspired by a three (Lukes 1974; 2005) or even four (Digeser 1992) dimensional 
understanding of power, the ontological and epistemological precepts of this study do 
not demand directly observable changes in behaviour to identify power at work. Rather, 
soft power as a result is viewed as an accumulated ideological potential, which may then 
serve to discursively frame certain policies as politically possible. Thus, the outcomes 
concerned will not in the first instance be behavioural modifications or policy shifts, but 
rather of an attitudinal nature. That is, they concern the response of the target audience 
to the communicated message. This may or may not require an actual change in opinion 
among the subjects under investigation, or it may simply reflect the perpetuation of value 
constellations and their preservation in the face of the pressure of alternative views 
currently being promulgated in a particular society.  
As argued in the conceptual framework, attraction and agenda-setting are to be seen as 
two sides of the same coin. Thus, responses to the main research question will focus on 
examining the extent to which Russia has been able to ‘set the agenda’ in terms of 
successfully projecting its reference points, value orientations and interpretative filters. 
Agenda-setting ability – and by extension, attraction – will be deemed to be present 
relative to the extent that these ideological discourses are accepted by the target 
audience. As such, acceptance may not necessarily be indicated by explicit and overt 
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agreement; it may also be observed in so far as audience members tacitly accept the 
discourse as their own, seeing it as credible, and adopt and use its precepts without 
fundamental critique. In neo-Gramscian terms, these individuals, by accepting moral 
leadership in this way, give their implicit consent to these discourses, which themselves 
serve to underpin ad reflect relations of power in a harder sense too. In such cases we 
may speak of hegemony.35 Individuals co-opted into the discourse unwittingly become 
agents of its wider dissemination, since their spontaneous reproduction of the discourse 
serves to reinforce it as a societal structure, and contributes to its normalisation as 
‘common sense’. 
This study follows Nye’s suggestion to evaluate soft power outcomes by means of surveys 
and focus groups. However, due to the largely structural, discursive approach of this 
thesis, an evaluation of whether soft power is present will focus less on whether 
particular individuals openly express ‘attraction’ towards Russian ‘resources’, and more 
on how the cultural and value narratives promoted by Moscow resonate with the target 
audience. 
4.3. Background Research: Desk-Based Work and Expert Interviews 
 
Desk-based research involving the review of relevant media, scholarly and policy-related 
sources has naturally been ongoing throughout this research project, and has covered a 
range of primary and secondary sources, including books, articles and reports published 
mostly in Russia and in Russian, in which the wider theme of soft power is discussed by 
practitioners and analysts capable of influencing political practice. This desk-based 
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 Whenever the term ‘hegemony’ is used in this thesis it will be in the neo-Gramscian sense articulated in 
the conceptual framework. ‘Dominance’ will be used to express the more conventional notion of the term. 
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research was supplemented by expert interviews in order to contextualise the readings 
and provide further insight from individuals with knowledge resulting from their 
proximity to domestic debates or policy work. The interviews were conducted in three 
main waves.36 The first were during a 10-day scoping visit to Kyiv in January 2010, the 
main purpose of which was to confirm Ukraine as a case study and gain greater familiarity 
with the political context there, especially as it was the moment of the first round of the 
elections that saw Viktor Yanukovych elected as president. Secondly, I travelled to 
Moscow for a month in June / July 2011 and conducted a number of interviews with 
experts, including academics, practitioners, policy advisers, analysts and four PhD 
students writing on topics related to Russian soft power. I conducted a few informal 
interviews during my preparatory visit around Ukraine in July 2011 and alongside the 
focus groups in the different regions of Ukraine, which helped gain a little more insight 
into local specificities. Further, telephone interviews were conducted with relevant 
experts on a rolling basis throughout the project as I came in touch with them to enrich 
my understanding of the local context.  
Generally, the persons interviewed were either recommended by university contacts, 
authors whose work I’d found useful or those I became acquainted with through the 
‘snowball’ method.37 The interviews were semi-structured to provide thematic guidance, 
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 Please see the appendices for a full list of interviews conducted. 
37
 ‘Snowball’ sampling is a method whereby initial interviewees put the interviewer in touch with other 
individuals whose insights they believe may be beneficial for the research project, in the manner of a chain. 
Biernacki, P. and D. Waldorf (1981). "Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral 
Sampling." Sociological Methods Research 10(2): 141-163. 
Also see Rivera, S. W., P. M. Kozyreva, et al. (2002). "Interviewing Political Elites: Lessons from Russia." 
PSOnline December: 683-688. 
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while allowing participants to raise the issues they considered relevant to Russian soft 
power, which, as will become apparent in the next chapter, differed significantly.38  
This study is particularly interested in the soft power influence of the Russian state. 
Therefore, in order to adjudge this, it is necessary to identify the discursive resources 
responding as closely as possible to those of officialdom. In addition to the foreign policy 
perspectives expressed in political leadership discourse, the Russia Orthodox Church and 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation have been selected as bearers of cultural and value narratives 
that dovetail with the political notion of sovereign democracy. Although formally 
independent entities, these bodies will be argued to have a commonality of purpose with 
the Russian state that is reflected in their tessellating discourses. 
4.4. Identification of Sources of Official Russian Soft Power Narratives 
 
Most straightforwardly, the Kremlin’s foreign policy discourse was ascertained through 
examination of the public discourse of foreign policy leaders between 2006 and 2011. 
Above all, this meant analysing the speeches of the Russian President and the Foreign 
Minister, although statements of others politicians with an interest in the softer aspects 
of foreign policy have also been taken into account (e.g. Konstantin Kosachev, Farid 
Mukhametshin). Although there was a shift in tone between the Putin and Medvedev 
presidencies, the core assumptions and perspectives have not demonstrably changed 
from the view of the world expressed by President Putin in his February 2007 address to 
the Munich Security Conference. Indeed, Richters has observed continuity in terms of 
Russian political culture under Putin and Medvedev (2012: 11). 
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 The basic set of questions may be found in Appendix J. 
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With regard to the more culture- and value-oriented discourses, the situation is a little 
more complicated. Since the collapse of communism, the Russian state has distanced 
itself from ideological structures in favour of flexibility of reaction.39 With this in mind, 
combined with the cultural heterogeneity of the Russian Federation, it is uncomfortable 
for the state to take an official position on culture and values, and indeed, the presidency 
has tended not to elaborate on these themes. Thus, in order to identify cultural and 
value-oriented discourses, it was necessary to look beyond the formal structures of the 
state. To this end, this study focuses on the cultural discourses articulated by the Russkiy 
Mir Foundation and the value-based narratives of the Russian Orthodox Church under 
Patriarch Kirill.  
In many respects, the Russkiy Mir Foundation is an archetypal tool of cultural diplomacy. 
It was established by presidential decree in 2007 as a joint project of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science, with the stated purpose of 
‘promoting the Russian language, as Russia's national heritage and a significant aspect of 
Russian and world culture, and supporting Russian language teaching programs abroad’. 
The Foundation is headed by Vyacheslav Nikonov, a well-known politologist, who has also 
contributed positively to the debate on sovereign democracy (Orlov 2006)40. Indeed, 
Nikonov was one of the initiators of the idea of soft power in Russia, who developed the 
idea that Russia must advance its influence abroad with the help of soft power. Although 
the foundation was created with the idea that it would be funded by a combination of 
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 State ideology is prohibited in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
40
 Nikonov is has also been a Senior Research Fellow at Moscow State University, Dean of History and 
Political Science at the International University in Moscow, founder of the Polity Foundation, President of 
the "Unity for Russia" Foundation, Head of the Commission on International Cooperation and Public 
Diplomacy of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, Deputy Chairman of Editorial Board for “Russia 
in Global Affairs” and a Member of the Board of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. 
http://www.polity.ru/engl/nik-eng.htm (accessed 14th December 2012) 
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public and private sources, in practice it has reportedly received its financing from the 
state budget since its foundation by Putin’s presidential decree. As such, it may be seen 
to represent a state view on culture. 
The main source of information for the analysis of these cultural narratives is the website 
of the Russkiy Mir Foundation,41 including features, articles, and speeches by senior 
representatives. The discourses were identified on the basis of regular and in-depth 
browsing of the foundation’s website since March 2008. Over this time, the texts 
available have increased in number greatly, but the narrative’s core assumptions appear 
to have been rather consistent.  
The Russian Orthodox Church was selected as the mouthpiece of a Russian discourse on 
values due to its long-standing connections with both state and society. The prescribed 
atheism of the Soviet period notwithstanding, Orthodoxy has long been at the heart of 
what it means to be Russian (russkii). As Nathaniel Davis has noted, ‘[t]he historic faith of 
Russia is Orthodoxy and Orthodoxy is deeply embedded in the Russian soul. It defines a 
Russian’s sense of nation, history and identity, even when the individual is not devout’ 
(1995: 222-3).  
Likewise, the synergy between Church and State is a long-standing feature of the Russian 
polity, with Prince Vladimir having been baptised into Orthodoxy as the Church of Kievan 
Rus in 988. Between 1721 and 1917, the Church formed part of the imperial state, and 
religion constituted a key component of Minister of Education Sergei Uvarov’s 1830 
doctrine of official nationality; Orthdoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.42 Despite persecution, 
suppression and infiltration during the Soviet era, the Church remained as an institution, 
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 http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/ (accessed 14
th
 December 2012) 
42
 More information on the traditional role of the Russian Church may be found in Richters 2012. 
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poised to regenerate following the collapse of the communism. Indeed, the Russian 
Orthodox Church has become one of the major players in the field of Russia-Ukraine 
relations43, a fact that is likely driven not only by of the spiritual significance of Kyiv, but 
also by the ‘competition for souls’ from different denominations in the country. This has 
rendered the task of maintaining and nurturing the spiritual leadership role of the 
Moscow Patriarchate as a means of preserving a common cultural and ideational space 
between Russia and Ukraine quite immediate. In short, the Russian Church may be seen 
as a bearer of what Gramsci has termed the ‘state spirit’ (1971: 146-7; Parmar 2010); a 
sense of responsibility for the fate of the state. 
However, it is important to recall that ROC is not a homogenous entity in terms of the 
outlooks of its representatives and followers. Rather, as Anastasia Mitrofanova (2005) 
notes in her study of the politicisation of Russian Orthodoxy, the existence of a number of 
different strands may be observed.44 Thus, references in this study to the Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) are to be understood as indicating the official position advanced 
by the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’ Kirill, 
unless otherwise stated.45 Patriarch Kirill, whom some close to the Kremlin consider the 
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 Interview with Igor Zevelev conducted in Moscow July 2011. 
44
 The five versions of political Orthodoxy as an ideology noted by Mitrofanova (2005) are as follows: 
political fundamentalism, contemporary pan-Slavism, neo-Eurasianism, Orthodox Communism and Russian 
Nationalism: quasi-Orthodoxy and neo-Paganism. As she herself notes (p. 37), in practice it is only possible 
to distinguish between these different versions as ideal types since they are ultimately different facets of 
the same ideology. None of these versions corresponds to the official ideology of the ROC, and represent 
more different religio-political shades of ideological extreme. 
45
 Although there is diversity of opinion among the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate (Richters 2012, 
interview with A. Zolotov), this study focuses on the ‘upper echelons’ of this body to elicit the narratives as  
these persons are ‘more publicly visible and only they have been granted the right to speak on the Church’s 
behalf. Furthermore, Frank Parkin points out that political ideals tend to work their way from “the top” 
downwards. This applies especially to hierarchical organisations like the Moscow Patriarchate, which did 




‘second Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation,’46 has been very active in cultivating 
Russian relations with Ukraine. Consequently, in terms of the sources selected as 
reflecting the views of the Russian Orthodox Church as they pertain to the on-going 
international value debate, these include primarily speeches given by Patriarch Kirill as 
accessed from the website, a book of speeches (Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’ 
2011) given by the Patriarch over the years, and certain policy documents available on the 
aforementioned website, namely the Social Concept47 and the Human Rights Policy48. In 
addition, some comments by the Patriarch’s close collaborators were also considered. 
It is also worth noting that interaction between the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
Russkiy Mir Foundation bucks the trend towards a lack of coordination among soft power 
tools observed in the next chapter; with relations between the two characterised by 
‘close cooperation’.49 This is reflected in the way that, in spite of the division of labour in 
terms of themes, the key assumptions of texts generated by the foundation are within 
the discourse established by the church. Both institutions stress their distance from 
political engagement50, although examination will show that together these discourses 
have significant (meta-)political implications. 
Although disentangled into these three strands for analytical purposes, the narratives 
(indicated in-depth in the appendices) are mutually reinforcing and inter-dependent; the 
propositions advanced and maintained as ‘attractive’ are simultaneously employed as 
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 Interview with an independent researcher conducted in Moscow in June 2011. 
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 The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights: 
http://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/ (accessed 3
rd
 January 2013) 
49
 Interview with A. Dolinskiy conducted in Moscow in June 2011.  
50
 Interview with V. Istratov conducted in Moscow in June 2011, Part Three of the ROC’s Social Concept. 
‘Church and State’:  http://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/iii/ (accessed 3
rd
 January 2013). 
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reference points to underpin agenda-setting initiatives. They likewise share a similar logic 
and central key assumptions about Russia, namely that Russia is a strong country with a 
historically-rooted civilisational radiance beyond its own borders; Russia is a ‘normal’ 
great power on the ascendant again, which has the capacity and right to participate in 
discussions of topics of global political, economic, cultural and other significance; Russia 
has a right to participate in the international community as an equal partner that shares 
much with Europe and the West, but also has its own valid perspectives borne of its 
particular experiences; moreover Russia has the will to defend and promote these beliefs 
by whatever means necessary, but seeks primarily to do so in concord with partners. This 
represents, in short, the premises of sovereign democracy as a political doctrine. The 
cultural and value-related strands advanced by the ROC and the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
represent the underpinning value basis, upon which the Russian claim to difference, 
expressed in the political positions summed up as sovereign democracy, rests.  
Indeed, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russkiy Mir Foundation are selected agents 
that seek to preserve and develop the cultural and spiritual characteristics that 
distinguish Russia from the West and underpin Moscow’s claim to civilisational 
uniqueness. The existence of a sovereign, samobytnyi cultural space justifies policies 
under the rubric of sovereign democracy which proceed from the assumption that Russia 
has cultural traditions requiring universal values and models to be implemented in ways 
that account for such specificities. Such policies also help retain decision-making power 
and ‘sovereignty’ in Russia and help resist globalising imperatives. The ambition is to re-
assume leadership by supporting national development in a way that both retains 




4.5. Conduct of Textual Analysis 
 
In preparation for the fieldwork, it was necessary to identify the target narratives, whose 
hegemony might then be assessed through the study of audience reception. As was 
previously noted, five Russian approaches to soft power have been discerned, only one of 
which can be explored in this study, namely Russia’s civilisational discourse.  
In order to identify the contours of the contemporary discourses being projected by the 
official foreign policy establishment, textual analysis, supplemented by expert interviews, 
was employed. Officialdom is interpreted quite broadly here, encompassing not only 
formal representatives of the state, but also those working in close collaboration with it 
(Hansen 2006).  
The target narratives were derived on the basis of wide reading, including not only 
speeches and policy documents, but also commentaries and other articles by 
representatives of the three selected institutions, as ‘if discursive structures operate in a 
political space, they will show up in any text’ (Wæver 2005: 40). In terms of how many 
texts to read, Wæver advises reading ‘any text, as long you read for long enough!’ 
(Wæver 2005: 40). Thus, a great number of texts were read, until it was felt that 
saturation point had been reached and no new key narratives were emerging.  
In terms of the time frame covered by the textual analysis, the research focuses on the 
positions articulated under the Medvedev presidency (2008-2012). Soft power became a 
more prominent topic in both scholarly consideration and policy circles during this period, 
as the discussion in Russia on this topic matured. Yet this is simply a useful temporal 
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bracket and should not imply a break with the policies of Putin; indeed a certain 
discursive continuity with that administration in this regard is acknowledged.  
Some commentators have expressed scepticism about Russia’s soft power intentions, and 
might lodge the complaint that Russian discourses are merely a disingenuous smoke 
screen for the pursuit of real hard power concerns. Wæver counters this with the 
observation that, 
[d]iscourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives 
of the actors, their hidden intentions or secret plans. Especially for the study of foreign 
policy where much is hidden, it becomes a huge methodological advantages to stay at the 
level of discourse. (Wæver 2005: 35)  
In this sense, the sincerity of the soft power agents is of little import beyond the issue of 
credibility in the eyes of the audience, as it is discourse, not ‘true’ intent, which 
conditions what is politically possible.51 A list of the soft power narratives evaluated in the 
survey is provided in the appendices, along with annotations explaining the rational for 
the choice of question in greater depth.  
4.6. Audience Reception: Justification of Choice of Methods 
 
This study has sought to devise a methodology to evaluate the presence of soft power 
that goes beyond the two-dimensional ambiguity of opinion poll data, while reaching for 
a greater scope than in-depth studies of particular aspects of cultural attraction (e.g. 
linguistic preferences). The study’s firm rooting in social science methodologies should 
also provide a more reliable means of assessing Russian soft power in Ukraine, which has 
also often been reported in anecdotal terms, frequently cherry-picked to suit the 
purposes of the author. As such, it should provide a more complete and balanced picture 
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 Also see Morozov 2009. 
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of the state of Russian soft power in Ukraine. In order to achieve this ambitious goal, a 
triangulated approach to methods was taken including with both quantitative and 
qualitative research. On one hand, a survey was employed to generate a quantitative, 
comparative perspective, which should help to satisfy the demand for reliability and 
generalisability. On the other hand, focus groups were conducted in order to elicit rich 
data enabling the statistical findings to be placed in a qualitative context.  
Surveys were used to generate a quantifiable picture of attitudes towards Russia’s 
proposed soft power discourses, and allow comparison between four selected cities. The 
way in which the data was processed also allowed for inter-regional comparison of the 
different themes (culture, values, policy etc.), which presented a more differentiated 
picture than anticipated. However, quantitative surveys give neither insight into the 
rationale for an opinion, nor help the researcher to understand how certain discourses 
are negotiated by audiences.  
To alleviate some of the shortcomings of the survey method, it was combined with focus 
groups, which are capable of providing a deep understanding of the context in which the 
soft power discourses are received. Yet as a social science method, they are not alone in 
this; such results may also be achieved through individual interviews. However, focus 
groups have a number of advantages over single-person interviews that caused this 
method to stand out as the most appropriate for the research in hand. This is because 
group dynamics are of relevance to the research. 
Indeed, rather than assuming inevitable ‘media effects,’ this study focusses on how 
communicated messages are actually received and negotiated by a target audience. This 
is because the real limits of discourse are not directly imposed by individuals or even 
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institutions, but emerge as a result of processes of meaning making that are imbued with 
power. They exercise a disciplining effect over thoughts and behaviours only to the extent 
they are internalised as common sense among a society of individuals. Thus, an 
advantage of focus groups is that this method of data gathering emphasises the social 
nature of communication, rather than seeing the views of groups of participants as simply 
a convenient ‘aggregate of atomised opinions or attitudes’ (Lunt and Livingstone 1996: 
8).52  
As Lunt and Livingstone (1996: 94) observe, ‘focus groups generate discussion, and so 
reveal the meanings surrounding an issue – both the meanings that people read into the 
discussion topic and how they negotiate those meanings. The significance of this lies in 
the fact that, as Moscovici (1984, referenced in Lunt and Livingstone 1996: 89) 
emphasises, social representations – such as identities and value orientations - are 
‘generated not so much through individual cognitive processes but through everyday 
conversations,’ that is, in a group setting. Thus, by functioning as simulations of the wider, 
quotidian processes of negotiating social meaning, focus groups provide insight into the 
social realities of a cultural group, through direct access to the language and concepts 
which structure participants’ experiences (Hughes and DuMont 1993). 
The dynamic discussions that focus groups are designed to generate also draw out 
diversity of opinion within or between groups, which also serves to ‘stimulate the 
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 Flick points to the possible benefits in terms of saving time and money (2002: 113) through the use of 
focus groups. However, this researcher’s choice of method was not motivated by the potential advantage of 
harvesting multiple opinions simultaneously. On the contrary, the time and effort required to coordinate a 
meeting time simultaneously convenient for a sufficient number of participants, arrange a reasonably easily 
accessible room to host the discussion and plan how to handle group dynamics more than compensated for 
any practical benefits accrued through this method. Indeed, there are also major financial and time-effort 
implications in effort in organising, conducting, recording, transcribing and interpreting group discussions, 
and hence it makes most sense to employ them when researching questions that might be not answering 
satisfactorily in the absence of the ability to replicate the social dynamics of generating opinions in groups 
(Flick 2002: 120). 
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answerers and support them in remembering events, and that […]can lead beyond the 
answers of the single interviewee’ (Flick 2002: 113). The proposed advantages of 
interaction offered by focus groups over individual interviews were born out by my 
experiences, as sometimes individuals revealed a more nuanced opinion on topics that 
they initially appeared to be quite set upon when challenged by fellow group members. 
This gave insight into the interplay of different factors in the formation of individual 
opinions. Equally, it is interesting when a point raised did not get challenged or 
questioned.  
This was particularly important as Russian soft power is a politically sensitive topic, with 
strong opinions on both sides claiming the presence or absence of what amounts to soft 
power. Focus groups are therefore useful as a method since they offer some means of 
quality control on data collection in that ‘participants tend to provide checks and balances 
on each other that weed out false or extreme views... and it is fairly easy to assess the 
extent to which there is a relatively consistent, shared view... among the participants’ 
(Patton 1990: 335-6, cited in Flick 2002: 113). As such, focus groups represent a relatively 
sound means of generating valid data. 
4.7. Limitations of the Methods Selected 
 
However, despite the strengths of the chosen methods for responding to the research 
questions posed in this thesis, certain limitations should be acknowledged. 
Firstly, focus groups cannot claim, unlike, albeit debatably, more positivist methods, to 
establish cause and effect relationships (Lunt and Livingstone 1996: 12). Yet this is not a 
major problem from the point of view of this study since, following the meta-theoretical 
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position outlined in the conceptual framework, it is in any case never truly possible to 
discern why individuals hold a certain opinion as it is not truly possible to differentiate 
between discursive and non-discursive factors. As such, we cannot ultimately know 
whether individuals and groups respond positively to Russian soft power narratives as a 
result of the Russian initiatives to promote those discourses, or due to other reasons. 
However, this is not an irreconcilable problem from the perspective of this research, as 
congruent outlooks are likely in any case to facilitate Russian policy by measure of their 
similarity with the wider soft power discourse, whether they are a result of Russian 
activity or not.53  
Secondly, qualitative methods such as focus groups are sometimes criticised by 
empiricists for their alleged inability to provide conclusions generalisable to the wider 
population. While acknowledging the need for care in such matters, this researcher would 
counter this with the contention that limited generalisability may be posited if saturation 
point is reached in terms of the main thrusts of the content. This requires sufficient 
groups to be conducted, until no further key ideas emerge in the last group. This issue 
may also be addressed through triangulation of qualitative findings with methods 
recognised as enabling the drawing of more generalisable conclusions, such as 
quantitative surveys. 
The third issue concerns representativeness. Although attention was paid to sampling, 
the 62 participants of the focus group discussions cannot be taken as strictly 
representative of the 436 survey respondents.54 While survey completion is a relatively 
undemanding, passive process for the respondents, participation in focus groups is likely 
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 See Nye 2004: 82, and section 6.4. of this thesis. 
54
 In this thesis, when ‘respondents’ are referred to, it always indicates those who completed the survey. 
‘Participants’ refers to those who took part in the focus groups. 
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to appeal individuals who feel more confident in expressing their views in front of groups 
of strangers. Furthermore, only those who were generally interesting in participating in a 
discussion of these political and social themes attended.55 My Kyiv moderator went so far 
as to inform me that the participants, who were mostly Master students, were ‘more 
active, less lazy’, than their counterparts on the old, five year, pre-Bologna ‘specialist’ 
degree programmes. Likewise, the great majority of the ethnic Ukrainian group in L’viv 
commented in their introductory statements that they were involved in the life of their 
faculty and / or city. Similarly in the East, particularly in Donets’k, participants tended to 
be more critical towards the stimulus materials than suggested by survey. Overall, 
however, from a methodological perspective, this is not problematic since the focus 
group is not conceptualised with the purpose of generalisability in mind, but rather to 
provide some context to the survey returns. The main conclusions from the focus groups 
will be drawn on the basis of the nature of the discussion, rather than the relative 
prevalence of certain perspectives. 
4.8. Rationale for Choice of Target Audience 
 
There is a debate about which is the more significant audience for soft power efforts; 
elites or the general public. Understanding soft power as representational force, Bially 
Mattern concludes that it is necessary above all for would-be agents of soft power to 
engage with elites; to ‘trap leaders or decision makers with threats to their subjectivities 
since it is they whose submission translates into policy and behaviours’ (2005: 610-611). 
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 Indeed, to many students, even the entirely respectable remuneration of 40 hryvnia  – a purchasing 
power equivalent to about 20 single journeys on the ‘marshrutka’ mini-bus taxi, or two cinema trips or two 
three-course meals in the Ukrainian buffet meal chain ‘Puzata Khata’ – was insufficient encouragement to 
participate. Indeed, the few cases where it was suggested that certain participants may have been primarily 
enticed by the financial incentive, they tended to be noticeably quiet in the discussion (e.g. a male student 
in Donetsk 2). 
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This is understandable, as it is they who are responsible for decision making in their 
respective society and therefore the potential agents of change in foreign policy direction, 
as well as acting as gatekeepers for the further dissemination of soft power messages. 
However, studies have pointed to the influence that may be wielded by co-opting the 
general public into one’s vision of society. This is demonstrated, for instance, by looking 
at US soft power in the 1950s, when the promotion of American consumer culture was 
aimed above all at the masses. This was highly successful in subverting the cultural 
dominance of European elites, who were horrified by these mass imports, which quietly 
introduced demand for change on a much wider plane (de Grazia 2005, Stephan 2006). Of 
course, the most successful soft power strategies will strive to nurture preference for 
their culture and values among both elites (with exchange programmes, scholarships, 
seminars etc.) and the general public (with mass communications and other civil society 
activity). Yet due to the relatively porous nature of international borders resultant from 
widespread access to means of communication and transport, it is possible for ideas to 
gain ground in the imaginations of populations and thus affect their understanding of 
themselves and their situation without the consent of the national ruling elite.56  
In this study I aimed to elicit the views of a section of the general population, since I am 
interested in analysing the reception among ordinary individuals whose stance is less 
likely to be shaped by vested economic interests, and who are more likely to feel able to 
express their opinion freely without political considerations. Elites are perhaps more likely 
to assume the official position of their patron in a focus group context57, as opposed to 
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 The psychological effects of  these information initiatives contributed significantly to the end of the Cold 
War, as well as providing focus for the demonstrations than lead to the colour revolutions across Eastern 
Europe in the noughties. 
57
 For instance, in Jacob Preuss’ 2010 documentary film ‘the Other Chelsea’ about the interaction between 
politics, business and sport in Donets’k, protagonist Kolya, a young, up-and-coming local politician, informs 
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engaging in a spontaneous and natural discussion of their own perspectives. Another 
reason for exploring the attitudes of members of the Ukrainian general public is that it 
was precisely this group that Medvedev declared should be targeted by Russian efforts in 
the sphere of soft power.58 There is also a feeling in Russia that Western agencies are 
specifically targeting the general public in order to try to effect political change in the 
manner of a ‘colour revolution’. 
However, the Ukrainian population has become very diversified since the fall of 
communism. Thus, in order to be able draw sensible and generalisable conclusions, it 
makes sense to focus on a particular section of the Ukrainian public. For this purpose I 
have selected higher education students from four cities across the country. In focusing 
on higher education students, I have chosen a highly educated section of society, born 
largely after the end of the USSR (aged c. 16-21) and with a relatively high level of access 
to a diversity of information. While it is not possible to directly extrapolate the views of 
this specific sample group to the general public as a whole, it is worth considering them 
thoughtfully, as the potential shape of things to come. After all, they are likely to become 
Ukrainian society’s leaders and opinion-formers of the future; the politicians, the business 
elites, the teachers, the journalists, the managers – in short those who are more likely to 
be in a position to act as an authoritative opinion-multiplier, spreading their views to 
others. As such, their negotiations of Russia’s soft power discourses are especially 
significant for scholars of politics. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the director that he’ll be going to a meeting to listen to Donets’k oligarch Rinat Akhmetov and on this basis 
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Researching the reception of contemporary Russian soft power discourses among 
Ukrainian students also had a number of practical benefits. It was assumed to be 
relatively easy to gain access to students as they are often linked in to online social 
networks that can be used to disseminate advertisements for my study. In the event, local 
coordinators from the universities were employed to recruit respondents and participants, 
whose task was greatly facilitated by their institutional connections and access. 
Furthermore, students are likely to attend certain places (i.e. university buildings) on a 
regular basis, thus facilitating focus groups attendance.  
It was decided to recruit students from only one university per city, because different 
universities have different orientations59 and in such a small-scale study one could not 
fairly represent the full spectrum so to speak of ‘students from Kyiv’. The research 
centred on ‘National’ universities, that is to say, ones considered to be more prestigious 
in Ukraine: Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv, Ivan-Franko University in  L’viv, Donetsk 
National Technical University and V.N. Karamzin Kharkiv National University. As such, they 
were not only usually the largest institutions in their respective towns, but also those that 
might be supposed to be among the more likely alma maters of the future generation of 
Ukrainian leaders.60 
4.9. Ukraine’s Regional Diversity and Presentation of Case Study Cities 
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 For instance, e.g. the Kyiv Mohyla Academy has a distinctly pro-Western orientation. NaUKMA has a lot of 
Western educational and research partners: 
 http://www.ukma.kiev.ua/eng_site/en/proj_part/part/education/index.php (accessed 22nd November 
2012). 
60
 The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA) was not included in this project as it is well-
known for its more pro-Western orientation, (the languages of education are Ukrainian and English, with 
Russian excluded) and was thus considered not to represent a fair test of wider attitudes, even among 
Kyiv’s student population. Indeed, although prestigious, this university is one of the smallest in Ukraine. 
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Numerous objective reasons speak for Ukraine’s selection as the case study country. 
Ukraine is a large, populous country situated at a strategic location between the 
European North and South, East and West. As well as hosting the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
at Sevastopol, Ukrainian territory is also a key supply route of pipelines delivering Russian 
and Central Asian gas to Europe (STRATFOR 2010). It is also characterised by vast tracts of 
fertile agricultural land. The country is on the cusp of Eastern and Western Christianity, 
and has historically been a meeting point of empires. Not only in their Russian and Soviet 
manifestations; the territories of contemporary Ukraine have also been under Polish, 
Lithuanian, Austrian, Austro-Hungarian, Romanian, Tatar and Ottoman rule. Even today, 
Ukraine is an area of contestation between Russian and European-Western influence, not 
to mention the domestic forces of nationalism. There are also more emotive, subjective 
factors that explain why Ukraine is especially important to Russia, but these will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Interest in the Ukrainian case is only increased by the fact it may be seen as a potential 
high-water mark of Russian soft power, if we consider the number of people speaking 
Russian as their native language and the high number of ethnic Russians as a proportion 
of the population. Furthermore, Russia has significant tools of ideational influence in 
Ukraine by virtue of its participation in Ukrainian media landscape and geographic 
proximity. 
Ukraine is characterised by very significant historically rooted regional diversity. Different 
parts of Ukraine still bear the influences of experiences under different empires, which 
continue to have, or perhaps have a revived impact on attitudes and cultural preferences.  
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Such is Ukraine’s regional diversity that, while I have taken four city case studies, it is not 
necessarily justifiable to assume that they reflect the wider picture in their region. For 
instance, it would be unjustifiable to assume that Kyiv represents central Ukraine beyond 
the capital, just as the situation in L’viv certainly does not correspond to the situation in 
Transcarpathia in west Ukraine, where Viktor Yanukovych received 41.55 per cent of the 
vote, compared with 8.6 per cent in  L’viv and 25.72 per cent in the city of Kyiv. The aim 
with this sampling strategy was rather to try to represent a limited cross section of 
Ukraine’s diversity. At the same time, the decision was taken to exclude certain outliers, 
such as Transcarpathia and Crimea.61  
Furthermore, one should recall that although the sample sizes are approximately equal 
for each city case study, the samples themselves represent populations that are not equal 
in number. The Donbas is among the most densely populated region of Ukraine, while the 
Galician regions are relatively rural and sparsely populated. Given that so-called ‘pro-
Russian’ attitudes constitute a significant cleavage in elections, one should take this factor 
into account if pursuing the political implications of this research. 
Background information on each of the case study cities is presented below. 
4.9.1. Donets’k 
 
Located in the east of Ukraine next to the Russian border, Donets’k’s city population is 
the fifth largest and metropolitan population the second largest in Ukraine. Although 
ethnic Ukrainians represent nearly 60 per cent of the population, the Russian language is 
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 Although Crimea is often included with Eastern or Southern Ukraine in regional comparison, it is a 
particular case. Russia has more soft power tools and resources in this autonomous region, particularly 
since it is a relatively new part of Ukraine and is home to many Soviet military veterans and their families, as 
well as Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Transcarpathia too is characterised by historical dynamics that make is 
different from elsewhere in Ukraine, and worthy of separate study. 
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clearly dominant. The city was not founded until 1869, but the area was previously part of 
the ‘Wild Fields’ to the South East of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and Novorossiya. As 
such, this area was not part of an independent Ukrainian state until 1991. 
Donets’k, both as a city and a region, is heavily industrialised and played an important 
role in the Soviet economy. The region retains significant integrated links with Russian 
business. Furthermore, reflecting the place of the Donbas in the economic power 




Founded in 1654, Kharkiv is situated in the East of Ukraine and constituted a main centre 
of Sloboda Ukraine [Slobozhanshchina / Slobids'ka Ukraina]; a historic trans-border region 
straddling Kharkiv and Russia’s Belgorod oblasts, and as such a hub of Ukrainian culture in 
the Russian Empire. Having been the first city to recognise Soviet power, it was capital 
city to the Ukrainian SSR between 1919 and 1934. Russian is the primary language in the 
urban centres, although Ukrainian is spoken in rural regions of Kharkiv oblast. According 
to the 2001 census, 71 per cent of the population of Kharkiv oblast were ethnic Ukrainian. 
Today, Kharkiv is a relatively wealthy, industrial city.  
4.9.3. Kyiv 
 
As the national capital, the city of Kyiv naturally commands a decisive influence over the 
country’s political direction, as it is from the capital and its universities that a large share 
of national leaders emerge. As the birthplace of the medieval kingdom of Rus’, not only 
Ukraine but also Russia and Belarus trace their statehood back to Kyiv. Having changed 
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hands numerous times, Kyiv became capital of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1917, 
and after an intermission of 13 years, was the capital of the UkSSR. Today Kyiv is 
considered a thoroughly Ukrainian city, and although Russian remains widely spoken, it is 
not to the exclusion of Ukrainian. 
4.9.4. L’viv 
 
The Western Ukrainian city of L’viv is often held up as a contrasting point to Ukraine’s 
eastern regions. By far the largest city of Western Ukraine, with c. 1.5million inhabitants, 
it forms a regional centre for Ukrainian Galicia ( L’viv, Ternopil and Ivano Frankivsk 
oblasts). As of 2001, 88 per cent of the population were ethnic Ukrainians and the area is 
primarily Ukrainophone although there is also a significant Russian minority (c. 9 per cent 
in 2001). 
Galicia [Halychyna] became part of the Soviet Union only in 1939, having been variously 
under Polish and Austro-Hungarian rule. It is considered the heartland of Ukrainian 
nationalism, and was the site of fierce partisan resistance to Soviet occupation during the 
Second World War. These regions remain relatively rural and agriculturally oriented, 
although  L’viv has a long history as a cultural and intellectual centre. Since the fall of 
communism, the city has (re-)developed significant cultural ties with the countries of 
Mitteleuropa.62 
4.10. Conduct of Survey 
 
The survey aimed to gauge responses to Russian soft power discourses and provide a 
quantitative picture of regional differences. The questions were developed on the basis of 
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consistently recurring positions and discursive themes articulated by the selected Russian 
soft power agents. These positions were formulated into statements, which the 
respondents had to evaluate on a five point scale, with one representing strong 
disagreement, five indicating strong agreement and three indicating ambivalence. The 
statements were all formulated in such a way that a score of five always indicated a very 
positive, ‘pro-Russian’ response. This allowed the generation of three scores 
corresponding to an average of each respondent’s evaluations of the cultural, value-
oriented, and foreign policy statements in the three substantive sections. An individual’s 
overall ‘Russian soft power score’ represents an average of their responses to the three 
sets of questions.  
In order to adjudge the presence of soft power, the ‘soft power score’ – whether relating 
to a particular strand or overall – should be equal to or greater than three; the point at 
which the average score exceeds ‘ambivalent’ and enters positive territory. Arguably, one 
might feel that having an ambivalent average score is not a particularly affirmative 
statement. Yet one should take into account that in the minds of the Ukrainian 
respondents, a score of three turned out to not be perceived strictly as an indication of 
neutrality or ambivalence. The scoring system was designed in tandem with the Kyiv 
moderator who recommended using a five point system (rather than the ten-point 
version I had initially proposed) due to the greater familiarity of this system to Ukrainian 
students, who are used to being evaluated out of five in their education system.63 Hence 
while labelled ‘ambivalent’ in my survey, the score of three still has an intuitively positive 
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 In principle, a new grading system has been introduced taking into account the Bologna Process. However, 
the five point system still seems to function as a reference point, with the new 12 point system probably 
only being applied to the Bachelor and Master programmes, i.e. a minority of cases, while many students 
continue on the five year ‘specialist’ programmes of the Soviet era. Under the tradition system, the grade of 
two indicates ‘unsatisfactory’; a failing grade. 
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association with being ‘satisfactory’, rather than say ‘neither positive or negative’; a fact I 
was unaware of at the moment of the research design. In short, this supports the notion 
of taking an average of three or greater as indicative of the presence of soft power. 
Survey recruitment was managed and executed to my instructions by a colleague in each 
of the four participating universities. In each case, these coordinators were faculty 
members concurrently working towards a doctoral degree [kandidatskaya]. I became 
acquainted with them through personal contacts and as a result of enquiries with 
Ukrainian research institutes. The surveys were piloted and then dispatched to the local 
coordinators ready for completion prior to my arrival in each of the target cities for the 
focus groups. This took place mostly in September 2011. The survey was available in both 
Russian and Ukrainian and each respondent should have had the choice, however, in Kyiv, 
the Dean stipulated that all surveys must be conducted in Ukrainian as a condition.64 
Respondents were solicited in various ways; survey distribution by university teachers in 
classes, active recruitment of individuals by employed student assistants, and emails from 
the moderators bearing the links to the online surveys. Recruitment was randomised in 
accordance with the prescribed sample populations.  
Upon completion of the survey, the data was cleansed and input into a statistics package, 
SPSS 19, for ease of analysis. The survey was generally completed well – there were few 
cases of all responses being the same, which might indicate an element of 
thoughtlessness. Some individuals, again very few, did choose to exclude whole sections, 
or even large parts of the survey. These cases have been included nevertheless for the 
insights they offer to particular questions, and where a particular element of information 
                                                          
64
 This was because Ukrainian is the official working language of the university. However, my moderator 
informed me that 80 per cent of the time she spoke with students in Russian outside formal classes. 
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is missing, this case was automatically excluded by SPSS in relevant queries and thereby 
did not affect the overall results. 
4.11. Profile of Survey Sample 
 
Altogether, 436 questionnaires were gathered, of which 100 were from Kyiv and Kharkiv 
each, 101 from L’viv and 136 from Donets’k.65 The figures below provide an overall 
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 The reason for the additional 36 survey respondents in Donetsk was that upon my arrival in the city, only 
around 70 of the intended 100 surveys had been completed, and, what’s more, despite verbal and written 
guidance detailing the proposed sample, those collected were rather weighted towards disciplines related 












Chart 1: Distribution of sample 
according to settlement type  














Table 1: Distribution of sample according to field of 
study by city (%) 
  
City N Natural Science,  Economics, Maths 
Humanities, 
Arts Other 
    Engineering Business Social Science   
      Kyiv 100 23 36 31 10 
L’viv 101 33 34 34 0 
Donets’k 135 40 57 0 3 
Kharkiv 100 8 21 66 5 





4.12. Conduct of Focus Groups 
 
The survey findings presented a diverse spectrum of opinions on the different narratives 
highlighted as relevant by this study. In the focus groups, the participants’ responses to 
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 Participants were also given an ‘other / prefer not to say’ option, but no respondents selected this. Kyiv 
was the exception, where the survey coordinator removed the option without consulting with me, later 








Chart 2: Distribution of sample according to sex 











Russian soft power discourses were explored in greater depth, with the assumption that 
this would provide insight into whether the participants shared and accepted the 
worldview proposed to them by Russia; a key indicator of soft power.  
The survey had posed a large number of questions, but given the generally accepted 
maximum duration of two hours, it would be impossible to discuss all points in the 
context of a focus group. Indeed, this was not necessary, since the focus groups did not 
simply seek an embellishment on the survey responses. After an introduction to the 
proceedings by the moderator, short video clips (c. five minutes) expressing the discourse 
were shown. The aim was to stimulate free-flowing discussion on the broad topic of the 
narratives, thereby giving insight into how the participants negotiated the proposed 
narratives and the interpretative resources they drew on in doing so. This offered insight 
into how discourses resonated and whether they were spontaneously reproduced or in 
various ways subverted by respondents. This enabled an assessment of the hegemony of 
the target discourses, and thus the extent to which Russia can be said to have soft power. 
Full information on the conduct of the focus groups, including the focus group guide and 
transcriptions of the stimulus materials may be found in the appendices.  
4.12.1. Role of Moderators 
 
The focus groups were facilitated by a moderator, whose job it was to explain the formal 
procedures, including introductions, outline the expectations of the participants, initiate 
an icebreaker, as well as lend formal direction to the discussion (Flick 2002: 116-7). 
In each case, the local survey coordinators also moderated the focus groups. This had a 
number of practical and methodological advantages over this researcher conducting them 
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herself. While considerable time and energy have been devoted to learning the Russian 
and Ukrainian languages, it is generally accepted that focus groups should be conducted 
by moderators mother-tongue fluent in a native language of the participants. In order for 
the participants to feel at ease to speak their mind freely and authentically, it is important 
that the moderator be able to quickly build a rapport, which is far harder for a foreigner 
and non-native speaker of the working language(s).  
Moderators were informed of the stipulations in various briefing documents (terms of 
reference, sampling guide and focus group guide) prior to my arrival in the city, and orally, 
both at the time of recruitment and during the specially budgeted briefing meeting.  
4.12.2. Number of Participants and Duration 
 
The literature proposes between six and ten participants as the ideal (Lunt and 
Livingstone 1996: 7), and indeed my experience suggested eight members as optimal in 
terms of group dynamics. The recommended length is 1.5-2 hours (Patton 1990: 335, 
cited in Flick 2002: 113). Most of my groups were within this range, although sometimes 
they did run longer once formal procedures were included. 
4.12.3. Number of Groups 
 
In terms of how many groups should be conducted, Lunt and Livingstone draw attention 
to ‘a useful rule of thumb [which] holds that for any given category of people discussing a 
particular topic there are only so many stories to be told. Hence one should continue to 
run new groups until the last group has nothing new to add but merely repeats previous 
contributions’ (1996: 7). This stipulation was born in mind during the conduct of the 
research, and it may be said that the picture that emerged across all groups reflected a 
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certain coherent range of views, although the extent of their prevalence differed 
somewhat by location. In total, eight groups were conducted,67 with two in each city. In 
each case, I liaised with the respective local moderator to ascertain their opinion as to 
whether a full range of likely mainstream opinions had been expressed. This was in every 
case affirmative after two groups.  
4.12.4. Focus Group Composition 
 
Another methodological decision in the design process concerns the composition of the 
focus groups; should they be homogenous or heterogeneous? Flick (2002: 115) notes that 
‘[i]n homogenous groups, members are comparable in the essential dimensions related to 
the research question and have similar background. For their part, Lunt and Livingstone 
(1996: 15) observe that ‘groups consistent in composition... are easier to conduct: the 
group establishes confidence more quickly, it moves more readily beyond platitudes 
towards analysis.’ Benefits were gleaned in these respects since my target audience was 
homogenous in the sense that all participants were university students and foreseen to 
be from the same universities. 
However, participants from a breadth of disciplinary backgrounds were targeted to 
ensure a range of outlooks, and a gender balance was likewise sought. This stipulation 
helped ensure the recruitment of people who did not know one another prior to the 
focus groups, which is generally considered to have benefits over working with ‘groups of 
friends or of people who know each other very well, because the level of things taken for 
granted which remains implicit is higher’ with such groups (Morgan 1988: 48, cited in Flick 
2002: 121). Thus, participants’ lines of thinking were more readily articulated for the 
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purposes of the recording and analysis than might otherwise have been the case. The 
groups were also heterogeneous with regard to certain characteristics relevant for the 
research questions; namely nationality and language preferences. Flick anticipates this 
will be beneficial in that, 
many different perspectives will be expressed and also that individual participants’ 
reserve will be broken down by the confrontation between these perspectives... the 
expectation linked to this is that the different backgrounds will lead to intensified 
dynamics in the discussion, which will reveal more aspects and perspectives of the 
phenomenon under study. (2002: 205) 
However, while acknowledging this potential plus, I chose to limit the internal 
heterogeneity concerning these issues with a view to potentially isolating the impact of 
the variables of ethnicity, language preference and region. This approach also allowed the 
observation of tendencies towards similarity and difference between the differently 
sampled groups. 
Recruitment to the focus groups was conducted on a voluntary basis: Individuals were 
offered the opportunity to participate at the end of the survey and those who indicated 
their willingness were invited by the moderator by telephone or email if they met the 
desired group profile.  
The focus group discussions were all recorded on a voice recorder and then transcribed in 
the original language by colleagues in Ukraine. The transcript data was carefully 
formatted for transfer into NVIVO 8, a qualitative data analysis programme. This helped 
facilitate the coding of the data into useful and easily reviewable analytical and thematic 




For ease of reference, this summary table of the design of participant profile is provided. 
Table 2: Summary of focus group participant profiles 
Focus Group Name Native Language Ethnic Background Language of FGD 
Kyiv 168 Ukrainian speakers (Mixed- not profiled) In Ukrainian but 
with some Russian 
Kyiv 2 Russian speakers (Mixed- not profiled) In Russian, but much 
Ukrainian 
L’viv 1 (Mixed- not 
profiled) 
Russian or mixed 
background 
In Ukrainian only 




In Ukrainian only 
Donets’k 1 (Mixed- not 
profiled) 
(Mixed- not profiled) In Russian only 
Donets’k 2 (Mixed- not 
profiled) 
(Mixed- not profiled) In Russian only 
Kharkiv 1 (Mixed- not 
profiled) 
Russian background In Russian only 




In Russian only 
 
4.12.4.1. Profile of Focus Groups in Donets’k 
 
While groups in the other cities were constructed in their own ways so as to try to reflect 
a certain demographic, some difficulties with recruitment were experienced at Donets’k 
National Technical University that meant it was not practically possible to construct 
groups according to a particular ethnic or linguistic profile and hence ethnicity was not 
controlled for in group composition.69 Each of the groups lasted around two hours, and 
took place exclusively in Russian on 9th and 10th November 2011. 
The first group was made up of six students, of which two were females, who were 
studying various specialisations in the faculties of Economics and Management. Two of 
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 In Kyiv, the groups were not designed to be bilingual but sometimes emerged as such. However, there 
appeared to be no problems in communication. 
69
 The first group was originally scheduled for several days earlier, but only four student attended and so it 
had to be postponed since it was felt that six was the minimum required to make it worthwhile in terms of 
the diversity of opinion and the resources required to conduct a single groups regardless of size. 
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the students indicated explicitly that they had family roots in Russia, while the group as a 
whole seemed to share the feeling that having Russian relatives was quite common. 
In the second group there were ten students, of which four were females. Many of these 
students were from the faculty of Energy Mechanics and Machine Building, with others 
from Economics and Computer Science. There are no Humanities or Social Science 
faculties at this university.  
4.12.4.2. Profile of Focus Groups in Kharkiv 
 
In Kharkiv, the first focus group was composed of nine students, of which one was male. 
This group was constructed of ethnic Russian, Russophone students. In the second group 
of six participants there were equal numbers of male and female students, who were 
from a Ukrainian background, but considered themselves native Russian speakers. These 
discussions were conducted on 16th and 17th November 2011 respectively; exclusively in 
Russian. 
In principle, these groups should have been composed entirely of students from the 
Kharkiv Karamzin National University. However, after both groups had been conducted it 
emerged that the second group of students had been recruited instead from the Kharkiv 
National University of Radio-Electronics (‘National’ designation received in 2001), thereby 
leaving this group constructed on different principles from the others. The decision was 
taken to retain this case study since both groups yielded interesting data. While the 
results were broadly in line with the findings from the other focus groups, these groups 
offered some interesting nuances. The group of Ukrainian background students hailing 
from the Electronics University seemed to reflect the Russian soft power target narratives 
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more consistently relative to the other groups in the study. In this sense, they provided a 
useful point of comparison, as a ‘control’ group that reflected the findings of the survey 
more closely. 
4.12.4.3. Profile of Focus Groups in Kyiv 
 
In Kyiv, the focus groups for the students from Taras Shevchenko National University 
were conducted in the morning and afternoon of 22nd October 2011, and lasted 
approximately two and a half hours each. The students were recruited to the survey by 
student assistants.  
The first group was targeted at Ukrainian speakers and consisted of seven participants, of 
which four were female. Three were from the Faculty of Philosophy, while the remainder 
hailed from diverse faculties, including Physics, Geography and Mathematics. Although 
this group was constructed as being Ukrainian-speaking, two male students spoke Russian 
throughout; one of these seemed to do this for the sake of being a contrarian and was the 
only student to take the opportunity to give himself a pseudonym; Ulrich. 
The second group was designed for Russian speakers, and was composed of nine students, 
of which four were female. The participants came from a full range of social science and 
technical faculties, including Radio Physics, International Economics, Law and Cybernetics. 
Again, despite having been constructed for Russophones, the group turned out to be 
much more linguistically mixed, with two or three of the participants choosing to respond 
in Ukrainian. After the end of the groups it emerged in conversation with the student 
assistants involved in recruitment, that these individuals had indicated Russian as their 
mother tongue in the survey and had spoken Russian on the phone, but had equally 
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‘made a transition’ to Ukrainian as their preferred everyday language of communication 
during the course of their higher education. 
4.12.4.4. Profile of Focus Groups in L’viv  
 
Both focus groups for students of the Ivan Franko National University in L’viv were 
conducted exclusively in Ukrainian on 25th and 27th October 2011, and lasted about two 
and a half hours each. The first group was constructed as a mixed group, with most 
students originating from the regions of Western Ukraine but having a family background 
with ties to Russia. This usually meant a Russian parent or Russian speaking family, 
although the sample also included a girl whose great grandfathers fought on different 
sides during the Second World War. This group consisted of seven participants, of which 
five were females, from various specialisations within the History and Electronics faculties. 
The second group was composed of students from a traditionally Galician background, 
that is to say, staunch Ukrainian speakers indigenous to the Western regions of Ukraine. 
There were eight participants in this group, of which two were female. In terms of 
discipline, again, most came from the faculties of History and Electronics, with one from 
Mathematical Mechanics. This group was constructed by the moderator as likely to 
articulate the most sceptical end of the spectrum as concerns Russian soft power 
narratives. The rather intellectual bent of some participants was reflected in the tone of 
the discussion, which sometimes became quite abstracted from the topic in hand, 




4.13. Statement of Research Ethics 
 
Ethical concerns were taken into account during the design and conduct of this research 
project. Respondents and participants were briefed on the project prior to data gathering 
commencing, and given the chance to ask questions. All data collected is held securely 
and anonymised, while focus group participants cited in the write-up are referred to 
under a pseudonym in order to preserve their privacy. That no harmful offence be caused 
to the focus group participants, the moderators maintained an atmosphere respectful of 
a diversity of views.  
The triangulated approach is also ethically positive as it gives a voice to the participants 
and thereby enables them to contribute to the data interpretation process, rather than 
unilateral researcher analysis. This is a component of the ‘new, critical approach to 
methodology which emphasises empowering and respecting respondents as participants 
in the research process’ (Seiter et al 1989, cited in Lunt and Livingstone 1996: 5). 
An ethically-mindful approach was also taken in dealings with the four local coordinators. 
Indeed, the balance of power was rather in favour of the Ukrainian colleagues, who 
played a significant gatekeeper role and without whose assistance the project would have 
been practically impossible. While all steps were taken to ensure effective, positive 
relations, on occasion certain issues arose, in terms of communication, differing 
standards of professionalism (lack of experience with Western counterparts, emphasis on 
just doing the formal task, ‘box ticking’ mentality, tendency to see methodological details 
as ‘parroting’, unnecessary formalities, unhelpful attitude towards constructive criticism, 
non-reporting of problems, unilateral decision making) and related to the fact that as 
public university academics are very poorly paid, they require several jobs to make ends 
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meet and are hence very busy. On the whole, however, the experience was successful, 
positive and rigorous. 
I take this opportunity to declare for the record that I have neither personal nor financial 
ties that would push me to favour a conclusion on the presence or absence of Russian 
soft power in Ukraine. This research has been conducted in a spirit of open-minded 
curiosity with the aim to increase understanding of the concept of soft power and how 
this concept is being engaged with in Russia. All the many persons who contributed to this 
research have been credited in the acknowledgements, appendix and bibliography as 
appropriate. 
4.14. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has outlined how the working definition of soft power established in the 
conceptual framework will be operationalised in order to answer the research question 
concerning the extent to which Russia may be said to have soft power in Ukraine. To this 
end, a particular section of the diverse Ukrainian population, namely higher education 
students in Kyiv, L’viv, Donets’k and Kharkiv, was selected. Their attitudes were canvassed 
through surveys and focus groups in order to gain quantitative and qualitative insight into 
how they negotiate Russian soft power discourses. This mixed-methods approach to 
evaluating the presence of soft power should overcome the problem of de-
contextualisation that dogs conclusions based exclusively on quantitative findings, whilst 
simultaneously allowing a broader perspective on the theme than is provided by studies 
relying on richly descriptive qualitative research alone. Prior to conducting such audience 
reception research, it is necessary to both understand the context of Russian approaches 
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to soft power and the core content of the discourses which are being promoted in 
Ukraine. These topics constitute the subject matter of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Russian Approaches to Soft Power 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Whereas some existing studies have been sceptical about the seriousness of Russian 
engagement with soft power, this thesis suggests that the Kremlin is indeed striving to 
develop genuinely co-optive tools and mechanisms of foreign policy influence, although it 
does raise some issues concerning its effectiveness. 
This chapter looks first at different notions of soft power in circulation in Russia, finding 
that some misunderstandings are indeed in evidence. The definition of soft power 
employed in this thesis was developed iteratively with the investigation of the Russian-
Ukrainian case study, with the ongoing revisitings of both theoretical and empirical 
materials contributing to a definition that sits well with the case study. However, this is 
not the only understanding in currency in Russia, and analysis of the empirical matter 
suggests five different approaches to soft power in practice. Thus, one might analyse 
Russian nation-branding, humanitarian cooperation, initiatives to promote an ‘objective 
image’ abroad, compatriot policies and the initiative to resume civilisational leadership. 
Some of these phenomena are described using soft power terminology, but wouldn’t 
come under the definition provided in the conceptual framework of this thesis. 
Conversely, activities corresponding to this definition are not necessarily described as soft 
power by practitioners. This thesis will only examine the fifth approach, Moscow’s 
attempt to reassert civilisational leadership. Since the definition articulated in the 
conceptual framework posits soft power as an ‘ability’ and substantive achievement, 
studies of Russian soft power must examine the extent to which Russia is able to exercise 
such cultural leadership in a given context, in this case, contemporary Ukraine. 
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Russian elites see their country as a great power, a defining characteristic of which is the 
ability to assume leadership on the international stage. A pre-requisite for leadership is a 
project or approach that one can propose to would-be followers. Further, to qualify as 
sovereign leadership, the cultural-ideational discourse framing such approaches should 
be determined in-country and distinctive from the offerings of other civilisational 
contenders, drawing on indigenous tradition. That Russia approaches soft power in this 
way is demonstrated in this chapter with reference to the statements of scholars and 
practitioners. Having established this background, the stage will be set for an examination 
the ideational contours of the civilisational discourse around which Russia seeks to rally 
partners. 
5.2. Conceptual Engagement with Soft Power in Russia 
 
This thesis argues that the need for soft power is recognised within the Kremlin. As Farid 
Mukhametshin, former head of Rossotrudnichestvo has noted, ‘any modernisation in 
society starts with the modernisation of worldview’ (2011). While Russia is unlikely to rely 
excessively on soft power to achieve its international objectives or reduce its hard power 
capacity, as Boris Mezhuev, a political analyst who has been involved in Russian 
discussions on soft power and image, said at a conference: ‘bad is the Hobbes who 
doesn’t dream of becoming Kant!’ (cited in Pavlovsky 2009). Indeed, while Russia’s 
military resources and raw materials may underpin Russian power, for them to be 
Russia’s main contribution to the world is seen as primitive, undignified and unworthy 
(Kosachev 2004; Medvedev 2009). 
However, within relevant state structures, interpretations of soft power are significantly 
less coherent (Rogozin 2010). Indeed, for all this interest in soft power among political 
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and media circles over the last years, there is evidence suggesting misunderstanding and 
a lack of engagement with the concept.70 Indeed, ‘soft power’ has been associated with 
femininity and thereby a culturally mitigated perception of weakness, which impedes 
serious engagement in certain quarters (Kivirähk 2010). The ‘real’ business is seen to lie 
with hard power, and therefore for some elites ‘softer’ approaches are 
incomprehensible.71 Hence, for many, attitudes towards soft power may be summed up 
by the view: ‘We’re not loved, but respected – that’s the main thing’.72  Indeed, 
Konstantin Kosachev (2009) observed that Russia underestimates attractiveness as a 
significant factor in its relations with its partners, and needs to cultivate sympathy and 
trust.  
Furthermore, in the Russian context, the first issue may in part be a linguistic one, with 
‘softness’ and power seeming oxymoronic, as the Russian renderings of ‘power’ – ‘sila’ 
[force], ‘vlast’ [domination], ‘moshch’ [might] – convey a stronger sense of asymmetrical 
obligation, compulsion and coercion, whereas the English term ‘power’ is flexible enough 
to also convey the notion of co-option. Perhaps it is for this reason that ‘soft power’, 
measured by identity, is sometimes seen to suggest a kind of ‘loyalty’ and ‘service’ to 
Russia among foreigners who are in some way dependent upon Moscow (Chatham House 
2011: 10; Pavlovsky 2011: 2; Ryabukh 2011; Prokhorenko 2012).73  
Consequently, the notion of ‘soft power’ has taken time to become embedded in the 
Russian policy world. Furthermore, the term has frequently been imbued with a negative 
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 For instance, early in the discussion, Russian journalists Avdeev and Kulikov (2007) refer to the use of 
water cannons and rubber-bullets as soft power, presumably on the grounds that these tend not to inflict 
fatal wounds, even if they are wielded coercively 
71
 Interview with N. Belaeva in Moscow June 2011. 
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 (2009). Lyubyat li v mire russkikh? Fond Russkiy Mir, 6th April: 
 http://russkiymir.ru/ru/publication/choice/index.php?id4=9148 (accessed 7th April 2009). 
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 Interviews with N. Belaeva and A. Okara conducted in Moscow in June-July 2011. 
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meaning quite at odds with the generally positive connotations of the English-language 
term. Vladimir Putin, for instance, has used the term in quite a different sense from that 
Nye intended, perhaps because none of its direct translations fit comfortably with Russian 
ways of thinking, and because it’s an Americanism whose conceptual claims to legitimacy 
are not accepted in Moscow. Putin recently employed the term ‘soft power’ to designate 
a specific type of Western-driven propaganda campaign: 
The notion of ‘soft power’ is being used increasingly often. This implies a matrix of tools 
and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting 
information and other levers of influence. Regrettably, these methods are being used all 
too frequently to develop and provoke extremist, separatist and nationalistic attitudes, to 
manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of 
sovereign countries. 
There must be a clear division between freedom of speech and normal political activity, 
on the one hand, and illegal instruments of "soft power," on the other.74 
By this reading, soft power is not the positive, post-modern, ethically sound way of 
conducting politics, as presented in the West. Rather, soft power represents a synonym 
for ‘orange technologies’; the financial, training-related, practical and moral support 
provided to members of Ukrainian civil society, particularly youth groups, in the run-up to 
the 2004 presidential elections. In this way, the metapolitical ground was prepared for 
the initiation and maintenance of popular mobilisation against electoral fraud on the part 
of the ‘pro-Kremlin’ candidate Viktor Yanukovych to the benefit of the Western-
supported candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. Konstantin Kosachev, in comparing Chinese soft 
power with that of the West notes, 
Whereas China underscores its non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, the 
West’s soft power principle say: “Make things better! Don’t put up with infringements on 
your rights! Don’t wait for changes to ripen by themselves!” It follows that the Chinese 
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 An article on foreign policy. Putin, V. V. (2012). "Russia and the Changing World." RIA Novosti 27th 
February(http://en.rian.ru/world/20120227/171547818-print.html (accessed 27th February)). 
This perspective was reiterated by the respondent in my interview with an independent researcher in 
Moscow, 27
th
 June 2011. 
141 
 
variant addresses contented people, while the West’s one appeals to the discontent. 
Logically, it should stimulate the West to incite internal discontent in other states to 
create optimal conditions for projecting its soft power (Kosachev 2012).75 
The recent proliferation of ‘velvet’ ‘revolutions’ in formerly Soviet-influenced countries 
combined with continued socio-economic and political problems on the domestic stage 
stoked elite fears of a ‘birch revolution’ in Russia. This resulted in the introduction of strict 
laws on foreign NGOs, presumably to impede their ability to propagate provocative ideas 
and ferment discord. It was likely such factors that caused Kosachev (2012) to declare 
that soft power relates ‘not so much to the sphere of culture and information as to 
geopolitics’. Issues of culture, spirituality and information integrity have been securitised 
(Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998) in today’s Russia, and the potential for threats against them 
are mentioned in the National Security Strategy (2009) and the Information Security 
Doctrine (2000).  
Elsewhere, ‘soft power’ is interpreted as simply as aspect of PR, as Okara observes: 
Very many people, especially the political establishment, believe that soft power is only 
the improvement of one’s own image [imidzh], that it’s simply the improvement of the 
country’s image in the post-Soviet space, that is to say, improving the image in the 
world.76  
In this vein, Andrey Kazantsev has opined that the methods of soft power are understood 
in Russia, and namely under their traditional moniker of ‘propaganda’ and, despite claims 
to the contrary, as being nothing new.77 In the Russian debate on this theme, two 
expressions corresponding to the English word ‘image’ are used; ‘imidzh’ and ‘obraz’. 
Konstantin Kosachev (2012),78 has pointed to the idea of ‘imidzh’ as referring to ‘a set of 
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 On the role of Western actors in instigating ‘colour revolutions’ also see Herd (2005). 
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 Interview with A. Okara conducted in Moscow in July 2011. 
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 Telephone interview conducted with Andrey Kazantsev in July 2011. 
78
 Konstantin Kosachev has been head of Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots 
Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation) since March 2012. He is also the Russian 
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outside observers’ ideas about a subject, i.e. a reputation which is often formed under 
the influence of persisting stereotypes (national, religious, historical or political) and 
information from intermediaries (the mass media, ratings, expert conclusions, etc.)’ By 
contrast, ‘obraz’ is seen to equate to ‘an exact reflection of objective reality which one 
can see for oneself, the actual state of affairs, which in case of an open state can adjust 
excessively negative or unjustified ideas’ (Kosachev 2012). While this thesis would not 
necessarily support this distinction on methodological grounds, it reflects a fault line in 
opinion on whether it is necessary to improve conditions in Russia with a view to the 
reality presenting itself in a more attractive way (obraz), or merely improve PR and 
marketing to ensure that existing conditions are more favourably perceived, without 
fundamentally changing anything (imidzh) (Kononenko 2006; Bespalov, Vlasov et al. 2007; 
Adilova 2008). 
Aside from the general mentions it receives in normative, journalistic commentaries, the 
term ‘soft power’ is most commonly used in Russia by members of the academic 
community who are understandably keen to link in to international debates surrounding 
this currently quite fashionable term. On one hand, the expression may also be used to 
refer to what has been termed in this thesis as soft power as a practice of engagement 
with multilateral institutions, rather than unilateral coercion, as a means of achieving 
foreign policy goals. On the other hand, Russian academic discussions of soft power as a 
resource share much in common with their Western counterparts in terms of the absence 
of a critical disassembly of the concept and consequent difficulties in operationalising a 
theoretically consistent analysis. That said, since the debate is more commonly turned to 
                                                                                                                                                                                
President’s special envoy for relationships with CIS member states, a member of editorial board of Russia in 
Global Affairs and former chair of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee. 
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narrower empirical examples, the discussion often turns out to be more informative as it 
relates to specific issues and provide new knowledge to the Western researcher (for 
instance: Fominykh 2008; Lebedeva 2009; Panova 2011).  
5.3. Obstacles to the Renewal of Russian Soft Power 
 
However, for all the words devoted to the broad theme of soft power, numerous issues 
impede successful implementation. 
Although ‘neo-imperialist’ or revanchist rhetoric may be utilised by some politicians to 
serve their own ends at a particular moment, on the whole, there is little intent among 
members of the mainstream political establishment to revise the borders of the Russian 
Federation. Indeed, despite the talk of Russia’s ‘imperial complexes’, one issue that has 
impeded the development of Russian soft power relates to an insufficiency of political will 
to engage in international meta-projects (Sakwa 2011 cited in Lomagin 2012: 499).79 
Sergei Karaganov (2010: 34) attributes this to the wish of the population to ‘relax after 
burden of communism and revolution.’ While at one time there was will in the political 
class to pay the economic price to ‘reintegrate the old empire’ (Evgeny Primakov cited in 
Fawn and White 2002: 167), today, even if money were available, there is little desire 
even to subsidise gas to Ukraine, for instance, in exchange for ‘friendship’ (Filimonov 
2010). Pragmatism is largely the mood of the day, as elites remain concerned with 
everyday political issues, not to mention ensuring their own access to power and money 
flows.  
Global projects are side-lined as a distraction from the bread and butter issues of 
domestic problems. According to Bokan, the elite is aware of the potential grounds for 
                                                          
79
 Interview with A. Okara conducted in Moscow 2011. 
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resistance, and foresees the reaction of opponents in such complaints that ‘we have 
enough internal problems, and again this nostalgia for the idea of being “ahead of the 
whole planet”, again imperial habits, again teaching others while at home…and so on and 
so forth’ (Bokan 2010: 148). There is a sense that the Russian state can’t do soft power 
because many of its influential representatives don’t, at this stage, believe in any 
‘romantic’ discourses; they are cynically ironic towards them.80  
Further, a lack of national self-confidence to act as a driving force behind such visionary 
projects is also diagnosed by Surkov, who writes, 
People say: “Russia has overstrained itself. Prolonged imperial exertion has weakened its 
powers; it has lost passionarity81 and is leaving history. Russia is breaking apart: the Far 
East is depopulated, the Caucasus embittered. Russia has fallen behind forever – a raw 
material backwater, a country of slaves and masters and eternal poverty, living from hand 
to mouth, off hemp and gas. Russia is physically dying out – a lethal outcome from 
population loss is inevitable.” (2009: 17) 
A loss of belief in Russian abilities to assume a wider leadership role have led to a shift in 
discourse among some elements of the nationalist movement, away from an 
internationalist narrative towards a set of ideas more typical of the European far right. 
Defensive, anti-migrant, isolationist and with paternalistic elements, this strain of 
nationalism is ‘more concerned with maintaining Russia’s “Russianness” than with 
territorial expansion’ (Popescu 2012). Such ‘red-brown’ nationalism is a cause for concern 
as it threatens not only domestic discord, but also to undermine Russia’s desired image 
narrative as a country well placed to offer the world the benefits of its successful 
multinational, multi-confessional experiences. Such cleavages in nationalist stance were 
observable at the Russian March to mark National Unity Day 2011 where more traditional 
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 Interviews with A. Pionkovskiy and A. Okara conducted in Moscow in July 2011. 
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 The translator notes: ‘Passionarnost’ – a concept in Lev Gumilev’s theory of the life cycle of the ethnos.’ 
(Surkov 2009: 17) 
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slogans like ‘There is No Russia without the Caucasus’ met chants of ‘Stop Feeding the 
Caucasus’ and ‘Russia for Russians’ expressing frustration towards migrants and the flow 
of federal funds to the region (Filimonov 2011). 
Nevertheless, irredentist elements do still exist. Statements interpreted in this light 
uttered by politicians such as Konstantin Zatulin have resulted in him being denied entry 
to Ukraine as a person non grata. Similarly, ideas expressed by the more radical among 
Russian politicians, to the effect that the Russian Empire should be restored as a Eurasian 
civilisation, provoke alienating impressions of Russian chauvinism (Pelnēns 2009) quite at 
cross-purposes to soft power. Overall, there is an impression of states being ‘forced to 
friendship’, thereby excluding the possibility of actual friendship. 
By contrast, ‘those for whom the sun sets in the West’ (Surkov 2009: 9) are depicted as 
wanting Russia to follow a liberal path of development, implying the relinquishing of a 
‘historical civilisational mission’ and establishment of ‘normal’ relations with 
neighbouring countries.82 According to Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s middle-classes – who 
arguably constitute the main constituency of liberal Westernisers – are ‘consumers, not 
citizens or entrepreneurs’ and thus in the absence of a res publica, Russia is not a nation 
(2010: 36). Hence there is a strong desire to co-opt this group, described as the best part 
of the country in the context of recent protests; the creative class upon whom success 
depends.83  
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 Russia has long had pro-Western constituency, for details, see for instance: Riasanovsky, N. V. (2005). 
Russian Identities. A Historical Survey. Oxford, Oxford University Pres. 
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 Of course, the memberships of these groups are fluid and may overlap and shift. Indeed, according to 
Nicu Popescu (2012), some nationalist leaders believe that the blend of anti-immigrant rhetoric and 
oppositional stance will appeal to many young, urban, Western-liberal leanings middle-class voters.  
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A further problem is that this group, which tends to be young (under 35), highly educated 
and professionally successful, are seen to be lacking in cultural and historical 
consciousness. Perhaps as a result of having been socialised during a ‘time of troubles’ in 
Russia, these high-flyers frequently chose degree courses likely to maximise their career 
prospects, in disciplines related to economics and management. Consequently, as Natalia 
Narochnitskaya (2007) observes, this influential portion of the new generation received a 
higher education that did not impart a cultural, historical consciousness. Indeed, Patriarch 
Aleksey also complained about the ‘practical, at times mercantile character’ of post-
Soviet curriculum (cited in Richters 2012: 47). The results of this may possibly be observed 
in the recent report conducted by the Gorchakov and the Naslediye Evrazii Foundations, 
which reported increasing skepticism about the premises of Russian diplomacy, including 
a ‘civilisational mission’ (Makarychev 2012). They don’t share a sense of the pressure of 
history but rather that of the moment; the need to secure their position after several 
decades of insecurity and to enjoy the material rewards of what they’ve achieved (Fadeev 
2006: 133). 
A number of commentators have been preoccupied by the lack of a blueprint for such a 
global construction project in the form of a specific, innovative model of development to 
offer the rest of the world. The lack of a distinctive ideology (Nikonov 2009) or original 
political philosophy ‘possessing organisational-practical potential’ (Pronin 2009) is seen as 
a problem to the generation of soft power on the grounds that, in sum, ‘a country 
claiming the role of a superpower, a centre of soft power, should propose its picture of 
the world to those surrounding it’ (Semenov 2008). 
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This ambivalence has a number of consequences. Firstly, it is reflected in an absence of 
serious funding for this foreign policy area (Filimonov 2010).84 This affliction is only 
aggravated by the high level of corruption85 in this sector, with up to 70% funds 
designated for soft power purposes said to be skimmed off.86  
Secondly, the fact that far from all elites have been co-opted one way or another into the 
official soft power discourse has resulted in some representatives of Russia, for instance, 
‘hardline nationalists with a genuinely imperial agenda’ that are capable of exercising 
leverage over the government (Tsygankov 2006) being quoted making statements – albeit 
sometimes disingenuously - that are essentially outside the ‘political correct’ ‘soft power’ 
discourse. While publicly doubting and railing against Ukrainian independence may 
provide short-term gratification to a certain demographic of the domestic audience, and 
thus mobilise support in elections, such rhetoric is counter-productive from the 
respectiveve of soft power. It provides continued fuel for anti-Russian narratives framing 
Moscow’s policy orientation as aggressive, imperial and retrogressive, and undermines 
more diplomatic overtures. 
Thirdly, as an independent researcher interviewed in Moscow in July 2011 put it, there is 
a lack of ‘systemisation of knowledge of national interests in this sphere’ making it harder 
to formulate and implement coherent policies. This is reflected in an absence of 
‘mechanisms for inter-departmental (inter-corporate) coordination of efforts’ (Filimonov 
2010) and an ineffectiveness of some existing tools (e.g. Rossotrudnichestvo)(Wilson 
2012). Instead, Russia’s public diplomacy is directed in a very top down way, through the 
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orientation are identified as ‘enemies’ of Russia’s project through their hampering of state efficiency by 
diverting funds to their own ends (Surkov 2009).  
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 Interviews with A. Kazantsev (by telephone), A. Okara and A. Dolinskiy in Moscow July 2011. 
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press service and foreign policy offices of the presidential staff and the Russian 
government staff which hinders grass-roots co-option and involvement (Filimonov 
2010).87 
5.4. Different Approaches to Russian Soft Power  
 
However, despite these obstacles, there is activity on the soft power front in Russia, 
although the presence of the above-mentioned issues is reflected qualitatively in efforts 
at implementation. Most significantly perhaps, Russian soft power suffers from a lack of 
coherent approach. That is to say, it is not the case that a single image of Russia is 
promote abroad, but rather it depends on the actors involved and what they seek to gain 
through Russia’s foreign policy (Feklyunina 2008: 610). The potential impact of such 
measures is, therefore, impeded by at-times clumsy top-down direction and a lack of 
networked interaction in public diplomacy, 88 as there appears to be a lack of direct 
communication and cooperation between the various agencies charged with such 
activities. The combination of will in some elite circles and ambivalence in others seems 
to have manifested itself into a hydra-like approach to soft power in Russia, whereby 
several different fronts are being pursued simultaneously. The approaches below have 
been teased apart primarily for analytical purposes; in practice there is some overlap 
between the discourses, goals and agents concerned, which allows for some mutual 
reinforcement. However, this step enables the identification and analysis of a 
manageable object of study about which sufficiently precise commentaries may be made.  
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 According to insights imparted by A. Dolinskiy during this interview in Moscow July 2011, the MFA, ROC, 
RMF and RT are also ‘directed’ from the Presidential Administration. 
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5.4.1. Approach: Nation-Branding 
 
In general, the aims of nation-branding activities are quite focused on promoting 
economic development and draw most explicitly upon insights from the world of business, 
especially marketing and PR. Seen through the prism of nation-branding, soft power is 
about elevating Russia’s image in the eyes of foreign citizens in general. Winning the right 
to host global sporting mega events such as the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 
World Cup would seem to indicate the pinnacle of achievement. Such demonstrations of 
supreme organisational, marketing and construction achievement may inspire awe and 
help create a prestigious image, but they also help raise the profile of a country as a 
means to create favourable conditions for development. For instance, the Presidential 
Press Office contracted PR agency Ketchum in the run up to the 2006 G8 summit in St 
Petersburg to promote the country as ‘an attractive place to invest, as a reliable energy 
partner, and as rightful member of the G8 and other world governing bodies.’89 
Additionally, for instance, there are websites such as WowMoscow, which promotes a 
‘new brand of Moscow’; ‘Moskva budushchego,’90 by providing cutting edge information 
on useful and amusing topics in Russian and English, and reinforces the city’s credentials 
as both a place of historic culture and modern living. Not only should it change 
perceptions of Moscow, it should also attract tourists and talented professionals from 
abroad to the city and thus help reverse the ‘brain drain’. 
While Russian business has sometimes been considered an arm of Russian foreign policy, 
a report by Chatham House (2011) suggests the need for caution with such assumptions, 
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noting ‘it is difficult to find examples of Russian businesses abroad serving Russian state 
interests. The businesses are careful to follow Western rules as they know they have 
quite a high barrier of suspicion to overcome. Russian businessmen speak in favour of 
their own country and modernisation’. In this vein, Russian oligarch Vladimir P. 
Evtushenkov was cited ‘[w]e have plans to develop everywhere, according to two 
principles: One, it must be within the law and, two, make a profit […] We have no 
preferences, because in business you cannot be emotionally attached. Business is not a 
woman’ (Smale 2012). As such, businesspeople may distance themselves from more 
civilisational narratives.  
5.4.2. Approach: Promotion of an ‘Objective Image’ 
 
This approach is more oriented towards the political world, and the background to it is 
the perception that Russia’s renewal as a recognised global power is impeded by an 
international image more negative than is warranted. Frequently, this poor image is 
perceived as resulting from a conscious strategy of ‘information war’ against Russia 
(Karaganov 2007; Rogozin 2010; Tsygankov and Fominykh 2010; Tkachenko 2011; Putin 
2012) on the part of certain other geopolitical players, specifically the West, which seek 
to contain Russia by keeping it weak and promoting ‘geopolitical pluralism’ in its 
neighbourhood (Brzezinski 1997:51). A key thrust in this regard is countering the 
perceived propagation of a sense of illegitimacy around the Russian regime, by comparing 
the country with the standard principles of affluent and established democracies. 
Accordingly, under the priority rubric of ‘information support for foreign policy initiatives’ 
the Foreign Policy Concept states, 
An important part of the foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation is 
communicating to the broad world public full and accurate information about its stand on 
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the main international problems, foreign policy initiatives and actions by the Russian 
Federation, its domestic social and economic development processes and plans, as well as 
on the accomplishments of Russian culture and science.  
 
In public diplomacy, Russia will seek its objective perception in the world, develop its own 
effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad, strengthen the role of 
the Russian mass media in the international information environment providing them 
with essential state support, as well as actively participate in international information 
cooperation.  
 
To this end, the Kremlin has established a number of communications outlets in recent 
years, which seek to help foreigners to better understand the logic of Moscow’s actions, 
even if they disagree with them (Feklyunina 2010: 9), as well as acting as much-needed, 
authoritative sources of good news stories about Russia. These include media outlets 
such as RIA Novosti, Russia Today,91 Russia Profile, Voice of Russia, Russia Beyond the 
Headlines. There are also various discussion fora whose activities are directed in this 
direction, such as the Russian International Affairs Council,92  the Valdai Club, the 
Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, some aspects of the work of the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation and the Institute for Cooperation and Democracy in Paris and New York. 
While cultural elements may be perceived faintly between the lines, they are downplayed 
to the advantage of more ‘pragmatic’ concerns, since such organisations are keen to 
promote Russia as a predictable, strong and reliable partner to influential representatives 
of foreign states. In presenting a diversified view on Russia, they aim to become a credible 
voice shaping global perceptions of the Russian state, its policies and life in Russia. 
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5.4.3. Approach: Compatriot Policy 
 
The need for a policy on Russia’s compatriots became acute with the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union into 15 successor states, which resulted in millions of ethnic Russians and 
nationalities historically identifying with the territory of the defunct state, finding 
themselves resident in newly independent states (Zevelev 2001; Zevelev 2008). 
Particularly in the Baltic States and Central Asia, Russian-speaking compatriots were often 
made to feel like second class citizens, as nation-building regimes frequently invoked anti-
Russian ‘othering’ motifs as a means to help define the new nation. Cast as potential fifth 
columnists, non-titular national Russophones were often denied civil rights, such as the 
ability to acquire full and equal citizenship, due to strict citizenship laws requiring 
knowledge of the local language.93 ‘Shamefully’ legally identified as ‘stateless persons,’ 
they were subject to restrictions on employment and property ownership. Nationalising 
measures also curtailed opportunities for communication and education in Russian, which 
had an impact on social mobility. In short, the situation of such persons was felt to be 
highly undignified (Putin 2012), and all the more so since they had shifted from being the 
main nationality of a multinational superpower to an external minority of a greatly 
weakened state. Despite a certain amount of rhetoric critiquing this state of affairs, 
during the 1990s the Russian state did not prioritise redressing the concerns of its country 
fellows abroad. Having regained state capacity, however, this issue has been thrust onto 
the agenda and Russia now seeks to unite its compatriots, who are extremely diverse in 
terms of their experiences and reasons for emigration, and hence rather disparate as a 
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 As a Finno-Ugric language, Estonian is completely different from Russian and hence rather difficult to 
learn, especially as most Russians are locally concentrated in the north-east of Estonia and hence have less 
contact with the Estonian language. Latvian is a member of the Baltic branch of the Indo-European language 
family. The issues are quite similar there. 
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community, into a more consolidated diaspora that might support Russian development 
(Chepurin 2009). 
Early post-Soviet attempts to build relationships with country-fellows abroad focussed on 
cultivating ‘pro-Russian’ groups in society, or cultivating elite links, driven by the notion 
that the more compatriots abroad ‘need’ Russia, the better for Russia’s international 
position (Zevelev 2008). Such relationships have often rested on the provision or future 
expectation of material incentives, thereby giving rise to the notion of ‘professional 
compatriots’ (Kudors 2010: 2; Makarychev 2011). However, despite receiving funds from 
the RF, such groups tended to act in their own interests, sometimes pursuing an agenda 
detrimental to the long-term interests of Russia (Hedenskog and Larsson 2007: 36). 
Rather than harnessing ‘hearts and minds’, the strident tone and activities of such groups 
have often tended to alienate the overall majority of citizens in the newly independent 
states.94  
In recent years, the Kremlin has sought to develop a more coherent, proactive approach, 
and incorporated the provision of ‘comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate 
interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad’ into its 2008 Foreign Policy Concept. 
The aim has been to offer legal support and veteran pensions to overseas compatriots, 
and a resettlement policy was also enacted, although far fewer compatriots than 
expected were enticed to repatriate themselves to the far-flung participating cities. Such 
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 For instance, slogans such as ‘Forever with Russia!’ [Naveki s Rossiei!] and ‘For the Russian Language, 
Unity and Dignified Living’ (by the Russian Obshchina of Crimea) and ‘Party of Slavic National Unity’ (by 
Russkii Blok) might be seen to suggest lack of loyalty to Ukraine. Although these banners were on display in 
Simferopol, when broadcast around Ukraine, there is a likelihood of their being associated with the Russian 
community more broadly. Yun, S.-H. and E. L. Toth (2009). "Future sociological public diplomacy and the 
role of public relations: evolution of public diplomacy." American Behavioural Scientist 53(4): 493-503. 
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approaches touch upon kin-state policy, but overlap with endeavours to cultivate 
culturally-rooted relations with compatriots.95 
5.4.4. Approach: Humanitarian Cooperation  
 
In the Russian-language context, the term most commonly used to describe activities that 
may be considered under the rubric of ‘soft power’ is ‘humanitarian cooperation’ which 
has increased in prominence over the course of this thesis. It includes collaborative 
activities in the spheres of education, culture and science. The background to this 
approach is recognition of the need to revive the ‘humanitarian’ potential of Russia, 
which is seen not only as an attribute of a great power but also as a basis upon which to 
cultivate relationship with compatriots and foreigners. And indeed, some Russian experts 
are optimistic that their country has very strong possibilities to pursue a humanitarian 
strategy (Kevorkova 2009; Bokan 2010: 150). 
Culture is identified as having a determining influence on the quality of the nation’s 
‘spiritual unity’, image and ability to offer an attractive unifying agenda through two areas 
of significance to soft power; namely both resources (humanitarian: relating to society, 
education, science) and tools (information provision) facilitating the export of Russian 
cultural output to the CIS states. According to the National Security Strategy of 2009,96  
[m]eeting the challenges of national security in the sphere of culture in the medium to 
long term is achieved by recognizing the paramount role of culture for the revival and 
preservation of cultural and moral values, for strengthening the spiritual unity of the 
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 This approach is expressed in such documents as the Programmes of Work with Compatriots 2006-2008 
2009-2011 and 2012-201, as well as the Programme of Assistance for the Voluntary Resettlement in the 
Russian Federation of Compatriots Living Abroad (http://www.fms.gov.ru/programs/fmsuds/) approved by 
President Putin in 2006 and the 1999 Federal Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation in relations 
to compatriots abroad 
http://wwwrg.ru/2009/07/28/polit-dok.html (accessed 31st August 2009) Compatriot affairs are handled by 
the Government Commission for Matters Concerning Compatriots Abroad. 
96
 Article 84: http://www.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/424  
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multinational people of the Russian Federation and the international image of Russia as a 
country with a rich traditional and modern dynamic culture, for the establishment of a 
system of spiritual and patriotic education of citizens of Russia, and for the development 
of a common humanitarian and information-telecommunications environment in the 
space of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and in adjacent 
regions.97 
Through pursuing measures developing the humanitarian dimension of foreign policy, 
interaction and collaboration with influential persons beyond Russia’s borders should be 
established, which may well facilitate increased bilateral cooperation. This approach 
includes cultural diplomacy, and hence the activities of the Russkiy Mir Foundation and 
Rossotrudnichestvo, narrowly defined. 
Numerous measures are being considered in the spheres of educational exchanges 
(Fominykh 2008), the establishment of a CIS Network University in 2008 (Filimonov 2010), 
regeneration of Russian theatre abroad (Mikhailov 2009) and film and cinema98 industries 
(Filimonov 2010) as well as a range of initiatives to promote the Russian language to 
name just a few steps on the road to renewing Russia’s soft power potential. 
5.4.5. Approach: Dissemination of a Civilisational Discourse 
 
The background to this approach lies in the search for post-Soviet discursive resources 
capable of reconciling Russia’s imperial past with the realities of the present, while 
creating a framework for a stable future. Indeed, Russia has never existed as a nation-
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 A document entitled the ‘Main Vectors of the Policy of the Russian Federation in international Cultural-
Humanitarian Cooperation’ was also approved by President Medvedev on 18th December 2010, but was 
criticised for being lacking consecutive logic, systematic objectives and clear, measurable indicators for 
implementation (Dolinskiy 2011). In an interview, Dolinskiy revealed that he considered the reason to this 
to lie in the factor that if the authors of the policy did not establish criteria, they could not be condemned 
for failing to achieve them.  
98
 Filimonov (2010) notes, drawing upon the ‘sovereignty’ motif, that government funding and extra-
budgetary sources should focus, as well as high culture, on the ‘wider production and export of domestic 
products of mass culture, but not through cheap imitations of Western patterns of different trends in 
contemporary music, choreography etc, but by cultivating original, exclusive styles based on all available 
formats. He also notes that ‘[c]inema must be approached as a political tool – the experience of Hollywood 
may well serve as a worthy example for Russian film makers to follow.’  
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state, but rather functioned historically as a centre, engaged in a ‘gathering of the lands’. 
While there was revanchist talk in the 1990s, by now the contemporary borders of the RF 
are officially accepted. Yet there are objective and subjective reasons behind the desire 
on the part of Russia’s elites for the country to re-assume at least a regional, if not global 
leadership role. Nowadays, however, this role should be facilitated as far as possible by 
soft power means. 
The rest of this chapter will focus on the civilisational approach to Russian soft power, on 
the grounds that this is the most interesting philosophically and politically, as well as not 
being thoroughly explored in the soft power literature. 
5.5. Sovereignty of Spirit: A Russian Perspective on Soft Power  
 
Despite the diversity of interpretations, it is suggested that there is an understanding of 
soft power prevalent in the Kremlin that coincides with the definition proposed in this 
thesis, even if discourses framing the notion of soft power as a way of working are not 
themselves hegemonic among those representing the wider state structures.  
The formulation which best encapsulates this approach, if not necessarily most commonly 
used in practice, may be summarised as ‘sovereignty of spirit’ [suverenitet dukha]. 
Although receiving far less attention in the English-language literature, this is an integral 
component of the sovereign democracy concept.99 ‘Sovereign democracy’ is not a stand-
alone ideology as such, but rather a largely coherent set of assumptions that constitute a 
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 Having been the central theme of Surkov’s ‘secret speech’ to the ‘Delovaya Rossiya’ business forum in 
July 2005, Surkov’s concept was first officially presented in a speech before ‘United Russia’ in February 2005. 
The proceedings of these ‘February Theses’ were published as a report ‘Sovereignty: a synonym for the 
ability to compete’ (2006), which in turn was elaborated upon in the articles ‘Nationalisation of the Future’ 
(2007), and ‘A View from Utopia’(2008). For the purposes of this thesis, these documents will be analysed 
as statements representing the official views of the Kremlin and by extension the ‘Russian approach’. 
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Russian official worldview; a normative framework within which more specific, practical 
measures towards realisation may be debated; a narrative whose elements lend 
themselves to both liberal or conservative interpretations within the same core discursive 
paradigm.100 Its key premise is that Russia has the tangible resource basis (vast territory, 
energy and mineral resources, a large if sparse population, nuclear capability) upon which 
to renew its status as a great power in the contemporary world, which is seen as 
irrevocably multipolar. As an independent or ‘sovereign’ power, Russia is not required to 
kow-tow to the West, which is perceived as attempting to impose to criteria and 
standards deemed inappropriate for Russian specificities.  
Soft power, as understood in this thesis, corresponds with the cultural aspect of sovereign 
democracy; the idea that Russia can and must maintain its samobytnost’; the uniqueness 
and distinctiveness of its culture. This has been referred to as ‘sovereignty of spirit’. While 
the term as such does not feature prominently in the public discourse of the leaders of 
the Russian Federation, the idea now flows between the lines in speeches and its 
significance is demonstrated in the consistency and increasing regularity with which 
culture, spirituality and samobytnost’ are mentioned in major foreign policy texts. 
Cultural contributions by no means trump the pursuit of traditional military and economic 
interests, but it is clear that Russia also intends to make its contribution to international 
competition in the cultural-civilisation dimension. Indeed, ultimately this should serve the 
pursuit of the hard power objectives (Putin 2012, Filimonov 2010), although as will 
become apparent, it is also valuable for its own sake. 
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 It was described as a ‘constitutional idea of Russia at the 21
st
 century’ [sic] in press release 87 dated 30
th
 
October 2007 subsequent to a conference of professional lawyers and academics with the same title at the 
Research Centre of Constitutional and Law Problems of Sovereign Democracy at Chelyabinsk State 
University. http://un.csu.ru/release_eng/1/2531_1.html (accessed 11th May 2009). 
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In advancing this argument, I draw on the writings of Vladislav Surkov (2005; 2006; 2007a; 
2007b; 2008; 2009),101 who as chief ideologist to both Presidents Putin and Medvedev 
was charged with the responsibility of reshaping the Russian public sphere (Sakwa 2008: 
4).102 Although his notion of sovereign democracy has had its share of critics (Medvedev 
2006; Pavlovsky 2010),103 no clear alternative has emerged to this concept, whose 
precepts have become the guiding principles of Russian policy-making despite the term 
being cited with less regularity today (White 2008; Hayoz 2009; Pavlovsky 2010). The 
success with which it has assumed the position of official ‘common sense’ about Russia 
today is most likely due to its capacity to reconcile beautiful words with the interests of 
big business and thereby rhetorically co-opt the larger section of the political elite.104 Or, 
in Surkov’s words, ‘[i]n such a task, there is pragmatism and romanticism. Allies and 
adversaries will be found. And it may constitute a mission’ (2009: 11). 
As was argued in the conceptual framework, soft power is ultimately about leadership 
and sovereignty in the sphere of culture broadly defined. This does not preclude 
interaction and even hybridisation with manifestations of other cultures, but overall the 
flow of influence of metanarratives - key assumptions and values – irradiates from the 
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 Vladislav Surkov is widely regarded as the cardinal gris, the ideological driving force behind the Putin-
Medvedev leadership, and considered by some to be no less than the second most powerful person in the 
RF (Russia Life article). Initially appointed as Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in 1999, then 
promoted to First Deputy Head on 8
th
 May 2008 under the Medvedev presidency, he remained in this 
influential until his recent promotion to Deputy Prime Minister for Modernisation and Innovation, which 
now places him in an advantageous position to oversee the implementation of change. 
102
 Robert Skidelsky (2007) has noted a ‘virtual identity of vision between the leader of the liberal ring wing 
party (SPS)’ Anatolii Chubais and Surkov, the ‘Kremlin’s chief “politologist”. We may uphold this claim if we 
examine the notions of sovereignty and Russian cultural values in Chubais’ 2003 article ‘Missiya Rossii v XXI 
veke’, though perhaps the emphasis is more on sovereignty than liberalism in Surkov’s work. However, it is 
Surkov who has written so prolifically on the topic in recently years, though in cooperation with other elites. 
Chubais, A. (2003). Missiya Rossii v XXI veke. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1st October, 
http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2003-10-01/1_mission.html (accessed 30th September 2009). 
103
 Also see the interview given by President Medvedev to Valery Fadeev, Ekspert, 24
th
 July 2006. 
104
 Surkov (2009) notes in the post scriptum to his article that the sovereign democracy concept was 
developed collaboratively with a range of stakeholders. 
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centre to the periphery. To be a sovereign in this sense – all while recognising that 
sovereignty, like power, is never absolute or unidirectional – is to assume a leading role in 
matters of culture in a given space; whether that be national, regional, global or even 
diasporic in scope. Kosachev (2012) acknowledges this aspect to soft power in his 
comment, ‘[e]levating one’s own values to the rank of global standard is also a task and a 
result of soft power.’ 
The relevance of the phrase ‘sovereignty of spirit’ to soft power becomes apparent in this 
citation by Oleg Matveychev,105 who states in a 2009 book of the same title that,  
to lose spiritual authority is to lose power. Real power is there where coercion is not 
required. On the contrary, the use of force [sila] speaks rather of weakness… sovereignty 
is precisely and only spiritual sovereignty. Such sovereignty of spirit is better than any 
army, atom bomb or economy. (142-3)106 
Matveychev, who is not only Vice-Governor of Volgograd Oblast but also political 
consultant to ‘United Russia’, acknowledges the potency of immaterial forms of power. 
Vladimir Putin stands behind this approach, having quoted prominent nationalist scholar 
Dmitry Likhachev in his 2007 address to the Federal Assembly, stating ‘state sovereignty is 
defined by cultural criteria’ (Putin 2007). 
By this understanding, a polity is not truly sovereign if it defines itself exclusively in terms 
of the value structures provided by another civilisation.107  This desire for cultural 
sovereignty is reflected in Surkov’s perspective on the future directions of the global 
                                                          
105
 Mr Matveychev is also very active on live journal: http://matveychev-oleg.livejournal.com/  
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 Surkov shares this view, criticising the status quo: ‘We have a rapidly expanding bureaucracy coupled to 
oil pipelines. Few of the people in leading positions in our society, in both the private and the state sector, 
are oriented towards the third wave. Raw materials are valued more than knowledge. Culture and 
education have not yet become the basis of the economy or of politics and as before are regarded as 
unprofitable social programs, peripheral to the raw-materials complex. There is no understanding that 
political, economic, and military advantages have no separate existence: they are always components and 
consequences of cultural superiority,’ (2008: 94) 
107
 Yet simultaneously there is an argument that once a discourse has reached a certain stage of hegemony; 
that is, its validity is widely recognised and its value precepts cease to encounter resistance, then it stops 
being the thetical property of a given actor and becomes common material. 
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system of states. Having dismissed the prospect of a future in which globalisation has 
dissolved national boundaries, Surkov incites Russian readers to, 
[d]ream of a global federation based on treaties among free states. All the units of such a 
federation must be equal. This does not mean that the federation will be cultural and 
economically homogenous: some units will be more equal than others. As a unit of a 
utopian global federation, I would like Russia to be a donor region, a leading nation, one 
of the centers of intellectual life. (2008: 93-4) 
On this basis, the management of Russia’s image, in its diverse facets, clearly assumes an 
important role. It requires Russia to re-enter the world stage as a subject-creator of 
history; an originating source of attractive narratives of representations about history, as 
opposed to being an object of discourses created by other civilisational centres (Pronin 
2009; Matveychev 2009: 141). This preoccupation with ‘global meta-projects’ (Ostrovskii 
and Shchedrovitskii 1999) is something clearly different and of a higher order than the 
advertising processes associated with ‘nation-branding’. The will and the ability to create 
such attractive cultural narratives successfully are surely defining criteria for a major 
global power.  
However, assertions of Russian distinctiveness should not necessarily point to the 
conclusion that the Kremlin is inherently or absolutely anti-Western. Indeed, Surkov has 
presented himself as an admirer of the West and in many respects his vision for Russia’s 
future incorporates the best the West has to offer. Yet there is a tension: 
Here in Europe are the intellectual resources, and without an access [sic] to them the 
modernization of our country is impossible. Cooperation in the spheres of science, 
technology, higher education as well as among transnational corporations in the science-
intensive and high technology sectors could connect our economy with the European and 
the transatlantic economies more reliably and to greater advantage than the primitive 
deliveries of raw material. 
To Russia’s west, let me repeat, there are people of different kinds: while some seek to 
subdue Russia, others count on mutually advantageous partnership. Our democracy is 
capable of responding to the former with determination to uphold our sovereignty and to 
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the latter with openness, flexibility and productive cooperation. Not to fall out of Europe, 
to hold on to the West is an important element in building Russia. (2009: 19-20) 
In addition to fortifying the material bases of state power, Russia needs to develop its 
own discourses with which to frame solutions to the major questions of the day. Surkov 
notes that Russia ‘must create a new society, a new economy, a new army, a new faith. It 
must demonstrate that it is both possible and necessary to think and speak about 
freedom and fairness Russian-style’ (2006). Here, he starts from existing Western 
discourses which place the values of freedom and fairness as core criteria for judging 
value and legitimacy, and not without reason, since as Prozorov has noted ‘a discourse 
against freedom appears to us today to be manifestly impossible’ (2007: 1), which seems 
to be recognised in Moscow (Kosachev 2012). He thereby proposes their reinterpretation 
under Russian ideational leadership. Indeed, in terms of implementing a discursively 
oriented strategy,108 the following words are perhaps Surkov’s most explicit public 
endorsement of soft power: 
Russia must say what it does, not do what others say, in the role not of an ordinary 
philistine but of a coauthor and coactor of European civilization. The production of 
meanings and images that interpret pan-European values and name Russian goals will 
enable us mentally to reunite our unsettled nation […] In the polemic of cultures, the 
Russian message must be weighty and distinct, free by nature, just in essence, attractive 
in form and acceptable in tone. It is necessary to affirm our own position in the 
philosophical and socio-political discourses of the West. We must claim out own positions 
in the philosophical, sociological, and politological discourse of the West. And through 
support of the Arts (above all, cinema and literature) we must gradually recover the 
conquering charm of Russian culture. (2009: 16) 
While he is rather thin on practical guidance for implementation, Surkov clearly 
understands the need for a ‘charm offensive’ to promote Russian culture as ‘an organism 
of meaning-formation and intellectual influence’ (2009: 16). Russia should emerge as an 
independent centre of thought since tacking too closely to the Western position on 
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 This interpretation was shared independently by Elena Panova, an employee of Russia Today who 
received her PhD from MGIMO on a topic related to ‘soft power’ in 2011/12. 
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cultural, value-related and spiritual matters erodes the claim to the sovereignty, not to 
mention the dignity that becomes a leading civilisational centre.109 The message contains 
a demand for respect of Russia as an equal, valid embodiment of European heritage, 
rather than a deviation from a ‘true’ path monopolistically claimed by EU-Europe and the 
wider West. Russian culture should generate narratives capable of fostering a sense of 
legitimacy and attraction as a prelude to leading the way for others, simultaneously 
fostering intellectual underpinning for the model of political and economic development 
deemed necessary to hold the federation together. Indeed, many writers’ musings on 
topics related to what is understood here under ‘soft power’ appear to indeed follow 
Surkov’s recommendation to integrate Russian narratives with Western philosophical 
discourses. Accordingly, it is common in this body of literature to find recognised Western 
thinkers referenced; Carl Schmidt, Francois Guizot, Arnold Toynbee, Jose Ortega y Gasset 
among others are drawn upon to frame a critique of the unsustainability of modern, 
globalised, even ‘dehumanised’ society (Chadaev 2006; Kazin 2008). This can be seen as 
an example of intertextuality, whereby the legitimacy of new interpretations is bolstered 
by reference back to accepted authorities. That is not to say that these theorists and the 
particular aspects honed in upon by Russian commentators are uncontroversial to 
Western eyes; frequently it is the illiberal, elitist, traditionalist elements that are 
elucidated, yet with this bibliographic pedigree, Russian thinking stakes a claim to a 
legitimately grounded development of the ‘other’ European heritage (Krastev 2007; 
Hudson 2009). Furthermore, it is on this basis that Russia resists attempts to frame it as 
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 Matveychev expounded upon this point, noting ‘[b]y measure of the extent we use alien discourse, we 
are the slaves of those who created this discourse or ascribed themselves the right to speak in the name of 
the creators. That’s why “sovereign democracy” about which many speak nowadays is possible only for 
Washington’ (2009: 141-2). 
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an anti-European power, instead advancing an image as a force for the renewal of 
European tradition. 
It is noticeable that ‘spirit’ is not a word stem which Surkov himself uses in his writings; 
perhaps such religiously inspired terminology would be too loaded with ‘pathos’ for he 
who is associated with cynicism even as he is said to have written poetry and lyrics. Yet 
the notion of spirituality features heavily in the commentaries of Oleg Makveychev, 
Patriarch Kirill and others, and their use of the term blends seamlessly with the essence of 
Surkov’s conceptualisations, which should be appealing to more pragmatic, less 
emotionally committed constituencies, too (e.g. business, energy sector, military-
industrial complex). 
What, then, does ‘spirituality’ signify at the nexus of the sovereign democracy-‘soft power’ 
project? Like much of the sovereign democracy concept, sovereignty of spirit appears to 
have a dual aspect.110 On one hand, the renewal of the ‘Russian spirit’ relates to domestic 
consolidation and unity (hegemony in Gramsci’s terms), and nods to the ROC’s enhanced 
role in nurturing moral values in Russian society as a means to strengthen the fabric of 
society. Yet sovereignty of spirit also has an external aspect, which is the particular 
concern of this thesis, although the domestic and foreign policy aspects are certainly 
linked. Apparently attentive to the 19th century warning by Konstantin Leontyev that 
“Russia’s death can come in either of two ways – from the East, by the sword of the 
awakening Chinese, or through voluntary merger with a pan-European republican 
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 See: Medvedev, D. (2006). "'Intervyu. Dlya protsetaniya vsekh nado uchitivat interecy kazhdogo'. [An 
interview with Valery Fadeev]." Ekspert 24th July. 
‘As regards sovereignty, one shouldn’t forget that it is signifies the supremacy of state power within the 
country and its independence beyond state borders.’ 
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federation” (cited in Yefremenko 2010: 37), Surkov stresses the ‘national’ – indigenously 
Russian – design for the future: 
The project of sovereign democratic is one of those that admit of a future – and not just 
any kind, but a distinctly national future. For the nation has not given currently living 
generations the right to terminate its history; the citizens of a country renowned for its 
great civilizing work are entitled to a worthy place in the world division of labor and 
profits. According to the principle “the one who rules determines the faith” a ruling 
nation that has not lost faith in itself will live. (2009: 18)111 
In this sense, sovereignty of spirit signifies national self-belief; faith in Russia. Surkov 
implicitly rejects the prospect of Russia succumbing to Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ 
scenario through dissolution into the ‘universal’ model extolled by the West. Reminding 
Russian readers of the sacrifices made by their forefathers for Russia as a great historical 
subject and the dishonour done to them by renouncing this birthright, he also garners 
support by indicating the potential rewards of individuals’ national self-confidence.  
Indeed, in order to avert the danger of lack of confidence resulting in a self-fulfilling 
prophesy, there are calls for a nationally-oriented elite (Fadeev 2006: 133), which is ready 
to work to rebuild Russia and be rewarded for it. Looking at the country more widely, 
Russia is seen to require a renewed ‘creative class’: 
The creative class as a leading class of the nation, renewed through the free contestation 
of citizens and their political, economic and non-governmental associations. The synergy 
of creative civil society groups (entrepreneurial, scientific, culturological and political) in 
the common (that means, national) interest resembles a positive alternative to the 
pretenders of the offshore aristocracy and their defeatist psychology. Manipulation and 
corruption can but poorly support the illusion of a state. Only a creative class of free 
people, united by values, capable of innovation (that is, competition) and motivated by 
personal advantage in service of national goals can seriously renew the state in a strong 
way. (Surkov 2009)  
In this sense, Surkov uses ‘creative’ to refer not only to the ‘impactful’ technical engineers 
of modernisation, but also the intellectuals, and thereby establishes a parity of esteem 
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between them, in resistance to those who have lost faith in Russia. Kosachev (2012) also 
recognises that soft power lays the basis for political projects by co-opting what Gramsci 
might have called organic intellectuals (Surkov 2007b). 
5.6. Importance of Ukraine for Russia’s Civilisational Project 
 
Yet while the Kremlin elite nurture the conviction that Russia is a great power on the 
world stage, the claim to any particular identity is not a unilateral process; it requires the 
recognition of significant others (Zevelev 2002: 450). Above all, these others are its 
presumed equals and would-be ‘followers’. In the case of Russia, and in consideration of 
the focus on soft power, the main target audiences are (1) the West and (2) those states 
upon which the Russian gaze falls primarily, namely the states of the post-Soviet space, 
and in particular the fellow East Slavic countries.112  
Indeed, the status of great power is not merely declaratory; it entails inclusion in all 
number of prestigious international clubs of powerful states. It is remarked that Russia 
seeks affirmation from the West of its status113 as a worthy and morally equal competitor 
through the inclusion of its elites at the highest levels of the international political and 
business communities.  
If recognition by the civilisational ‘other’ is important for Russia’s claim to be a global 
leader, this importance is surely matched by that of the recognition of those who are 
envisaged as being in the front line of followers. From the Russian perspective, if a 
national culture is to justify its claim to wider civilisational leadership it should be 
sovereign; ‘made in Russia’. Further, if a polity is sovereign, there must be those to whom 
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 Russian soft power does target a far broader spectrum of countries, but foreign policy documents, 
practical measures and statements suggest these are the primary audiences. 
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 This tendency is seen to characterise Russia much more than China which is in a comparable position. 
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one is the sovereign; the sun under which others jostle for place (Matveychev 2009: 147). 
By this, one has in mind those countries considered by the Russian leadership to be within 
what Medvedev called Russia’s ‘sphere of privileged interest’;114 namely the areas 
historically part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, and in particular, the regions 
populated by fellow Orthodox East Slavs. 
Today, however, as a result of Western drives to promote pluralism in the post-Soviet 
region, Russian narratives of being encounter the soft power discourses of other political 
actors. One of the key sources of Western attraction, alongside improved living standards, 
has been the promise of state sovereignty in terms of political independence. Rooted in 
Realpolitik, the sovereign democracy narrative disputes this as a flattering political illusion, 
Surkov claims: 
Of course, far from all nations crown their political creation with the acquisition of real 
sovereignty. Many countries do not even set themselves such a goal, traditionally existing 
under the protection of other nations, periodically changing protectors. The apparently 
artificial replication of “revolutions” as entertainment and of managed (from without) 
democracies is in fact quite natural for such countries (2009: 13). 
The expression ‘managed democracy’ (Herd 2005; Karaganov 2007)115 has often been 
applied to Russia to describe the imperfectly implemented model of checks and balances 
characteristic of that political system. By Surkov’s reading, however, the phrase rather 
indicates the global majority of smaller states who have received international 
recognition but are essentially steered by external forces more powerful than themselves. 
The colour revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine are thereby understood as a 
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 Karaganov (2007) explains the preference of managed democracy in some capitals as follows: ‘‘An 
authoritarian state finds it easier to manipulate its energy and other assets for foreign-policy purposes. In 




switching of alliances, facilitated by the use of ‘soft power technologies’ to create a 
critical mass of demand for an alternative and to mobilise people to achieve it. This is 
acknowledged as a failure of Russian public diplomacy, and was the catalyst for serious 
engagement with the challenge of renewing Russia’s soft power attraction. In this regard, 
Nicolae Popescu summarises the views of Konstantin Kosachev, Head of the Duma 
Committee on International Affairs, for whom, 
‘the situation is absurd’ when post-Soviet states enjoy more benefits from cooperating 
with Russia and still they want to ‘enter into the straitjacket of European institutions and 
to fall under the diktat of Brussels.’ This happens because Russia ‘cannot explain the 
purpose of its presence in the post-Soviet Union… The West is doing this under the 
banner of democratisation, and one gets the impression we are doing it only for the sake 
of ourselves… Our activeness is following too openly Russian interests. This is patriotic but 
not competitive.’ (Popescu 2006)  
There is a need for a positive discourse to explain Russia’s role in the world generally, and 
in individual country’s such as Ukraine specifically. This reflects that fact that by the mid-
2000s, the limits of pure pragmatism appeared to have been reached. In 1996, Yeltsin had 
initiated a search for a ‘national idea’, but the focus of activity remained mostly on 
practical issues, such as privatisation, the 1998 crisis and IMF loans. Similarly, during the 
first term of the Putin presidency, the problem of Russia’s image was raised, but 
economic growth continued to be the central political issue. Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ 
proved that utilitarian and intransparent engagement with so-called pro-Russian elites 
along the lines of promoting interests in the energy and business sectors was insufficient 
to secure Russia’s overall, long-term interests in the region (Okara 2007; Hudson 2009; 
Solovyev 2010).116 
                                                          
116
 For further information on the history of relations between Ukraine and Russia see also: Solchanyuk, R. 
(2001). Ukraine and Russia. The Post-Soviet Transition, Rowman and Littlefield. 
 Yekelchyk, S. (2007). Ukraine. Birth of a Nation. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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The objective, geostrategic grounds for Russia’s particular interest in Ukraine have 
already been mentioned in the methodology. Yet there are further, rather subjective 
reasons for Moscow’s desire to retain Kyiv in its sphere of civilisational influence. Russia 
traces its statehood back to the state of Kievan Rus founded in about 880; Kyiv is the 
cradle of Eastern European Christianity, the mother of all Russian cities (Richters 2012: 99) 
and home to some of the most prestigious shrines in Orthodoxy; a favoured destination 
for pilgrims. While official discourse accepts the current political constellation of 
independent statehood, Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are seen as fraternal 
nations, ‘one people’117 of Orthodox East Slavs, bound together by a common history and 
shared linguistic and culture heritage. These issues weigh all the more heavily for the fact 
that pre-1991, Russia had not existed as a nation-state but rather occupied the role of 
centre for a multinational empire. For many Russians, the mental image of ‘their’ country 
has been co-extensive with the borders of the Soviet Union, with Kyiv a particularly 
integral part of that. Ukrainians are often regarded affectionately, although the notion of 
being ‘Little Russians’118 [‘malorusskii’] is resented due to its perceived paternalistic, 
chauvinistic or neo-imperial associations. Without Kyiv, Russia would be uprooted from 
its emphasised self-image as a country with a long historical tradition. Loss of direct 
control over ‘brotherly’ Ukraine in 1991 signaled a lapsing in Russia’s status as great 
power (Leontiev 2009; Roman Solchanyuk, cited in Richters 2012: 101); the idea that Kyiv 
might renounce its place in the Russian civilisational realm and gravitate towards the 
West is thus intolerable for some.  
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 Indeed, President Yushchenko actively strove to encourage Ukrainian citizens to renounce such a 
framing of their identity. (2009). Yushchenko poprosil ukraintsev ne byt' khokhlami i malorossami. 
Segodnya.ua. 23rd December http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/jushchenko-poprocil-ukraintsev-ne-byt-
khokhlami-i-maloroccami.html (accessed 6th January 2013).  
169 
 
In this regard, a young, independent researcher expressed the feeling of needing to ‘get 
Ukraine back’.119 However, he also stressed that there was no need to incorporate the 
country into the RF. Rather, Ukraine should be reintegrated into Russia’s ideological and 
cultural space; in short by means of soft, not hard power (also see Lomagin 2012). 
Russia’s soft power work may thus be viewed as a way to deal with Ukrainian 
independence in the manner of networked ties that are seen to better befit the 21st 
century. The co-option, rather than the coercion, of the Ukrainian elite and population 
may serve objective and subjective Russian interests better. 
5.7. Renewed Engagement with Ideas in the Kremlin 
 
Given Russian sensitivities concerning the fate of Ukraine, the events at Kyiv’s 
Independence Square may thus be seen to have acted as a trigger, forcing Moscow’s 
political elite to go beyond its ‘sporadic and contradictory attempts’ (Volkov 2005: 18), 
and take seriously the need to engage creatively with political ideas, transcend dead-end 
pragmatism and return ‘meaning’ (Okara 2007) or in Surkov’s terms, ‘romanticism’ (2006: 
32) to national political life. Since then, there seems to have been a rekindling of the 
political debate on the Russian idea as a focal point for such endeavours. 
Russia has a tradition of intellectual reflection on national identity, always connected with 
a need to make or justify historical choices by elites. The search of direction for soft 
power strategy is no exception. The ‘Russian idea’ coined by Vladimir Solovev in 1888 
aims to explain how Russia is different, who are Russia’s friends, allies and enemies, and 
what are the implications for policy. It comprises ‘a set of basic ideas that constitute the 
self-identity of Russians across social divisions and coalesce into a national project or 
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historical mission’ (Volkov 2005: 18). In seeking inspiration in historical reflection on 
Russian identity, Moscow’s approaches to soft power can be seen as a part of the 
country’s aspired-to ‘conservative modernisation’, which should ‘bring about 
modernization – without losing traditional values or, more importantly, tampering with 
the country’s political regime’ (Nikonov and Shakhrai 2003; Trenin 2010: 27). Although 
Russia does not presently offer a particular, distinct model of development, its ideational 
offerings are posited as emerging as a result of a dialectical process, whereby the 
‘extremes’ of the West’s liberal modernisation are balanced through an appreciation and 
conservation of certain historically rooted values. This notion also has echoes of historical 
notions of Russia as a space where East and West not only meet, but also fuse and 
emerge richer from the interaction. The project seems premised on the belief that in spite 
of the great wells of socio-economic attraction possessed by contemporary Western 
countries, this civilisation is accumulating ideological, political and structural 
contradictions that will provide the conditions for future turmoil. Russia’s claim to the 
avant-garde is an attempt to pre-empt this crisis with an alternative model that reconciles 
all that is appealing of modernity with the traditions that many in the world are unwilling 
to leave behind. It is conceived, in principle, as a less prescriptive route to modernisation 
that may appeal to countries with a different value tradition from that of the West. As 
Karaganov envisages it, 
As it turned out, competition is not over: the defeated planned socialist economy has 
been replaced by a new model, which potentially is very attractive, especially to the 
former Third World countries – that is, the majority of humanity. This model is 
authoritarian semi-democratic capitalism, effective economically and acceptable 
politically… many neighboring societies, tired of poverty, chaos and uncertainty, are eager 
to emulate the sovereign system of Russia, which is showing growth and is better 
governed. In addition, authoritarian rulers of many states prefer to have a tough yet 
predictable Russia that would not encroach on their sovereignty as their neighbor. (2007) 
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Despite views to the contrary, the Kremlin’s understanding of Russia’s role in the world is 
that the country ‘at all stages of its development, [has] sought to achieve a more 
equitable world order’ (Medvedev 2009). Indeed, themes expressed by phrases such as 
‘justice’ [spravedlivost’], unity or conciliation [sobornost’] and soglasie [concord] pepper 
the discourse. Further, as will become apparent in the following chapter, one of the key 
themes said to differentiate Russia from the West is spirituality, in the sense of 
religiously-inspired moral and cultural consciousness. In his contemplation of Russian 
political culture, Surkov (2008) refers intertextually to how established figures of Russian 
thought who have articulated this theme: 
The definition [of Russian culture] of Ivan Il’in […] is astonishing in its brevity and 
profundity: “Russian culture is the contemplation of the whole.” We find something 
similar in [Nikolai] Berdiaev: “It is the mission of the Russians to give… a philosophy of the 
whole spirit… If a great and original culture is possible in Russia, then it can only be a 
religious-synthetic and not an analytic-differentiated culture.” [Prince Evgenii] Trubetskoi 
agrees: “More characteristic of the Russians in knowledge of the world through religious 
intuition as an organic whole, in contrast to the West, where philosophers have 
penetrated the mysteries of the world by breaking it down rationally into components for 
analysis.” Joseph Brodsky spoke of a “Russian chiliasm” that assumes the “idea of change 
in the world order as a whole” and even of the “synthetic (more precisely: nonanalytic) 
essence of the Russian language.” 
 
While it may be characterised as an instrumental raid on the treasure chest of history; 
with all the selective forgetting and memory that is so intrinsic to identity building, this 
reflection strives to reinforce a particular reading of what Russia culture is like. The 
intertextual references to familiar and established names from ‘our own’ tradition impart 
a sense of authenticity that lends authority and mobilising power to those words. 
Moreover, these phrasings indicate and perpetuate the valuation of a distinct cultural 
epistemology; a mode of thought depicted as ‘holistic and intuitive and […] contrasted 
with [the] mechanistic, reductionistic consciousness’ (Surkov 2008: 82-3) attributed to the 
West; simultaneously placing Russian profundity in an elevated position on the hierarchy 
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of esteem. Russian political culture, he states, strives towards concord and unity over 
individualisation, which must be reflected in the political system. Surkov describes the 
nature of the Russian mentality, and strives to historise it by retrospectively interpreting 
Russian history as an embodiment of the same values. For instance, he asserts that 
Russian political culture is characterised, among other features, by an ‘idealisation of the 
goals of political struggle’ (2008: 83). The fact that Russia may be less materially refined 
than the West doesn’t matter as the Russian outlook is characterised by, 
a romantic, poetic long-sightedness. It has an indistinct perception of what is nearby – a 
rickety fence, a bad road, the litter in the nearest gateway – but a detailed knowledge of 
what shines in the distance, of mirages on the horizon. Paying more attention to the 
wished-for than to the real, this view of things leads to a quest for the sole truth, for 
supreme justice. It creates a sense if not of exclusivity then of being special, different 
from one’s neighbours. This sense of being different is both appealing and extraordinarily 
inspiring. This search for a special truth of one’s own, this need to live by one’s own 
intellect, compels one to act with marked independence. The whole history of Russia 
since the reign of Ivan II [1462-1505] is a demonstration of intellectual independence and 
state sovereignty (2008: 85). 
 
It is these elements, which seen to provide a framework for the Russian difference; they 
infuse cultural narratives and provide the background assumptions. When contrasted 
with Western philosophies of knowledge, these elements provide greater scope for the 
societal validation of discourses drawing on tradition, religion and spirituality. Yet, again, 
Surkov, aware of the need for Western technologies for modernisation, is careful to stress 
that the difference from the West is relative, not absolute. 
Indeed, while Russia has long constructed its identity in contradistinction to Europe and 
the West, today pronounced anti-Westernism is problematic; not least since a large part 
of the Moscow elite are reflexively pro-Western and look to the West as a reference point 
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of relative worth (Chatham House 2011),120 not to mention the recognised futility of 
serious international confrontation at this time (Karaganov 2007). Thus, in order to 
circumvent this apparent contradiction, Russian leaders have sought to construct the 
country as one of the three pillars of European civilisation. As Natalia Narochnitskaya put 
it, ‘we are an inalienable part of Europe, but at the same time, we are an alternative to 
the Western Christian Catholic-Protestant civilization’(2007b). Accordingly, Russia, EU-
Europe and America have all developed the European tradition, and while the latter two 
may be classed as ‘Western’, Russia declines this descriptor for itself. In this way Russia is 
in a position to lay a claim to belonging to Europe as an identity club, with all its positive 
associations of progressiveness, high standards of living and civilisational achievement. 
Simultaneously, Moscow reserves space to take this legacy – the European or Western 
thesis - and develop it further, synthesising other elements from Russia’s historical 
experience to create an attractive cultural-ideational product to offer the world, backed 
up by Russian hard power (Krastev 2009). In this sense, Russia strives to present itself not 
as an ‘anti-West’, but rather as an ‘other Europe (Krastev 2007) or even the ‘new West’ 
(Karaganov 2007; D. Trenin, cited in Chatham House 2011: 23); offering benefits and a 
cultural corrective.121  This self-conception has the potential to reconcile both the 
Kremlin’s critical rhetoric of the West that appeases nationalists and others with its pro-
Western overtures, while preserving space for Russian distinctiveness. This discursive 
scope should be borne in mind when considering aspects in the following chapters that 
appear to advance an anti-Western line. 
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5.8. Russkiy Mir – Contours of Russia’s Civilisational Vision  
 
The previous section has presented the ideational motifs of Russian soft power, arguing 
that rather than offering a utopian ideological blueprint, Russia’s contemporary 
civilisational vision constitutes a synthetical corrective of the Western model of politico-
social development. In recent years, Moscow has often couched this vision in terms of the 
Russkiy Mir. 
The term Russkiy Mir122 has made increasingly frequent appearances since around the 
turn of the millennium and was discussed in the Kremlin in 2007.123 Yet, the object 
referred to under this label differs depending on who is speaking and their intentions. 
Vyacheslav Nikonov, Director of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, has used the term to refer to 
all friends of Russia anywhere in the world, that is, all people interested in the languages, 
cultures and history of Russia.124 By contrast, Patriarch Kirill has used the term more 
narrowly to signify Orthodox believers of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan 
and elsewhere (Patriarch Kirill 2009). Thus there is an inherent ambiguity about the term, 
which has thus not been translated to preserve the multiplicity of meaning inherent in the 
original, which stems not only from differences in usage, but also of the sliding meanings 
of its constituent parts. 
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Indeed, the word ‘russkii’, for Patriarch Kirill, signifies Holy Rus’ as a whole; an epithet to 
describe the medieval kingdom of three sister states and their spiritual legacy. Yet this 
signifier may also be interpreted by those who would see it as an implicit nod to the 
unspoken primacy of ethnic Russians in national projects; a reflection of the on-going 
negotiation of the place of the Russian ethnic group in contemporary Russian society 
(Surkov 2009). While the ambiguity of the term can serve as a useful panacea to the 
potentially explosive tensions surrounding this issue domestically, the phrasing is also 
open to the suspicion abroad that for all the nice words, ‘russkii’ actually means ‘rossiiskii’, 
and thereby associating the term with an imperial intent of the part of the Russian 
Federation. 
‘Mir’ also has a number of potential translations and connotations in English. Broadly, it 
speaks inclusively of the friends and admirers of Russia as they are dispersed across the 
world. More narrowly, it indicates ‘mir’ as the global community or ‘obshchina’ of 
Russians or Russian-speakers, which Moscow would like to coalesce as a more closely-knit 
diaspora. Some scholars hint at the use of ‘mir’ to signify ‘empire’[‘imperiya’], albeit a 
peaceful one (Ostrovskii and Shchedrovitskii 1999; Shchedrovitskii 2000). Indeed, while 
‘mir’ also proclaims a peaceful approach by Russia in its interactions with the world, 
Alexey Dolinksiy also conveyed the insight that the Russkiy Mir is also about peace for 
Russians.125 Here peace may be seen to indicate relief from the agony of crises of 
orientation, provoked both by the perceived humiliation of a statehood shrunk far smaller 
than the traditional reference point of Russian identity construction and the loss of 
historical mission resulting from the sudden end of the Cold War and subsequent 
demoralisation. Yet despite this ambiguity about the presumed members of the Russkiy 
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Mir and aims of engagement with them, activities to realise the distinct visions articulated 
by Nikonov and Kirill are not inherently contradictory, but may proceed in parallel, even 
overlapping and complementing one another, as may be the case with the different 
approaches to soft power highlighted above.126  
Russian debates on national identity have historically and in the contemporary period 
revolved around whether Russia should turn to the West or focus on the ‘East’. But the 
eastern dimension is not homogenous; alongside Pan-Slavism and notions of Russia 
development with its Orthodox brethren, Eurasianism is a significant current of thought. 
This study focuses on the Pan-Slavism elements as the case study is Ukraine and this 
aspect is expressed most closely in Orthodox discourses of cultural unity in this country. 
However, the discourse does not seem to preclude or be contradicted by Russia’s 
development of closer ties in the Eurasian space. On the contrary, Patriarch Kirill has 
asserted the role of the Russkiy Mir as a delegate in a ‘dialogue of civilisations’ with other 
ethno-religious communities, in which the secular world – predominantly the West – is 
seen as ‘the Other’ against which more spiritual people might find unity (Patriarch Kirill 
2011: 33-8).  
In relative proportion to vitality of the Russkiy Mir there emerge opportunities for Russia 
to reassume the role of ‘union-forming’ state by exercising legitimate leadership as a 
civilisational centre. As presumed by the logic of ‘sovereignty of spirit’, a civilisation 
worthy of the name must offer a unique and distinctive worldview to humanity capable of 
providing answers to the pressing questions of the age.  
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5.8.1. Discursive Strand: Culture of the Russkiy Mir 
 
The discourse on the Russkiy Mir is predicated upon the assumption that the distinctive 
culture and traditions of ethno-national communities are and should be maintained as 
relevant and meaningful categories in human society and political interaction. The finger 
is thereby pointed at the expansive dynamics of globalisation – frequently interpreted as 
little more than a cloaked phrasing for Americanisation - which stands accused of 
advancing an agenda of economic, political and cultural homogenisation.  
Cultural prestige is an element in the credibility of an aspirant soft power, and the Russkiy 
Mir Foundation’s website seeks to cultivate a positive association of Russia with some of 
the best global examples of high culture. By informing users of developments in this area, 
the website becomes a source of ‘good news’ about Russia, counterbalancing the morale-
seeping flow of critical and negative coverage emanating from foreign and Russia-based 
sources alike. Although not uncritical of carefully selected aspects of Russian political life, 
critique tends to relativised and placed in a context of a trajectory of progress in the right 
direction. The site also provides ‘evidence’ that Russia is still a focus of great interest 
among foreign citizens. On such themes, however, the website generally provides pieces 
of relevant information for the digestion of readers themselves, rather than foisting 
familiar, pre-determined condemnatory conclusions that would likely alienate the more 
refined target audience. Similarly, the website also contains a diversity of materials which 
might prove useful to students and teachers of Russian language and culture abroad that 
have in many cases been generated by user-driven projects supported by grants from the 
foundation. Russia thus emerges in the attractive light of a provider of assistance, while 
simultaneously potentially helping to occupy a space which might otherwise be filled by 
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language learning products generated without Moscow’s input. Since these grants are run 
on a competitive basis and more applications are received than grants available, this 
presumably enables the foundation to select the projects more supportive of its 
objectives and discourses. 
Closely connected with the nurturing of Russian culture abroad is the preservation, 
development and dissemination of Russian perspectives on history, and in particular, key 
moments in contemporary debates about the nature of relations with neighbouring 
states. If one follows the logic that ‘history is written by the winners’ then academic 
debates about the unfolding of past events are drawn into the competition for primacy. In 
this context, debates about history assume geopolitical significance, since ‘those who 
want to split the unity of Russia and Ukraine need to reshape the past of the basis of 
historical mythology and political ideology’ (Martyshin and Bespalov 2010). 127 
Maintenance of WWII narratives of liberation helps to vindicate the Soviet era, indicating 
it was not a complete black hole in course of Russian history. Indeed, admitting negative 
elements would involve ‘reconfiguring the whole groundwork of Russian national identity,’ 
which is not a priority at the moment. 
The promotion of the Russian language is significant for soft power not least because the 
number of speakers of a given world language is used as a proxy quantitative benchmark 
of prestige and civilisational attractiveness. The great classical works of literature in 
Russian represent part of the claim to greatness of the Russkiy Mir. Definitions 
foregrounding language make positive overtures to Ukraine, since many of the greatest 
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proponents of ‘russkii’ literary heritage were Ukrainian, and thus via the Russkiy Mir, 
Ukrainians become bearers of cultural legacy whose creative works make a defining 
contribution to the expanse of global civilisational development.  
Yet a language may be learned for quite pragmatic reasons as well as sheer cultural 
attraction. Thus the popularity of a language for learners is also indicative of their 
perceptions of the opportunities it may create for them; arguably a measure of attraction, 
although considered rather closer to ‘hard’ economic power for the purposes of this 
study.  
In the contested cultural space of Ukraine, a choice for English classes instead of Russian 
is not necessarily a rejection of Russia since the two East Slavic tongues are often 
considered mutually intelligible. However, falling statistics on the numbers of pupils, 
students and candidate teachers learning Russian in Ukrainian educational establishments 
gives the impression of civilisational decline. This is also a cause for alarm among 
interested persons as it is believed to lead to a reduction in Russian literacy and the 
proliferation of hybridised forms such as ‘surzhyk’, which can be negatively evaluated as a 
non-literary form. Since the tendency toward less refined language use is also an issue 
related to the quality of education across all social strata in Russia itself, this represents a 
bifurcation of contemporary cultural norms from the high culture upon which Russian 
claims to world-leading agenda-setting standards of civilisational achievement are based, 
and is represented in the 2009 Russian National Security Strategy.128 
The Russian language is advanced as the natural lingua franca of choice among citizens of 
the states of the former Soviet Union for historical reasons, and is today projected as a 
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means whereby the cultural heritage of small nations might become readily part of world 
culture (Verkhoturov 2010). Yet given the rise of variants of English – including 
‘Globish’129 – as a international language, the continuation of this trend cannot be taken 
for granted. Indeed, a shift would be a huge blow; as well as breeding a confidence-
dulling sense of being on the global margins, such a state of affairs might auger in a 
vicious circle of decline. A language is the intrinsic bearer of not only culture, but also 
mentality and worldview; a fundamental symbolic marker of cultural identity 
(Verkhoturov 2010) that binds individual together as a community. Indeed, language 
emerged as an important factor linking participants to a notion of the Russkiy Mir in the 
focus groups. Further, maintaining Russian as an international language is, however, not 
only important for its own sake as a cultural and emotional binder; it is also important as 
a medium of communication enabling the easy export of cultural and media products; 
excellent conduits of soft power ideational discourse. 
5.8.2. Discursive Strand: the Values of the Russkiy Mir 
 
This section examines a traditional source of value orientation in society; the Church, in 
particular the perspectives offered by Russian Orthodox Church under Patriarch Kirill. The 
task of the churches’ ideational-informational work seems to be support the affirmation 
and development of the privileged place of narratives of spirituality, morality and 
tradition within the framework of public discourse, both in Russia and the countries under 
its canonical jurisdiction, especially Ukraine. 
While the institution of the Russian Orthodox Church is seems to be the driving force, this 
value discourse is often not overly religious in terms of its specific content. God is 
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2006/dec/03/features.review37 accessed 13th April 2012. 
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referred to, but the spirituality with which the narratives are infused relates more 
generally to modes of living. In this sense, the narratives expressed so prominently in the 
Patriarch’s public discourse are more ‘national-spiritual’ than ‘religio-spiritual’ in nature. 
Members of the Russkiy Mir, or Holy Rus’, to use the Patriarch’s preferred expression, are 
invited to avow themselves to an identity as part of a spiritual people anointed with the 
task of reclaiming and preserving a presently neglected part of Europe’s heritage. The 
bearers of this spiritual-cultural tradition are simultaneously offered a sense of moral 
superiority that helps generate politically beneficial collective self-esteem (Feklyunina 
2010: 5). 
An interesting aspect of Patriarch Kirill’s notion of the Russkir Mir as a transborder 
Orthodox community is that rather, unlike typical nationalist variants, this vision is not 
necessarily defined by Russia. Accordingly, 
the Holy Patriarch sees Russkiy Mir as a wider integral space, and people are expected to 
serve the development of this integral space as a whole and each of its countries in 
particular. [I]f there is a small Russian community somewhere in Scandinavian or Latin 
America, it is not an object of Moscow’s actions, but a subject of relationships within 
Russkiy Mir… Russkiy Mir is not equal to modern Russia. (Ryabykh 2011) 
 Rather, the philosophical claims to knowledge provided by Eastern Orthodoxy should 
underpin a project with a more universal purpose, and, as indicated above, persons of any 
nationality may in principle contribute to that. Nevertheless, despite the claims not to be 
specifically Russian, it seems that opportunities for Russia to reassume the role of ‘union-
forming’ state emerge in relative proportion to the vitality of the Russkiy Mir.  
Thus, the Russkiy Mir asserts its civilisational standing. While working to preserve 
tradition and identity, its thinkers strive to engage with ideas coming from the secular 
world and to which of its features enhance modern living and should be embraced and 
182 
 
what should be resisted. It offers a critique proceeding from the observation of the 
ultimate unsustainability of the Western liberal model of development, highlighting a 
tension between cultural-spiritual identities and liberal claims to universal interpretations 
of human rights and freedoms (Patriarch Kirill 2011). The ROC advances the claim that it is 
possible to think about a progressive and just world system based on universal principles 
differently defined. The proposition and implementation of a viable alternative to the 
Western (neo-)liberal project is a vital constituent part of Russian claims to sovereignty of 
spirit; a fertile kernel of soft power. 
It has its Russian specificities, but the aim is to seek shared positions for a common 
platform among those in the world who likewise question the viability of the current 
order. It is clear that thinkers within the Kremlin do see the potential for their country to 
assume a leading role in global inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue. Looking even 
beyond the Ukrainian case study, Russia has created opportunities for cooperation with 
countries who share the conviction that religion, cultural identity and tradition maintain 
value that should not be erased or even outlawed as normative guiding factors in human 
society. Patriarch Kirill has stated his belief that there are core values shared by different 
cultural and religious groupings that can serve as a basis for a new normative order. 





5.8.3. Discursive Strand: Russian Foreign Policy 
 
As previously discussed, the most overtly political aspects of the soft power discourse, 
labelled ‘sovereign democracy’, present a commentary on contemporary global affairs, 
which should co-opt support abroad. This Russian vision proceeds from a critique of the 
current global trajectory of military-strategic, economic, cultural and spiritual 
development. While such narratives have been interpreted as manifestations of ‘anti-
Americanism,’ this is not the case in an absolute sense since, as previously argued, it is 
more expedient for Russia to frame Western countries as a competitors than enemies. 
From this perspective, the USA is appraised from a political angle, and deemed to have 
squandered the chance at global leadership it was given at the end of the Cold War, and 
again after 9/11, when rather than re-shaping world affairs for the good of all humanity, it 
allegedly opted for political opportunism; triumphantly seizing the moment of unipolarity 
to impose its will on others under the illusion of the universalism of its model (Karaganov 
2008; Ivanov 2011).  
Sovereign democracy then reflects Russian konkurentosposobnost’; the ability to resist 
Western pressure to implement ‘arbitrary’ benchmarks imposed from abroad, in 
preference of political models inspired by domestic traditions. One facet of the 
ambiguous understanding of sovereignty was explored already in the previous chapter, 
and argued to indicate in that context a disparity of sovereign independence of action 
between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ countries as an inherent attribute of realist political 
order, viewing all else as unsustainable idealism (Surkov 2009). However, sovereign 
democracy is also argued to suggest a discourse of equality; albeit one that functions on 
normative-moral level. It is a reaction against the democratisation agenda of the West, 
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which is framed as assuming a priori the inferior standing of political relations in non-
Western countries. States seeking to integrate in the Western politico-economic and 
security communities are expected to unquestioningly adopt the corresponding 
‘progressive’ policies, some of which are deemed to reflect ‘non-traditional’ value 
orientations in the Russian discourse. By contrast, while not denying the universality of 
certain core values across diverse human communities, the Russian model is posited as 
allowing culturally specific interpretations thereof. This typically concerns value 
interpretation relating to understandings of human rights and freedoms. For instance, in 
this sense, equality and freedom refer not to the individual, but to the collective. ‘The 
anti-liberal measures are designed to secure freedom, but instead of liberating the 
individual, the concern is the freedom of the common will, the national self-fulfilment by 
means of a great state’ (Morozov 2009: 223). 
5.9. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has approached soft power as one of the foreign policy components of 
Russia’s wider modernisation strategy, that should be based on, among other things, a 
‘faith in Russia’ (Trenin 2010: 28) to serve as testimony to the country’s ‘sovereignty of 
spirit’. As such, it forms the cultural component of the sovereign democracy project. This 
implies, on one hand, that Russia maintain its own cultural traditions and implements 
policies that express indigenous values rather than supposedly universal international 
models. On the other hand, it also hints that Russia act as a sovereign leader, exercising a 
preponderance of cultural influence over other states.  
Although soft power is by definition interested in exploring the dynamics of ideational 
hegemony as they pertain to the international sphere, such international cultural work is 
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equally significant to domestic politics. Hence soft power is also interesting for the way it 
holds a mirror up to Russian internal politics, revealing much about the ambitions, self-
understandings, insecurities and competing narratives of the country’s ruling elites in the 
course of a discussion of the issues impeding a flourishing of Russian soft power. 
Stressing the sovereign uniqueness [samobytnost’] of its model, Russia sees itself as a 
historically-rooted civilisational centre. However, such a claim relies on the existence of 
others who also form part of the civilisation. Ukraine has been argued to be of primary 
importance in this regard. Thus, while it seems accepted that Ukraine is formally an 
independent state, there is a strong will to renew cultural ties and ideational influence so 
that the country’s centre of civilisational gravity remains toward Russia, even if it might 
engage in some pragmatic cooperation with Europe. The symbolism of Ukraine’s ultimate 
loyalty to Russia, with whom it shares profound spiritual and cultural ties, may serve to 
assuage the sense of loss and humiliation experienced with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
The new orientating idea to serve as the kernel of the Russian soft power project appears 
to have been found in the belief in the possibility of synthesising the positive aspects of 
modernity in terms of human development, with tradition and spirituality. In this sense, 
Russia strives to pose as an alternative to the Western model of societal progress. The 
Russian ‘soft power’ discourse is not inherently anti-Western. In fact, it is explicitly 
respectful of some aspects of European civilisational achievement. Yet, while some 
elements in the discourse share the universal values proclaimed by the Western, the 
narrative simultaneously and pragmatically offers sufficient flexibility to exercise sharp 
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criticism of certain manifestations thereof, or, at the very least, the right to choose how 
to implement such values. 
This chapter has cast light on the guiding inspiration behind Russia civilisational 
discourses, revealing numerous themes that help to understand the origins of today’s 
discourse. The next step is to examine and example of how these narratives are 
disseminated in Ukraine, namely the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and its local 
branch, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. 
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Chapter Six: The Moscow Patriarchate as a Tool of Russian Soft 
power in Ukraine 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter explored Russian conceptual approaches to soft power, and 
identified and analysed the key elements of a contemporary, forward-thinking Russian 
civilisational soft power discourse. This chapter will cast light on the methods of the wider 
diffusion of this worldview by examining what is argued to be one of the principal agents 
of Russian soft power; namely the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). While the previous 
chapter also discussed the Russkiy Mir and sovereign democracy foreign policy narratives, 
here the focus will rest solely upon the activity of the ROC. This is because although the 
civilisational discourse appears to have tacit state sanction, the Church is taking the lead 
in disseminating this worldview, leaving the state free to engage in politics pragmatically. 
Funded by the state budget, the Russkiy Mir Foundation cooperates directly with the 
Church, although it emphasises cultural community over value issues. In terms of power, 
profile and financing, however, it is dwarfed by the Church, which essentially has its own 
power base and self-consciously assumes some responsibility for the fate of Russia. It is 
thus valuable to look into the ROC’s soft power work in a depth that could not be 
accomplished for all three strands within the limited scope of this study.  
The practical realisation of a Russian soft power approach will be explored by looking 
more closely at the work of the Church. It is suggested that the activities of the Church 
are gathering momentum under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill; furthering the 
dissemination of its outlook through interaction with both the secular authorities and 
direct civil society engagement. As a ‘tool’ of Russian soft power, the ROC, it is argued, is 
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striving to extend both its capacity and the effectiveness of its work. Further, seeking to 
hone its authority and credibility as an opinion former, the Church is paying careful 
attention to its image, both by developing a more strategic approach to media 
engagement and by paying attention to public opinion in its self-positioning. It appears 
that an effective learning process is underway with regard to the quality of informational 
work, permitting the supposition that the methods of soft power work are being 
productively imbibed by the Church. Nevertheless, while the ROC may be spearheading 
modernisation in Russian relations with the public, it is not immune from the impact of 
wider dynamics of Russian ‘soft’ influence in Ukraine, as will become apparent upon 
perusing the findings of the audience reception work in the next chapter. 
It is argued that the discourse of the Orthodox Church dovetails with the civilisational 
assumptions of the Russian state. The ROC is engaged in the business of soft power par 
excellence; not only working to increase the attraction of Russia and its culture, language 
and historical legacy, but are simultaneously striving to set the agenda by asserting the 
right to contribute to the conceptualisation of issues of normativity and legitimacy – in 
short the definition of ‘attractiveness’ itself. Thus, while the Russian state has often been 
deemed incompatible with the very notion of ‘soft’ power, the close examination 
presented here suggests that within Russia tools of soft power are being developed that 
may prove capable of increasing the attraction and agenda-setting potential not merely 




6.2. Networked Interaction between Church and State 
 
Chapter five implied a symbiotic relationship between the Church and State in Russia, 
which will be explored in greater detail here. Indeed, while the Church is considered a 
‘tool’ of Russian soft power in the terms of this thesis, this should not imply a ‘master-
servant relationship’ (Ryabykh 2011), or that the Church is instrumentalised in a purely 
unidirectional manner. Indeed, although the Church declares itself, in the words of the 
late Patriarch Aleksey, ‘ready for further cooperation with the [S]tate because we only 
have one homeland, one history and one future’ (cited in Blitt 2008: 777), it does not 
envisage itself as a junior partner in the arrangement. Rather, as Hegumen Philipp 
Ryabykh, Deputy Chairman of the DECR, asserted ‘we see that in the modern world, the 
more stable and sustainable systems are the ones that are based on several centers of 
decision-making that coordinate activity’ (2011). 
Both Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill have compared the post-Soviet period to the ‘Time 
of Troubles’ [‘smutnoye vremya’] (Patriarch Kirill 2012b; Putin 2012b); the decades of the 
seventeenth century characterised by an undermining of spiritual identity, state 
weakness and overshadowing external influences; a framing which chimes with Russia’s 
deficiency of ‘sovereignty of spirit’ diagnosed in a previous chapter. While the Russian 
Federation has recovered from the cataclysmic shocks unleashed by the end of the Soviet 
Union, the state’s utilitarian role in society as a balancer and delegator of power has 
ultimately proven insufficient to ensure societal coherence by creating shared meanings 
that bind a society together and lend it stability (Okara 2007; Hudson 2009), to the point 
of posing a threat to the stability and security of the state. Thus, as Makarin has 
suggested, unlike the subordination of former times, today the relationship is mutual with 
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‘the state [counting] not just on the loyalty of the Church but also on its active political 
support’ (2011: 8). Richters (2012: 8) concurs, observing that the ‘post-communist ROC 
[has] its own agenda which it has formulated independently of the state and which it 
seeks to implement by all available means’. Now, as in the interregnum, the Church, by its 
own interpretation, believes it should exercise a special responsibility, assuming a leading 
role in fostering unity in society. Accordingly, in December 2009, the Russian Orthodox 
Church, supported by United Russia, announced its expectation that the ‘government 
would not merely consult with the Church, but “must jointly decide… what their common 
values are and what modernization tasks must be accomplished”’ (Blitt 2010: 1365).  
Russia’s leaders have signaled their support for such an approach, with President 
Medvedev using a speech on the day of Patriarch Kirill’s inauguration in 2009 to promise 
that ‘the special, trustful relations with the [ROC] will be kept and further developed to 
the benefit of the Fatherland’ (Blitt 2008: 777). Furthermore, Vladimir Putin has spoken 
with reference to the deprivations of the communist period of the ‘debt’ owed to the 
Church130 and has acted accordingly; not only granting the church various long-strived for 
opportunities, but signaling a broader movement in policy with support for the 
construction of 200 new churches in Moscow alone.131 The Moscow Patriarchate has also 
received assistance in the re-acquisition and construction of Churches abroad. 132 
Significantly, the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and Trade has submitted a 
draft bill on the restitution of property confiscated by the Bolsheviks and now held by the 
state. The bill would turn the ROC into one of the largest, and therefore most powerful 
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landowners in the country133, which would help underwrite its financial independence134 
and secure the Church’s future as a steady force of societal influence independent of 
shifts in party political conjunctures.  
In its Social Concept of 2000,135 the Russian Orthodox Church asserted its right to be 
consulted on issues relating to society. In order to facilitate this, the Church has, under 
the leadership of Patriarch Kirill, reinvigorated its mechanisms for communication and 
interaction with most key state institutions through establishing new consultative organs 
and appointing senior clergy to existing ones; in short, linking in to networks of influence. 
Networks are organised around dominant nodes, whose power is predicated upon their 
ability to leverage and connect to other channels of ‘soft’ influence, shaping their 
‘programming’ (Castells 2009: 72). Judging by the extent and quality of interaction 
between the Kremlin and the Danilov Monastery (Blitt 2008: 743, Makarin 2011: 8), the 
Russian Church is becoming an increasing potent such node. This chapter will examine 
how the Church is networked in to the state power structures, which provide some of the 
‘hard power’ resources backing the initiatives, as well as providing access to switching 
and programming capacities. 
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 The ROC apparently decided to formulate a social conception in 1994, but did not organise a committee 
to do so until 1997. It was headed by Kirill Gundayev (Richters 2012: 18). The social concept should remain 
valid for an ‘unspecified, but relatively long period of time’ (Richters 2012: 30). Significantly, this document 
is said to have facilitated the reunification with the ROCOR, which interpreted its section on church-state 
relations as renouncing Patriarch Sergei’s declaration of loyalty to the Soviet state in 1927 (Richters 




Such fora of interaction include the Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious 
Associations,136 the Working Group of MFA and ROC,137 the Government Commission for 
Religious Associations,138 and Expert Council of the State Duma Committee for Public 
Associations and Religious Organisations,139 as well as the Synodal Department for 
Church-State Relations. 140  In May 2012, the ROC signed a one-year renewable 
cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Culture, establishing targets.141 Furthermore, 
within Church structures a Council for the Arts has been formed to ‘unite the efforts of 
the Church, representatives of cultural institutions of civil society in an effort to overcome 
the negative phenomena in our society, including in the cultural sphere’.142  
Such bodies have not only enabled the Church to reinforce its de facto privileged position 
vis-à-vis other religions and outlooks, but have also placed it in an advantageous position 
to potentially support the ‘reprogramming’ of the networks supported by the individuals 
who compose these bodies. Apparently, this strategy is bearing fruit, as according to 
Vsevolod Chaplin, the phenomenon of the ‘podsvechnik’ (slang for politicians who 
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pandered to the Church but lacked an understanding of Orthodox faith) ended under 
Putin’s rule, and that ‘among politicians, there are now more and more people who read 
the Gospels[,]… go on pilgrimages and attend [C]hurch services’ (cited in Blitt 2008: 737). 
This study does not go so far as suggesting that the constitutionally secular and 
ideologically neutral Russian state may be assuming a religious motivation, but certainly 
the neo-Slavophile, political aspects of the ‘spirituality–infused’ discourse are referred to 
by senior government officials (Blitt 2011: 373). Putin, although in regular contact with 
the Patriarch, and consistently making reference to spirituality and culture, does not 
expand on these themes in explicit depth in his public speeches. 
The Church also contributes actively to Russia’s foreign policy. The Patriarch receives 
ambassadors before departure to their host country, and Foreign Minister Lavrov would 
like the ROC to ‘consider the preparation of a series of lectures on the role of religion in 
world politics’ for students of MGIMO and the Diplomatic Academy (Lavrov 2011).143 The 
ROC also participates in dialogue with international organisations, such as World Public 
Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’, the Council of Europe (which adopted a White Paper on 
Intercultural Dialogue in 2008), the World Russian National Assembly and the Russia-
Islamic World Strategic Vision Group as well as supporting Days of Slavic Literature and 
Culture. 
Such elite liaison work is also taking place in Ukraine specifically. For instance, it is well-
known that President Yanukovych has met with Patriarch Kirill several times; most 
significantly on the occasion of his pre-inauguration blessing. However, the spectrum of 
Church-elite interaction has a much broader dimension in Ukraine, as in Russia. For 
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instance, on 13th July 2009, at a seminar at the Kyiv Percherska Lavra, the Ukrainian 
translation of the ‘Basic Teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Dignity, Freedom 
and Human Rights’ was presented to a high-profile audience including Metropolitan Lazar 
of Simferopol and Crimea, former Ukrainian President Kuchma, and Human Rights 
Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada, Nina Karpacheva. The gathered company also 
included Vadim Kolesnichenko, chairman of the inter-fractional organisation of Deputies 
of the Verkhovna Rada in support of the canonical Orthodox church, who is well-known in 
Ukraine for his ‘pro-Russian’ orientation (Pelnēns 2009). He noted that ‘the “fundaments” 
create a broad opportunity to conduct enlightening and human rights activities in society, 
referring to spiritual roots, beyond the political dynamics and artificially created 
conditions’ and proposed that each Deputy should refer to the document in their work, 
with the aim of returning core principles of justice and morality to society.144  
In this we may observe the strengthening of the position of the Moscow Patriarchate in 
Ukrainian society. Elite engagement is particularly significant in this regard since elites 
have the capacity to act as gatekeepers, facilitating or impeding the wider dispersion of 
this ideational position within their jurisdiction. For their part, Ukrainian politicians 
appear to welcome opportunities to cooperate with the church as they perceived that 
this increases their chances of winning elections (Richters 2012: 115). While it is not 
possible to gain an overview of the full extent of such outreach work among the political 
class in Ukraine, it seems that such liaison initiatives are bearing fruit. For instance, the 
website of the Information Department of the Moscow Patriarchate recently reported the 
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proposition of a Ukrainian bill against sexual propaganda which recalls that of St 
Petersburg.145  
Evidently, through the development of such structures the Church is establishing 
networks with the state and civil society that increase its potential to perform switching 
and programming functions, and to instil its ideas into the policy-making process, 
including in foreign relations with the neighbouring states. Yet, Russia would not stand 
credibly as a spiritually and culturally enriched civilisational centre without real 
developments on this front domestically, while such steps simultaneously bolster the 
‘sovereignty of spirit’ that the nation was deemed lacking.  
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6.3. The Church as a Direct Channel of Informational Influence in Ukraine 
 
As a relatively religious country, with 71.4 per cent of the population professing to be a 
believer146  and 68.9 per cent of Ukrainians ‘fully trusting’ or ‘rather trusting’ the 
Church,147 this institution may be well placed to shape the nation’s consciousness. 
Simultaneously, however, the legacy of the country’s historical and geopolitical cleavages 
is also played out in the religious sphere. Accordingly, since the rescinding of the 
prohibitions on religious freedoms, a ‘competition for souls’ has been fought between the 
various Orthodox denominations, not to mention a plethora of other, mostly Evangelical 
denominations, frequently branded ‘sects’. 
In this popularity contest it appears at first glance as though the only ‘canonical’ 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, that of the Moscow Patriarchate, granted broad rights of 
self-governance (Makarin 2011: 23) by Bishop’s Council in 1990,148 is in first place, with 
more than 11,000 parishes in Ukraine (2009). By this measure, the UOC(KP); branded 
‘schismatic’ following its establishment in 1992 by a unilateral declaration of autocephaly 
by Metropolitan Filaret, trails behind with only approximately 4,000 parishes. The 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) had 1183 parishes. The Greek Catholic 
Church, which was founded in 1595 as a compromise, and answers to the Pope while 
practising Orthodox rites has 3566 parishes. However, believers of this latter faith are 
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mostly concentrated in relatively pious Western Ukraine, where the Church has acted as a 
pro-Western voice. 
However, examination of figures on the number of adherents to these denominations 
suggests a somewhat different picture.149 A survey150 undertaken by Kyiv’s Razumkov 
Centre observes that of Orthodox believers, 67.3 per cent are attached to the Moscow 
Patriarchate, and 24.6 per cent to the Kyiv Patriarchate.151 Among my sample, however, 
the picture seems more balanced, with 50 per cent and 47 per cent of Orthodox believers 
confessing to the Moscow and Kyiv Churches respectively. Adherents of the Moscow 
Patriarchate constitute roughly a third of all respondents in Kyiv, half in Donets’k and 
approximately three-quarters in Kharkiv. In L’viv, less than ten percent considered 
themselves members of the Moscow Church. The relative over-representation of the Kyiv 
patriarchate is perhaps due to the youthful demographic studied, who have only ever 
known an independent Ukraine ruled from Kyiv. Furthermore, as Richters (2012: 98) 
observes, since churches do not clearly proclaim their institutional affiliation, believers 
may be unaware whether they are technically a parishioner of a Kyiv or Moscow affiliated 
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http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/news/common/news11378.html (accessed 21st July 2010) 
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Church, but call themselves a member of the Kyiv Church to emphasise their Ukrainian 
identity.152 
  
However, in addition to the significant proportion of non-believers,153 the potential direct 
impact of the Moscow Patriarchate on my sample group is considerably reduced when we 
consider the number regularly practicing their religion; an indicator of the priority people 
attribute to religious matters in their life. While one might argue that the identification 
with a religion could be important in indicating political outlook, irregular church 
attendance, for instance, limits the potential for clerics to communicate directly with this 
group of parishioners. Indeed, the proportion of those regularly engaging in religious 
practice is significantly lower among the students from Donets’k (11 per cent) and Kharkiv 
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 The notion that Ukrainians do not make such strong differentiations between the churches as the 
hierarchs themselves do is demonstrated in the way that, for instance, the greatest number of Ukrainians – 
regardless of affiliation, thought that the head of their Church was head of  the UOC(MP) (Richters 2012: 
98). 
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 In the cities of Kyiv, Donets’k and Kharkiv, nearly a third of respondents did not profess a religion. While 
in Kyiv a total of 17 per cent of these respondents couched their approach to religion in terms of atheism 
(10 per cent) or agnosticism(7 per cent), in Donets’k and Kharkiv a corresponding number chose the 












































(10 per cent) and indeed among adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate generally (12 per 
cent). By contrast, in L’viv, where the more Western-oriented Greek Catholic Church is 
most popular (51 per cent), over a third of believers regularly practice their faith, 
potentially giving that Church greater potential to exercise direct influence. 
Table 3: Frequency of religious practice of respondents indicating a religion by city and religious 
denomination (%)  
City N Don't  Practice on  Practice  
    practice religious holidays regularly 
     Kyiv 72 17 56 28 
L’viv 95 16 48 36 
Donets’k 92 11 78 11 
Kharkiv 73 16 74 10 
     UOC (MP) 133 18 70 12 
UOC (KP) 120 10 72 18 
Greek Catholic 57 14 49 37 
          
Note: UAOC and other confessions not included in breakdown by religion due to small sample size. 
    Clearly, with such low numbers of higher education students of the UOC(MP) regularly 
practising, religious services and other church events have limitations as a means of 
communicating the Orthodox message, let alone generating Russian soft power. Even if 
we consider that the doctrine of the other Orthodox churches is the same, still direct 
communication between clergy and believers appears to be a stunted means to achieve 
the ambitious society-level ends intended.154 
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 Indeed, although commentaries on religious affairs in Ukraine tend to have stressed the antagonism 
between the different denominations, one might also consider the way in which the spiritual message of 
the other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches might actually help reinforce the message of the Moscow Patriarch 
in terms of the need to resist materialism (see section 5.10. for a discussion of the values-oriented 
discourse being promoted). Nye himself (2004: 82) accounts for this, observing that European soft power 
can also be a ‘source of assistance and reinforcement for American soft power and increase the likelihood 
of the United States’ achieving its objectives. Soft power can be shared and used in a cooperative fashion. 
European promotion of democracy and human rights helps advance shared values that are consistent with 
American objectives.’  
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6.4. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Wider Societal Engagement 
 
While the number of religious communities of all denominations, and particularly the 
Moscow Patriarchate, has increased in Ukraine, it is recognised that such quantitative 
measures are insufficient, with the Patriarch noting shortly after his investiture that ‘the 
work of the Church must now be assessed not only in terms of the number of churches 
and monasteries but also in terms of the influence that the Church has on people’s lives 
and on society’ (11th March 2009, Tula, cited in Filatov 2011: 28). Accordingly, the Church 
should expand its pastoral role, which is relatively weak, and develop beyond places of 
worship to become centres for the provision of social support.155 
In his ‘Prison Notebooks,’ Gramsci (1971) wrote of the apparatuses of political and 
cultural hegemony, which have a positive educative purpose in society, creating social 
consent for a particular order of things by disseminating, in the terms of this thesis, a 
particular discourse. In recent years, the church has succeeded in gaining access to these 
apparatuses. In July 2009, President Medvedev signalled his support for the restoration of 
the military priesthood; the assignment of chaplains of Russia’s four main faiths to army 
units deployed in battle or abroad. Funded by the Ministry of Defence, the initiative 
should attract the strongest – physically, culturally and intellectually – from among the 
clergy and contribute to the modernisation of the army by encouraging spiritual revival 
and boosting morale with the dropping in of parachuting chaplains and air-dropped mini-
churches, complete with a ‘life-sustaining module’ and ritual utensils.156 In Ukraine, the 
UOC(MP) has also obtained the right to send military priests into the Ukrainian army, and 
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 According to Richters, Orthodox norms have traditionally encouraged the ROC to remain silent on social 
issues. Apparently the other Eastern Orthodox churches have not welcomed the increased competitiveness 
that must ensue as a result of the ROC’s shift away from this position (2012: 33). 
156
 https://rt.com/news/flying-church-army-russia-055/  
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as such is the only religious organisation with access to this institution. This was organised 
through the UOC(MP)’s Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Law 
Enforcement Agencies of Ukraine (DRAFLEA).157 
In another return to pre-revolutionary tradition, on 22nd February 2011 the Russian 
Federal Penitentiary Service and the Synodal Division for Prison Ministry of the ROC 
(established 5th March 2010) concluded an agreement on the provision of chaplaincy 
services in Russia’s prisons and training resources for prison clergy. 158  Similar 
collaboration was established between the Moscow Patriarchate and the State 
Penitentiary Service of Ukraine in August 2011.159 An inter-faith roundtable under the 
auspices of the Committee on the Legislative Support of Law Enforcement of the 
Verkhovna Rada resulted in the resolution entitled ‘the participation of religious 
organizations in shaping the legislative initiatives in the area of penal policy’ on 28th May 
2012.160  DRAFLEA’s access to penal institutions has also excluded other Ukrainian 
denominations (Richters 2012). 
Perhaps the most significant triumph for the Church in its forays into the public space has 
been the introduction of compulsory religious education in schools in Russia. From 2012 
all Russian schools must offer pupils in the fourth and fifth years twice weekly classes in a 
choice of one the following three modules: ‘Foundation of Religious Culture’ (focussed on 
Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism or Buddhism), ‘History and Cultural Background of the World’s 
                                                          
157
 According to Richters, sources on this topic are extremely scares, but she reports that the Archbishop 
facilitated the department’s creation by signing an agreement with the state during Kuchma’s first term in 
office. He is said to have received the Order of St Andrew the First Called, a very prestigious and rarely 
awarded decoration from the RF for his efforts. The activities of military priests include: dispensation of 
sacraments, catechism, measures to inoculate military personnel in the values of self-sacrifice and 
homeland, morality, wisdom, fight drug abuse, bless flags of Ukraine, etc. 
158
 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1414730.html  
159
 http://sinod.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&id=68  
160
 http://www.kvs.gov.ua/peniten/control/main/uk/publish/article/637818  
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Great Religions’ or ‘Foundations of Secular Ethics’. The courses should be led by teachers 
having attended special further training courses. Deacon Andrei Kurayev has designed a 
textbook ‘Foundations of Orthodox Culture’ published in 2009, which Filatov argues says 
more about neo-Slavophile ideas than Orthodoxy (2011: 42).  
Beyond involvement in these more traditional institutions of civil society, the ROC has 
also entered the cultural sphere more broadly, including sectors likely to attract the 
attention of young people. An Orthodox youth movement has been founded, based on 
the Orthodox corps of the Nashi movement. Russian Orthodox Church’s Education 
Committee co-supports the International Charitable Film Festival ‘Radiant Angel’ which 
has an eye to the ‘Development of spiritual-moral culture of the young generation of 
Russia’.161 Showing innovation in church outreach to diverse audiences (Makarin 2011: 
20), Deacon Andrei Kurayev has been known to preach at rock concerts (Papkova and 
Gorenburg 2011: 4), while Metropolitan Kirill and others met with musicians Konstantin 
Kinchev and Yuri Shevchuk to discuss the compatibility of rock music with Orthodoxy.162 
Vsevolod Chaplin has also floated the idea of a ‘national’ dress code that would reflect 
religious sentiment of different confessions, combining ‘elegance and style’ with 
modesty.163 By occupying physical space with people attired with respect to religious 
sensibility, a strong visual message would be conveyed about ‘normal’ values in the 
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 The 8th such festival took place on 8th November 2011 in Moscow. 62 films produced in Russia and 
other countries were seen by 25 thousand viewers. The festival is also conducted with the support of 
Russian Ministry of Culture, the Moscow Government, the Socio-Cultural Initiatives Foundation and other 
organisations. 
(http://www.spc.rs/eng/metropolitan_hilarion_takes_part_closing_8th_international_film_festival_radiant
_angel accessed 13th May 2012). 
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 Official site of the Moscow Patriarchate: ‘Metropolitan Klimet met with rock musicians K. Kinchev and Y. 
Shevchuk, 15
th
 June 2006 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/105287.html  accessed 11th May 2012 ) 
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 Alexandrova Alexandrova, L. (2011). Orthodox Church recalls eternal values, urges universal dress code. 




community. This would contribute to the visual decentring of permissive views, and shift 
the normative balance understood to define the community. 
In terms of innovation in the Church’s civil society engagement, the ‘Orthodox 
Initiative’ 164  is particularly worthy of mention as it indicates clearly the growing 
sophistication of Russian soft power approaches and the associated financial commitment 
to these measures. First initiated in 2005 by the Foundation of St. Seraphim of Sarov, the 
Orthodox Initiative is a grant competition for projects in the spheres of education and 
training, social services, culture and information activity. Both secular and religious 
organisations based in the canonical territory165 of the ROC are invited to apply for grants 
of up to 500,000 Russian roubles (just under £10,000). In different ways, the projects 
envisaged are intended to make Orthodoxy a positive aspect of people’s lived experience 
in the territories concerned, through promoting traditional values and patriotism166 and 
through the provision of services inspired by Christian charitable purpose aiming to 
address key social problems. Since 2010 when Patriarch Kirill became chairman of the 
steering committee, the initiative has, in its own eyes, assumed a qualitatively new level. 
Purely quantitatively, from examining 1,500 applications and allocating 380 grants worth 
altogether 73 million roubles between 2005 and 2009, in 2011 alone the ‘Orthodox 
Initiative’ received approximately 2,000 applications and granted funds totalling 164 
million roubles for 580 projects in Russia and the CIS.167  
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 Competition ‘Orthodox Initiative’: http://www.pravkonkurs.ru/  
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 Here, this is stipulated to include: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Kazakhstan, 
Kirgizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
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 Seminar regional’nykh koordinatorov mezhdunarodhogo grantogo konkursa ‘Pravoslavnaya Initiativa’ 
http://www.pravkonkurs.ru/novosti/115-2012-05-12-17-16-52 (accessed 12th June 2012) 
167
 http://www.pravkonkurs.ru/home/o-konkurse (accessed 12th June 2012) 
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However, the project is about more than the simple allocation of funds. Rather, the 
initiative seeks to bring the Russkiy Mir alive in a more profound, sincere and professional 
way by creating networks. Firstly, the organisation centres on the idea of a partnership 
between representatives of the Church government, social, scientific, cultural and media 
circles to create joint projects on a local level.168 To this end, coordinators have been 
appointed in almost every diocese in the Russkiy Mir, with a particular focus in 2012 on 
Ukraine. Indeed, speaking at the first training seminar for regional coordinators in April 
2011, the Metropolitan of Saransk and Mordovia Barsanuphius noted that the regional 
coordinators should become the ‘first assistants of the diocesan bishops in the search for 
diamonds in the rough who are ready to benefit the Church and the Fatherland.’169 Here 
we may perceive the construction of the network of ‘friends’ rather similar to that 
described in normatively-intoned articles on Russian soft power. Here, however, the 
nature of the relationship appears technically professional in nature, with an emphasis on 
social partnership, not ‘service’ (Ryabykh 2011) to Russia, to fulfil specific and positive 
aims, which may lend it a less politicised aura. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
notion of the Russkiy Mir as a borderless spiritual space, in addition to individual projects, 
the competition also welcomes collaborative applications for ‘network projects’ from two 
or more regions and ‘infrastructural / system projects’ for those willing to offer meta-
                                                          
168
 This outlook is reflected in the composition of the Steering Committee, which is composed of the 
following individuals: Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill (Chair), Sergei Kirinenko (Executive Director 
of Steering Committee, Director of RosAtom), Metropolitan of Saransk and Mordovia Barsanuphius 
(Managing Director of Moscow Patriarchate), Metropolitan Kliment of Kaluga and Borovsk, Metropolitan 
Nizhny Novgorod and Arzamas Georgy (Chairman of the Foundation of St. Seraphim of Sarov ), Bishop of 
Rostov and Novocherkassk Mercury, Bishop of Smolensk and Vyazemsky Pantaleon, Archpriest Vsevolod 
Chaplin, Lyubov Glebova, (Head of the Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science), Vladimir 
Legoida (Chairman of the Synodal Information Department), Andrey Klishas (Member of Federation Council), 
Alexander Konovalov (Minister of Justice), Vladimir Sungorkin, (Editor of "Komsomolskaya Pravda") and 
Valery Fadeev (Director of the Institute of Public Planning, member of the Public Chamber, editor of 
‘Russian in Global Politics’). 
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 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1445639.html (accessed 12th June 2012) 
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level methodological support to organisations conducting projects.170 Such a dense, 
interlinked organisational structure offers opportunities to set the agenda of issues 
deemed societally significant and propose correspondingly attractive solutions. The 
existence of effectively interlinked networks also strengthens their potential to achieve 
objectives as the nodes can lend mutual logistical and rhetorical support. This is not only 
practically useful, but may also help reinforce the sense of the target discourse as 
‘common sense’ apparently widely dispersed in society. 
This initiative is particularly interesting from the point of view of soft power, which 
emphasises the formative role of civil society over state-led initiatives. Devolving some 
responsibility for the advancement of Church messages to locally initiated projects in the 
dioceses may offer greater potential for success since such co-opted partners lend 
‘authenticity’ to the project through the personal conviction and initiative of the 
individuals involved and their pre-established proximity and hence greater authority to 
the target audience. In this way, if successful, the narrative may cease to be perceived as 
an overt top-down ideology, and become ‘common sense’ as a discourse, diffused 
through horizontal, capillary-like action in society.  
Castells (2009: 194) observes that ‘messages, organizations, and leaders who do not have 
a presence in the media do not exist in the public mind.’ As a key means of reaching 
people, they are pre-requisite for agenda-setting. The Church has its own religious media 
organs (e.g. ‘Spas’ TV channel), however, their audience is almost by definition limited. 
Therefore, to better occupy the information space, the Church seeks to extend its 
influence beyond its own media outlets. Proactively seizing the initiative the ROC extends 
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 Network projects are encouraged through the availability of larger grants; up to one million roubles. 
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the hand of friendship to secular media outlets on the basis of cooperation around 
common human values shared by many groups in society. As Patriarch Kirill has noted, 
Our country is secular and free. Of course, we cannot expect that the media industry will 
bear only Christian values. However, there are universal values - for example, love of ones 
neighbour, compassion, and creativity. If in the mass media today, a call to creativity and 
to searching were to sound, if the media renounced its destructive pitch, it would be a 
huge plus. They would form creators.171 
While recognising the plurality of outlook in the media landscape, there is an appeal to 
sympathisers in the wider secular realm to consider these arguably uncontroversial 
ethical values in their work. In this way, the Church can hope to shape the programming 
of the network; the editorial decisions and the choices of the professional journalism 
corps (Castells 2009: 200) in a way that is ‘self-configuring’ – not through diktat but by 
demonstrating the attraction of its position. This offers the advantages of unity of 
purpose, but also the benefits from flexibility of execution (Castells 2009: 21). 
Approaching this goal from another angle, the church is also seeking to build relations 
with those training the media professionals of the future. For instance, Metropolitan 
Kliment of Kaluga and Borovsk gave a public lecture on the role of the media industry in 
shaping the civic space at the Moscow State University of Printing Arts. Furthermore, the 
Synodal Information Department has begun to provide monthly media training sessions172 
with experienced PR experts, to ‘reduce the communications gap with colleagues from 
other publications’ including those in the secular sphere, as well as to encourage focusing 
attention on the social and public activities of the dioceses, rather than inter-church 
affairs. Indeed, the Patriarch has stressed the need to improve the Church’s information 
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 Speech by Metropolitan of Kaluga and Borovsk Kliment at a meeting with students of the Moscow State 
University of Printing Arts on 13th March 2012 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/2062578.html 
(accessed 4th January 2013) 
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 For instance, the four-day courses for employees of the Orthodox media in St Petersburg. 
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policy, going beyond reacting to challenges in the information environment, such as 
scandals, to providing positive news; information about the Church’s social, educational 
and cultural activities in society.173 To assist in this regard, opinion polls are being 
conducted in order to understand public perceptions of the Church, for instance by the 
FOM and Kyiv’s Razumkov Centre.174 With this knowledge, the Church is in a better 
position to react quickly to criticism.  
6.5. The Moscow Patriarchate as a Credible Meaning-Maker in Ukrainian 
Society 
 
The previous part of the chapter examined some of the means by which the Russian 
Orthodox Church may disseminate its worldview in Ukraine. However, as ascertained in 
the conceptual framework, it is not sufficient for an individual to merely become familiar 
with a narrative to be convinced by it, to internalise and to reproduce it as his or her own 
worldview. While success depends in part on the ability of the discourse to persuasively 
account for the demands of the contemporary circumstances, a highly significant factor 
affecting audience disposition is the perceived authority of the agent. 
The conditions for credibility are largely dependent on the social context of the audience. 
In principle, Russia has significant soft power resources in Ukraine deriving not least from 
the history of shared statehood, common language and culture, and the attraction of 
Russia’s world culture. However, in post-Soviet Ukraine, these facts have often been 
turned against Moscow. Indeed, the history of Ukraino-Russian relations has often been 
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 Greater sophistication is expected from the media, for instance, not putting a photo of a girls choir 
singing folk song next to an advertisement for a nightclub and associated image, or not flanking a feature 
about peace and conflict with an article about youngsters throwing toilet paper at a home for war veterans. 
(http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/2062578.html) 
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 Fond obshchestvennoe mnenie. (2012)., Otnoshenie k RPTs i patriarkhu Kirillu. 
http://fom.ru/obshchestvo/10434 (accessed 24th May 2012). 4th May. 
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re-framed by nationalising elites in negative terms of heavy-handed imperialism; a 
discourse which has frequently been used to the detriment of relations with Russia today. 
In independent Ukraine, discourses supportive of Ukrainian statehood has been reflected 
in the teaching curriculum in schools – in place during the education of my respondents 
and participants – as well as the media and public memorials. 
However, the creation of such discourses is not unilateral and entirely without foundation, 
but has often been supported by the statements of Russia’s representatives abroad. 
Although Ukrainian sovereignty is formally recognised by Russia, numerous examples 
point to an ‘inability to reconcile itself to coming to terms with Ukraine as an independent 
state’, and ‘an attitude of denial to an independent Ukrainian identity’ (Leigh 2011), and 
hence a lack of sincere conviction behind official public statements.175 Such attitudes are 
perceived not to be mere policy statements and rhetoric, but a reflection of ingrained 
modes of thought prevalent among the political elite in Russia, including even some 
clergy. Independent Ukraine is not seen straightforwardly as an equal, as Okara 
commented; 
In Russia, it’s only possible to be the older brother, horizontal relations are impossible, 
that is to say, equal relations are impossible, anyway, that’s how Russia behaves with 
others, relations can only be top-down, like with a younger brother.176 
Indeed, such centre-periphery type attitudes appear to be expressed in the Realpolitik- 
inspired narrative of sovereign democracy, which is quite dismissive of the quality of the 
sovereignty of smaller states (see discussion in chapter five), making a clear distinction 
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 The state apparatuses are composed of a diverse range of individuals, and while some are familiar with 
and adhere to the ‘soft power’ discourses, others may express contradicting views that call into question 
the sincerity  of the official position. Clustering particularly in the ‘force structures’, such individuals with 
such a background may consider that the interests of the state are better pursued by following a ‘harder’ 
more coercive line with antagonists and competitors. The failure to reconcile, as yet, both hard and soft 
power narratives means that the state’s soft power position can easily be contradicted and thereby 
undermined. 
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 Interview with A. Okara conducted in Moscow in June 2011. 
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with that of true great powers. Such incidents reinforce stereotypes about Russia as 
suffering from a post-imperial complex to the extent that the country – if not by military, 
then by political, economic and cultural means – constitutes a revanchist threat to its 
neighbour.  
While proximity to the state offers the Church many material and strategic advantages in 
terms of ‘switching’ and ‘programming’, it is also in some respects a liability. As a 
consequence of the history of close cooperation and collaboration with the Russian state 
in imperial and Soviet times, not to mention the Russian Patriarch’s resistance to the 
autocephaly of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Moscow Patriarchate is easily cast the light of a 
‘tool’ of foreign policy; a dependent agent instrumentalised by the Kremlin for political 
gain. Interpretations drawing on anti-imperialist critique are not conducive to the 
development of trustful, productive and close relations, and the impression of close ties 
taints the Church with suspicion of political intent; impeding its ability to work effectively 
in Ukraine. For its part, and despite the synergy of interests, the Church claims a relatively 
high level of independence vis-à-vis the Russian state.177 Vladimir Legoida, Head of the 
Synodal Information Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, states that ‘the Russian 
Church has never in its history been so independent of the state as it is now. It treasures 
this independence.’178 However, in order for this soft power tool to appear credible in the 
eyes of some Ukrainian audiences, there should be not only some level of reality, but 
moreover the impression of distance from the power structures of the RF and from 
political interests on the part of the Church.  
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 Interview with P. Kasatkin conducted in Moscow in June 2011. 
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Perhaps for this reason there appears to be a conscientious strategy to differentiate the 
Moscow Patriarchate from the Russian state in the eyes of Ukrainians. For instance, upon 
the Patriarch’s return to Moscow after his first official visit to Kyiv in July 2009, both 
President Medvedev and Patriarch Kirill sent letters to the Ukrainian president which 
could scarcely have been more contrasting in nature. While Medvedev’s was searingly 
critical of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidential leadership and conveyed Moscow’s intention 
to withhold sending an ambassador to Kyiv,179  Kirill’s communication contained a 
message of gratitude, blessings, and the compliment that ‘despite of the all difficulties, 
Ukraine is successful consolidating its statehood’.180 Furthermore, having appeared to 
support Putin for the presidency (despite claims to stay out of party politics), the Church 
has shifted to more critical public stance towards the political elite, stressing, for instance, 
the need to listen to the population181 and to engage with Ukraine in a spirit of equality 
and respect (Ryabykh 2011182). In this way, the Church takes steps towards establishing 
the sense of itself as a distinct personality in an emerging multi-voice civil society; 
bolstering its own credibility as an independent actor.183 This is significant not only in the 
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 Dmitry Medvedev (2009) ‘Poslaniye Prezidentu Ukrainy Viktoru Yushchenko’, 11
th
 August 
http://www.kremlin.ru/news/5158 (accessed 3rd January 2013) 
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 Although the Patriarch does appear to have transgressed Church policy of remaining aside from party 
politics by likening the 12 years of Putin’s power in the Kremlin to a ‘miracle from God’ in the run up to the 
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The legitimacy of the President is based on the trust of the people. You have that trust. But it means that 
the highest goal of Presidential service is the service of the people. For this service to be successful, it is 
necessary to be able to hear the voice of the people […] We prayed today that your closeness to the people, 
your ability to hear people’s voices will become sharper with every day of your government, bringing 
manifest benefits to our Fatherland and our people. (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2206277.html 
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 ‘The equality in Russkiy Mir –as I see it – is that you don’t receive directives from the center, but 
everyone can generate ideas that can be useful. One should learn to accept reasonable, sober proposals 
from one’s partners. It is one of the tasks for the Russian elites – to perceive the centers of Russkiy Mir as 
equal partners.’ 
183
 Likewise, after 2008, the ROC apparently refused to set up own institutions in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, as it continues to recognise them as the canonical territory of Georgian Orthodox Church. ROC as 
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eyes of the domestic constituency, but above all for foreign audiences; in order to be 
accepted as an authoritative voice and to win the trust of foreign citizens, the Patriarch 
should not be seen as a representative of the Russian Federation kow-towing to state 
diktats. 
While Russians may stress their sincere affection for ‘Little Russians’, narratives 
presuming Ukraine’s ‘friendship’ as a Russian prerogative are not well received, 
particularly when compared with Western discourses emphasising respect, equality and 
security also circulating widely in Ukrainian society via the media etc. Indeed, acute 
awareness of the negative aspects of the historical interaction between Russia and 
Ukraine create a demand for security, and Western narratives offering NATO and EU 
membership as a route to prosperity, well-being and sovereignty. The Church must 
account for such factors when formulating its own discourse of attraction. 
The Russian Orthodox Church has traditionally supported Slavic unity. However, since the 
Church’s stake is in spiritual, rather that overtly political or economic influence, it is far 
less constrained by the ‘great hard power’ discourse enveloping elites in the force 
structures, for it to embrace the present conjunctures. Accordingly, as Father Philipp 
Ryabykh, the Moscow Patriarchate’s representative to the EU, reports, 
The Holy Patriarch’s idea is that we can accept the current forms of political arrangements, 
the sovereignty of the post-Soviet states, but we should nonetheless acknowledge the 
existence of this value-based community, and each nation can use this common resource 
in order to most successfully implement the projects of its national development. 
(Ryabykh 2011)184 
                                                                                                                                                                                
sole channel of communication between Russia and Georgia (Makarin 2011: 10).Cynics have suggested this 
might only be so as to avoid setting a precedent inconducive to Russia’s domestic situation. 
184
 The Church does acknowledge that the Russian Federation ‘already occupies a special place in [the 
Russkiy Mir] because it is the largest and economically the mightiest country of the Russkiy Mir. However, 
this point may be overlooked in discourse as a mere technicality. 
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This value-based civilisational community – the Russkiy Mir – is perceived to transcend 
state frontiers, and is touted as a unifying resource in the sense that the implementation 
of the spiritual project provides a direction and rallying point for activity both within and 
across national borders.  
Today’s Moscow Patriarchate maintains a discourse grounded in its own logic. Where 
Russian discourse has often cast Ukraine in the follower role of ‘younger brother’ who 
would soon return to the fold like the prodigal son, this narrative casts the status quo as a 
natural and promising development, in much the same way that the collapse of the USSR 
is framed in Putin’s discourse as being facilitated by Russians’ choice for freedom. This 
rhetorical step likewise helps deflect the sense of humiliation associated with the loss of 
what many Russians effectively consider to be their Jerusalem. The positive aspects are 
reinforced by the stress now placed on Ukraine’s equality in the Russkiy Mir, as the 
Patriarch stated at the IV Assembly of the Russian World in 2010, 
Ukraine should not and cannot be a slave or a junior partner in this historic case. It is 
designed to be a responsible heir to Rus and to create the Russian world on an equal 
footing with its other heirs.185  
In a symbolic gesture to underline this equality, upon his investiture Patriarch Kirill 
ordered that all flags of the states within the Moscow Patriarchate’s jurisdiction, not just 
that of the Russian Federation, be displayed on equal height below the Church standard 
in his throne room.186  
Keen to appeal to Ukrainians and dispel the notion that the Moscow Patriarchate seeks to 
shepherd the country back into the ranks of Russia’s satellite states, Ukraine has rather 
been cast as a trailblazer of the Russkiy Mir. Ukraine, the Patriarch has stated, recognised 
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itself as an inheritor of Kievan Rus sooner than Russia did, designating ‘Baptism of Rus 
Day’ as a national holiday in 2006, while Russia and Belarus waited until 2010 and 2011 
respectively. The celebrations on this day (such as concerts) seemed designed to increase 
awareness of the peoples’ common origins in the civic consciousness and give the day 
positive associations. Since his investiture, the current patriarch has always underlined his 
respect by marking the occasion in Ukraine, where he has lauded that it is easy to pray 
and makes profuse kind remarks about the faithful. By way of demonstration of the 
priority he accords to Ukraine, in addition to these four annual visits, the Patriarch has 
made a further five official and pastoral visits to Ukraine, visiting not only Kyiv, but also 
Rivno, Crimea, Odesa, Dniepropetrovsk, Chernobyl, Donets’k, Luhans’k, Alchervs’k, and 
Chernivtsi. The message is clearly that Ukraine matters, not merely as a lowly investment 
destination or a chip in a geopolitical game, but in its own right, for its elevated cultural 
and spiritual merits, of which its citizens are readily encouraged to be proud. In a further 
show of enthusiasm in 2009, the Patriarch announced his willingness to adopt dual 
Ukrainian citizenship.187 
Thus, despite its strong patriotism, the Russian Orthodox Church, especially under Kirill, 
considers itself a supra-state church, not merely amicable but also indigenous to Ukraine 
(Filatov 2011: 33). Patriarch Kirill has expressed his ‘fervent desire […] that all countries 
associated with the Russian civilization, […] realize our common heritage's value, not as a 
threat to their autonomy, but as a valuable resource in a global world.’188 In elevating 
Ukraine for particular praise, the discourse of the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate 
in Ukraine strives not to undermine, but rather to reinforce Kuchma’s argument that 
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 Speech by Patriarch Kirill to the IV Assembly of the Russkiy Mir. 
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‘Ukraine is not Russia’ (2003). Instead, rather than becoming a vassal of Western Europe 
as Yushchenko’s vision entailed, Ukraine is offered a more esteemed position in the 
implementation of a unique and forward-looking integration project. Since Ukraine is 
considered to be more developed in terms of its level of consciousness within the 
civilisational history of Rus, Ukraine is amongst the forerunners, rather than lagging 
behind as would be the case in the European model, which must surely be considered a 
plus. Indeed, the Russkiy Mir narrative has potential because it does not in principle – if 
still potentially in practice – privilege Russia.189 
The Russian Orthodox Church therefore offers a reframed view on the relationship 
between Russia and Ukraine, and simultaneously, as the purveyor of this more ‘attractive’ 
and acceptable discourse, strives to construct itself as a positive force, rather than posing 
a rhetorical challenge to Ukraine’s dignity and self-identity as an independent state. In 
distancing itself from discredited discourses, the Moscow Patriarchate may pre-emptively 
deflect and diffuse criticism, and thereby bolstering its authority and credibility as an 
opinion former in Ukraine. 
6.6. Cooptation of Clergy  
 
However, while senior clerics may have committed to this ‘politically correct’ discourse, it 
is not necessarily the case that the remainder of the clergy are supportive of these 
contemporary messages. The views discussed here and attributed to Kirill and his team 
are essentially the official account, developed in cooperation with Russian state actors. 
Yet it appears that opinion in the UOC(MP) is not homogenous, but is as diverse as 
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 Russia is recognised to have a special status due to its economic and territorial magnitude.  
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Ukrainian society as a whole.190 While clerics in Eastern and Southern Ukraine are loyal to 
Moscow, the legitimacy of MP influence on the UOC(MP) has been questioned, and MP 
clerics in the western and central regions may look to the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Constantinople for support (Richters 2012: 99, 109).191 
Further, as a reformer, Kirill’s positions are still controversial in some ecclesiastical circles, 
not least with regard to his perceived interest in missionary activity and worldly concerns 
over spiritual matters. Indeed, some clergy have been removed from their posts for 
criticising his political involvement. However, the fact that priests may ‘defect’ to the 
UAOC or UOC(KP) if dissatisfied, has pushed the Russian hierarchy to develop ‘softer’ 
means of keeping them on-board and reducing internal divisions; involving ‘positive 
incentives, rather than threats’ (Richters 2012: 113). This has involved granting more 
freedom to UOC(MP) priests relative to their Russian counterparts, in the form of turning 
a blind eye to involvement in politics, as well as stressing what the MP has to offer; the 
ideas of canonicity, the Third Rome theory and simple inertia (Richters 2012: 113).192 
In recent years, a significant part of the communicative activity of Kirill’s team has worked 
to co-opt clerics themselves into the renewed discourse and modes of speech and 
behaviour more appropriate to fostering soft power to avoid counterproductive 
inconsistencies in the Church’s message. Since it is through the media that the general 
public gains its impressions of the Church, guidelines and training have focussed on this 
sector. In response to various ‘off discourse’ public statements, clergy are asked to work 
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 Interview with A. Zolotov conducted in Moscow in June 2011. 
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under the guidance of the diocesan authorities in their cooperation with the media, but 
where opinions nevertheless diverge from the Church’s teaching, they are instructed to 
make clear that this is a privately held view.193 Furthermore, the Church also seeks to 
raise the intellectual level and professional sophistication194 of media products, and to 
end church sponsoring of ‘dubious’ literature, that is, material on the extremist fringes 
(Filatov 2011: 29, Richters 2012), aiming to effectively phase out off-discourse materials 
that damage the credibility of the official narratives. 195 
Emphasis is also placed on ameliorating the spirit in which Church representatives engage 
with the wider world. Where the dispute with the Kyiv Patriarchate has created suspicion 
of the Church’s purposes in Ukraine, the Patriarch exhorts clerics to conduct their ministry 
bearing in mind ‘not self-promotion or trying to achieve weight and recognition in society, 
but the feeling of responsibility for the future of the people, the execution of his vocation 
in the world’ (Ilarion 2012).196 Clergy are likewise asked to avoid darkening of relations by 
unjustified refusals to allow journalists access to information or by over-sensitive 
reactions to correct and proper criticism.197  
In response to the identified need to increase the effectiveness of its contributions in the 
media space, the Church is investing in training events, not only for clergy but also those 
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 The Basis of the Social Concept Part Fifteen ‘Church and Mass Media’   
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 January 2013) 
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 Concretely, he has pointed to avoidance of features which could undermine efforts to promote through 
the overtly contradictory emotions aroused, drawing attention to steps such as not putting a photo of a 
girls choir singing folk songs next to an advertisement for a nightclub and associated image, or not flanking 
a feature about peace and conflict with an article about youngsters throwing toilet paper at a home for war 
veterans.( http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/2062578.html) 
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 According to Mitrofanova (2005, cited in Richters 2012: 23), the orientation of the contemporary ROC, 
expressed in the social concept distances the MP from ‘radical groups’ named ‘the political Orthodox’ and 
‘starts to define an ideological mainstream that differs from the extremist fringes’. 
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 Metropolitan of Volokolamsk Hilarion (2012). Rozhdestvo Khristovo - ne prosto povod dlya svetskogo 
torzhestva. Official site of the Moscow Patriarchate: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1934484.html 
(accessed 12th January 2013). 12th January. 
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 May 2012 
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involved in Orthodox media more widely, and regional coordinators of the Orthodox 
Initiative.198 At the V Festival of Orthodox media in Donets’k in May 2012, for instance, 
Vladimir Legoida read aloud an address by the Patriarch, calling for responsibility in 
communications, both Orthodox and secular to avoid unnecessarily inflaming passions: 
The church mission is being conducted in many areas of public life, which often causes the 
undisguised irritation at those who seek to limit the participation of the Church in modern 
life. Under these conditions, you must understand that our thoughtless and careless 
words spoken at times not only can give rise seeking an occasion (2 Cor. 11:12) 
blaspheme the Holy Church and its canons and ministers, but also to discourage people 
from Orthodoxy, alienating them from God. Aware of the responsibility resting upon us, 
we must strive to make our witness of faith has been measured and effective response to 
any aggressive rhetoric, sounding to the Church.199 
In this way, the Church as a whole should establish itself as an originator of best practice 
in society, a source of attraction in the wider world too.200 Although the Russian Orthodox 
Church has demonstrably modernised its approach to societal influence; identifying and 
addressing certain obstacles to its emergence as an authoritative societal leader placed to 
encourage the coalescence of the Russian World as a value community, certain frictions 
beyond its control nevertheless remain. Indeed, the Church’s ability to exert hegemony in 
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projects responding to societal need among specifically targeted beneficiaries with concrete and 
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Further progress on the part of the ROC is developing a soft power arsenal is evidenced by the emphasis 
placed on raising quality. The role of regional coordinators  is taken seriously, and while the Patriarch 
praised improvements in the Committee’s work in 2011 at a training seminar, he urged the attendees to do 
better, noting that the ‘Orthodox grant competition should be conducted on an impeccably professional 
level, be completely transparent, and, of course, attract the attention of all of society.’ Likewise, Vsevolod 
Chaplin, Chairman of the Synodal Department for Church and Society, while expressing the hope that, 
encouraged by the Orthodox Initiative, the religious worldview will be articulated in society by its bearer, 
insists that this must be done ‘without any enmity, without any aggression, without anything that might 
alienate people from the Church.’ 
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the Ukrainian information space is impeded by the fact that the target discourses do not 
circulate in an informational vacuum, but rather in interaction with the alternative 
narratives of contending interest groups. 
6.7. Access to Alternative Viewpoints 
 
Despite the full reasoning behind the resonance or otherwise of a particular message 
among the members of given target audience never being truly knowable, as argued in 
the conceptual framework, exposure to contrary ways of thinking is a significant factor 
identified in the communication literature. Here, it will be argued that the credibility of 
both the discourse and the Church as a source of value leadership in society are affected 
not only by media narratives oppositional to the Church and its message, but also 
significantly by content from Russia itself, including even that which might be deemed 
‘pro-Russian’ in character. 
Based on this research, it is not possible to state the degree to which the civilisational 
narratives expressed in this chapter and the previous one shape the worldview informing 
the editorial lines of mainstream Russian media products in Ukraine. Certainly, the 
current Patriarch has made quite a few televised appearances since his enthronement, 
not to mention receiving considerable coverage in the printed media. However, while 
such appearances are relayed in the Ukrainian media, it should not be assumed that they 
are readily received by the youthful, educated target audience examined in the following 
chapter. No viewing figures are available for church media products, but it seems likely 
that they would predominantly be accessed by practicing believers, which represent a 
relatively small proportion of my sample. Furthermore, if Moscow’s clerics believe that 
Russian TV channels would give the church’s message a sympathetic framing, then they 
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would be disappointed to learn that among the sample a relatively limited proportion 
regularly access Russia-based channels; even in Donets’k and Kharkiv only 26 per cent 
watch Channel One Russia regularly. 
Table 4: Respondents regularly viewing the following 
channels by city (%) 
 Channel City 
  Kyiv L’viv Donets’k Kharkiv 
     Inter 27 23 37 33 
Channel One Russia 13 6 26 26 
Fifth 11 13 8 13 
K1 / K2 9 16 12 18 
NTN 13 8 12 18 
Megasport 12 18 18 17 
Noviy 33 65 56 51 
ISTV 13 36 17 * 
M1 / M2 21 42 34 48 
BBC 18 15 18 15 
STV 39 53 56 48 
Ukraina 13 15 28 29 
Ukrainian First Channel 7 6 8 6 
Rossiya 7 2 11 6 
Donbas 1 2 14 20 
RT 2 3 2 0 
Kultura 2 3 3 2 
          
Notes:  
    Regularity is defined here as frequency of viewing evaluated as '4' or '5' of a possible '5', 
corresponding to viewing the channel 'often' or 'as a main source'. 
 * No data available for Kharkiv. 
    
However, some Ukrainian channels are considered to be ‘pro-Russian’, although what this 
actually means is contestable. For instance, ‘Inter’ bills itself as the ‘main channel of 
Ukraine’ and is part owned by Channel One Russia. Controversially, for instance, the 
channel twice showed a three-hour liturgy by Patriarch Kirill in place of its usual coverage 
of Ukrainian parliamentary debate. However, while TV remains the most significant 
channel of communication among the Ukrainian population at large, among my sample it 
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is far from the most popular means of accessing information about current affairs, with 
an average of only 45 per cent turning to television as a source of information about 
world events. In the focus groups it emerged that this is for many people the case 
because they have no time or live in a student hostel. Instead, students tend to use the 
internet, the usage of which has ‘come into its own in the 2002 and 2004 elections’ 
among this group much more than among society as a whole (Kuzio 2006: 56).  
 
Table 5: Respondents declaring they have regularly used the following sources to gain information 
about what happens in the world, over the past 12 months by city (%) 
 
   City TV Radio Print Press Internet Blog Social Media Friends Family Colleagues 
          Kyiv 28 9 25 67 13 32 58 59 43 
L’viv 35 13 14 59 14 42 53 57 42 
Donets’k 56 11 26 63 23 50 66 71 50 
Kharkiv 60 39 16 74 44 55 69 * 55 
          Average 45 18 20 66 24 45 62 62 48 
                    
Notes: 
         Regularly' is defined as those evaluating their viewing frequency as '4' (often) or '5' (main source) on a five point scale. Respondents 
could select as many options as applied to them. * Data not available for Kharkiv. 
  What’s more, Ukraine’s new generation of future leaders are strongly 
 
 involved in social media and online networking sites. 
 
Table 6: Respondents indicating regular use of social media internet 
sites by city (%). 
Social Media City 
  Kyiv L’viv Donets’k Kharkiv 
     Facebook 26 28 22 64 
Vkontakte 65 78 86 87 
Live journal 10 5 8 46 
          
Notes: 
    Regular use defined as frequency of access evaluated as '4' (often) or '5' (main source) on a 
five point scale. 




In recent years, internet sources have been used effectively against the patriarch, if the 
findings from my focus groups are anything to go by (see section 7.6.7.). The story of the 
scandal of Patriarch Kirill owning a luxury watch appears to have spread round the 
internet with the aid of various memes, some of which are depicted in Image 1. While the 
Church may have invested many words in explaining how the Patriarch came to be 
wearing such an expensive watch, the diffusion of a doctored image showing the watch 
on his wrist airbrushed out but still reflected in the highly polished wooden table nearby 
sends a much stronger message; instantly conveying the idea of church duplicity and 
1: 'Patriarch Kirill: I’ll show you "mixed-up layers". Putting me, a 
Holy man, to shame…‘ In stocks: ‘ROC photo-shopper’. 
2: Well-heeled clergy point the way 
1: 'Photoshop for Dummies' featuring 
the now infamous watch, only visible in 
the reflection on the polished table. 
Image 1: Memes inspired by the scandal surrounding Patriarch 
Kirill’s $30,000 watch. 
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hypocrisy.201 Although the Church conceivably possesses reasonable arguments, in an era 
of images, they may be drowned out by the easy flow of punchy captions hammering 
home a blunt message of hypocrisy and scandal in the church and ridiculousness.  
Representatives of the ‘patriotic’ Ukrainian media tend to take an oppositional stance to 
positions advanced by the Russian state and the Moscow Patriarchate on a range of 
political, religious, cultural, linguistic issues, often stressing the benefits of Euro-Atlantic 
integration, the distinctiveness of Ukraine’s historical, cultural and linguistic experience, 
and depicting Russia as an aggressor and antagonist. It is also necessary to consider the 
antagonistic role of non-political media products that promote lifestyles and values 
contrary to the spiritual teachings of the Church.  
Generally speaking, oppositionally-minded media and their representatives tend to frame 
Russia as a potential threat not only to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereign 
independence, but to the country’s very national identity as such across a wide variety of 
cultural, political, economic, religious and linguistic themes. In addition to the perception 
of imperial longing for Ukraine on the part of Russia, part of this anxiety stems from the 
relative size and weight of Ukraine’s Eastern neighbour across a ranges of indexes. The 
media landscape is one such sphere. ‘Ukraine sees the world through Moscow’s eyes’ said 
Natalia Gumenyuk, referring to the determining role of Russian publishers and producers 
in the Ukrainian market. However, the current situation is not a complete boon to Russian 
soft power. For instance, when coverage is viewed as so overtly ‘pro-Russian’, it enables 
opposition journalists to stir unease among audiences by drawing attention to the way in 
which Ukrainian culture and language appear to be endangered by Russian pressure. The 
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unspoken implication behind the remarks of journalist interviewees seemed often to be 
that this influence is intentionally foisted unidirectionally by Russia for illegitimate 
political purposes. Resentment is thereby fostered that is corrosive of soft power efforts. 
However, although Volodymyr Kulyk202 observes that Russian programming does project 
a Russian worldview, he questions the extent to which this is a component of a joined-up 
strategy imposed by Moscow. Rather, he notes, Ukrainian TV companies are keen to 
import Russian media products since they are cheaper than domestic or, especially, 
Western productions. Moreover, Ukrainian producers are often driven by similarly 
commercial concerns in the creation of their own programming, which is likewise 
designed with export markets in mind. Even shows intended for Ukrainian prime time 
viewing may be made with a Russian audience in mind. It is assumed by production 
companies that profit margins will be too low without the Russian market, which can 
provide 80-85 per cent of revenues, in comparison with approximately 10-12 per cent in 
Ukraine, and 1 per cent each in Belarus and Kazakhstan. Consequently, the first priority is 
to please Russian audiences – not only viewers, but also TV managers and the authorities 
– a fact which is reflected in the worldview assumptions of the programming (see also 
Kulyk 2010). The idea is that whatever is received well in Russia will also be received well 
in Ukraine, not vice-versa. Even purely entertainment programmes have certain taboos 
which may not be broken, even to the point of being hostile to Ukrainian identity and 
independence. In TV series, for instance, the action is frequently set in a generic post-
Soviet space, and text such as signposts that are visible in shot may well feature words 
that are the same in Russian and Ukrainian for ease of export, thereby perpetuating the 
sense of a shared living space. Programming with a more patriotic, Ukraine-specific 
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orientation is limited in terms of its geographic appeal and potential profitability, and 
hence its attraction to producers.  
In such cases, programming is created with a focus on business and the profit imperative, 
not diplomacy. This has significant implications for the ‘attraction’ of Russia in Ukraine as 
certain themes, such as the apparent lack of difference between the two countries that 
may be gratifying for Russian audiences, but offensive to Ukrainian patriotic sensibilities. 
This is particularly the case as controversial films, such as ‘My iz budushchego 2’203 and 
‘Sevastopol’204 for instance, were widely discussed and criticised in the Ukrainian media, 
and gave renewed fuel and continued relevance to critical media narratives. 
Hence, although Ukrainian TV scheduling may contain what could be considered a large 
amount of ‘pro-Russian’ programming, it is not necessarily ‘on discourse’ from the ROC’s 
point of view, and may well not cultivate positive emotions towards Russia generally, 
possibly even undermining efforts to move towards a more acceptable discourse among 
Russia’s neighbours. Given close proximity of Church and State, it is likely to cast a 
shadow over the level of perceived sincerity of Russian cultural diplomatic overtures.  
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 ‘My iz budushchego 2’ [‘We are from the future 2’] is set in the contemporary period at a military 
reconstruction event of a battle near L’viv, except the four protagonists – two Russians from St Petersburg 
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confrontation) and contrastingly positive traits to both the Russian protagonists and the Soviet forces of 
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6.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this section, the Orthodox Church has been taken as an example of a ‘tool’ of Russian 
soft power, and analysed with the aim of demonstrating how soft power and the 
attendant considerations are taking root in Russia.  
Reconciling the Church’s part in Russia’s fate with its insistence upon independence, the 
chapter has examined the re-invigorated fora for interaction between the two institutions. 
Further, although Ukraine is a relatively religious society by Western standards, direct 
Church communication via sermons and religious media has little potential to achieve its 
ambitions as the audience is limited. Thus, with the mission to shape national culture 
broadly, the UOC(MP) strives to communicate with society as a whole, engaging civil 
society apparatuses, particularly those that involve to the youth. Initiatives are being 
taken to construct networks of influence that devolve some responsibility to local agents 
and should become ‘self-configuring’, thereby diffusing power in society and rendering it 
less visible. The UOC(MP) also strives to co-opt Ukrainian clergy into its soft power 
approaches by stressing incentives for cooperation over threats and implementing media 
guidelines to help ensure the Church’s communications are not self-sabotaging by 
straying ‘off-discourse’. The Moscow Patriarchate also appears to have recognised the 
need for credibility and to take into account the concerns of the target audience. As such, 
it recognises the alienating effects provoked by the paternalist, overbearing overtures by 
the RF’s representatives, and counters this with the notion that in the Russkiy Mir, 




Thus, while some of Russia’s would-be ‘tools’ have pursued their goals myopically and 
without due consideration of all relevant factors, provoking feelings of insecurity and 
rejection among ostensible target audience, the actions and pronouncements of the 
senior hierarchy of the ROC, seem to reflect understanding of the relevant issues and a 
long-term, intelligent and systematically considered approach to the realisation of the 
overall goals of Russian soft power work. Crucially, the Church appears to be aware of 
certain weaknesses, which enables it to act practically and through its narratives to 
account for criticism that is levelled at it and thereby deflect it. The sophisticated, multi-
faceted communication strategy exists in cooperation with growing network structures 
and resources that aim to provide support appropriate to the social and pastoral role of 
the Church, hence providing a material base for attraction.  
Yet, in spite of the increased coordination and resources of the Church to promote this 
civilisational agenda, there remain question marks over the Church’s ability to reach the 
higher education students targeted by this study. Whether such developments will be 




Chapter Seven: Findings of the Audience Reception Research 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Overall, this thesis has sought to examine the extent to which Russia may be deemed to 
have soft power in Ukraine. Attempts to evaluate the extent of Russia’s soft power in 
Ukraine today depend critically on what one considers to be Moscow’s objectives with 
regard to this country and its citizens. Having identified five Russian approaches to soft 
power broadly understood, the civilisational approach has been explored in more detail. 
By this measure, Moscow’s ambition has been to secure Ukraine’s continued belonging to 
the notion of a ‘russkii’ civilisational space. It has been argued that the physical re-
integration of Ukraine into the political space of Russia, either as a satellite state or in 
terms of shared statehood is not the immediate aim of Russian policy. Thus, the salience 
of soft power in Ukraine does not depend on indicators such as an expressed willingness 
to integrate with Russia. While in the long-term the ambition may be to secure Ukraine’s 
commitment to some form of post-Soviet integration project such as the Custom’s Union, 
in the first instance the aim is meta-political; to re-constitute the cultural basis for 
cooperation, namely to preserve and develop ideological and cultural-civilisational 
discourses framing Ukraino-Russian cooperation as logical, desirable and historically-
rooted. 
As was argued in chapter four, Moscow’s vision of national security demands that Russia 
be sovereign, not only in terms of preserving and developing its ‘samobytnyi’ civilisational 
contribution, but also by performing a cultural-ideational leadership role for other states 
and people in the international system. As outlined in the methodology, the extent to 
which Russia is able to do this constitutes a measure of Russian soft power in Ukraine. 
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Hence, it was necessary to enquiry how ‘hegemonic’ Moscow’s civilisational discourses 
are in Ukraine. Accordingly, surveys and focus groups were conducted in four Ukrainian 
cities in September-November 2011, with a view to gaining insight into audiences’ 
negotiations of the target narratives, whose content was presented in chapter five. Both 
methods elicited attitudes towards the three elements relevant to soft power as 
highlighted by Joseph Nye: culture, values and foreign policy stance. 
A considerable body of previous research has highlighted an East-West attitudinal 
cleavage in Ukraine regarding Russia and related political issues, which this thesis does 
not in principle dispute. Yet on more apparently politically neutral points, such as values 
issues, Ukrainians do share elements of a worldview, and indeed one that continues to 
have much in common with Russia. Hence it appears there are some grounds to speak of 
the continued existence of what might be considered a ‘russkii’ civilisational space. 
Soft power – essentially the ability to wield ideological influence – rarely works in a 
vacuum. There are almost always existing and competing sources of influence. In Ukraine, 
the main competitors to Russian cultural-ideational influence are Western ideas and 
indigenous nationalist narratives. Given the concern with relative gains attributed to soft 
power by the conceptual framework of this study, it is useful to consider the negotiation 
of Russian discourses in interaction with those of the significant others, particularly the 
Western narratives, as these are in any case referred to in the stimulus materials. Given 
that a certain facet of Russia’s sovereign democracy idea doubts the ability of smaller 
states to be truly independent of great power blocs, the extent to which Ukrainians 
consider themselves different from Europeans or Westerners seems, by default, to cluster 
them with Russia. 
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In essence, the reception research sought to elicit insights into the extent to which 
Ukrainian students identified with (i) the notion of the Russkiy Mir (ii) Orthodox 
traditional values as opposed to Western ones (iii) the foreign policy positions articulated 
by the Russian president. The extent to which the ideas expressed were seen as attractive 
and shaped the participants responses is seen as an indicator of soft power. While the 
focus groups contextualised responses and allowed core themes to be elicited, the survey 
produced a quantified perspective permitting comparison between the cities. 
The resonance of the ideas propagated by Russia’s soft power agencies may be discerned 
not only from the way in which participants responded positively and affirmatively to the 
stimulus material, for instance by repeating its arguments. The highest level of soft power 
influence may be observed in the way that some individuals went beyond plain 
statements of agreement, beyond repetition or paraphrasing of the ideas presented, to 
‘filling in the gaps’: statements reflecting what may have been hinted at, but remained 
unsaid in the stimulus clip, drawing thus on wells of collective knowledge. These unsaid 
ideas may constitute the fringes of the discourse, elements that are not officially 
sanctioned, but reflect shared assumptions. These ideas flow from what is said, resulting 
from what the soft power agent may generally assume to be common knowledge among 
the target audience because of the tone and content of the communication history. 
Based on the survey findings, Russia is argued to have soft power in Donets’k, Kharkiv and 
Kyiv, although in declining magnitude; to the extent that it is more marginal in Kyiv. These 
finding were reflected in the focus groups, although the participants in the L’viv group 




The focus groups showed how some participants wholeheartedly accepted and embraced 
the message proposed by the stimulus materials to the extent that it appeared to 
correspond to their ‘common sense’ outlook on the world. Yet, relative to the survey 
findings, participants more frequently approached the stimulus material from a critical 
perspective, especially in Kyiv and in the Galician group in L’viv. Their reasoning for this 
scepticism more often than not drew on certain negatively-weighted narratives of ‘what 
Russia is like’. These elements appear equally to have coalesced into a stable discourse, a 
body of common sense knowledge on this topic. It appeared difficult for a good number 
of individuals to seriously entertain the possibility that the communication could have 
some merit; they filtered the message out for dismissal a priori due to the associations 
with the Russian Federation.  
Thus, it is suggested that while Russia does have potentially powerful soft power 
resources, realisation is hindered by the widespread circulation of oppositional discourses 
that cast Russian initiatives by default in the light of a threat and thereby subtract from 
positive narratives. However, while there are certainly grounds for such perceptions, it is 
not simply the case that these narratives objectively reflect unattractive realities. Rather, 
such discourses are partly due to a process of constructing such realities as unattractive 




7.2. Overall Picture of Russian Soft Power in Four Cities of Ukraine 
 
This sections that follow present the empirical findings of the empirical research in 
Ukraine. The survey and focus group guide and stimulus materials employed to elicit this 
data may be found in the appendices. 
The quantitative findings presented in the table below indicate that Russia may be seen 
to have soft power in three out of the four case study cities, since the average Russian 
soft power score of respondents from Kyiv, Kharkiv and Donets’k totals more than three; 
the score deemed to indicate a level of attraction and agenda-setting ability. Admittedly, 
the Kyiv city average barely exceeds this threshold, and the standard deviation is 
significantly higher than in the other cities, suggesting greater variance in attitudes there. 
By contrast, L’viv has the lowest standard deviation, an indicator of the lowest average 
variance from the average score, which suggests a greater level of uniformity in the 
generally more negative verdict on Russian soft power messages among L’vivians. In 
Kharkiv, the average overall Russian soft power score rests mid-way between the scores 
of Donets’k and Kyiv; with scores on individual questions sometimes sharing the middle-
ground with Kyiv and sometimes verging towards a pole closer to Donets’k. 
Table 7: Mean Overall Russian Soft Power Score  
City N Mean Standard Deviation 
   
  
Kyiv 100 3.08 0.64 
L’viv 101 2.83 0.51 
Donets’k 127 3.58 0.54 
Kharkiv 100 3.32 0.55 
        
Note: 




Looking at the table below, we may observe that the relative differences in overall 
average Russian soft power score are reflected in the percentages of respondents whose 
answers bracket them in the positive category. In L’viv only 34 per cent of respondents 
expressed an overall positive attitude to the Russian soft power messages polled in the 
survey. This figure rises to 59 per cent and 65 per cent in Kyiv and Kharkiv respectively, 
and is highest in Donets’k, where 82 per cent indicated a generally positive overall 
response to Russian soft power messages. 
Examining the distribution of the overall Russian soft power score data, it is clear that the 
great majority of responses fall into the two middle quartiles, with an average of 53 per 
cent of respondents falling under the middle quartile (2.5-3.49) across the four cities. 
Only 7 per cent in L’viv indicate a very negative overall response (<2), in comparison with 
4 per cent in Donets’k. 21 per cent of Donets’k respondents indicate a very positive 
response(>=4) to Russian soft power messages while only a single respondent answered 
so positively in L’viv, with Kharkiv and Kyiv returning mid-range scores. 
The sections that follow will explore the quantitative and qualitative fieldwork findings in 




Table 8: Individuals' mean Overall Russian Soft Power Score grouped 
by percentage 
   City       Soft power score grouped 
  No Yes   1-1.49 1.5-1.99 2-2.49 2.5-2.99 3-3.49 3.5-3.99 
4-
4.49 4.5-5 
            L’viv 67 34 
 
0 7 19 41 23 10 1 0 
Kyiv 41 59 
 
3 2 14 22 28 27 4 0 
Kharkiv 35 65 
 
0 0 4 31 32 21 8 4 
Donets’k 19 82 
 
2 2 6 9 25 36 19 2 
                       
Note: 
           Category boundaries rounded to two decimal places. 
      Due to rounding, percentage scores in some cities may not add up to 100. 
     
7.3. Presentation of the Fieldwork Findings for the Cultural Strand 
 
This sub-chapter presents the survey and focus group findings concerning the reception 
of the culture-related aspects of Russia’s projected soft power discourse. 
It needs to be recognised that for many citizens of Ukraine, ‘Russian’ culture is indigenous; 
either because their ancestors adopted the Russian language at some point, or because 
they migrated from Russia, not to mention the history of shared statehood of varying 
durations. Furthermore, the cultures are in any case rather close, sharing as they do 
centuries of interaction in their recent past. As such, the presence of large numbers of 
Russophiles or at least Russian-speakers is not necessarily evidence of the vitality of 
contemporary Russian soft power in Ukraine, but a legacy gifted from the previous era. 
Nevertheless, while cultural models may seem ingrained to the point of appearing an 
essential feature, culture is not static and future developments in Ukraine may prove to 
reveal its profound undecideability and arbitrariness. For instance, a significant number of 
formerly Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens living in Kyiv appear to have switched to 
Ukrainian as their language of preference and with it often embraced a more ‘Ukrainian’ 
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worldview, and all that this implies in terms of the relationship with Russia. 205 
Consequently, at this moment in time, the intent of Russian soft power in Ukraine must 
be not so much encouraging familiarisation with Russian language and culture – although 
in Western Ukraine some of the current young generation are indeed growing up without 
learning Russian – but rather with stemming the shift towards a more ‘nationally-oriented’ 
Ukrainian worldview and the tide of likely political consequences of such a trend. This 
should, it is argued, occur through a re-articulation of a civilisational discourse. 
In fact, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, with its limited budget and profile, can have only a 
relatively small part to play in this process. However, as a source of information, it 
provides a direct insight into the quasi-official position on questions of culture. 
Furthermore, it serves as a focal point for the elicitation of opinions on ‘Russian’ [russkii, 
of Rus’, and rossiiskii] culture, the Russian Federation as a state and the relations between 
the two. 
The stimulus clip for this section was a promotional clip from the website of the Russkiy 
Mir Foundation,206 which presents the organisation’s establishment, aims and activities in 
support of Russian language and culture across the world. Moreover, the clip also 
presents the foundation’s ideational orientation. While the discussion also elicited 
                                                          
205
 In Kyiv, some Russian-speaking students from Eastern and Southern Ukraine had started to speak 
Ukrainian upon arriving in Kyiv. This topic was explored in greater depth in an interview with Oleg Yatsenko, 
conducted in Kyiv in January 2010. Yatsenko described himself as a ‘typical Russian speaker born in Kyiv’, 
whose grandfather was ‘a pillar of the Soviet regime, an NKVD officer’. As part of the Kyiv elite, it is 
apparent that following perestroika, a shift in consciousness occurred in his family. Where ‘only some very 
remote relatives who were from the village were, I thought, on a lower stage of development, they were 
speaking Ukrainian, or some kind of language I couldn’t understand,’ following independence, ‘everything 
changed […] and the same thing was with the majority of Kyiv people, all of them spoke Russian, they’ve 
never heard Ukrainian, but when this transformation came, we felt ourselves Ukrainian, despite [the fact 
that]my mother is pure Russian.’.   
206
 The stimulus clip is available from the Russian version of the Russkiy Mir Foundation website:  
http://russkiymir.ether.tv/ From the options available, select 'Выбор программы' from the menu on the 
top, then open ' A. ФОНД' from the menu that opens on the side, then choose 'Ролики о Фонде'  and then 




opinions concerning the foundation and its activities, this write-up will focus mainly on 
the insights provided into the wider theme: the participants’ relationships to a wider 
‘russkii’ cultural sphere. 
Table 9: Mean Russian Soft Power Score (Cultural 
Strand) by city 
City N Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
     L’viv 101 2.40 0.69 
Kyiv 100 2.99 0.77 
Kharkiv 100 3.58 0.63 
Donets’k 130 3.80 0.75 
        
 
When it comes to cultural issues, attitudes are more polarised. Russia does not have soft 
power on a cultural level for 88 per cent of respondents in L’viv, while more than a third 
indicated a very negative attitude. In Kyiv, a more balanced picture emerges, with 49 per 
cent expressing views allowing them to be counted under the Russian cultural soft power 
umbrella, with 85 per cent of respondents falling into the two central quartiles (a score of 
2.5-3.49 for this section). Strong support for Russian cultural soft power is observed in 
Kharkiv and Donets’k, where 84 per cent expressed views affirming the salience of 
Russian soft power (>=3), while 20 per cent and 38 per cent indicated very positive views 
(>=4) respectively. In all cities the standard deviation for the cultural strand is higher than 




Table 10: Individuals' mean Russian Soft Power Score (Cultural Strand) grouped by 
percentage 
 City                       
  No Yes   1-1.49 1.5-1.99 2-2.49 2.5-2.99 3-3.49 3.5-3.99 4-4.49 4.5-5 
            L’viv 88 13 
 
8 26 31 23 3 9 1 0 
Kyiv 51 49 
 
5 5 19 22 22 22 4 1 
Kharkiv 16 84 
 
0 1 3 12 32 32 12 8 
Donets’k 15 84 
 
0 4 3 8 10 36 27 11 
                        
Note: Category boundaries rounded to two decimal places. Due to rounding, percentage scores in some cities may not add up to 100.  
 
Let us look firstly at the language issue, which, as argued previously, is a key marker of 
soft power as well as a predictor of its future viability. While in L’viv more than 80 per 
cent of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘Russian is my preferred language of 
interethnic communication’ over two-thirds agreed in both Donets’k and Kharkiv, while 
there was a fairly even balance between supporters and opponents of this statement in 
Kyiv. In Donets’k and Kharkiv, 20 per cent expressed neutrality towards this statement, 
perhaps suggesting openness to Ukrainian. 
 
Nevertheless, when asked about the significance of a mastery of Russian, Ukrainian and 






























Chart 4: Responses to the statement 'Russian is 







cent of respondents in Kyiv and Kharkiv declared the importance of fluency in Russian for 
their careers, slightly exceeding the number in Donets’k, where it is possible the question 
was misunderstood by some as the city is almost entirely Russian-speaking. Less than one 
third agreed with the statement in L’viv. Correspondingly, Ukrainian language enjoyed 
strong support across the country with the exception of Donets’k where only 40 per cent 
affirmed the importance of the national language for their future. Most interestingly, 
however, is the level of importance accorded to English which exceeded 80 per cent in all 
cities, reaching 97 per cent in Kharkiv. Whereas mastery of Russian is taken for granted in 
Eastern Ukraine, knowledge of English is seen to add a plus, differentiating an individual 



















Chart 5: Responses to the 
statement 'fluent 
knowledge of Russian 
language will be crucial for 





















Chart 6: Responses to the 
statement 'fluent 
knowledge of Ukrainian 
language will be crucial for 








Furthermore, in spite of the sporadic complaints about discrimination against the Russian 
language in Ukraine on the part of the RF and reproduced by the media, it seems that 
they have not succeeded in framing the debate on this topic in Ukraine, since even in 
Kharkiv and Donets’k only 33 and 25 per cent of respondents respectively expressed 
support for the statement.207 This is not to say that concrete steps which might over time 
objectively weaken the position of Russian in society have not been taken, but only that 
such measures have not been subjectively interpreted as discrimination on a broad scale. 
Aleksey for instance asserts the contrary, that it is Ukrainian that is squeezed: 
Again we are Ukrainians, we’re an independent people. Russian is in no way infringed 
upon in Ukraine, even the opposite; rather it’s possible to observe some infringements 
against the Ukrainian language. (Aleksey, Russian speaker, Kyiv 2) 
Furthermore, while 51 per cent of Donets’k respondents and 53 per cent in Kharkiv208 
supported making Russian the second official language, the fact that only one single 
person mentioned this issue in the entire course of the focus groups, suggests it is not an 
                                                          
207
 This figure falls to 10% in L’viv and 18% in Kyiv. 
208




















Chart 7: Responses to the 
statement 'fluent knowledge 
of English language will be 










When it comes to Russia’s civilisational radiance, upon comparison of the two charts 
above, we see that contemporary Russian culture is perceived significantly worse than 
Russia’s historical cultural heritage. The focus groups suggested that Russian literary 



































Chart 8: Responses to the statement  'Russian 
contemporary culture represents a valuable contribution 






































Chart 9: Responses to the statement 'Russian cultural 
heritage represents a uniquely valuable contribution to 






then indigenous Ukrainians are preferred. For Lara, this seemed to be something of a 
forward-looking patriotic choice.  
I also really love Russian literature; my favourite writer, Dostoevsky, is a Russian and I 
really love Turgenev. But in general I read contemporary Ukrainian literature. The last 
things I read were by Zabruzhko and Shlyapa. That’s why we should create our own 
[Ukrainian] competitive idea. That’s it. So whatever gives us something useful, as the girls 
said, we just take for ourselves. As Shevchenko said, ‘don’t shun your own’ and learn from 
the foreign, to paraphrase it somewhat. That’s how it works. (Lara, Ukrainian speaker, 
Kyiv 1) 
This inequality seems to be a motivating factor for many of those who advocate for 
Ukraine and its culture, and there is a recurrent sense of needing to support ‘our own’. 
Indeed, despite the overall positive connotations associated with Russian culture itself, 
the impression gleaned from even some Russophone Ukrainians was that enthusiasm for 
things Russian has an aura of the past about it. Natasha explains, 
It’s true, there are people [for whom the work of the Russkiy Mir Foundation will be 
interesting]. For example, my grandfather celebrates the New Year at 23.00, by Moscow 
time. Here it isn’t 0.00, it’s 23.00. He has a separate television, we have a separate one. 
That’s how we mark the New Year. [Laughter] We do have people who feel the culture, 
those people who lived in the USSR. Probably they’re middle-aged and more than 50. But 
less than 50… I don’t they are too interested in the Russian language. They exist, but not 
en masse. Only those people who remember Stalin, Khrushchev, they want to return to 
that time. That’s why it’s interesting for them. They dream, ‘if only Stalin was here in 
politics now!’ That’s what my grandmother says. (Natasha, Donet’sk 2) 
Again, ‘pro—Russian’ sentiment is associated with the past and looking backwards 
nostalgically to a ‘golden era’ that doesn’t exist as a reality in the minds of these young 
participants, and hence may be regarded somewhat ironically. Those holding such views 
seemed to be viewed with the affection afforded to those who can pose no threat.  
Herein lies something of a problem for Russian efforts to nurture soft power particularly 
in Ukraine, since cultural prestige is an element of international leadership. This has been 
particularly significant for Russia where culture has formed the basis for a sense of moral 
superiority when standards of living lagged. Among my Ukrainian participants, however, 
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the perception of Russia’s striving to be the best was framed in rather negative terms; 
perhaps unsurprisingly, as unequal competition, arrogance or simply unquestionable 
strength can easily evoke resistance, especially when not framed in soft power’s 
legitimating discourses.  
 
The Russkiy Mir website showcases the work of the foundation and in doing so, shows 
how Russian culture is relevant and attractive in the most diverse locations. Low levels of 
disagreement to the statement ‘Russia has a lot of admirers in foreign countries across 
the globe’ tend to suggest exposure to sources that perpetuate this idea, at least in the 
East. 
While the figures are clearly divergent on prominent cultural-linguistic issues, reflecting 
the contrasting perceptions of historical realities across Ukraine that have (re-)emerged 
since independence, when it comes to questions relating to certain, non-political legacies 
of the Soviet period, greater consensus appears to exist. In L’viv, more than 60 per cent 
responded affirmatively to the statement ‘I am personally proud of the fact that Yuri 





























Chart 10: Responses to the statement 'Russian culture 







in spite of the furore that surrounded the celebration of Victory Day in L’viv in 2011,209 
two-thirds of the respondents from this city affirmed that it continues to be important to 
celebrate Victory Day across Ukraine, although this figure rises to approximately 95 per 
cent in Donets’k.  
 
                                                          
209
 The Verkhovna Rada passed a law allowing the Red Army banner to be flown on Victory Day, along with 
the Ukrainian national flag. This decision was later reversed, but not before it sparked controversy, with the 
L’viv local council responding by stating that it would not celebrate Victory Day at all and banning marches 
on that day. Critics argue this step is anti-constitutional as it contradicts a federal law stating that Victory 
Day is to be celebrated across Ukraine (2011). Prism of history – Ukrainian city split over WWII 
commemoration. RT: http://rt.com/news/victory-day-lvov-nationalism/ (accessed 5th January 2013). 8th 
May. 
 (2011). Ukrainian Court Bans Use Of Soviet Red Flag Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine_court_bans_use_of_soviet_flag/24238302.html (accessed 5th 



































Chart 11: Responses to the statement 'I personally feel 










Judging by the responses above on whether the respondents consider themselves as 
members of the Russkiy Mir, it might be concluded that there is particularly low level of 
attraction in this sphere. However, it is also likely that this distancing is a result of 
unfamiliarity with the concept of ‘Russkiy Mir’. Across Ukraine, 84 per cent of my 
respondents claimed not to have heard of the foundation. Furthermore, in the focus 
group discussions, participants expressed a low level of awareness of both the term and 
the eponymous foundation. Prior to viewing the stimulus clip, very few focus group 































Chart 12: Responses to the statement 'It is very 
important to continue to commemorate Victory Day 






































Chart 13: Responses to the statement 'I consider myself 






interestingly, those that did tended to be rather critical, perhaps suggesting that 
oppositionally-oriented media may have reported the centres’ opening. Thus, it is 
unsurprising given this lack of familiarity that few survey respondents should have chosen 
to identify with the concept. Yet this belies the sense of cultural closeness between 
Ukrainians and Russian beyond this label. For instance, when faced with the statement 
‘although Russia is a separate state, I do not perceive it as a foreign country’ considerable 
numbers of participants from Kyiv, Kharkiv and Donets’k gave an affirmative evaluation, 
and even in L’viv nearly a third shared this view. 
 
Clearly, then there is still some sense of shared community still between Russians and 
Ukrainians, although this is not necessarily to the exclusion of nationally-rooted 
identification. Citizens of Ukraine and Russia find they have good mutual understanding, 
both linguistically and culturally. Indeed, towards the end of the focus group section on 
culture, the question of being a part of, or ‘close’ to the Russian World was put to the 
participants. On the whole, once more familiar with the concept, the proportion of 





























Chart 14: Responses to the statement 'Although Russia 
is a separate state, I don't perceive it as a foreign 






generally, among my participants, most Russian native speakers in L’viv, Kharkiv and 
Donets’k considered themselves to be part of the Russkiy Mir:  
I consider myself [a part of the Russkiy Mir] because I speak Russian. If I spoke in 
Ukrainian, I’d feel myself to be a part of the Ukrainskiy Mir [with laughter]. But I’m a part 
of the Russkiy Mir, for me Russian is closer than Ukrainian. I consider myself a part of the 
Russkiy Mir. (Sergei, Donets’k 2) 
The Orthodox Church is also what unites us. And the Russian language. That’s why I 
consider myself a small part. [of it]. (Sasha(f), Donets’k 2) 
While the Russian language seems to play an important part in this identification, it 
doesn’t necessarily imply any further identity. Indeed, Olena for instance explicitly 
distances herself from the Russian language through use of the third person possessive 
pronoun: 
I’m only a part of some Russkiy Mir in so far as I know their language and my grandfather 
came from Russia, that’s it. (Olena, Donetsk 1) 
Interestingly, participants did not necessarily consider belonging to the Russian World as 
a matter of free will. Taras, from the Galician group in L’viv, emerged as one of the most 
consistent and hardest critics of Russia, yet even he considers the ‘Russian World’ label 
applicable to himself: 
I think that perhaps we are all to a certain degree included in this idea of the great Russian 
world, in so far as we use Russian language literature, Russian language music, TV… and 
even the same site ‘Vkontakte’. Everyone to a greater or less extent is included in this idea, 
even in spite of our will, even perhaps without realising it. (Taras, Galician Ukrainian-
speaker, L’viv 2) 
 
While Taras accepts the term, in depicting Russian influence as ubiquitous and of sub-
conscious character, he effectively emphasises its scale and potency, as if to create a 
straw man as a focal point of resistance. The themes of being incorporated against one’s 
will and an almost paranoid sensitivity to the brainwashing of less-knowing citizens was a 
recurring theme.  
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Other resisted or questioned the term ‘Russkiy Mir’ as being unfamiliar, but their 
articulations essentially draw upon the notion of some level of pre-existing affinity or 
commonality which is essentially what is promoted by the Russkiy Mir Foundation. 
As for whether I consider myself a member of the Russkiy Mir, well, because I didn’t know 
about this organisation before, of course, I can’t answer affirmatively. But as for whether I 
consider myself a member of some kind of Russian community, well, I am a bearer of the 
Russian language and it binds me to it. But at the same time, I’m a citizen of Ukraine. 
(Olya, Donets’k 1) 
Despite the at times ambivalent attitude expressed towards the Ukrainian language 
among monolingual Russian speakers, some participants pre-emptively resisted the 
notion that there could be a contradiction between loyal citizenship of Ukraine and 
belonging to a Russian cultural ‘community’. For Irina, use of the Russian language is an 
issue of practicality, rather than emotional connection: 
I was born in Ukraine, so I feel somewhat part of the culture, and on the other hand I 
don’t esteem the Russian language as a part of the soul, but rather just as a tool that I use. 
(Katja, Russian background, Kharkiv 1) 
In sum, belonging to a kind of ‘Russian world’ or community seems to be defined by 
kinship, religious affiliation and especially language; factors that are in a sense given as 
historical legacies, aside from current state activity. However, how Ukraine’s young 
people perceive these issues, and how their life choices are informed by them, is 




While it is not possible to make quantitative generalisations on the basis of focus group 
data, the findings do reveal certain tendencies among the participants. While a significant 
proportion of the participants considered themselves to belong to some kind of wider 
‘Russkiy Mir’ community, what that meant to them differed greatly. Based on the focus 
groups with the higher education students from across Ukraine, four broad approaches to 
belonging to the Russkiy Mir could be discerned.  
1. Russkiy Mir as the historically rooted indivisible cultural, linguistic, spiritual zone.  
2. Russkiy Mir as expressing an inbetweenness, Russian but not Russia and rooted to 
Ukrainian territory  
3. Russkiy Mir as a post-colonial condition from which Ukrainians should be liberated 
4. Rejection of belonging to the Russkiy Mir 
These will now be explored in greater depth. 
7.3.1. Russkiy Mir as a historically rooted, indivisible cultural, linguistic, 
spiritual zone. 
 
The sense of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ as a historically rooted indivisible cultural, linguistic, 
religious zone perhaps corresponds most closely to an embodiment of this notion as its 
proponents would like to see it, narrowly defined. Thus, in the case of this densest 
identification with the Russkiy Mir, the borders between Ukraine, Russia and Belarus are 
considered vague at best, and in some cases senseless. The referent space of identity 
construction is less specifically Ukraine or Russia, but the wider space associated with 
‘Rus’; the medieval polity to which all three modern East Slavic states trace their ancestry. 
A student in Kharkiv, Alena, for example, when asked about her identity, replied: 
In principle, I don’t know, let’s say, for instance, Slavs are closer: Russians, Belarussians 
and Ukrainians. It seems to me there is some sort of distinction – but why? Just if we 
speak about culture, and not only language, then it seems to me that our history is very 
closely connected and we shouldn’t just be divided up; “those are Russians, those are 
Ukrainians, and those ones Belarusians’’. We are very closely integrated with one another 
in terms of history, culture and politics. If they are talking about the period of the USSR, 
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are they also talking about Russia? Or, let’s say, the time of Kievan Rus – is that Russia or 
not? Well, it’s not clear. I think things shouldn’t be clearly divided. I would rather not say 
Russian, but perhaps Slavic. (Alena, Ukrainian-background, Kharkiv 2) 
Alena expresses the slight mystification as to why these ‘fraternal peoples’ have been 
divided into different states. Clearly, she draws on a different vision of reality from that 
promoted by Ukrainian nation-builders, and overall her responses in the focus groups 
have tended to be among the most ‘on discourse’. Nevertheless, she doesn’t identity as 
‘Russian’ as such, but rather favours the more inclusive term ‘Slavic’ to describe her 
identity orientation. 
Even with this concept of identity that seems more ‘on message’ from the point of view 
of Russian soft power, there was no indication that these individuals might behave as 
‘pro-Russian fifth-columnists’ or were hostile towards Ukrainian statehood. Among my 
participants, only one individual suggested their identification was rather with specifically 
Russia instead of Ukraine, and even this was somewhat tentative. 
7.3.2. Russkiy Mir as a Liminal Identity 
 
For some participants, the sense of belonging to the Russkiy Mir was allied with a sense of 
living in a space that was neither fully Ukrainian, nor Russian. Here, it is accepted that 
Ukraine and Russia exist as formally separate entities, but also that people live in this 
space in ways that do not correspond with the borders. As such, Eastern Ukraine may be 
seen to represent a liminal space, a point of reference of a hybrid identity that finds its 
inspiration in both Ukrainian statehood and Russia, but is something distinctly other to 





Asked how she identified herself, this Russian-speaking student from Kharkiv replied: 
Well, I would say that I consider myself a citizen of Kharkiv or even Eastern Ukraine. 
Certainly it’s neither Ukraine or Russia, it’s something liminal and vague. (Zheniya, Russian 
background, Kharkiv 1) 
Alyona elaborates on the same question, noting how the essential facts of her family 
background meet with a civic loyalty to Ukraine, resulting in a dual identity. 
My parents are also Russians, and, of course, Russian culture is very close to me, but I am 
a citizen of Ukraine and I love Ukrainian culture, Ukrainian people and Western Ukraine, 
so I think, 50-50. (Alyona, Russian-background, Kharkiv 1) 
 
Likewise Anna, who despite some childhood familiarity with Ukrainian traditions, 
nevertheless feels closest to her native language community; a fact which feeds into this 
sense of a liminal identity. 
I also see myself as a resident of Kharkiv and also partly Ukrainian and partly Russian, 
because, for instance, my grandmother speaks Ukrainian and my childhood was 
connected with such bearers of Ukrainian traditions, and for me it is close to a certain 
degree, but on the other hand there’s the literature and the fact that I speak Russian – 
this makes me closer to Russian, so there’s something dual here. (Anna, Russian-
background, Kharkiv 1) 
 
Anna and Alyona seem very at ease with Ukrainian traditions alongside their Russian 
native language, expressing no desire for further Ukrainianisation or to make the shift to 
Ukrainian native language. Yet, whereas for Alyona and Anna the sense of identification is 
dual in nature, with a sense of identifying with both Russian and Ukrainian culture, for 
Zheniya, local identification has a greater hybrid character. While the two girls cited 
above both seem at ease with Ukrainian traditions and language. In Zheniya’s case, the 
impression is one of distancing from ‘that’ Ukraine; the Ukraine of the West, while her 
previous comments indicate she doesn’t consider herself as belonging to Russia. 
 
As for the use of Russian language, for instance, Russian language and Russian people are 
much closer to me than those nationalists and Ukrainian speakers from Western Ukraine. 
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As for communicating with Russians and with Ukrainians, I prefer speaking with Russians. 
(Zheniya(f), Ukrainian background, Kharkiv 1) 
 
Milana expresses a similar sentiment, giving a feeling of non-commonality with and 
distance from Ukrainian speakers. Again certain negative connotations are expressed; 
whereas for Zheniya it was comparative distancing from ‘nationalists’, Milana expresses 
the feeling of difference in terms of her non-comprehension of Ukrainian speakers. 
I absolutely agree with Zheniya that Eastern Ukraine, it’s not Ukraine and it’s not Russia, 
but something else. But as for whether I consider myself Russian – I consider myself half 
Russian and half Ukrainian, but living in Ukraine. And I agree with her that it’s much more 
agreeable to speak with people who speak Russian; and well, when people come from 
Western Ukrainian and start talking in Ukrainian, I sometimes don’t even understand 
them. (Milana, Russian-background, Kharkiv 1) 
 
In Donets’k a slightly different picture sometimes prevailed. Here, too, participants often 
expressed identification with their city or region, but expressions of feeling at one with 
Ukrainian cultural tradition were rather absent in their testimonies. Participants gave the 
impression of being cut off from feeling more Ukrainian due to their lack of confidence in 
speaking the language and a lack of exposure to Ukrainian tradition, 
It’s very hard for us to learn the language because in Donets’k there are a minimum of 
Ukrainian-speaking people, who could urge the others to speak Ukrainian. We need a kind 
of critical mass, like in Kyiv, where half can speak Ukrainian when they choose to. (Pyotr, 
Donets’k 2) 
 
I consider myself a citizen of Donets’k. I can’t make myself say ‘citizen of Ukraine’ because 
I don’t even speak Ukrainian. (Misha, Donets’k 2) 
 
We’ve been living in Ukraine since Independence Day only 20 years ago, we’ve not been 
subject to some kind of Ukrainian influence so that we feel state power [derzhavnist’]. We 
learnt the history of Kieven Rus, we understood that all these peoples lived together. 
(Oleg, Donets’k 2) 
 
Nevertheless, participants often pointed to their citizenship of Ukraine to indicate their 
loyalty and belonging here and not elsewhere, despite being a Russian speaker.  
251 
 
Indeed, such dual identities were most commonly expressed in the East of Ukraine, but a 
sense of liminality was also expressed by members of the Russian minority in L’viv, 
I would say [I feel partially a member of the Ukrainian world], but 60-40, more to Russian. 
My father is also Russian, at some point I myself lived in Novosibirsk for half a year. My 
mum speaks Ukrainian and my father, Russian, but somehow Russian is generally closer to 
me ‘by spirit’. I don’t know why. (Vlad, Mixed background, L’viv 1) 
Parallel to the issue of affinity with the Russkiy Mir, other spatial identities also emerged 
in the discussion. In addition to the aforementioned city or regional identities, the notion 
of a supranational or transnational identity was popular among the participants from 
Eastern Ukraine in particular, perhaps as a way of circumventing the awkwardness of this 
hybrid identity space. Specifically, the notion of ‘citizen of the world’ was a popular 
identity designation. On one hand, this conceptualisation of identity has strong 
precedents in the more sovietised East, being reminiscent of the ‘homo sovieticus’.210 
Expressions of such cosmopolitan identities did not seem to specifically indicate the 
attachment of these participants to Russia, although they often coincided with more 
favourable reception of the soft power discourses. The way in which the notion of the 
borderless citizen has been survived beyond Socialist internationalism, suggests that 
independent Ukraine has not yet won full emotional loyalty. Simultaneously, progressive 
sounding and positive-weighted (except, perhaps, in the eyes of a Ukrainian nationalist), a 
de-territorialised, cosmopolitan identity211 seems convenient, spacious and comfortable. 
Transcending parochial borders, such an identity opens a window to the world. It skips 
around the folksiness attached to Ukrainianess by nationalists and patriots, which must 
seem quite foreign to urban dwellers in the industrial heartlands whose collective 
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 (2005). Thorny legacy of 'Soviet Man'. BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4529073.stm 
(accessed 5th January 2013). 9 May.  
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 However, the notion of ‘citizen of the world’ shouldn’t necessarily be automatically equated with 
Western cosmopolitanism, as the following sections suggest that a sense of shared liberal morality is not to 
be taken for granted. 
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memory linking back to the rural past has been severed. Simultaneously, it avoids 
‘inappropriate’ links to Russia and the negative connotations of ‘sovok’. Perhaps Kharkiv, 
even more so than Donets’k, is conducive to such a hybridisation of identities, as there 
both Ukrainian and Russian are both widely spoken. Yet, some Russophones in Kharkiv 
and Donets’k expressed a certain sense of Ukrainophone Ukrainians as the ‘other’. The 
fact that even members of this post-Soviet generation mentioned that they find 
communicating with West Ukrainians less comfortable than with Russians, suggests that 
maybe this ‘wall in the heads’ isn’t going to change soon.  
In this section we explored the views of those whose identities are rooted to the territory 
of Ukraine, but do not consider themselves exclusively Ukrainian if this is defined by 
language, in the sense they are often content to continue speaking Russian and this forms 
a part of their identity. These individuals appear content to be part of the wider cultural 
community that has been labelled the ‘Russian World’ and have expressed a sense of 
sharing the ‘Russian soul’. This by no means suggests that these individuals are fully under 
the overall Russian soft power umbrella – indeed, many such participants in this study 
responded quite critically to the second and third strands – but it is clear that ‘russkii’ 
culture maintains its attraction.  
7.3.3. Russian World as a post-colonial condition 
 
In this approach, belonging to the Russian World was interpreted as an inherited 
characteristic, but one that was no longer appropriate to independent Ukraine. Such 
individuals – regardless of their ethnic background – tended to have a clear sense of 
belonging to Ukraine and apparently desire to support that distinct national 
consciousness and build upon that tradition. 
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I believe that we are a part of the “Russian world”. I myself am Russian by nationality 
that’s why I see myself as a part of the “Russian world”. But I think that here in Ukraine 
there should be Ukrainianisation, we should try to support our native language more than 
Russian. (Masha, Donets’k 2) 
Many participants, despite the question having been posed to individuals in terms of 
whether they personally identify with the Russian World, spontaneously responded with 
reflections on a collective cultural orientation. 
I don’t agree [with being part of the Russkiy Mir]. Because we are already TOO MUCH a 
part of the Russian World. That was then, 19-20 years ago. But now it’s Ukraine – we 
should learn Ukrainian more […] At least in this part of Ukraine, in the Donbas. My view is 
that we should move away more, promote our culture, and not copy or just accept what 
Putin foists upon us. It’s nothing to do with him. (Misha, Donets’k 2) 
In the both preceding citations, the participants highlight their associations with the 
Russkiy Mir not only as something that ‘we’ – presumably residents of Eastern Ukraine – 
are part of, but something that should be moved away from. In this view, being part of 
the Russian World is perceived as an inherited legacy of the past that somehow does not 
sit quite comfortably with an independent and sovereign Ukraine. There is the feeling 
that more should be done to promote Ukrainian language and tradition. 
- In so far as we speak of the ‘Russkiy Mir’ as a propaganda shell then I’m also a 
part of it. For me,… Russian language is native, I grew up in a Russian-speaking 
region, in the ‘Odeshchina’212 so I became a part of that world at birth, but….. I 
like speaking Ukrainian and I do so. 
- So, your own … decision? 
- Yes, it’s my own decision, as an exit from this ‘Russkiy Mir’.  
(Dima, Ukrainian-speaker by preference, Kyiv 1)  
Such views don’t exist solely in the more Ukrainianised regions. Mikhail from Donets’k 
expressed a similar sentiment, albeit unrealised: 
In so far as I’m just a speaker of Russian, but I would happily… I, crudely put, dream of the 
day when the community I live in speaks its native language, that is to say, native for me is 
Ukrainian anyway. (Mikhail, Donets’k 1) 
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In Donets’k, one got the impression of individuals trapped in a Russian language zone, 
preventing them from feeling fully Ukrainian. Only one student in Donets’k expressed 
confidence in speaking Ukrainian, and she was rather proud of herself, as if it was rarity 
there. Certain comments seemed to suggest Ukrainian was not taken completely 
seriously. Yet this was in the minority. The lack of a critical mass of Ukrainophones in 
Donets’k is compounded by lack of opportunity: my interview with a Dean at DNTU 
revealed that the students at the university received only one term of Ukrainian language 
training.213  
7.3.4. Non-Inclusion in the Russkiy Mir 
 
Having focused on those who related, one way or another, to the notion of belonging to a 
Russkiy Mir, it is useful to give voice to those who rejected this association and to explore 
their motivations. Among my participants, it was primarily those with some kind of innate 
connection to Russian culture that felt they were in some way part of the Russkiy Mir. The 
exceptions were those who described themselves as Russian native speakers in Kyiv, who, 
like most Ukrainian native speakers in L’viv, and the capital tended to distance themselves 
from the idea without further comment, as if not even really taking the notion seriously, 
so far was it from their normative conceptualisations. As one female student in Kyiv 
(group 1) put it: ‘It’s not close to me. I absolutely don’t want it to be close to me’. 
As we saw above, a significant number of those that did see themselves as part of the 
Russkiy Mir, perceived it as a collective membership, and often involuntary. Yet Rustam, 
an outspoken and critical member of the first group in Donets’k chose to see it as a 
subjective, by implication, individual matter. He acknowledges his connections to Russia, 
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but because of his take on the subject, feels able to reject incorporation into the Russkiy 
Mir. 
The idea isn’t close [to me], and so I don’t consider myself a part of the Russian world. […] 
It’s a very complicated question, connected with a subjective choice. I count myself as a 
Ukrainian because I was born in Ukraine, I’m a citizen of Ukraine, I have Ukrainian roots. 
But I also have a certain relationship to Russia because I have relatives from Russia and 
my mum is Russian. (Rustam, Donets’k 1) 
A numbers of participants were unwilling to associate themselves with the Russkiy Mir 
due to the formulation itself, and its connotations with the Russian Federation: 
- I think that the word ‘russkii’ itself comes from ‘Rus’. If you take it to mean that, then we 
are a part of the ‘Russian World’, but few people see it like that. I don’t consider myself a 
part of the Russian [‘rossiiskiy’] World. 
- But the Russian [‘russkii’] World? 
- Russian [‘russki’]? Yes, but Rus isn’t Russia. ‘Russkii’ but not ‘rossiiskii’. 
(Vasilisa, Ukrainian-speaker, Kyiv 1) 
 
The suggestion by an interviewee in Moscow214 that the Russkiy Mir Foundation was 
doomed as soon as it was named seems to have been borne out by the focus groups, with 
the involvement of Putin in this non-governmental organisation affirming suspicions of 
the political intentions of the foundations. 
7.3.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The research shows that the many participants in this study felt a sense of affinity with 
the Russkiy Mir as a cultural, language and kinship community, although the degree to 
which this was accepted as a level of identity varied. Similarly varied was the level of 
acceptance of the need to embrace the markers of Ukrainian national identity, such as a 
sense of clearly delineated state borders, language and traditional culture. However, the 
participants often demonstrated resistance when the discussion turned to the Russian 
Federation’s efforts to popularise Russian culture and language in Ukraine. While such 
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cultural work was valued for its own intrinsic merits, the involvement of the Russian state 
cast an altogether less favourable light on these activities.  
As such, it seems apparent that among this target demographic, various expressions of 
closeness to the ‘Russkiy Mir’ – even if not framed in such terms - is by no means 
necessarily synonymous with a stereotyped ‘pro-Russian’ attitude or uncritical 
identification with the broader palette of narratives considered here to be part of Russian 
soft power discourse. 
The research provided insights into not only how participants articulate their affinity to 
the culture of the ‘Russkiy Mir’, but also the discourses they draw upon to contest the 
narratives proposed. Indeed, attitudes towards Russia’s activities in this regard were 
conditioned by widespread counter narratives articulating a highly critical view on ‘what 
Russia is like’. To the extent they are widely dispersed, such discourses serve well to 
inoculate many Ukrainians against Russian discourses of soft power by engaging a filter 
that allows Russian activity to be cast in the light of neo-imperialism or otherwise 
provoking of distrust. This will be explored further below. 
7.4. Presentation of the Fieldwork Fielding for the Foreign Policy Strand 
 
This sub-chapter presents the fieldwork findings of the research devoted to exploring 
Ukrainian attitudes towards Russia’s foreign policy outlook. Examination of the mean 
scores of the individual participants reveals a familiar pattern. Once more the L’viv and 
Donets’k cases stand out as attitudinal poles, with both also having a lower standard 
deviation than the other two cities, suggesting again a greater homogeneity of opinion 
there. In L’viv, 62 per cent of respondents provided an overall negative evaluation of the 
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statements, with only 9 per cent giving a more positive overall average score than 3.5. 
Conversely, in Donets’k 77 per cent of respondents gave a positive overall evaluation, 
with only eight per cent returning a score lower than the middle quartile. In terms of the 
number of respondents giving an overall positive average score for this strand, there is 
little to differentiate the figures in Kyiv and Kharkiv; 50 per cent and forty seven per cent 
respectively, while the standard deviation were also comparable, at 0.75 and 0.77 each.  
Table 11: Mean Russian Soft Power Score(Foreign Policy 
Strand) by city 
City N Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
     L’viv 101 2.88 0.57 
Kyiv 100 2.95 0.75 
Kharkiv 100 3.12 0.77 
Donets’k 133 3.50 0.64 
        
Note: Cases with zero responses excluded 
 
 
Table 12: Individuals' mean Russian Soft Power Score (foreign policy Strand) grouped by 
percentage 
City N     Distribution of scores by category 








4.49 4.5-5  
            L’viv 101 62 39 1 8 13 40 30 6 3 0 
Kyiv 100 50 50 5 7 16 22 30 16 2 2 
Kharkiv 100 53 47 0 4 24 25 17 19 5 6 
Donets’k 132 23 77 0 1 7 15 32 27 12 6 
                        
Note: Results significant at 0.001, Pearson's Chi Square: 87.8 
  Category boundaries rounded to two decimal places. Due to rounding, percentage scores in some cities may not add up to 100. 
 
 
Focus group participants were asked to response to an audio-visual stimulus featuring an 
excerpt from Vladimir Putin’s famous speech to the Munich International Security 
Conference in 2007. In the five-minute section concerned, the then President of Russia 
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pointedly highlights the issue of unipolarity, the dangers it poses to the world and as such 
a rather thinly veiled critique of the USA. In terms of the arguments advanced by Vladimir 
Putin, it may be said that by those who approached the speech in a relatively favourably 
disposed manner, the main analysis was largely found to be correct. Some individuals 
criticised the speech on various specific grounds (e.g. oil wars, Vlad), but by and large his 
argument was accepted as ‘objective’. However, the clip did not arouse great enthusiasm, 
probably since the participants tended to have a rather cynical perspective on Putin’s role 
in this context. Indeed, participants were in no hurry to rally round in support against the 
USA. Rare were the examples of focus group participants expressing any kind of glee in 
Putin’s admonition or supporting a reinforcement of an ‘us and them’ cleavage. This was 
perhaps due to the fact that in the excerpt Putin was perceived to be simply ‘adding 
water’ [lit’ vody]; padding his speech with words without offering new insights.  
The survey findings suggest that approximately two thirds of the respondents feel that 
the world is indeed becoming more multipolar. Yet far from a majority of respondents 
were convinced that Russia deserves a more significant role in the global political 
leadership in this multipolar order. A mere 11 per cent agreed in L’viv, and while a third in 
even Donets’k pronounced themselves ambivalent on this question. Nevertheless, in 
Kharkiv and Donets’k, there was more support for this view with 38 per cent and 47 per 




The problem in this regard is likely to be a lack of trust in Russia. Even Mikhail who spoke 
in favour of Russian positions on a number of significant occasions is cynical in this regard: 
Yes, so he says that unipolarity is bad, but still it’s absolutely clear that he wouldn’t mind 
if this unipolarity favoured Russia. (Mikhail, Donets’k 1) 
While Vladimir Putin used his Munich speech as an opportunity to cast Russia in the light 
of a state that stands up against undemocratic developments in global affairs, relatively 
few respondents felt convinced that ‘Russia plays an important role in the establishment 
of justice in international politics’.215 Indeed, despite Russia speaking out relatively 
consistently against NATO military involvement in the Middle East, for instance, Vasilisa 
from the Ukrainophone group in Kyiv was one of the few participants to explicitly credit 
Russia in this regard: 
Honestly, sometimes I support Russia when such a cunning organisation as the UN tries to 
introduce various sanctions against other countries, and Russia actively counteracts this. 
It’s worthy of attention, of respect that they have their own opinion, and won’t be led by 
Western countries. (Vasilisa, Ukrainian-speaker, Kyiv 1) 
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16%, Kharkiv 29%, Donetsk 33%. In L’viv and Kyiv two-thirds of respondents actively disagreed with this 









































Chart 16: Responses to the statement 'Russia deserves a 









Similarly, a Galician student, Volodymyr, expresses respect for the way that Putin 
defended Russia’s interests and justifies his positive evaluation on the grounds that, 
Insomuch as I think that here he did everything very well, as he defends his own interests. 
And if a similar kind of situation occurred in Ukraine, then any head of state must defend 
their interests. And concerning the words of Vladimir Putin, he did just that, he defended 
the interests that America infringes. (Volodymyr, Galician Ukrainian Speaker, L’viv 2) 
Volodymyr was not the only Ukrainophone participant in L’viv to agree with Putin’s logic, 
although he was rather more generous in his overall approach than most. Other L’vivian 
participants agreed with the analysis, but the speech frequently did not succeed in 
garnering their support because they noted a contradiction between Putin’s normative 
criticisms and their perception of his own policies. Likewise, Donets’k student Sasha, who 
had shown sympathy for Russian points in some areas, did not warm to the speech either, 
noting ‘Everyone has their inadequacies, right? The West has one set of issues and Russia 
another.’ Likewise Galician Taras, one of harshest critics of Russia among my participants, 
and no particular fan of the West, is not particularly swayed: ‘Maybe it is the case that 
America teaches Russia democracy, while itself introducing democracy by the tomahawk, 
but they deserve one another.’ 
Indeed, when it comes to democratic development within Russia, which Putin refers to as 
being the subject of hypocritical lectures from abroad, the picture is somewhat 
inconsistent. A relatively consistent figure of 20-25 per cent of survey respondents across 
Ukraine agreed that ‘to a large degree, Russian democracy is criticised by other countries 
for their own benefit’. Similarly, this narrative of a Russia treated unjustly by cynical 
players – a variation of the more historical ‘Russia surrounded by hostile forces’ narrative 




When asked directly whether they agreed that ‘in spite of its inadequacies, Russia is more 
or less a democratic country,’ only in Donets’k did a clear majority of respondents come 
out in support. During the focus groups, many participants likewise took a rather sceptical 
stance in this regard. However, despite their reluctance to endorse Russian democracy 
when questioned directly on this subject, when the matter was raised indirectly 
participants seemed rather less critically disposed. Indeed, responses often echoed 
Moscow’s insistence that democracy in Russia would be implemented according to a pace 
and model best attuned to the historical, cultural and social particularities of that society. 
As Rinat put it, ‘we have our own kind of democracy, that is, it’s more characteristic of 
our mentality, our particularities so to speak’. Viktoriya concurs, linking in to the related 
argument that countries like Ukraine are not ready for democracy as is embodied in the 
West: 
Well, yes, I agree. Our stage of development does not quite coincide with the Europeans’, 
and even less so with the Americans’. And that’s why imposing their point of view on us is 
rather foolish. Whose business is it if we have democracy or authoritarianism? They live 
as they want, so be it. (Viktoriya, Ukrainian background, Kharkiv 2) 
As such, we may observe that the core principles of sovereign democracy seem to be 


































Chart 17: Responses to the statement 'In spite of 
its inadequacies, Russia is more or less a 








person to make such speeches, participants in the focus groups tended not to dispute his 
democratic legitimacy, considering him to on the contrary to ‘[represent] the interests of 
the majority of the population of Russia’ (Viktoriya). Still, as regards the survey 
respondents’ approval of the Russian leadership, the figures are rather polarised, with 57 
per cent of respondents in support in Donets’k and a mere 16 per cent in L’viv.  
 
 
However, again, when given the opportunity to express a more nuanced position in the 
focus group discussions, a slightly more diversified position emerged. Accordingly, 
although Putin’s approach to foreign affairs, particularly as regards Ukraine, is resented, 
as the President of Russia he enjoys approval, even in L’viv. Tanya notes, 
I have quite a negative impression. One of my first thoughts was that if we had such a 
president who would have pushed us so, then things would be more or less all right. As 
president, his country’s domestic politics are quite good, but I don’t like his foreign 
policies. (Tanya, mixed background, L’viv 1) 
Shura expresses a similar view, although it should be noted her view did not go 
uncontested by her fellow group members. 
In principle, for Russia he is the ideal president, but in foreign policy he is focused on 
some kind of, if not expansion, then something close to it. Yes, it’s clear that he wants to 
impose Russian culture on other states, and I think this is negative, because although 
cultural boundaries are becoming blurred by globalisation, they don’t have to be 

































Chart 18: Responses to the statement 'On the 
whole, I have a positive attitude towards the 








other separate state that wants to preserve its identity. I don’t know, it’s not worth saying 
if he’s a very bad politician or a very good one. First of all, he’s a good president for 
Russia. (Shura, mixed background, L’viv 1) 
Furthermore, the president’s personal charisma also helped trump reservations for some  
participants.  
And I really liked the video. Of course, what he said was wild nonsense, but Putin is such a 
cutie, I like him. (Liza, Russian-background, Kharkiv 1) 
When quizzed about specific issues that might actually have given rise to concerns about 
Russian democracy, survey respondents did not seem overly perturbed. One reason for 
this endorsement of Russia’s development under Putin, although not explicitly stated or 
referred to in the discussions, may be that the Putin regime has supported domestic 
stability; an aspect which respondents tended to evaluate positively. Across Ukraine, 52 
per cent of all respondents supported the statement ‘the preservation of domestic 
stability is the most important task of a country's political elites and should be achieved at 
any cost’, while only one quarter opposed it.216 Such notions are frequently opposed to 
democracy-oriented ideas, whereby democracy is seen as necessarily a bit ‘messy’ and all 
the more healthy for it. Yet recollections of being on the sharp end of the creative chaos 
of the 1990s still loom fresh in Ukrainian collective memory, continuing to shaping the 
generation that was very small at the time. Indeed, similarly supportive views were 
expressed with regard to the issue of whether 'despite international criticism, Russia was 
right adopt a tougher policy against oligarch acting against the national interests of 
Russia'.  
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clear third of respondents evaluated the statement with a four to indicate their disagreement; 35 per cent 
and 47 per cent more than Kyiv and L’viv respectively. Again, as discussed above, it would be overly forward 






7.4.1. Concluding Remarks 
 
Rather than examining opinions on specific political topics, the spread of which is rather 
familiar, this study has sought to harvest views on political themes more broadly defined; 
seeking insight into the general attitudinal preferences that may shape reactions to 
particular issues. 
When it comes to whether people share Putin’s geopolitical assessment of the world, it 
appears they do, although positive feelings slumped when the focus shifted to Russia’s 
place in the world, about which responses were much more ambivalent. In spite of this 
the strength of Russia, and of Putin as its leader was admired by participants and 
constituted part of its positive image, although, as will become apparent, Moscow needs 
to use this capital much more responsibly to gain more efficient soft power benefits. 
Indeed, Putin’s attempt to engage in negative ‘othering’ of the USA did not meet with 
enthusiasm among this demographic; perhaps because they did not live during the Cold 
War and may have most to gain in their future’s from the West. Above all, the impression 
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Chart 19: Responses to the statement 'The preservation of 
domestic stability is the most important task of a country's 








was of a low level of trust and extensive cynicism towards Russia, neither of which bodes 
well for Moscow’s attempts to glean the benefits of soft power. 
7.5. Presentation of the Fieldwork Findings for the Values Strand 
 
This section of the study will present the findings of the survey and focus group 
discussions dedicated to exploring responses to the values-related aspect of Russian soft 
power in Ukraine. Both methods sought insight into the extent to which some of the 
issues central to the position advanced by Patriarch Kirill are shared. 
Upon consideration of the mean of individuals’ overall scores for the statements in this 
strand by city, it is immediately apparent that there is considerably greater consensus on 
the values-related narratives than was the case with the other two strands. Indeed, 
region is not a statistically significant variable in cross tabulations with the values score. 
While the general picture of a range of opinion remains; with L’viv on the sceptical, and 
Donets’k on the more sympathetic end of the spectrum with Kharkiv and Kyiv in the 
middle, in this case, there is only 0.26 of one grade difference in the mean scores 
between the most and least sympathetic cities. Figures from all cities indicate attraction 
towards the ideas proposed. 
 
Table 13: Mean Russian Soft Power Score(Value-oriented 
Strand) by city 
City N Mean  Standard Deviation 
   
  
L’viv 101 3.21 0.67 
Kharkiv 100 3.28 0.52 
Kyiv 100 3.31 0.69 
Donets’k 133 3.47 0.59 





Table 14: Individuals' mean Russian Soft Power Score (Values-oriented Strand) grouped by 
percentage 
City N                     
    No Yes 1-1.49 1.5-1.99 2-2.49 2.5-2.99 3-3.49 3.5-3.99 4-4.49 
4.5-
5 
            L’viv 101 41 60 3 2 7 29 23 28 9 0 
Kyiv 100 30 70 3 3 2 22 27 31 12 0 
Kharkiv 100 35 65 0 0 6 29 34 23 6 2 
Donets’k 133 24 76 1 1 2 20 29 35 8 4 
                        
Note: 
           Category boundaries rounded to two decimal places. Due to rounding, percentage scores in some cases may not add up to 100. The 
figures represented in this chart are not statistically significant, for information only. 
Given that the statements used in the survey were drawn from the articulations of a 
religious leader, and thus ostensibly reflect value-orientations based on the Bible, this 
distribution might seem curious given the lesser religiosity of the respondents from 
Donets’k in comparison with their L’vivian counterparts. 
Religious affiliation is statistically significant with regard to the value-oriented score, but 
not greatly (40.525*). As one might expect, the non-religious are less likely to agree 
strongly with statements generally favourable to a more ‘moral’ or religion-oriented 
approach in society; and accordingly, the greatest number of non-religious respondents217 
were only mildly in agreement (44 per cent of this category had an average score of 3-
3.49) with the statements. Although the greatest number of Greek Catholics – who are 
concentrated in Western Ukraine – had a slightly negative overall opinion on the 
statements posed (32 per cent in 2-5-2.99). Furthermore, among those who professed a 
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 Here, non-religious respondent means those that ticked ‘agnostic’ or ‘atheist’ in response to the 
corresponding question in the survey. Those who tick ‘don’t know’, ‘prefer not to say’ or another religion 
were classed as missing values for this question. 
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religion, the extent to which they practiced their religion – regularly, only on religious 
festivals or not at all - was not significantly associated with their views on these issues.218 
Overall then, the survey suggests that among the target sample religiosity itself is not a 
significant factor informing attitudes towards the value-related issues polled in this study. 
The purpose of this study is not to try to argue what is the main factor shaping the 
opinions of Ukraine’s young people – indeed, this would methodologically be impossible – 
but rather to explore the extent to which the ideas advanced by Russian soft power 
actors resonate with this particular audience, and what discursive resources they draw 
upon in their interpretations. 
In this section on values, the stimulus material consisted of comments made by Patriarch 
Kirill during a talk show broadcast live on the Ukrainian television channel ‘Inter’ on 28th 
July 2009. Symbolically, this date coincides with ‘Baptism of Rus Day’, which has been 
marked as a state holiday in Ukraine since 2008, and fell during the Patriarch’s first 
foreign visit in an official capacity since his investiture as Patriarch of Moscow and all 
Russia on 1st February 2009. The studio audience was composed of members of Orthodox 
youth groups in Kyiv and prominent representatives of Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian 
society.219  
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 This was the case when we explored degree of religious practice across Ukraine. In fact, when results 
were analysed on a city-by-city level, they turned out to be statistically significant in Kharkiv, only. Given the 
previously discussed issues surrounding the Kharkiv statistics, great weight will not be placed on the them 
alone when the reasons for their difference cannot straightforwardly and logically be explained without 
further research. 
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 Namely: Fyodor Bondarchuk, Nataliya Varley, Boris Korchevnikov, Vladimir Gostyukhin, Olga Bogomolets, 
Pyotr Tolochko and Oleg Karamazov. 
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In this excerpt,220 Patriarch Kirill presents the notion of a ‘civilisational project’; a ‘struggle 
for a way of life’. His tone seems moderate, reasoned and the content of the whole 
speech seems to be designed to account for a range of attitudes; believers and ‘those 
who will look at the screen with annoyance’. Accounting for Ukraine’s diversity was 
particularly necessary as the talk show aired at prime time on ‘Inter’, the self-proclaimed 
‘main channel of Ukraine’. In terms of the participants’ reception of the excerpt, speaking 
generally, the core ideas of the Patriarch’s speech – the discomfiture with the notion of 
the consumerist ideology, the sense of being culturally different and not wishing to 
renounce that difference, ambivalence about European integration – enjoyed some 
considerable resonance with the audience. 221  When it came to opposition to the 
Patriarch’s discourse, participants tended to refer to a rather standard set of critiques 
about what Russia’s representatives are like, much in the same way as we saw in the 
previous sections, rather than engaging critically with the content of his speech. 
Frequently, these lines of argument were aimed at undermining the authority and 
credibility of the Patriarch, as a way of dismissing the content of his words. 
In the stimulus clip, the Patriarch referred frequently to Europe and the West. He did 
appear to be engaging in ‘othering’ practices since while his words were measured and 
his tone moderate, the comparisons with the Russkiy Mir reflected unfavourably on the 
West, given the members resources on this theme. 
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 The excerpt utilised in the focus groups was extracted from close to the end of a question and answer 
session, and came in response to the following question by Oleg Karamazov, guitarist with the Ukrainian 
rock group ‘Karamazoff Brothers’: ‘Your Holiness, could “Baptism of Rus’ Day” which we are celebrating 
today become an all-national (obshchnarodnyi) and state holiday for modern Ukraine, Russia and Belarus? 
Could it become a symbol of a people’s spiritual unity; a reminder that we are all spiritually and culturally 
kindred, that we are all brothers and sisters?’ The five minute stimulus clip presented just under half of the 
Patriarch’s response to this question. It is worth noting that the band ‘Brothers Karamazov’ played a concert 
in honour of Baptism of Rus’ Day.  http://www.karamazoffbrothers.com/o_nas.htm 
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 Evidence for this also took the form of reports of tacit endorsement based on the native-speaking 
moderators’ observed impressions of the participants’ body language, eye contact, significant silences and 
so on, rather than an argued justifications on tape. 
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Hence, it is very useful to consider notions of the West and of Europe in the discussion on 
values; not least since these concepts have frequently been drawn on in Russian 
discourse as the civilisational other. The issue of European integration was considered a 
specific political issue, and was hence not specifically accounted for in the soft power 
scores, which sought to gain a broader, less explicitly political picture of the attitudinal 
landscape. However, attitudes on this topic were harvested during the survey 
nevertheless.222  
As argued in the chapter five, Russia seeks to maintain its civilisational samobytnost’, both 
for its own sake, and to underpin its distinct sovereign democracy political model, which 
is premised on the notion of Russia’s civilisational uniqueness. Some degree of value 
consensus is an important component of a community’s culture, and serves as one of the 
markers that differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’. Thus, a sense of difference from wider 
European or Western culture is important for Russia to warrant a sense of cultural 
leadership. The matter of whether Ukraine remains under the Russian civilisational 
umbrella is, therefore, a question of how far the country’s citizens share what are touted 
as shared ‘russkii’ values, or turn away to embrace the liberal outlook of the West. 
Clearly, in principle, it should not be necessary to choose between a Western or Eastern 
orientation, and as far as possible Ukraine under President Yanukovych has sought to 
tread the middle ground, maximising benefits from both directions. However, once issues 
become securitised, there is a tendency for political analysts to see things in zero-sum 
terms: to the extent values’ Europeanisation of Ukraine occurs, Russia is seen to be bereft 
of the discipleship of a historically kindred polity. 
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 The aim was partly to serve as a control, as the existing polls may serve as a ‘known’ against which my 
own findings might be compared, thereby allowing estimations of how the attitudes of my participants fit in 
to the broader picture. 
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Setting EU membership as a state policy goal, as Ukraine has done, is often seen as an 
indicator of soft power. European Union Studies scholars propose that the EU’s soft or 
normative power emanates from its values (Manners 2002; 2006; 2009), and indeed such 
attributes are frequently cited as part of the community’s power of attraction. By this 
rendition, young Ukrainians would be drawn towards Europe by the prospect of living in a 
liberal, democratic society, and the unspoken assumption seems to be that they would 
embrace all that goes with it in terms of cultural change. Russia is often presented as the 
negation of these positively-weighted attributes, with the implication that Ukraine should 
embed itself in the West to stave off possible revanchism. 
While existing literature on this topic has suggested a rather tepid response to the 
prospect of EU membership among the Ukrainian population, it must be noted that 
European integration appears to enjoy significantly greater support among my young 
demographic than the population as a whole.223 Of the higher education students polled 
in my survey, an absolute majority – 59.4 per cent - declared their support for 
membership of the EU.  
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 For instance, a study conducted by the Eurasian Monitor in April-May 2009 found that only 20 per cent 
of Ukrainians wanted integration into the EU, while 34 per cent preferred integration into a Russia-Ukraine-
Belarus-Kazakhstan union (and 12 per cent back into the USSR), and 23 per cent wanted full independence 
for their country http://blogs.euobserver.com/popescu/2009/09/13/russian-and-eu-power-of-attraction/ 
accessed 17
th




However, exploration of the data along regional lines reveals a differentiated picture. 
Although over 70 per cent of the young people polled in Kyiv and L’viv supported EU 
membership, this fell considerably in Kharkiv and Donets’k, to 54 and 44 per cent 
respectively. Interestingly, the proportion of respondents actively opposed to EU 
membership was relatively consistent across the country at around 20 per cent, with a 
third of the students simply ambivalent in the Eastern cities. Overall, the diversity of 
opinion remaining between cities notwithstanding, it is clear that higher education 






Chart 20: All-Ukrainian attitudes 













On the issue of relations with Russia, there is a clear East-West regional cleavage. In 
Donets’k and Kharkiv, two-thirds of respondents favoured close relations, while less than 
a quarter did so in L’viv, where 40 per cent were strongly opposed to the idea. Further 
examination of the data, however, supports Mykola Ryabchuk’s argument that the 
attitudes in Ukraine, and not least among the highly educated youth of today, defy 
comfortable stereoypes, and do not in fact divide neatly into what might be termed ‘pro-
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Chart 21: Attitudes towards EU membership by city (%) 














































Chart 22: Responses to the statement 'Ukraine and Russia 
should cultivate close and friendly ties that reflect their 












Indeed, we see that in three of the four cities approximately a third of respondents 
concerned expressed a desire for close cooperation with both Russia and the EU.224 
Clearly, Donets’k and Kharkiv seem more drawn to Russia than the EU, while the reverse 
is true in Kyiv and L’viv, but the differences are perhaps not so polarised as is sometimes 
suggested. Such impressions have perhaps arisen as a result of the fact that, as Katharina 
Wolczuk noted in her CREES current afffairs seminar on 7th March 2012, neither the EU 
nor Russia’s discourse surrounding the other’s offerings in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ 
seem to perceive any benefits to Ukraine in the policy proposals of the other.  
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 It should be noted, furtherrmore, that these figures do not even account for those who expressed 
partiality to one optional but were ambivalent about the other and who account for 23 per cent of the total 









Chart 23: Interaction of views on EU membership and 'close 
and friendly ties with Russia' for all respondents (%) 
Only EU membership
EU member + ambivalent on
Russia
Both
Close to Russia + ambivalent on
EU







Chart 24. Key: Pink: Positive attitude towards continuation of historical cooperation with Russia, only. Blue: Positive 
attitude to EU membership, only. Purple: Positive attitude to both. Numbers refer to percentage of respondents by city, 
to the exclusion of those who did not favour either option.  
A further point to note regarding these observations is that it is abundantly clear why the 
Patriarch – regardless of his own position on Ukraine’s further European accession - could 
not simply speak directly or absolutely against Europe: young people made up a large 
proportion of his studio audience. His purpose must have been to incite people to reflect 
on this matter, rather than alienate them with diktats. This also further supports the 
arguments about the learning processes underway regarding soft power made in the 
previous chapter. 
These findings were explored further in the focus groups, although the issue of Europe 
and Ukraine’s relationship to it was raised in a slightly different way, with the participants 
asked to express their views on Ukraine’s geopolitical choice. Overall the notion of 
pursuing a European course was the most popular among the focus group sample, 
particularly in L’viv and Kyiv, although it also found strong advocates in Kharkiv and 
Donets’k too. The second most popular of the three choices was for an independent, 
neutral Ukraine, which resonated with students in all cities despite reservations about its 
viability. Finally, a number of students in Kharkiv and Donets’k expressed the conviction 
that Ukraine should follow a path closely allied with Russia. No claim to generalisability is 
made on the basis of these findings for reasons already articulated in the methodology, 
Relative attraction of EU membership and continuation of historically close relationship with Russia by 
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yet the focus group data does nevertheless provide some insight into the rationale behind 
such preferences. Rustam believed he captured the mood of many concerning the East-
West question when he stated that,  
We talk about how we mustn’t sever ties with our neighbours, how we’re close, we’re 
brothers and so on, but everyone sees him or herself in Europe, because everyone wants 
to live like people live there. (Rustam, Donets’k 1) 
 
For many proponents of Ukraine’s European choice, the reasons were clear and simple: 
Well, this question of whether to be closer to Russia or closer to Europe, it’s the same as 
asking whether to go towards stagnation or towards development. Naturally we should 
go towards development. (Katja, Russian-background, Kharkiv 1) 
Clearly, the EU has succeeded in promoting an appealing image of itself in terms of 
standard of living, rooted in its economic power, but to what extent might one speak of a 
community of values? As previously argued, Russia’s claim to civilisational distinctiveness 
rests on the notion of synthesising the construction of modern living standards with the 
preservation of traditional elements; values, culture. Unlike in the West, Russia seeks to 
develop the role of the Church in society, and to preserve and foster a traditional sense of 
spirituality and morality among the population. As the overall soft power scores for this 
strand have shown, such discourses seem to be relatively widely accepted in all the case 
study cities of Ukraine. Now, these will be examined in more detail.  
The reasons motivating individuals’ preferences for joining the EU seem to have been 
rather material in nature; rooted in a desire for a higher and more secure standard of 
living. In his discourse, the Patriarch co-opts this discourse, noting the need for 
improvements in welfare, but nevertheless criticises excesses of materialism and 




If you accept that glitzy trinkets aren’t the main thing, and that the spiritual and material 
need to be kept together, in principle, these thoughts are right, and much of it, in 
principle, is worth remembering in today’s civilisation. (Olena, Donets’k 1) 
 
 
Likewise, it is apparent that for this student that the categories proposed by the Patriarch 
and the positive value attributed to them are relevant, acceptable and so attractive: 
There were some abstract, general phrases, but I liked it; and why not? Everyone should 
strive away from the material to the spiritual, because it’s the fundament, it’s a pair of 
scales, material and spiritual, and if one is overladen, then why not put a stake on the 
other? (Serega, Donet’sk 1) 
Yet not all students agreed with this perspective. A number of participants expressed the 
idea that the patriarch’s speech was a ‘utopia’ (Katja) and ‘delirious ravings’ (Viktor). 
More concretely, for Yulia, a Galician Ukrainian Speaker (L’viv Group 2), the main principle 
of the speech clearly has not become common sense knowledge: ‘He explained well why 
the material is so bad, […] but he didn’t explain what will be so good about returning to a 
spiritual life.’ Indeed, the sense of not being with the times is a recurrent theme, with 

























Chart 25: Responses to the statement 'the 
acquisition of weath and consumption should 
not be promoted as the main sources of 








These ideas are out of date. First of all, everything’s taken from the Bible, with some 
religious teachings that aren’t fit for our times. Now nobody’s got any money yet you 
can’t actually do anything. (Tanya, mixed background, L’viv 1) 
Yet, there was a strong sense that the core notions of a dichotomy between the 
‘spiritual’, and ‘material’ were familiar to the participants. The participants are also 
comfortable using concepts such as ‘spiritual,’ and do so regularly, especially in Donets’k, 
which is significant as it underlines the relevance of these categories for people’s ways of 
interpreting the world, despite the lower level of religiosity there. 
Indeed, looking at the survey data more closely, we can observe that the respondents 
predominantly supported the main premise of the patriarch’s speech, namely that 
spiritual and moral values have an important place in contemporary Ukrainian society. 
 
Not only do the participants positively appraise spiritual values, but they also perceive a 
negative influence from Europe in this regard. This young woman expresses her 
agreement with the Patriarch, identifying the standard of living rather than traditions or 

























Chart 26: Responses to the statement 'Ukraine's 
path to modernisation and development should 
take into account the importance of spiritual 








weighted phrases like ‘throwing themselves’ and ‘run off’ indicates a desire to distance 
herself from such behaviours. 
First of all, he was right to say that young people now are really throwing themselves at 
everything connected with money and success. The reason why Western Europe attracts 
many people – it’s because of the very high standard of living. There it’s not so much the 
traditions or the language that are so attractive, but the quality of life. As he rightly said: a 
full belly and a stuffed pocket. That’s why people forget about their spiritual values and 
run off there, where one can live comfortably and with confidence in the future. That’s 
why I think that this video is a good example of why it’s necessary to preserve spiritual 
values. You can listen to this video, it conveys positive emotions. (Sasha(f), Donetsk 2) 
What’s more, the testimony of Lena from L’viv also affirms the idea that resistance to 
European cultural influence is not specifically related to a given religious denomination, 
but rather reflected a narrative more widely dispersed in society, thereby making it more 
stable:  
Myself, I’m believer of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, so in this regards I just don’t 
have a very positive attitude towards this patriarch, in so far as he absolutely does not 
support the idea of the unification of [Ukraine’s] churches.225 On the other hand, I agree 
with him concerning Europe. Although he’s patriarch, and shouldn’t have a relation to 
politics, but I agree that in terms of religion, Europe doesn’t offer anything good. (Lena, 
Galician Ukrainian Speaker, L’viv 2) 
Vasilisa, who had a pro-European attitude towards Ukraine’s geopolitical future, 
nevertheless expressed similar concerns: 
We are striving to join Europe, but I also don’t agree that Ukraine has not, has never had 
any history and that we should just join Europe and adopt everything European. I don’t 
even like the phrase ‘euro-remont’ [‘overhaul to European standards’]. I think that 
Ukraine should take the good things offered by Europe and cooperate with it, but Ukraine 
also has its own history, its own culture, its own achievements that shouldn’t be forgotten 
as if it never happened, as if this isn’t worth anything, as if it’s just history. And who was it 
who said that Europe’s the standard, that this model is the best example? Tolerance 
towards Europe, in my opinion, cannot be universal and all encompassing. All this 
homosexualism comes from there, and I don’t think that Ukraine should adopt this and 
support it. (Vasilisa, Ukrainian-speaker, Kyiv 1) 
The student seems to be buying into the assumptions proposed by the patriarch. We can 
observe resistance to the presumed arrogance that Ukraine should simply adopt foreign 
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 Viktor Yushchenko had sought to unite Ukraine’s orthodox churches into a single national church, but 
this was resisted by the Moscow Patriarchate. 
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standards without regard to its own history and culture. In particular, there is opposition 
to ‘homosexualism’; presented in terms of the promotion of a controversial set of 
attitudes and behaviours deemed to be contrary to the norms of Ukrainian culture. 
 
Tanya holds a similar interpretation of the patriarch’s speech, underlining the 
distinctiveness of Ukraine in comparison with the Western countries. 
Let just say, I didn’t see anything negative in [the speech]. In my view, this monologue 
wasn’t an appeal to any one country. I think rather he appeals to the unity of all the 
peoples of Kyivan Rus. […] and just focussed on the way we have a completely different 
mentality from the countries of far Europe, America and so on, and that we can’t build 
our society the same way they built theirs. So we should develop our society in our own 
way, according to our traditions, which will be better for us. We won’t approach building 
our society in the same way as them. Yes, maybe it was successful for them, but we need 
a slightly different path, one that’s adjusted for us, I think. (Tanya, mixed background, 
L’viv 1) 
 
In her response Tanya draws also on one of the ideas at the core of Patriarch Kirill’s 
speech, and a central plank of sovereign democracy more generally. She counters the 
universalism that is often presumed to characterise the Western model, and reserves the 
right to rather arrange society in such a way that is best for Ukraine, and in accordance 

























Chart 27: Responses to statement 'Western 
society and its morality has become too tolerant 








Some participants even go further, explicitly complaining about the way in which they feel 
that Western culture is imposed upon them via the media, which was hinted at in the 
stimulus: 
I think he’s really got the right idea about advertising, because it all starts with, I don’t 
know, chewing gum or sweets and ends up imposing a lifestyle; ideas, some goals, dreams 
are imposed upon you. It turns out that you need a lot of money, that you need 
something else. Maybe a person has such an inner need, but he didn’t have it before, it 
was just imposed on him, without him even understanding that, and he just lives like he’s 
told and stops thinking. (Alena, Ukrainian-background, Kharkiv 2) 
Such ideas reflect the notion of ‘information war’ and awareness of efforts to integrate 
Ukraine more fully into the Western capitalist system. This is significant if we follow 
Norval and Mijnssen in noting ‘acknowledging the ways in which one’s thinking and acting 
has been dominated by this or that picture or analogy is a precondition both for 
successful therapy and a criteria of the correctness of the diagnosis’ (Norval and Mijnssen 
2009: 45 ). Vladimir is particularly sharp in his critique, pointing explicitly to the West as 
the source of this influence, and disparaging a lifestyle placated by consumerism, noting, 
[f]or instance, now we are trying to live out Western culture. He [Patriarch Kirill] calls 
upon Ukrainians, and Slavic people in general to come to their senses and stop being 
clones of Western culture. Concerning these glossy magazines he said again that we are 
now consuming information which is simply senseless, and is only intended to clog your 
brains, so that you sit in front of the television and don’t think about anything, and just go 
on living somehow, without changing anything. (Vladimir, Ukrainian-background, Kharkiv 
2) 
Where the patriarch linked in more abstractly to the Russian discourse on the need for 
‘sovereignty of the spirit’, Vladimir recognises the critique and brought in his own 
examples. Indeed, the stimulus clip succeeded in eliciting a critique of Western culture 
that actually goes further than that articulated by the patriarch, broadening beyond the 
imbalance towards materialism to criticise cultural relations vis-à-vis the West more 
generally in a way that was not mentioned in this clip. The way in which some participants 
took ownership of the patriarch’s message, with such fluent elaborations upon the theme 
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seems to suggest that such discourses were not novel, but rather are indeed circulating in 
the Ukrainian information space. In this way we see that at least some elements of the 
Russian soft power discourse is diffused in society, repeated spontaneously by its 
members– rather than relying on state-led, top-down diffusion – and thereby reinforcing 
the critique.  
As mentioned previously, more participants favoured European integration despite these 
criticisms. However, a handful of the participants did use cultural matters as criteria of 
discernment in favour of cooperation with those who share more than just economic 
interest. Here, Rinat picks up on fears that Ukraine will somehow be exploited if 
interaction is on a material basis alone, and expresses the desire for a more profound, 
satisfying level of cooperation 
I completely agree with him. The idea there wasn’t about joining the EU or something 
else, he just presented some common things from the point of view of Orthodoxy, based 
on current problems. That is to say that now there is a problem here concerning joining 
the EU, and he for instance expresses the view that the EU will only accept us as economic 
partners, only in the sense of profiting from us, that’s it, and there’s no idea of unity on 
some other level, and no possible support. In other words, apart from money, nothing will 
unify us with them, this was the main idea, I think. So if we cooperate, then let’s at least 
cooperate with those who are closest to us on a cultural and spiritual level. We need to 
work towards collaboration on a higher level than just something to do with the economy 
or money, something more than just material stuff, because cooperation isn’t strong if it’s 
only supported by money. (Rinat, Ukrainian-background, Kharkiv 2) 
 
Relatively few participants shared Rinat’s conviction of the need to cooperate most 
closely with Russia even in the Eastern Ukrainian focus groups. On the contrary, while 
recognising a sense of cultural difference and even of a ‘struggle for a way of life’, the 
participants seemed very reluctant to acknowledge and take ownership of the notion of a 
‘civilisational project’. It seems that this is likely to be attributable to some apprehensions 
about such ambitious terminology, which when discussed in the context of the Russkiy 
Mir in a previous section, met repeatedly with awkwardness, seemingly on the ground of 
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its ‘pathos’. Indeed, talk of such grand emotional narrative projects seems a bit 
cringeworthy in these days of ironic distance and understatement. Furthermore, many 
individuals seemed to pick up on the implied opposition between the successors of Holy 
Rus’ and the secular West proposed by Patriarch Kirill, and were uncomfortable with that. 
People do not want to be isolated from Europe and its positive associations. Indeed, 
several participants took issue with what they considered to be an attempt by the 
patriarch to construct a dichotomy. As Alyona notes: 
The main idea is that the West is evil, and that Russians are the most moral people, and 
that in the 21st century our generation is just completely going against all spiritual values. 
I think the speech is absolutely incorrect. (Alyona, Russian-background, Kharkiv 1) 
Although many critiques were raised regarding the prospect of EU membership, among 
the participant sample, most did not disavow this opportunity altogether, but often 
merely qualified it with hopes of preserving and maintaining Ukraine’s distinctiveness. 
Vlad, on the other hand, finds it unlikely that Europe will ever accept either Ukraine or its 
values: 
I do not see anything good in adopting some European traditions. Why would they do to 
us if we will still never be in the Europe? This is my opinion. They still will never did take 
us – it’s 100%. And they won’t accept our values ever. (Vlad, mixed background, L’viv 1) 
7.5.1. Concluding Remarks 
 
Although the patriarch himself received a rather ambivalent reception among the 
participants, the ideas he represents seemed to have significant currency. As foreseen by 
the target discourse, the category of ‘spirituality’ was held up and valuable, and as a 
characteristic that Ukraine shouldn’t renounce without thought. Indeed, there was a 
sense of perceived tension between integration in the European Union and the material 
benefits it might bring, and Ukraine’s preserving its own heritage that makes it special. 
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While Russia was often framed in terms of being a purveyor of propaganda, some 
participants also recognised this characteristic in Western communications. Nevertheless, 
the participants did not appear to be comfortable with the notion of a resistance to 
Western values when constructed in such a way that cuts Ukraine off from Europe and 
the West. The greatest number of respondents wanted to keep ties with both Russia and 
the EU. 
7.6. Discursive Challenges to Russian Soft Power in Ukraine 
 
The previous section has indicated that Russian civilisational soft power discourses do 
have the potential to be quite attractive in Ukraine. However, this potential is stymied by 
the negative discourses in circulation concerning ‘what Russia is like’. Responses were 
quite often characterised by a ‘hinge’, whereby a positive evaluation of a certain aspects 
would be conjoined with a ‘but nevertheless’ [vsye ravno] type of expression that 
inevitably led into an enumeration of concerns. Indeed, rejection or negativity towards 
the narratives in the focus groups often seemed to be less a result of individuals’ 
reflections, though, of course, that was part of it, but moreover, stemmed from wider 
collective understandings. The consistency with which such criticisms occurred not only 
within but above all across groups suggests that rather than being the result of 
individually derived conclusions and research, these narratives are quite probably in 
circulation in the Ukrainian information space as recurrent pieces of information and 
interpretative prisms. The mere availability of such information is, of course, not alone 
sufficient for it to become integrated as a feature of individuals’ collective assumptions; 
‘members’ resources’ or ‘code’. First they must actually access it. That means choosing to 
use sources that convey such viewpoints, or exposure to credible, authoritative 
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individuals that relay the information in question. 
This section will present the recurring elements that participants more commonly drew 
upon in their discursive negotiations of the stimulus materials. 
7.6.1. Discursive Challenge: ‘Zombification’ 
 
In many cases, expressions of positive emotion regard the network of Russkiy centres, for 
example, were heavily hedged with the caveats along the lines that it would exceed the 
desired mandate and become a politically driven force. For many, it invoked associations 
with the Russian state, and, moreover, a certain sense of familiarity in the narratives 
provoked expressions of distrust in Russia, with the stimulus clip variously being 
pigeonholed with such expressions as ‘zombification’, ‘manipulation’, ‘brainwashing’, 
‘expansion’ and ‘propaganda,’ rather than the more positively associated 
‘popularisation’.226 Part of the reason for this view was the status of the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation as a state-sponsored initiative, which elicited statements conveying a low 
level of trust in official organisations and claims that the foundation would have been 
more welcome if it had been a genuine grass-roots organisation. This sense of veiled 
political intent behind the foundation’s was reflected in the way that the majority of 
participants, especially beyond Eastern Ukraine, chose to describe its activities. Stas, for 
instance, expresses, on one hand, agreement with the content, but neutralises the 
positive value with reference to established tropes about what Russia and its 
representatives are like. 
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 Interestingly, Richters (2012: 42) notes that this terminology of ‘brainwashing’ and ‘turning people into 
zombies’ was used by the ROC to condemn the proselytisation of Western religious organisations working in 
Russia and presumably Ukraine in the post-Soviet period. 
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In principle, he didn’t say anything wrong. [….] Nevertheless, there is a particular context 
to this speech. As was said, you have to read between the lines, and in this case, listen 
between the words, because at the end of the day, I’d say it’s a word game, and between 
these words you have to look out for something else, something less positive than it 
appears. (Stas, Galician Ukrainian Speaker, L’viv 2) 
The notion that the speech represented a ‘play on words’ and that it is necessary to ‘read 
between the lines’ featured regularly in the narratives of the participants. We have here a 
rather sophisticated audience, one that is vigilant to propagandistic attempts at 
manipulation by the authorities; among whom the patriarch is clearly numbered. The 
participants appeared to be sensitive to a certain ambiguity [dvuznachnost’]; a duality of 
meaning applied to utterances on certain topics. While this isn’t so explicit here, there is a 
sense that participants know what he means, what he intends, what his aim is, even if he 
does not actually articulate it explicitly. 
7.6.2. Discursive Challenge: Political Intent  
 
Here Yulia is explicit in what she feels is political about the speech; it’s the underlying 
drive towards some kind of unification, whether that be getting everyone under the 
Moscow Patriarchate, or a more general political confluence 
But I agree with Stas that really this is a play on words. Even if we read between the lines, 
[that] he said there that it is not about secularisation, about the separation of the church 
from politics, that in general it’s not about politics, but about the fact that we are losing 
our spirituality and so on, but nevertheless at the end he returned to politics and spoke of 
unification and so on. So if you actually read between the lines, it all becomes clear. (Yulia, 
Galician Ukrainian Speaker, L’viv 2) 
Most frequently, participants did not appear even to perceive a need to articulate what 
precisely was ‘political’ about the speech, as if they considered it to be self-evident. For 
some, the perception of the patriarch as a political actor is sufficient to cause suspicions 
as to his intentions: 
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This is just full-on brainwashing. Well, for me he is absolutely in line with the party leaders 
of the Soviet era, with those who sit in the Russian government. It's just a politician.[…] 
Well, […] there really wasn’t anything new there. Let’s say, I didn’t find out today that you 
can confidently place an equals sign between the church and politics. (Ira, Russian-
background, Kharkiv 1) 
This perspective of the reality not being as it seems is heavily predicated upon the 
assumption that the patriarch is a representative of the Russian government, and as such 
is a highly political figure. Furthermore, participants repeatedly drew attention to the 
patriarch’s Soviet past as a ‘KGBeshnik’ (Taras, Galician Ukrainian-speaker, L’viv). 
7.6.3. Discursive Challenge: Imperial Revanchism 
 
A significant number of participants experienced the clips as rather heavy-hand, which 
rather than alleviating concerns and stoking interest in Russia, fitted neatly into existing 
negative perceptions of Russia held by the participants, and thereby helped to reinforce 
them. Indeed, as Yulia hinted above, many participants perceived the public diplomacy 
activities as a way of promoting unification and as a cloak for imperialist desires: 
If I was a citizen of Russia, then clearly I would view it positively, but as for me, now, then 
obviously it is a negative phenomenon. I understand that every empire that collapses 
strives for revenge, and in essence, the “Russian World” is all-in-all really just a part of 
that plan. (Dmytro, Russian speaker, Kyiv 2) 
Likewise, Taras was a particularly vehemently critical member of the Galician group as 
regards Russia, noting: 
“An NGO created by Putin” – Yeah, right! Even the name ‘Russkiy Mir’ alludes to the 
imperial habits of Russia. Russkiy MIR!  
While in the Eastern cities participants were somewhat uncomfortable with what they 
saw as the imposition and obtrusiveness of Russia by proxy, they refrained from the 
stronger language sometimes employed by participants in Kyiv and L’viv, where the same 
stimulus provoked associations with authoritarianism, imperialism and cultural expansion.  
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For a number of the more sceptical Russophone participants, the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
represented an example of Russia trying to prevent countries from achieving national 
fullness in the sense of successfully retrieving the imagining essence of their culture prior 
to Russian intervention. 
Basically, the movie was about the Russian language, but it also involved such motifs as 
the promotion of Russian culture itself. In the video we saw Russian dances, Russian 
balalaika. For what purpose would this fund be created? To start with, for the countries of 
the former CIS, so that these countries do not manage to recover their identity [bytnost], 
their true culture, and continue to study the Russian language and Russian literature, and 
continued to consider themselves citizens of the Soviet Union and nurture some kind of 
ties with Russia.’(Oleg, Donetsk 2) 
 
7.6.4. Discursive Challenge: Obtrusiveness 
 
Given the association with political manoeuvring, the perception of the foundation as 
obtrusive was widespread among the participants. Despite the low level of awareness of 
the foundation and the local ‘Russian centres’ themselves, participants were sensitive to 
the notion that the presence of the centres would entail the imposition of Russian 
language and culture in Ukraine, with the intent of exerting political influence. Yuri, for 
instance, was not convinced that the activities would be conducted on a purely voluntary 
basis, and would rather be ‘voluntarily-coerced’; suggesting a façade of voluntarism, 
behind which certain implicit sanctions on non-participation might be found: 
On one hand it’s possible to see it as support for one’s language that any country could 
undertake, but then again in view of the fact it’s Russia and how it was during the time of 
the USSR, then it’s possible to see it as voluntary-coercive227 imposition of the Russian 
language. (Dmytro, Galician Ukrainian Speaker, L’viv 2) 
 
Humane, and so to say, unobtrusive, But Russia is more like a vice, it closes all exits and 
entrances, it puts Ukraine in an unfavourable position, although it too is dependent on us, 
                                                          
227
 ‘Voluntary-coercive’ [dobrovol’no-prinudital’nyi] describes suggests actions that give rise to effects that 
are technically ‘voluntary’ but have been brought about by circumstances meaning it would be difficult and 
unfavourable to do otherwise.   
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and there’s no question of partnership relations here, just a situation whereby ‘we stand 
above you’, and that’s it. (Nadia, Ukrainian speaker, Kyiv 2) 
The practices characteristic of the Soviet times appear to cast a long shadow; reproduced 
even among those who never lived under that system. Even in supposedly ‘pro-Russian’ 
Donets’k, some participants felt uncomfortable with the imposition that the foundation 
represented to them. Mimicking in a shrill tone, one student expressed her impressions of 
the patterns offered to Ukraine by similar organisations: 
It’s pressed upon you: ‘come along, learn this Russian language! Come along, open a book! 
Join our group! Drop Ukrainian language! Leave Ukraine, go to Russia, work there!’ 
(Masha, Donets’k 2) 
In spite of this rather widespread impression, it must be noted that not all students 
perceived that the presence of the foundation’s ‘Russian Centres’ inevitably constituted 
an imposition or a means of more-or-less forcing people to be attentive to Russian 
language and culture. Such individuals tended to use a nearly identical core formulation 
to express this sentiment, along the lines of; ‘in principle, it’s voluntary: if you’re 
interested, you go, if you’re not, you don’t. I don’t see anything wrong with that.’ Most 
representatives of this less reactionary view were from the East Ukrainian groups.  
7.6.5. Discursive Challenge: Exaggeration of Russia’s Threat Potential  
 
Yet, these logical arguments went by-the-by for many participants. Indeed, the 
perception of the threat posed by Russia in the minds of some participants – especially in 
Kyiv and L’viv – goes quite beyond the credible. Stas, for instance, appears to have a view 
of Russian strategy quite divorced from a reasoned evaluation of the Russkiy Mir 
Foundation’s capacities,  
I consider [the Russkiy Mir Foundation] the quiet before the storm […] Russia wants to get 
as many supporters as possible because it’s easier to rule the world, easier to control 
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various aspects of international life. They don’t lose by getting as many supporters as 
possible, but only win. (Stas, Galician Ukrainian Speaker, L’viv 2) 
Of course, soft power and diplomacy is indeed about cultivating allies, but in his mind – 
and not only his – such initiatives could only be designed with ill-intent, illegitimate 
means and imperial ambition. Here again, we see an example of critics of Russia inflating 
the threat perception, all the better to take an equally firm stance in opposition. The 
notion of mir [‘world’] contained in the title of the foundation strengthened the feeling of 
its implication in a plan to realise a desire to impose Russian on the entire globe. Indeed, 
some participants expressed a feeling of pressure from the presence of Russia on many 
sides. 
If you look at it so, then they are interposing not only the ‘Russkiy Mir’ but in all spheres 
of life; in the banks, savings banks, in telecommunications – everything is in Russian and 
everything appears increasingly from within Ukraine. (Nadia, Ukrainian speaker, Kyiv 2) 
Clearly, this concern does have some basis in reality, as many Russian companies have 
holdings in Ukraine, yet, despite symbolising Russian presence, it can by no means be 
taken for granted that such outlets intentionally serve as ‘tools’ of Russian soft power or 
reflect the views of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, as previously noted, this may have the 
overall effect of magnifying the perception of the apparently relatively modest activities 
of the Russian Centres. Commercial enterprises commonly do their work for financial not 
political purposes, and may well not be linked in to the bigger picture of soft power 
networks and thus don’t speak the discourse. Yet, as observed in the conceptual 
framework, messages reinforcing a person’s worldview are more readily heard than those 




7.6.6. Discursive Challenge: Preponderance of Russian Strength  
 
So, in some respects, although on one hand respected, the very strength of Russia, its 
culture and prevalence of the Russian language in Ukrainian society may in some ways be 
seen as an impediment to the enhancement of Russian soft power there. 
Correspondingly, among those who feel the radiance of that power, reactions are often 
characterised by fear of the possible consequences of the asymmetrical relationship. For 
instance, the magnification of the threat posed by Russia corresponds with a feeling that 
the odds are not evenly stacked, giving cause for concern. One student expressed this 
concern: 
I don’t know, to me personally the idea of improving the quality of knowledge of the 
Russian language isn’t in itself bad, of course not, but when the quantity of initiatives to 
enhance this are greater than the quantity of initiatives to improve knowledge of 
Ukrainian, then it is a bit inappropriate, I think. 
Another impression that emerged quite strongly was that of a Russia which behaved as if 
superior to all others, with Putin expressing ‘necessary things with an accent on the fact 
that Russia is so good and all the others are so bad’ (Viktor, Surzhyk speaker, Kyiv 2). 
Indeed, magnified by having viewed the two previous clips where the same sentiment 
was identified, Putin’s statements against American use of force provoked Natasha to 
observe with increasing degrees of sarcasm that: 
One sentence immediately came to mind: “we’re better than them”. “Look, America is 
expanding into the whole world, but we’re better. We don’t do it like that, we do it 
properly – we are quietly propagating our culture, very gently promoting our religion 
everywhere, we’re doing it all so well that you won’t even notice it.” He somehow pushes 
this thought all the time, and that’s it. Personally, I think that there’s the idea that we, 
“we, we will do everything so well that you won’t even notice.” (Natasha, Ukrainian 
speaker, Kyiv 2) 
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Many participants like Natasha seemed highly sensitised to Russian influence in Ukraine, 
and hence felt antagonistic towards it. This is suspected to be a result of critical 
communications by those who would resist this. 
7.6.7. Discursive Challenge: Personal Credibility 
 
A final core issue impeding a flourishing of Russian soft power relates to the issues of 
personal credibility and the corresponding charge of hypocrisy. In particular, this 
concerned the person of Patriarch Kirill, who did not receive a particularly positive 
evaluation in any city, especially not in the East where there is presumably less reverence 
for religious figures. 228  The most damning critiques related to the way in which 
participants simultaneously perceived a contradiction between said and done: 
The first idea suggests that we renounce consumer culture. But on the other hand, in my 
opinion, these clergymen in no way renounce it. They buy themselves luxurious things 
and cars. He[the patriarch] certainly didn’t go [to the studio] on foot! (Pyotr, Donets’k 2) 
Indeed, a significant number of participants in different groups referred to the means of 
transport favoured by the patriarch. While Russian-speaking Vlad in L’viv also remarked 
snarkily that ‘Yes, he certainly didn’t come by bike’, his counterparts in the Ukrainophone 
group observed how the majors of Brussels and London do indeed travel to work by 
bicycle. Participants seemed to be well-informed about the various brands of luxury car 
supposedly driven by the patriarch and his entourage, despite allegedly exhorting their 
parishioners to buy the Russian-made Lada Kalina (Denis, Russian speaker Kyiv 2). Such 
tales were supplemented by accounts of expensive watches, gold-roofed, three-storey 
                                                          
228
 Indeed, in Kharkiv 69% of respondents gave a negative evaluation of the patriarch, while only 12% 
expressed a positive view. It is hard to explain this fully. The visit of the patriarch was criticised in opposition 
media, and provoked annoyance through the traffic chaos caused by the cavalcade, which passed near the 
university. Students at the Karamzin Kharkiv National Technical University were active during the ‘Orange 
Revolution’. During the same trip, the patriarch also visited Donets’k. One may thus speculate whether the 
topic was handled in a specific way at the university, possibly by staff too. 
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holiday villas in the outskirts of Donets’k (Misha, Donet’sk 2) and golden robes and 
crosses worth as much as a flat in Kyiv. The fact that Kirill is at the top of his chosen 
profession and that these are part of his regalia didn’t cut much ice as participants 
explicitly or more often implicitly applied a rather democratic critique, to reproach his 
material elevation in comparison to most Ukrainians. Rustam responded to the 
suggestion that such possessions could be normal for a patriarch in a tone thick with irony: 
The issue isn’t whether it’s normal. Of course, this watch for $300,000[sic], it’s completely 
normal, I don’t dispute it. It’s just that he said that it’s decadent, that we need to restore 
Orthodox culture, like he said, that material values aren’t the most important. But for a 
person who wears on his arm a watch that cost $300,000, it’s clear which values are 
primary. Well, I agree! (Rustam, Donets’k 1) 
Besides the political intentions, a number of students expressed cynicism about the 
financial motivations of the patriarch in his visits to Ukraine: ‘Why does the patriarch have 
such a great regard for Ukraine? It’s explained by the fact that he needs Ukraine as a big 
money box!’ (Pavel, Galician Ukrainian speaker, L’viv 2). These narratives are directed 
against the church in general and the patriarch in particular rather than against Russia, 
but they do have a negative impact on the ability of these representatives of Russia to 
serve as credible and authoritative opinion formers. 
7.6.8. Summary 
 
In the focus groups, the overall reception of soft power narratives communications was 
adversely affected by a number of critical discourses about ‘what Russia is like’. 
Frequently, participants expressing an opinion critical of Russia did not appear to feel the 
need to expand upon their core critique at length in order to justify it. Rather, they often 
advanced concisely formulated opinions, expecting others to know what they meant, 
without detailed explanation. On the whole their expectations on this front seemed not 
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to be disappointed. The sense of such attributes being general knowledge on ‘what 
Russia’s like’ was also reflected by the knowing, or ironic tone used by participants. The 
existence of negative discourses impedes the ability of the would-be meaning makers to 
exercise ideational leadership in society, since they distract from engagement with the 
actual ideas. 
7.7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In general, quantitative findings of this study suggest that Russia has soft power in 
Donets’k, Kharkiv and Kyiv, although in the latter city this attraction is more contested. 
This means that in these three cities Russia, on the whole, is perceived as attractive and 
its values and ideas contribute to ‘agenda-setting’; that is, they are called upon in 
formulating interpretations of the world. Russia cannot be described as having soft power 
in L’viv. Discourses contesting Russia’s attractiveness and its potential and credibility as 
meaning-making are particularly salient there, although they were also discerned to a less 
degree in the other cities. 
Turning to the individual cultural, value-oriented and foreign policy strands of the 
discourse, a more differentiated picture may be presented.  
As a shared cultural and linguistic space, the idea of the Russkiy Mir did attract some 
identification, although what that meant to individuals differs significantly. A key point is 
that there the sense did not emerge from these findings that being a part of the Russkiy 
Mir was incompatible with Ukrainian citizenship; although the sense of being part of an 
all-Ukrainian national culture often seemed attenuated for those in the East. This was due 
to a lack of Ukrainian languages skills or unfamiliarity with Ukrainian traditions. This gave 
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rise to various shades of hybrid identities, ranging from a sense of belonging to a variously 
formulated borderless Slavic community, to liminal identities somehow between Russia 
and Ukraine as a whole to those who, somewhat reluctantly, acknowledged themselves 
as inheritors of the Russian cultural legacy, but looked to develop their Ukrainian identity. 
Although a significant number of the focus groups participants were ethnic Russians, only 
one said they felt Russian not Ukrainian. Numerous participants identified with a ‘citizen 
of the world’ identity, thereby avoiding awkward identity choices. In Kyiv, there seemed 
to be little to differentiate the native Russian-speakers from the Ukrainophones; there 
was a clearly delineated sense of Ukrainian national identity, without in principle being 
antagonistic to Russian culture. A number of participants there had made a shift from 
their native Russian to Ukrainian as their language of preference. In the Galician group in 
L’viv, a stronger, more anxious sense of a preoccupation with Ukraine’s fate was apparent, 
and my contact their observed a more exclusionary sense of nationalism there. In the 
mixed group in L’viv, a range of positions were articulated. On the whole, certain 
reservations to be discussed below notwithstanding, the value of promoting culture 
seemed to be acknowledged, but an unstated feeling was imparted that to retain 
attraction, Russian cultural activity should be future-oriented, not just reliant on the past. 
Most common ground between participants in the different cities was found on the issue 
of values. The notions of the value of spirituality over materialism and the need to 
preserve traditional culture in the face of Western pressure to liberalise were generally 
not contested. Thus, a sense of cultural-civilisational commonality binding Ukrainians and 
Russians and differentiated them from Europe and the West was observed. In this case 
particularly, though potentially also regarding the others too, it is accepted that these 
attitudes may not necessary result from Russian informational work, but possibly from 
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nationalist movements that are strong in L’viv. However, this is not deemed to represent 
a methodological problem since, as argued in the conceptual framework, it is 
theoretically not possible to ascertain for sure an ‘true’ individual’s reasoning for a given 
belief.229 Indeed, as already noted, Nye himself takes into account the ability of powers to 
‘piggy-back’; to glean the benefits of the dissemination of the same or compatible values 
undertaken by other entities. 
With regard to Russia’s foreign policy stance, the analysis was accepted as accurate, but 
again did not really inspire enthusiasm for Slavic unity or similar resistance against a 
latter-day ‘imperialist West’ in any group. In addition to the observed cynicism concerning 
Moscow’s motives and sincerity, this may be due to the fact that the West does have 
significant wells of soft power in particularly terms of trust and and there is little desire 
for conflict with a civilisation that still exudes socio-economic attraction if not necessarily 
cultural-spiritual appeal more narrowly defined. By contrast, the sovereign democracy 
discourse whereby nations have a right to develop their political models in line with their 
own traditions and culture resonated much more clearly. 
The examples given in this chapter have focussed on the moments where the discourse 
resonated with the audience. Although examples where the meanings given by the 
Russian narrative were specifically contested were also noted, the final section of this 
chapter was devoted to the more generic discursive challenges that characterised the 
greater part of the audience’s rejectionist reception of the stimulus materials. The themes 
of this set of elements were generally rather consist across all cities, although the extent 
                                                          
229
 Further, during my fieldwork I heard rumours that the nationalist Svoboda [‘freedom’] party is supported 
by Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of the Regions, in order to detract influence from more moderate parties that 
might succeed in uniting the country round a moderate programme and thereby attenuate the electoral 
advantage presented by ‘pro-Russian’ sentiments roused against ‘nationalists’.  
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to which each prevailed varied according to region, tending to be stronger in L’viv and 
Kyiv as the survey findings suggested would be the case. The negative characteristics 
attributed to Russia by this rather stable discourse included perceptions of Moscow as 




Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
This thesis makes three main contributions to the literature on soft power, with a 
particular focus on its application to the Russian case study. The first is theoretical in 
nature and consists of the re-framing of Joseph Nye’s popular soft power concept with 
reference to scholars of discourse theory, Cultural Studies and communication whose 
work gives robust theoretical content and helps explore how attraction is constructed. 
The second is the application of the re-worked concept to the as yet under-researched 
case study of Russia as a purveyor of soft power. One aspect of Russia’s soft power work, 
specifically its civilisational approach, is examined. The processes of intended soft power 
generation are analysed; from rationale and ambition, to the projected narratives, to a 
significant set of agents and tools of their dissemination to the audience’s reception. The 
third contribution is a sub-case study that investigates how Russia’s soft power discourses 
are received by an audience in a selected target country, namely Ukraine. It is on this 
basis that a judgement is made about the extent of contemporary Russian soft power 
referring to the case study of higher education students in four cities across Ukraine. 
Where Nye’s notion has often been presented as a neutral term to describe a progressive 
practice, this thesis has sought to insert the politics into the concept of soft power. To 
achieve this it was necessary to deconstruct Nye’s diffuse concept of attraction, which has 
been presented as an essential attribute of certain values and phenomena, and which 
leads to ‘attracted’ states and individual foreigners to voluntarily seek the leadership of 
the USA. By contrast, following theorists such as Laclau, Mouffe and Norval, this thesis 
has proposed that soft power’s attraction might usefully be viewed as an extrapolation of 
a re-articulated post-Marxist notion of Gramsci’s hegemony to the international arena. 
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Accordingly, the attractiveness of given phenomena may not be ‘objectively’ appraised, 
except within the terms of reference provided by discourses of meaning and value. Soft 
power, it has been argued, is the ability to produce and effectively disseminate such 
narratives that are capable of becoming hegemonic in a Gramscian sense and thereby set 
the agenda for how ‘attractiveness’ is defined. As such, soft power is less a cause of 
cultural influence, than a cultural effect of wider power dynamics that facilitate 
immaterial kinds of influence. In short, soft power is not only the ability to be perceived 
as attractive, but to shape the very definition of what constitutes ‘attractive’, valuable 
and good, and, by contrast, to identify manifestations of evil, repression, and marginality. 
Where for Nye soft power communicative tools are about informing audiences about 
‘good’ ideas, in this framework, these tools become complicit in the construction of those 
ideas as ‘good’. While Nye sees the profusion of American films abroad as a result of 
demand and evidence of US attraction, this thesis points to their supply as a factor in the 
creation of that very attraction. From a discursive perspective, the capacity to determine 
the framework of reference for value interpretations shapes the conditions for what is 
politically possible. 
Thus, soft power is a valuable resource for any polity. Yet, while soft power is an 
immaterial form of influence, the thesis has shown that it is reliant on hard power means. 
Economic and military strength may be required to gain access to audiences, by funding 
production and distribution channels or even to make foreign territories accessible to 
these tools. Hard power resources are also required to uphold a relatively desirable – that 
is, secure and sustainable – mode of existence for people, in order to remain ‘attractive’. 
In turn, by winning the consent (passive or otherwise) of foreign populations, a state 
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wielding soft power should find it requires less economic and military power to preserve 
its dominance. 
Thus, in this thesis, the emphasis of evaluating of soft power has been shifted from the 
input side – the ‘tools’ and ideas created in an attempt to position a polity as attractive – 
to the outputs; that is to say, whether those measures are actually effective in terms of 
their ability to effectively propagate discourses that are perceived as ‘attractive’ and ‘set 
the agenda’ among the audience.  
Turning to the specific findings from the case study, this thesis has argued that soft power 
foreign policy has been accepted by the Kremlin as an important aspect of national 
modernisation; both as a means of advancing Russia down a progressive trajectory of 
growth by encouraging beneficial economic, political and military cooperation, and an 
indicator of national development in its own right. In principle, cultural engagement is no 
longer just about leveraging loyalties, but about milieu shaping in ways that can be 
positive-sum while creating an overall favourable environment for the pursuit of Russian 
interests.  
Russia, it has been argued, is simultaneously pursuing several approaches to soft power 
as broadly understood. This thesis focussed on a civilisational approach, which 
corresponds most closely to the definition of soft power articulated in the conceptual 
framework. While Russian civilisation might be understood in different ways, Ukraine is 
always at the heart of such notions. Indeed, as a polity that until 1991 had existed for 
centuries as a multi-national imperial state, many contemporary Russians consider that 
their country ‘was, is and will be’ a great power. Ukraine, ‘brotherly nation’ of fellow 
Orthodox East Slavs, is considered to be an integral part of that, not least since Russia 
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traces its statehood back to ninth century Kyiv. Coupled with the geo-political significance 
of Ukraine for Russia, these factors have meant that Kyiv’s overtures to the West 
following the ‘orange revolution’ have provoked feelings ranging from the humiliation of 
seeing the Cold War enemy dig-in on the territory of its closest ally, to concern for the 
practical implications for Russian business and the Black Sea Fleet. These events, it has 
been argued, served as a catalyst for more serious engagement with the principles and 
mechanisms of soft power. 
The debate between pragmatists and nationalists over whether or not Ukraine should be 
‘re-integrated’ appears to have generally been answered to the effect that Ukrainian 
independence and neutrality may be accepted if Ukraine remains within the cultural, 
ideological and civilisational space that has become known as the Russkiy Mir. Given the 
‘russkii’ discursive current favouring spirituality over materialism, such an approach may 
make rewarding claims to moral superiority, whilst positing Russia in the desired light as a 
country that deals ‘normally’ – non-coercively – with others. Ukraine’s membership of 
this project is a key element demanded for ‘sovereignty of spirit’; whereby in order for 
Russia to be ‘sovereign’ – effectively, secure – in the cultural sphere, the country must not 
only have a vital national culture capable of winning the consent of citizens, but also be 
able to serve as a cultural leader to other states and nations. 
Currently, it cannot be said that Russia is advancing a unique model of development as 
part of its soft power arsenal; such ideologies do not currently exist that could co-opt 
widespread support whilst enabling the pursuit of Russian goals in its wider Eurasian 
neighbourhood. However, it is not the case that Russia has nothing to offer other states, 
even if its offerings are officially unpalatable to the sensibilities of Western leaders. 
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Although Moscow has sought to promote an effective image to further cooperation with 
Europe and beyond, this thesis has approached Russian soft power from a civilisational 
angle, the gaze of which falls not on Western states (though it seeks to entice their 
compatriot residents), but on the former socialist and non-aligned countries. Considering 
itself historically as a proponent of the avant-garde, Moscow seeks to seize the initiative 
by offering not a distinct alternative to the West, but a mark 2 model; a corrective to the 
perceived excesses of the US-led original. Russian elites perceive that the sovereign 
democracy model may appeal to states wishing to engage in mutually beneficial 
cooperation and even integration projects in the service of national development. Yet, 
where Western variants have made their financial support conditional upon normative 
stipulations in apparently unrelated spheres, the attraction of sovereign democracy lies in 
its willingness to leave traditional cultural patterns untouched. This may prove appealing 
since joint development projects may help avoid economic troubles that create 
conditions that ferment popular discontent (such as those which powered the Arab 
Spring and the velvet revolutions), as well as preserve the traditional structures of 
authority in society; particularly organised religion. In the case of Ukraine, soft power 
activity has focussed not only on promoting ‘russkii’ culture, but also on raising 
consciousness of ‘russkii’ cultural values as distinctive from those of the West and as 
worth preserving. Since the sovereign democracy model rests on the notion that 
countries need political models in line with their traditions, in strengthening shared and 
unique cultural discourses Russia seeks to bolster the rationale and hence attraction of its 
political model and make it more desirable for export. 
Although this ‘soft’ approach has been relatively coherently and consistently articulated 
by the foreign policy elite, it is, however, hard to know how far it has become the 
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‘common sense’ discourse among the wider community of officials and other 
representatives of Russia abroad. This is an important issue since ‘off discourse’ 
statements, behaviours and attitudes embodying unattractive characteristic exhibited by 
representatives of Russia may even serve to ‘inoculate’ audiences against genuinely 
positive overtures by cynically framing them as disingenuous. While imperial-themed 
narratives may gratify sections of the domestic audience, they play into the hands of anti-
Russian actors abroad by providing justifications of oppositional policy positions and 
strengthening their resistance. In short, such tendencies are counterproductive, but say 
something about the ability of the Kremlin to co-opt even domestic elites into a broad 
discourse on where Russia is going in the 21st century. 
The results of the quantitative survey presented in chapter seven suggest that Russia 
does not presently have soft power in L’viv, but continues to have soft power in the other 
three case study cities, albeit only marginally in Kyiv. Meanwhile, the qualitative data 
generated through the focus groups has brought nuance to understandings of Ukrainian 
attitudes towards cultural, value-oriented and foreign policy themes. Analyses have 
typically focussed on the identity poles of East and West, represented by the notions of 
sovietised, pro-Russian ‘sovoks’ and Ukrainian nationalists of Galicia. This study has 
shown that the core ideas represented in Russian soft power narratives do resonate as 
‘attractive’ and plausible for many across the country. Contrary to expectations, the 
discourses the participants drew upon to oppose Russian narratives drew upon a very 
similar well of ideas in each of the focus groups, with the difference lying above all in the 
vehemence with which this resistance was asserted. Galician narratives drew on notion of 
Russian ‘chauvinism,’ whereas in the Eastern cities, the complaint was more specifically 
about the sense of unnecessary cultural pressure from their neighbour, even if that 
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culture was in and of itself attractive. The discourses of spirituality encountered 
significant acceptance. The fact that the difference between the evaluations on this 
theme was not statistically significant by city suggests that these values represent a 
shared ‘common sense’ across Ukraine.  
In short, the problem was most commonly with the way of promotion, not the narratives 
themselves. While shared statehood and the rhetoric of ‘brotherhood’ with Russia might 
be associated with the past, it was rare for the values of culture and spirituality 
themselves to be critiqued. On the contrary, they were valued as ideals, even if most 
participants were not likely to be racing to their nearest ‘Russkiy Centr’ imminently.  
Indeed, opposition to and rejection of the clips was largely rooted in a shared body of 
negative discourses on ‘what Russia is like’, which frequently included interpretative 
elements of Russia as neo-imperial, chauvinistic, obtrusive, hypocritical, propagandistic 
and excessively confident. These seemed to be the default mode among a significant 
number of participants in the focus groups. Thus there is a need for Russia to co-opt 
members of domestic and foreign civil society who will reproduce the soft power 
discourse not simply because they are paid to do so, but because they believe in its 
virtues, recognise audience expectations and avoid the pitfall of allowing their passion for 
the subject to pigeon-hole them as representing these negative trends.  
The beauty of soft power and the factor that distinguishes it from old-fashioned 
propaganda is that ‘it doesn’t feel like propaganda’ (Parmar 2010). Its virtue lies in its 
invisibility; soft power is diffused and the ideas reflected do not appear to emanate from 
a clearly identifiable centre, as is the case with hard power, but rather co-opt local actors 
to reproduce them throughout society. Further, unlike political pamphlets and the like, 
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soft power’s cultural products don’t directly tell audiences what to think. Nevertheless 
they are imbued with culturally-specific values and judgements. In exposing foreigners to 
life-styles cast as attractive, viewers are exposed to these value narratives and introduced 
to new ideas and ways of thinking. Over time and through repetition these narratives help 
shape what audiences think about; what they find relevant to judge various issues, and in 
turn may transform their desires, hopes and expectations. This, as the ‘velvet’ revolutions 
of the past quarter of a century have shown, can have a great political impact.  
Clearly Russia is making progress in its endeavour to rekindle soft power. The work of the 
Russian Orthodox Church suggests that the concepts and mechanisms of soft power have 
germinated as ideas and steps are underway to put them into practice. The findings of the 
audience reception research suggest that there is considerable further work required 
before international impressions of Russia will be consistently guided by the target 
discourses, even in Ukraine. International leadership requires a degree of trust which, 
judging by the critical narratives through which Russian soft power activities were 
interpreted, is not currently forecoming. Nevertheless, the resonance with which the 
content of Russia’s civilisational soft power narratives suggested that Ukraine remains in 
a cultural space, which some might call the Russkiy Mir, even as it looks to work with the 
West on certain issues. Those seeking to restore Russia’s ‘sovereignty of spirit’ have 
grounds for optimism, if certainly not celebration. 
If, as some have suggested, the sphere of culture and ideas constitutes the terrain of 
international competition in the 21st century, then it is necessary to have conceptual tools 
that allow us to clearly identify and analyse the processes in play. In providing an 
interdisciplinary theoretical approach this thesis offers a framework that may be applied 
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Appendix A: Survey Content 
 
This is the original English text of the survey which was translated by a native speaker into 
Russian and Ukrainian for the study. 
 




Thank you for your interest in my survey. 
 
I am a PhD student at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at the 
University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. 
 
This survey forms part of a doctoral research project on the attractiveness and credibility 
of Russian culture and ideas among students in Ukraine. During this survey you will be 
asked to evaluate a number of statements which reflect the viewpoint expressed by 
certain representatives of Russia. Since information about these issues is often 
disseminated through the media, you will also be asked to share some information about 
what media you use, as well as some general information about yourself. 
 
This survey should take no longer than 10-15 minutes to complete. 
 
I am very interested in your personal opinions, attitudes and feelings; please just answer 
honestly and openly. You can stop doing the survey at any time without giving a reason.  
Please, only fill in this survey if you:  
 
• are a citizen of Ukraine and 
• are a current student at one of the following participating Ukrainian universities, 
and 
- Donets’k Technical University, Donets’k 
- Ivano-Frankivsk National University, L’viv 
- Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkiv 
- Taras Shevchenko National University, Kyiv 
 
• have lived in the oblast where you are studying for the majority of the past five/ 
ten years (Kyiv region and Kyiv oblast are counted together here) and 
• have Ukrainian or Russian or Ukrainian and Russian as your mother tongue and 





What’s more there is an opportunity to participate in my focus group. If you would like to 
participate in this innovative research, please complete the form at the end of the survey. 
The focus groups will last between two and two and a half hours and you will receive a 
token remuneration of 40 hryvnia for your participation.  
 
Although my research project is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(granted 2008), this study is conducted entirely independently of the UK government, 
other authorities, private organisations and foundations, and is not politically motivated.  
Be assured that your responses are entirely anonymous and confidential.  
 
Your participation is crucial for my research - many thanks in advance! 
 
Section one: Background information 
 
Part 1: [Respondent profile.] This section asks for some information about you in order to 
put your responses in context. 
 
Please select the option that applies best to you: 
1. University of study (Please tick appropriate response for you) 
2. Area of study / specialisation (Please choose from the drop down menu) 
3. Year of study (Please tick appropriate response for you) 
4. Year of birth (Please choose from the drop down menu) 
5. Sex: Male / female / prefer not to say (Please choose from the drop down menu) 
6. Is your main place of residence over the past 10 years (Please tick appropriate 
response for you) 
- a city (> 100,000 inhabitants) 
- a town  
- village (< 5,000 inhabitants) 
 
7. What is your nationality? (Please tick appropriate response for you) 
- Ukrainian 
- Russian 
- Mixed Ukrainian-Russian 
 
8. What is the nationality of your parents? (both Ukrainian, both Russian, Ukrainian 
and Russian, Ukrainian and other, Russian and Other, Others, don’t know / prefer 
not to say(Please tick appropriate response for you) 
 
9. What is your mother tongue? (Ukrainian / Russian / Ukrainian and Russian) (Please 
tick appropriate response for you) 
 
10. What language do you usually speak at home? (Ukrainian / Russian/ Ukrainian and 





11. What is your religion? (UOC MP / UOC KP / Ukrainian Greek Catholic / Ukrainian 
Autocephalous Church/ Roman Catholic / Protestant/ Muslim/ Jewish /Buddhist / 
Neo-Pagan / other / atheist / agnostic / don’t know / prefer not to say) (Please tick 
appropriate response for you) 
 
12. If you have a religion, do you practice your religion regularly? (yes / no / no 
religion) (Please tick appropriate response for you) 
 
13. How often do you travel to Russia? (Often, sometimes, rarely, never) (Please tick 
appropriate response for you) 
14. Why do you travel to Russia? (Work, visit friends and family, holiday, shopping, 
other please state, never travel to Russia) (Please tick appropriate response for 
you) 
 
15. Do you have family in Russia? (Yes, we are in close contact, Yes, but we are not in 
close contact, No, don’t know) 
16. Have you spent a considerable amount of time (more than 6 months in total) over 
the last ten years living outside of Ukraine? Where? 
 
Part 2: [Media Consumption.] This section asks about the kinds of media you use. 
 
Over the past 12 months, how important have the following media been for you as 
sources of information about what’s going on in the world from?  
 
17. Please tick the most appropriate response for you (main source, regular source, 
occasional source, rare source, never get information from here) 
• TV 
• Radio 
• Printed newspapers 
• Printed news magazines 





• Social networking sites 
• Other (please state) 
 
17.  How often do you watch the following kinds of TV programmes?  




• Political talk shows 
• Social talk shows 




• Other (please state) 
 
18. How often do you watch the following TV stations?  
Please tick the most appropriate response for you (Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly 
or less) 
• National Television company of Ukraine (First National Channel) 
• “Culture” 
• Inter 
• Kino-TV / Enterfilm 
• Channel 5 
• Russian First Channel 
















• CITI TV 
• TET 
• Kino 
• Donbas regional channel 
• CNN 
• BBC World 
• Don’t watch TV / don’t know 
 
19. How often do you listen to the following radio stations?  
Please tick the most appropriate response for you (Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly 
or less) 
• National Radio Company of Ukraine 
• “Culture” 
• Russkoe Radio 
• Lux FM 
• BBC Ukrainian 
• Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty 
• Hit FM 
• Kiss FM 
• Voice of Russia 
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• Russkiy Mir Radio 
• Don’t listen to the radio / don’t know 
 
20. How often do you browse to the following websites?  
Please tick the most appropriate response for you (Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly 
or less) 
• KID (http://zadonbas.org) 










• None of these / other please state 
 
22. How often do you read the following newspapers and news magazines?  
Please evaluate each of the following statements, by ticking the most appropriate 
response for you: (Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Yearly or less) 
• Uriadovy Kuryer 
• Korrespondent 
• Holos Ukrainy 
• Izvestiya v Ukraine 
• Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine 
• Ekonomicheskiye Izvestia 
• Kommentari 
• Kyiv Weekly 
• Expert-Ukraina 
• Fakty i kommentariyi 
• Sobytiya I luidi 
• Delo 
• Invest gazeta 
• Segodnya 
• Salon Dona I Basa 




• Ukrainska Pravda 
• Dzerkalo Tyzhden 
• Ukrayinsky Tyzhden 




23. When it comes to films made outside Ukraine, how do you define your attitude to 
cultural products from the following countries and areas (like a lot, like somewhat, 
ambivalent, dislike somewhat, dislike a lot, don’t know) 
 USA / Canada 
 South and Central America  
 China 
 Eastern Europe 
 India 
 Russia 
 Western Europe 
 Other country / area 
24. When it comes to music made outside Ukraine, how do you define your attitude to 
cultural products from the following countries and areas (like a lot, like somewhat, 
ambivalent, dislike somewhat, dislike a lot, don’t know) 
 USA / Canada 
 South and Central America  
 China 
 Eastern Europe 
 India 
 Russia 
 Western Europe 
 Other country / area 
25. How do you evaluate your level of trust in the information on international affairs 
presented by media from the following countries (trust a lot, trust somewhat, 
ambivalent, distrust somewhat, distrust a lot, don’t know) 
 USA / Canada 
 South and Central America  
 China 
 Eastern Europe 
 India 
 Russian 
 Western Europe 
 Ukraine 
 Other country / area 
 
Part 3: [Political and societal activeness.] This section asks about your interest in political 
and societal activity 
 
Please evaluate the following statements by ticking the most appropriate response for 
you (5 strongly agree, 4 somewhat agree, 3 ambivalent, 2 somewhat disagree, 1 strongly 




26. I am very interested in politics  
27. I take part in political activities (clubs, campaigns, information dissemination 
28. I attend Ukrainian public cultural events (festivals, camps, meetings, performances 
etc.)  
29. I attend Russian public cultural events in Ukraine (festivals, camps, meetings, 
performances etc.) often, sometimes. rarely, never, don’t know)  
30. It is important to me to vote in national elections (for the President, Parliament) 
31. I can imagine myself taking part in protests or demonstrations in support of my 
views 
 
Section 2: Soft power issues 
 
Part 4: [Attraction of Russian Culture.]  
The questions in this section reflect the positions expressed on the website of the 
‘Russian World’ foundation, a body sponsored by the Russian government to promote 
Russian language and culture across the whole world. 
    
Please indicate your attitude to each of the following statements by ticking the most 
appropriate response for you. (5 strongly agree, 4 somewhat agree, 3 ambivalent, 2 
somewhat disagree, 1 strongly disagree, don’t know) 
 
32. Russian contemporary culture represents a valuable contribution to global 
civilisational diversity  
33. Russian cultural heritage represents a uniquely valuable contribution to global 
civilisational diversity 
34. Russian is my preferred language of interethnic communication 
35. I personally feel proud of the fact that Yuri Gagarin was the first man in space 
36. It is very important to continue to commemorate Victory Day across Ukraine 
37. Although it is a separate state, Russia doesn’t really feel like a foreign country to 
me. 
38. Russian culture has a lot of admirers in foreign countries across the globe  
39. In my opinion, the notion of the “Russian World” means 
• Russia, its people and culture 
• All ethnic Russians 
• All Eastern Orthodox believers 
• All residents of Russia and compatriots abroad 
• Native speakers of Russian language 
• Any person identifying with Russian culture 
• Don’t know 
40. I consider myself a member of the Russian world  
41. I consider myself to be a Russian compatriot 
 
Part five: [Attraction of ‘Russian’ value model] 
 
This section asks for your opinion on some issues related to values. These questions 




Please indicate your attitude to each of the following statements by ticking the most 
appropriate response for you: (5 strongly agree, 4 somewhat agree, 3 ambivalent, 2 
somewhat disagree, 1 strongly disagree, don’t know) 
 
42. Western society and morals have become too tolerant of non-traditional 
behaviour  
43. Wealth accumulation and consumption should not be promoted as the main 
source of value in society  
44. Ukraine’s path to modernisation and development should take into account the 
importance of spiritual and moral values 
45. I have a high opinion of Patriarch Kirill and consider him a leading authority  
46. Discussions of the human rights of minority groups in society should take in 
account the opinions and sentiments of the majority of society’s members 
47. All peoples have the right to their own way of life; political correctness is not a 
reason to interfere with this 
48. Compared to other major states, Russia has a praiseworthy track record of 
preserving the cultural and linguistic uniqueness of its minorities. 
49. More should be done to promote spirituality and morality in Ukrainian society 
50. The state of interethnic, inter-confessional relations in Russia is a very good 
example to other states. 
 
 Part six:[ Attraction of Russian foreign policy discourse.]  
 
This section asks for your opinion of the Russian position on some issues in global politics 
which have been advanced by the President and foreign policy leadership in recent years 
Please evaluate each of the following statements, by ticking the most appropriate 
response for you: (5 strongly agree, 4 somewhat agree, 3 ambivalent, 2 somewhat 
disagree, 1 strongly disagree, don’t know) 
 
51. Russian democracy is criticised by other countries mostly for their own benefit  
52. It is legitimate for each country to decide how democracy should be implemented 
there, taking into account its own history, traditions and culture  
53. Despite its imperfections, Russia is more or less a democratic country. 
54. Today the world is genuinely becoming more multipolar 
55. Russia deserves a more prominent role in world political leadership 
56. Ensuring domestic stability is the most important task of a country’s elites and 
must be ensured at all costs 
57. Despite international criticism, the Russian authorities were right to clamp down 
on oligarchs acting against Russia’s national interests  
58. Overall, I have a positive view of the political leadership of Russia 
59. Russia plays an important role in standing up for justice in international politics  
60. Russia has a responsibility to monitor and support the rights of compatriots 
abroad  
 
Section three: Attitudes to other topics 
 




This section asks for your opinion on the attraction of Russia as a place to work and live. 
As well as asking about your evaluation of your own prospects, the questions also reflect 
positions sometimes advanced in Russian foreign media. 
 
Please indicate your attitude towards each of the following statements by ticking the 
most appropriate response for you: (5 strongly agree, 4 somewhat agree, 3 ambivalent, 2 
somewhat disagree, 1 strongly disagree, don’t know) 
 
61. Ukraine would benefit from adopting an approach to modernisation and 
 development similar to that of Russia  
62. Generally, people in Russia live better than in Ukraine  
63. Assuming equal salaries were available, I would prefer to work for a Russian 
company, rather than a Ukrainian, or Western one.  
64. I would be glad to move to Russia to live and work 
65. Although Russia has some problems, life is getting better there  
66. Life is probably less comfortable in Western countries than is commonly perceived 
67. Russia is an innovative and modern country 
68. Fluent command of Ukrainian language will probably be vital for my career 
69. Fluent command of Russian language will probably be vital for my career 
70. Fluent command of English language will probably be vital for my career  
 
Part Eight: [Attitudes towards high-profile political questions in Ukraine] 
 
This section asks for your opinion on some high-profile debates related to Ukraine-
Russian relations in recent years. 
 
Please indicate your attitude to each of the following statement, by ticking the most 
appropriate response for you: (5 strongly agree, 4 somewhat agree, 3 ambivalent, 2 
somewhat disagree, 1 strongly disagree) 
 
71. I support the Kharkiv Accord on the continuation of the stationing of the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2042. 
72. President Yushchenko was wrong to make Stepan Bandera a national hero of 
Ukraine 
73. The claim that the famine of 1932/3 (Holodymyr) was a genocide targeted 
specifically against the Ukrainian people is a misrepresentation of history. 
74. I am personally affected by discrimination against the Russian language in Ukraine 
75. Russian language should be made an official language of Ukraine on a national 
level 
76. If I had children, I would want them to attend a Russian speaking school 
77. I am against Ukrainian NATO membership 
78. I am against Ukrainian EU membership 
79. Ukraine and Russia should cultivate close and friendly ties that reflect their 





Section four: Invitation to participate in a focus group 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in my survey! 
 
I am very interested in your opinions on the topics raised in this survey, and you are now 
invited to apply to participate in the focus groups. The aim of these focus groups will be 
to deepen the insights gathered through the survey. 
 
About eight to 12 students like yourself will take part in each of the focus groups. The 
format is a “round table” discussion lead by a research professional. Participation is 
voluntary and all your answers will be kept confidential and will be used for research 
purposes only. We are simply interested in hearing your opinions, which will always be 
respected. Participants usually find participation in a focus group to be an interesting and 
enjoyable experience. 
 
Before the focus group takes place, you will need to spend half an hour browsing a 
website indicated by the survey coordinator. 
 
You would be remunerated for your time with 40 hryvna, which will be distributed 
immediately after the end of the focus group. Light snacks will also be provided before 
the start of the discussion. The focus groups will last 2-3 hours and will take place in [time] 
at [place]. 
 
If you would like to contribute to this innovative research, please provide your contact 
details below: 
 
• Would you like to participate in a focus group? [yes / no] 
• First name 
• telephone number  
• email address 
• Language of preference: Ukrainian / Russian / no preference 
• Comment (optional) 
 





If you indicated that you would like to participate in the focus groups, you will be 
contacted by the survey organiser [when] if your profile meets the target sample – this is 
because we want to ensure a variety of views in the discussion. 
 




Appendix B: Focus Group Guide  
 
This document was drafted in English, translated into Russian by a native speaker and 
then developed in tandem with the moderator in Kyiv prior to the first focus group 
discussion. As such, the final version is not available in English. Moderators in Kyiv and 
L’viv translated into Ukrainian ‘off the hoof’. 
 
ГАЙД ДЛЯ ФОКУС-ГРУППЫ 
 
Для налаживания контакта с участниками (2-3 минуты)  
 
Прежде всего, мне бы хотелось немного поближе познакомиться с вами. Не мог бы 
каждый из вас представиться и немного, хотя бы в общих чертах, рассказать о себе и 
своей семье, учёбе , интересах, месте где живёте 
 
Вопросы для обсуждения на Фокус Группе: Часть 1 – Русский Мир  
 
Скажите, пожалуйста, Вы что-то слышали о фонде Русский Мир? 
Что именно? Чем он занимается? 
Введение для первой части: 
В этой части дискуссии, мы собираемся посмотреть отрывок из интервью с 
директором Фонда «Русский Мир», Вячеславом Никоновым, в котором он дает 
информацию об этом фонде.  
 
Демонстрация клипа Русский мир 
 





Скажите, пожалуйста, в нескольких словах, какие ассоциации у Вас возникли при 
просмотре клипа – 2-3 слова.  
 
Оцените, пожалуйста, по 5 бальной шкале свое впечатление от этого клипа 1 – очень 
негативные эмоции, 5 – очень позитивные эмоции. 
 
Почему у Вас именно такие эмоции, объясните, пожалуйста. 
 
Вопрос 2: Общая реакция 
 
Фонд «Русский Мир» вовлечен в финансирование проектов по поддержке русской 
культуры, языка и наследия через разные социальные группы и НПО на Украине. Это 
вас интересует? (если «да», то что именно интересует и почему; если «нет», то 
почему?) 
 




Вопрос 3: Дискуссия по поводу термина (понятия) «Русский Мир»  
 
Вы слышали об идее «Русского Мира» до этой встречи?  




Насколько близка Вам идея РУССКОГО МИРА? 
Чувствуете ли Вы себя частью РУССКОГО МИРА? 
Кем Вы себя считаете (например, жителем Киева/другого города, украинцем, 
русским, европейцем, гражданином мира). 
Почему? 
 
ВОПРОСЫ ДЛЯ ОБСУЖДЕНИЯ НА ФОКУС ГРУППЕ: ЧАСТЬ 2 – ИДЕИ ПАТРИАРХА 
КИРИЛЛА  
 
Введение для части второй: 
В этой части дискуссии, мы собираемся посмотреть отрывок из ток-шоу, в котором 
фигурирует патриарх Кирилл. Ток-шоу было показано на «Интер» в феврале 2009 и 




Какое у Вас первое впечатление? Охарактеризуйте свои эмоции несколькими 
словами, которые Вам приходят в голову после просмотра клипа? 
 
Оцените, пожалуйста, Ваше отношение к услышанному по 5-ти бальной шкале. 1 – 
совершенно не понравилось, 5 – очень понравилось. 
 
Объясните, пожалуйста, почему Вы поставили именно такую оценку. 
 Часто ли вы видите патриарха в СМИ?  
 Вы знакомы с идеями, которые он озвучили или вы слышите эти идеи 
впервые?  
 
Вопрос 2: Разделяют ли участники мнение патриарха Кирилла о проблемах?  
 
С Вашей точки зрения, какие основные идеи высказывает Кирил в этом клипе? 
Согласны ли Вы с идеями, высказанными патриархом Кирилом? 
Почему? 
 
 (Что вы думаете о его предположении о необходимости более моральном и 
менее материалистическом подходе к модернизации?) 
 




Является ли концепция Русского Мира, предложенная патриархом, хорошим 
способом решения проблем материализации сегоднешнего мира и обесценивания 
духовных ценностей? 
 
Разделяете ли вы убеждение патриарха, что концепция Русского Мира может что-то 
предложить для остального человечества? 
 
Этот цивилизационный проект вас лично интересует и притягивает? (почему «да» / 
почему «нет») 
 
Вопрос 4: Отношение к патриарху Кириллу  
 
Как вы оцениваете право патриарха Кирилла делать такого рода заявления будучи 
на Украине? Почему у вас сложилось о нем такое мнение? Где вы взяли 
информацию об этому?  
 
С чем у Вас ассоциируется Патриарх Кирилл – с русским миром в целом или только с 
Российской Федерацией? 
 





Сейчас мы посмотрим несколько отрывков из речи бывшего президента России, 
Владимира Путина, на важной международной конференции по глобальной 
безопасности в Мюнхене в 2007. Эта речь вероятно является одной из его самых 




Что Вы можете сказать. Выскажите, пожалуйста, свои эмоции 2-3 словами. 
 
Оцените, пожалуйста, этот клип по 5-ти бальной шкале, где 1 – совершенно не 
понравилось, 5 – очень понравилось. 
Почему? Объясните, пожалуйста, свои оценки. 
Вопрос 1: Осведомленность с выраженной идеей  
Слышали ли Вы эти идеи раньше? 
 
Вопрос 2: Отношения к идеям, выраженным Владимиром Путиным 
 Как Вы думаете, какая основная идея речи Путина? 
 Вы согласны с его идеями? 
 Согласны ли Вы с Путинской критикой Запада? Почему 
 
Что имел в виду господин Путин, когда он говорит, что «нас постоянно учат 




Вопрос 3: Оценка Путиным роли России в мире  
 




Откуда Вы узнаете информацию о тех темах, которые мы сегодня обсуждали (Россия, 
отношения России и Украины, русский мир….?  










Как Вы думаете, какой путь следует выбрать Укриане? Держаться ближе к Россие, к 
Западу или что-то еще? 
 
Благодарности/ заключительные вопросы/ дебрифинг / обратная связь 
 
Часть 1: Дополнительные комментарии по теме 
 Мы обсудили все три темы. У вас есть что-нибудь, чтобы вы хотели добавить 
относительно затронутых сегодня тем? 
 Что являлось наиболее важным источником информации, формирующим 




Appendix C: Translated Transcription of Focus Group Stimulus Material: 
Cultural Strand 
 
The stimulus clip consists of a short promotional video about the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
and the notion of the Russkiy Mir. A transcription in English is provided here. 
 
It is available from the Russian version of the Russkiy Mir Foundation website: 
http://russkiymir.ether.tv/ From the options available, select 'Выбор программы' from 
the menu on the top then open ' A. ФОНД' from the menu that opens on the side, then 
choose ‘Ролики о Фонде' and then choose ' Презентация Фонда Русский мир' from the 
submenus that open. 
 
“Russkiy Mir Foundation. 
 
Do you speak Russian? More 300 million people than all over the world will say ‘yes’. 
Russian is native language of 160 million people, nearly one fourth of them live outside 
Russia. Russian is the fifth most wide-spread language after Chinese, Spanish, English and 
Hindi. At the new millennium, the increased economic role of Russia, revived interest in 
its language and culture, thus helping promote it abroad. Such promotion is the goal of 
Russkiy Mir Foundation. 
 
‘I believe it is important to support the Russian language initiative of creating a national 
foundation of the Russian language, whose key objectives are development of the Russian 
language in Russia, support of its study programmes abroad and general popularisation of 
Russian language and literature.’ [Vladimir Putin] 
 
Russkiy Mir foundation was established in June 2007 by the decree of the President of 
Russia, Vladimir Putin. It is a non-government organisation whose goal is to provide 
widespread support of Russian language. Being so complex, beautiful and expressive the 
Russian language is rightly one of the most important parts of Russia’s national patrimony. 
‘The mission of the foundation is to make knowledge of the Russian language fashionable, 
prestigious, advantageous. It should give undisputable advantage in life so that Russia 
becomes a country which lives at peace with itself and brings ideals to the rest of the 
world; ideals of freedom, ideals of good, , ideals of justice, ideals of sovereignty, ideals of 
dignity and self-respect. Then the Russian speaking world in general and Russian Mir 
foundation in particular will fulfil their destination.’ [Vyacheslav Nikonov] 
 
In February 2008, Russkiy Mir Foundation opened its first Russian language and literature 
centre in Yerevan, Armenia. Today there are nearly 30 Russian centres in Tadjikstan, 
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Latvia, China, Japan, Bulgaria and the USA and other countries. 
The foundation plans to open not only Russian language and literature centres, but also 
Russkiy Mir rooms. This special purpose programmes will allow anyone to get a 
complimentary full set of books and fiction books helpful in studying Russian. 
 
[Students speaking] 
‘My name is Khe Yu. My Russian name is Anya.’  
‘I am twenty. I like Moscow very much.’  
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‘Russian Language is very beautiful and interesting.’  
 
Russian centres are an open treasury of all possible sources of knowledge about Russia 
and the Russian language. There is a library, collection of audio records, learning aids, 
methodological support, plus access to Russian web resources; everything needed to 
learn Russian language, culture and history. Studying Russian language has never been 
easier. For every age, the Russkiy Mir Foundation has developed a separate language 
programme. For example, kids learn language from a series of colourful images, while 
characters of every cartoon teach them reading, understanding, pronunciation or five to 
ten words, phrases and sentences.  
 
For adult students there is another multi-media course, ‘Russian for Everyone’. Teaches 
pronunciation and teaches how to recognise Russian speech. The foundation also 
sponsors the publication of books, dictionaries, reference books and monographs, which 
are used in dozens of universities. Every year, there are more and more of those who 
studying using foundation materials. 
 
‘Currently, 90 high education institutes abroad have their faculties or departments of 
Russian language. However, there are other non-philologists, 20-30 thousand of them.’ 
 
One more area of foundation’s activity is material support of projects aimed at preserving 
and popularising Russian language and literature. Already the foundation has supported 
around 500 of such projects.50 festivals of Russian culture. It uses all sorts of possibilities 
to support interaction between like-minded people from all parts of the world. Besides 
large-scale and continuous programmes supporting foreign-language press, the 
foundation produces its own media products. The two key products are the ‘Russkiy Mir’ 
printed magazine and the foundation’s web portal. The website is open to all wishing to 
take a Russian language distance course, to find like-minded people in their country and 
throughout the world, to apply for a grant, and to get quality help in tracking the projects 
related to culture and language support. 
 
Russkiy Mir Foundation creates a new global informational and cultural space. Russian 
World is not only one nation, it is a nation living in peace with itself and with the rest of 
the world. The key word is peace, as lack of hostility. Russian world reflects Russian 
conciliation, accord, Russian concord, unanimity, union after the vociferous processes of 
the 20th century. This conciliation experience imported to Russian by centuries of ordeal 
is what the country should give to the world. 
 






Appendix D: Translated Transcription of Focus Group Stimulus Material: 
Values Strand 
 
The stimulus material consisted of comments made by Patriarch Kirill on a talk show 
broadcast live on the Ukrainian television channel ‘Inter’ on 28th July 2009.  
 
A transcription translated into English is given below. 
 
The clip used in the focus groups is available here:  
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HI7FmSgTe0&feature=related. The full text available 




“Now we face a no less serious challenge. Not only in the times of Miklouho-Maclay were 
trinkets attractive – a beautiful wrapping is always attractive. The sparkling trinkets of 
modern life surround one’s head, intoxicating human consciousness; and young people in 
particular undoubtedly want to live like the women who stares at you from the front of a 
glossy magazine. People believe in advertising, believe in fashion, believe in stereotypes 
as if they were reality – it’s a virtual world! Adverts for creams against wrinkles strike me 
the most: a young woman of 20 odd years promotes a cream against wrinkles, and sure 
enough there are grown women who believe this – they say, I’ll look like this beauty if I 
use the cream they advertised! It’s an example of how advertising and the stereotypes it 
imposes may influence our consciousness. 
 
That’s why our struggle is not against flesh and blood, as said the apostle Paul (see 
Ephesians 6:12). Our struggle is for the way of life offered to us by Jesus Christ, and 
against that way of life proposed to us today by a godless civilisation. So-called 
secularisation is dangerous not in terms of Church-State relations; when the Church is 
separated from the State. Secularisation is dangerous when the spirit is severed from the 
flesh, when the spiritual and the material are separated, when a person is given over to 
the power of material elements. I think that this is the main question, and resolution of 
which the future of the entire human race depends. We, who emerged from the 
baptismal font of Kyiv, have something to tell the world. We have a unique experience – 
nobody else has our experience; the experience of persecution, confessors, martyrs and 
organised resistance to godless ideology. 
 
Something else amazes me. I am by no means speaking against the Western world; I 
know the West well and have lived in the West, but why, in dialogue with the Western 
world do we so easily assume the role of a follower? What values are offered to us? What 
is unique in what this rich civilisation tells us today? Why do we so easily surrender our 
birthright? We are ready to join a united Europe, any other Europe. Are we entering to 
get ideas? To get a shot of a proper lifestyle? Are we entering to eat richly, for the sake of 
the stomach and the pocket? Probably it’s also not bad, but then let’s take our values 
with us, only I’m not sure that there they’ll be ready to accept our values. But to enter as 
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followers, losing our spiritual birthright, forsaking our tragic, but unique, incomparable 
experience – this gives me serious doubts. 
 
I think that our unity – the unity of the spiritual space of Holy Rus’, historical Rus’ – is of 
enormous power as a civilizational project, and it is not destined to be a follower. It is 
designed to generate ideas, and now this is happening; it is intended to launch 
philosophical challenges that other must answer. We have the potential to develop a 
genuine dialogue between East and West, and not the dialogue of “a horse and its rider”. 
Only such a dialogue will lead to the construction of a united Europe. A united Europe 
cannot be constructed according to patterns not created together with our great 
civilisation; independent and original. If we want to build this Europe, we must agree on 
how to create new patterns. Perhaps the Lord will lead us to this and we will be able to 
make our civilizational contribution to the construction of those fair relations in the world 





Appendix E: Transcription of Focus Group Stimulus Material: Foreign 
Policy Strand 
 
The stimulus material consists of an excerpt from a speech given by Vladimir Putin at the 
Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10th February 2007.  
 
A transcription is given below. 
 
Source (English language version):  
 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type8291




The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations 
to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history? However, what is a 
unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to 
one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of 
decision-making.  
 
It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is 
pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself 
because it destroys itself from within.  
 
And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, 
democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the 
minority.  
Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some 
reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.  
 
I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s 
world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and 
precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not 
suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis 
there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.  
 
Along with this, what is happening in today’s world – and we just started to discuss this – 
is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of 
a unipolar world. And with which results? Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions 
have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and 
created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional 
conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less 
people perish in these conflicts – even more are dying than before. Significantly more, 
significantly more! 
Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in 
international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent 
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conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution 
to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.  
 
We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. 
And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one 
state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has 
overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, 
cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is 
happy about this?  
 
In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question 
according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.  
And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I 
want to emphasise this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international 
law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms 
race.  
 
The force’s dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats – though they were also well-
known before – have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a 
global character.  
 
I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think 





Appendix F: List of Interviews 
 
Here, the interviews conducted for this thesis are listed. 
 
Interviews Conducted in Moscow in June / July 2011 
 
22nd June  
Alexey Dolinskiy 
Assistant Executive Director at Russkiy Mir Foundation, Assistant Dean at School of Public 
Administration, Moscow State University, consultant in international affairs industry, PhD 
on Russian public diplomacy at MGIMO under Prof. M.M. Lebedeva. 
 
23rd June  
Prof. Marina M. Lebedeva 
Professor of Psychology, Chair, Department of World Politics, MGIMO 
 
23rd June 
Dr. Pyotr I. Kasatkin 



















Dr. Nina Belyaeva 
Head of Public Policy Department, Higher School of Economics 
 
29th June 
Dr. Andrei Kazantsev 
Senior research fellow (the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Security) and lecturer at MGIMO, 







Journalist, staff writer for Russia Profile 
 




Dr. Vasiliy N. Istratov 
Deputy CEO, Russkiy Mir Foundation, former Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan 
 
4th July 





Director of Foreign Language New Production, RIA Novosti 
 
6th July 
Andrei A. Zolotov 
Deputy Director of RIA Novosti International Service, advisor to chief editor of RIA Novosti, 
founding Chief Editor of Russia Profile, recognised expert on Russia’s religious affairs and 
global developments related to Orthodox Christianity. 
 
6th July 
Dr. Alexey Gromyko 





Head of International Projects at RIA Novosti, Executive Director of Valdai Club, member 
of Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 
 
7th July 
Dr. Rostislav Turovskiy 
Department of Politology, Moscow State University 
 
8th July 
Dr. Igor Zevelev 
Director of Moscow office of MacArthur Foundation, formerly Washington bureau chief 
of RIA Novosti, and former Head of Department and Deputy Director at the Center for 





10th July 2011 
Elena Panova 
Post-Graduate student research Russian soft power under Prof M.M. Lebedeva at MGIMO, 
now employed at Russia Today 
 








Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv. 
 
Interviews taken during scoping visit to Kyiv in January 2010 
 
19th January 2010 
Oleg Yarosh  








Researcher, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy 
 
21st January 2010 
Oleg Yatsenko 
Head of All Ukrainian Youth Societal Organisation “Students’ Brotherhood”. 
 
21st January 2010 
Myhailo Kirsenko 
Professor of History at Kiev-Mokhyla Academy 
 













Daur Sergeevich Zukhba 




12th August 2010 
Ostap Kryvdyk 
Journalist, Political Consultant 
 








19th August 2010 
Marta Dyczok 
Associate Professor of Departments of History and Politics, University of Western Ontario 
June 2009 
Mikhail M. Vladimir 
Director of Russian House of Culture and Science, Berlin 
 
17th March 2011, Helsinki 
Vadim Kononenko 
Researcher, Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
 
23rd March 2011, Helsinki 
Arseniy Svinarenko 







Appendix G: Elements of the Cultural Strand  
 
The Russkiy Mir Foundation promotes the intrinsic value of culture and cultural identity 
generally, and of their Russian manifestations specifically. Below are the statements 
utilised in the cultural section of the survey questionnaire, together with a brief 
justification of their inclusion. 
 
'Russian contemporary culture represents a valuable contribution to global civilisational 
diversity' 
 
Although this thesis has argued that focusing on the manifestations of culture to the 
exclusion of the salience of ideas is unwarranted in analyses of soft power, clearly 
perceptions of culture do play a part. Positive views in this regard indicate that individuals 
are receiving a favourable message, which might not be prevalent if they are 
predominantly accessing critical sources of information, or if Russia was not effectively 
communicating its achievements or indeed was not distinguishing itself in this area. 
What’s more, the success of cultural activities resonates in other spheres, suggesting 
financial ability, organisation, inspiration and the moral superiority associated with 
foregrounding culture. The Russkiy Mir Foundation celebrates and encourages this, both 
in the activities it supports and its online coverage. 
 
'Russian cultural heritage represents a uniquely valuable contribution to global 
civilisational diversity' 
 
Similarly to the previous factor, a high score on this point indicates that respondents 
continue to receive a positive message about Russia’s historical legacy in the sphere of art, 
culture and literature. The mere existence of the prestigious cultural achievements of the 
past is not sufficient to generate cultural attraction; this knowledge much be 
disseminated, which is by no means to be taken for granted if we consider that Ukraine 
sought to teach Russian literature not as a separate subject, but as but one component 
among others in a course on world literature. The Russkiy Mir Foundation celebrates 
Russian cultural heritage through special measures, events and features in its media 
products.230 
 
'Russian is my preferred language of interethnic communication' 
 
Language is a key marker of national identity and a boundary between information spaces. 
The choice between Russian and Ukrainian and even English is symbolic of the degree to 
which an individual has been attracted by alternative patriotic or globalist narratives. As 
Filimonov (2010) has noted, 
 
A major condition for strengthening Russia’s authority in the territory of the former Soviet 
Union is expanding the Russian cultural presence there Work to preserve the role of the 
Russian language as a means of interethnic communication between the peoples of the 
[FSU]… remains an indisputable priority. 
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Although Russia is a separate country, I don't perceive it as a foreign state' 
 
Similar to the Soviet period, there are open, visa-less borders between Russia and Ukraine, 
which helps perpetuate a sense of being part of a wider shared cultural space that could 
be labelled as a civilisation which characterised Russia’s relationship to much of Ukraine 
until 1991.  
 
'I personally feel proud of the fact that Yuri Gagarin was the first man in space' 
Presidents Putin and Medvedev as well as the Orthodox hierarchy have shared a 
‘patriotism in which Soviet achievements are given particular attention […] Putin believes 
that love for the homeland is a traditional Russian value and that patriotism could unify 
the country while making it “better, richer, stronger and happier”’ (Richters 2012: 68). In 
this vein, the Russkiy Mir Foundation commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of Yuri 
Gagarin’s space flight in 2011 under the slogan ‘First in Space’. The event was framed as 
an a national achievement of which all former Soviet people could justly be proud. 
Coverage drew attention not only to the space flight as a human scientific and 
technological endeavour that will stand for all time, but also lionised the endearing 
personal traits of the astronaut. The ‘First in Space’ campaign also allowed a celebration 
of common history of human achievement of the united Soviet people, without any focus 
on communist ideology. 
'It is very important to continue to commemorate Victory Day across Ukraine' 
 
The will to attribute positive valuation to shared history is also expressed in 
commemoration of the Second World War victory over Nazi Germany. 1945 entered 
Soviet political culture as a ‘source of identification and self-esteem for both the political 
leadership and the population’ and appears not to have diminished in this regard 
(Richters 2012: 67). The supporting narratives have, however, been subject to revisionist 
critiques by, among others, Ukrainian nationalists, who have attempted to depict the 
events of this period in terms that undermine the Soviet discourse of liberation than 
modern Russia has largely perpetuated. Furthermore, in  L’viv in 2011 there was a big 
debate about whether to commensurate Victory Day there. The Russkiy Mir Foundation 
in particular, and also Russia more generally, have been paying active attention to the 
maintenance of existing Russian narratives on the Second World War, presumably to 
impede a collective forgetting of certain newly inconvenient factors from Ukrainian 
cultural memory. 
 
'Russian culture has a lot of admirers in foreign countries across the globe' 
 
The Russkiy Mir Foundation’s website consistently underscores through its choice of 
features that people all over the world are interested in Russian culture. 231  This 
demonstrates the civilisational radiance of the Russian world, and seeing such 
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 For instance, the interview with Yuri Prokhorov, rector of the Oushkin State Russian Language Institute 
‘Russian is in demand around the world once again’. 
http://www.russkiymir.org/en/publications/interviews/index.php?id4=10302 (accessed 3
rd
 June 2009). 
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phenomena can incite a critical mass type effect, whereby after a certain tipping-point, 
the concept comes to prominence and attracts a surge in adherents as it becomes an 
accepted part of the cultural landscape. Respect for a prestigious culture is part of soft 
power attraction, and resists the idea that Russia is becoming internationally irrelevant. 
 
'I consider myself a member of the Russkiy Mir' 
 
Ideally, as many foreign citizens as possible, and especially in the former Soviet Union 





Appendix H: Elements of the Values Strand  
 
Below are the statements utilised in the values section of the survey questionnaire, 
together with a brief justification of their inclusion. These are particularly based on the 
discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church. 
 
Western society and its morality have become too tolerant of non-traditional 
behaviours.  
 
On the whole, the nature of the critique against the West is not absolute in nature. 
Rather than being portrayed as ‘evil’ and categorically ‘othered’; the civilisation is framed 
as having lost its way somewhat. The pragmatically minded might well recall Surkov’s 
statement of the need to cooperate with the West, and therefore the need for narratives 
that frame competitive debate, without invoking enmity. There is significant intertextual 
potential in this regard, as Richters (2012: 44) notes ‘the ROC’s dislike of “the West” and 
liberal democratic principles matches the communists’ foreign policy and their autocratic 
style of government. The Church’s wish to close Russia to new or ’Western’ religious 
influence has traces of the isolationism that characterised the USSR for most of its 
existence’. Resistance to Western cultural influence often expresses a conservative 
discourse regarding ‘non-traditional behaviours;’ often a euphemism for homosexuality 
and other liberal sexual mores. This element also links in to the notion of opposing 
discourses that favour minorities ‘at expense of sentiment of majority’. 
 
The acquisition of wealth and consumption should not be promoted as main sources of 
values in society.  
 
This may be seen as a re-articulation of the Soviet discourse on bourgeois materialism, 
whereby notions of the West as placing excessive value on the material, over the spiritual 
and human draw intertextually Soviet discourse on bourgeois materialism, re-articulating 
what many people ‘know’ about the West in ways that preserve its stability and indeed 
draw authority from the perpetuated nature of this discourse. The Moscow Patriarchate 
and Orthodox thinkers, Richters observes, have always ‘held everything to do with money, 
profit and calculability in deep contempt’ (cited in Richters 2012: 45), which ‘turned a 
widespread concern of the 1990s into an almost desirable characteristic’. Again, the 
perceived orientation of Western society towards these values provides frequent grounds 
for criticism, both implicit and otherwise. 
 
The Ukrainian path to modernisation and development should take into account the 
importance of spiritual and moral values.  
 
The statement seeks to ascertain how individuals appraise the emphasis on spirituality 





I have a high opinion of Patriarch Kirill and consider him to be a leading authority.  
 
As previously noted, in order to optimally engage in mean-making, credibility and 
authority are highly recommended. This statement attempts to succinctly evaluate the 
level of approval of the current patriarch.  
 
In societal discussions on the rights of minorities, it is necessary to take into account the 
opinions of the majority.  
 
This statement emerges as a response to the perception that Western societies are 
allowing their cultural integrity to become eroded by integrating value elements that are 
considered ‘non-traditional’ in Russian society. This seems to relate in particular to 
advancing minority sexual preferences, ‘at expense of sentiment of majority’ opinion. For 
instance, gomoscope.ru website launched in May 2012 to ‘combat the growing terror of 
sexual minorities’ and defend the rights of heterosexuals.232 Nataliya Narochnitskaya 
(2007)has also reported that ‘the diktat of minority rights contradicts democracy’  
 
All peoples have the right to their own way of life - Political correctness is not a reason 
for the infringement of this right.  
 
This reflects the key tenant of sovereign democracy that people have the right to live in 
line with their own traditions, as well as the discussion about political correctness in 
Europe, which has often had an oppositional tone, framing it as hypocritical and as sign of 
multicultural decadence (Aliev and Khasmagomadov 2010). 
 
In comparison with other states, Russia has a positive experience of preserving the 
cultures, languages and uniqueness of its ethnic minorities.  
 
The Russian imperial experience is contrasted with that of Western powers, with the 
implication that life under Moscow’s domination was more equitable for those concerned. 
As Orthodox commentator Natalia Narochnitskaya (2007b) put it: 
 
The fact that Russia never had colonies] is historical achievement of the Russian 
world. All territories and peoples of Russia had equal rights. The national culture 
of ethnic minorities was not suppressed but supported. The patrimonial empire 
guaranteed ethnic groups protection and helped them to preserve their 
samobytnost. […] No racial segregation, no slavery, no religious war, never used 
atom bombs […] Russia and the Russkiy Mir have something to be proud of in the 
sphere of political culture.  
 
Similarly, despite simmering ethnic tensions, Putin has spoken positively about the 
country’s different faiths, including Islam, and says Russians should be proud of their 
country’s diversity. (cited Richters 2012: 53). Based on its favourable experience of 
religious cohabitation, Russia could, it is believed, contribute usefully to an international 
inter-faith discussion (Putin 2012). 
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It is necessary to take more serious steps to strengthen spirituality and morality in 
Ukrainian society. 
 
This factor captures the extent to which Ukrainians believe measures to increase 
spirituality and morality should be practically implemented in society. 
 
Interethnic and inter-confessional relations in Russia are a good example to other 
countries.  
 
It is stressed that Russia must learn from the critical examination of international 
experiences. One thematic area producing considerable debate is that of migration which 
has been followed closely by the Russian media. While the official discourse maintains the 
view of an inclusive federation with various degrees of primacy accorded to ethnic 
Russians by individual actors, the problematisation of multiculturalism in some Western 
states has been noted. Accordingly, advocates frequently point to the purported absence 
of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflict within the diverse realms of Russian 
statehood, concluding from this that Russia has something valuable to offer the world in 
this regard. This is considered to qualify Russia to assume a leadership role in the search 





Appendix I: Elements of Foreign Policy Strand 
 
Below are the statements utilised in the values section of the survey questionnaire, 
together with a brief justification of their inclusion. These drew upon official statements 
by foreign policy representatives. 
 
Every country has the right to decide to implement democracy in line with its own 
history, traditions and culture.  
 
Although Russia’s political system is commonly criticised by Western states as a mere 
façade of democracy, Kremlin elites do not fully concur. Based on the assumption that 
Russian history, culture and tradition differ significantly from the Western experience and 
provide significantly different conditions for development, Moscow reserves the right to 
implement a model of democracy appropriate for Russian conditions and in consideration 
of domestically defined priorities. 
 
In spite of all its inadequacies, Russia is more or less a democratic country.  
 
The Russian authorities readily admit failings in the Russian political system, yet they 
insist that that the country is a democracy, albeit a different kind than in Western 
countries, and is headed in the right direction. As Surkov frames it, 
 
The time of observation is negligible and it is early for bold conclusions, but the first steps 
of Russian freedom are reassuring. Democracy has coped with poverty, separatism, 
societal despondency, legal collapse and has halted the dissolution of the army and state 
apparatus. It put pressure on oligarchy, went on the decisive offensive against 
international terrorism and strengthened the economy… it works… (Surkov 2009) 
 
As such, these discourses resist not only Western critiques of Russian democracy, but also 
domestic elites who would claim that ‘greater democracy in Russia would be harmful’.233 
Levels of acceptance of such statements will give an indicator of the extent to which 
respondents are co-opted into the Kremlin’s explanatory discourse on Russia’s 
achievements concerning democracy, or whether their thoughts are more thoroughly 
influenced by critical sources. 
 
Today the world has really become more multipolar.  
 
In the first decade of the 21st century, the argument for unipolarity and ‘benign’ American 
hegemony (Krauthammer) was presented as in the global interest, since having a single 
power acting as ‘global policeman’ was seen to reduce conflict and rivalry in favour of 
peace. Moscow argues for ‘justice for Russia in the world’ (Surkov); meaning full 
representation in matters of major international geopolitical and economic significance. 
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 Brian Whitmore, ‘Russia’s hyperactive ideologist’ RFERL, 19
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 June 2009, 
http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1758417.html (accessed 6th July 2007). 
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Russia deserves a more significant role in global political leadership. 
 
The background to this statement is the notion that the West is striving in various ways to 
keep Russia down, out or otherwise contained, which is against Russia justified aspiration 
to great power status. 
  
The preservation of domestic stability is the most important task the political elite of 
the country and should be guaranteed at any price.  
 
The maintenance of state stability and sovereignty are seen as national security priorities. 
Fear of the turmoil of the 1990s is held up as an example of what must be avoided at all 
costs. 
 
In spite of international criticism, the Russian authorities are right to have taken a 
tougher stance against oligarchs acting against the national interests of Russia.  
 
The Khodorkovskiy Affair, for instance, was harshly criticised in the West, and cited as 
demonstrative of the failures of the Russian political system. Raisons d’etat and a concern 
for territorial sovereignty have not been seen as grounds for the selective application of 
justice. The ROC also supported the vilification of oligarchs who enrich themselves at 
expense of the population and state (Richters 2012: 45). Surkov summarises the threat 
perception as follows: 
 
The revanche of the oligarchy – a final decision in favor of the unconstrained trans-
nationalization of Russia’s economic and political assets – will doom the country to loss of 
subjecthood, dissolution into globalization instead of than participation in it. (2009: 17) 
 
On the whole, I have a positive view of the political leadership of Russia.  
 
The question seeks to evaluate the level of approval of the Russian leadership, which has 
implications for its credibility, perceived legitimacy and therefore its mean-making 
capacity. 
 
Russia plays an important role in the establishing of justice in international politics.  
 
Russia has accused the USA of imperilling international security and stability through its 
attempts to achieve absolute security (Putin 2012). In response, Russia has been involved 
in critiquing the certain behaviours in international politics, with accusations of double 
standards and breaches of international law. In this way, Russia draws upon anti-imperial 
motifs that echo those of the Soviet period. 
 
Russia bears responsibility for the monitoring and protection of the rights of 
compatriots abroad.  
 
In the 1990s, Russia was unable to uphold the interests of those Russians who found 
themselves living in a foreign country following the collapse of the Soviet Union with 
regard to their civil, linguistic and political rights. Having regaining capacity, supporting 
Russians abroad – ‘compatriots’ – has become an important policy objective. The ability 
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to protect its own not only befits the dignity of a major power, but measures to this end 
have also given grounds for Moscow to get involved in the domestic affairs of the Soviet 
successor states, particularly in the Baltic and Ukraine. The assertive protection of 
compatriots was the ostensible rationale for Russian intervention in Georgia in August 
2008. Further, as Putin has noted ‘respect for one’s country is rooted, among other things, 
in its ability to protect the rights of its citizens abroad’ (2012). 
 
To a large extent, Russian democracy is criticised by other countries for their own 
benefits. 
 
This question seeks to assess the extent to with audiences are convinced of the charges of 
double-standards directed at Western political agents by Moscow, which feels that 
Western values put Russia at a disadvantage (Trenin 2007: 76 cited in Feklyunina 2010: 
23). For instance, Vladimir Putin has stated that, 
 
it appears that with the Arab Spring countries, as with Iraq, Russian companies are losing 
their decades-long position in local commercial markets and are being deprived of large 
commercial contracts. The niches thus vacated are being filled by the economic 
operatives of the states that had a hadn in the change of the ruling regime. 
One could reasonably conclude that tragic events have been encouraged to a certain 
extent by someone’s interest in a re-division of the commercial market rather than a 
concern for human rights (Putin 2012). 
 
Further, countering critique of Putin’s democratic credentials, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry 
Peskov has even described Putin as liberal, stating ‘Putin is a liberal not in his words but in 
actual practice […] In the West, they indulge in branding him “iron”, “prophet of 
authoritarianism” and so on. This is complete nonsense.’234  
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Appendix J: Questions for Fieldwork Interviews 
 
1. Could you briefly explain your professional position or positions and activities? 
2. How do you personally understand soft power and does its application to Russia differ 
from elsewhere? 
3. How widespread and engrained is recognition of Russia’s need to develop soft power? (To 
what extent is it a matter a generation change?) Where are the main bases of support for 
a soft power approach to international politics? Who are the main detractors / sceptics of 
this approach? Have soft power’s proponents in Russia successfully coopted wider groups 
of interested persons and opinion formers into the modern ‘soft power’ foreign policy 
narratives? 
4. It is sometimes suggested that the state plays a more significant role in Russian soft 
power strategy than elsewhere. Do you agree? Are moves afoot to shift the emphasis 
towards the civil society sector? 
5. It was once said by Vyacheslav Nikonov that Russia could not have soft power as it didn’t 
have an ideational agenda to offer to the world. Do you agree? Is there a distinctive 
approach to development that Russia might offer to the world, drawing upon its own 
traditions? Is there demand for such a model? Do you see the ideas of sovereign 
democracy as something potentially attractive to foreigners (the controversial title aside)? 
Ideally, what image of Russia would you like Ukrainians to have?  
6. What are the most effective tools of soft power at Russia’s disposal in Ukraine? How do 
you see the role of the Orthodox Church in Russia’s soft power strategy? 
7. What are the main contemporary challenges to Russia soft power attractiveness in 
Ukraine? 
8. How much interaction and coordination are there between measures aimed at the 
Russian compatriot community in Ukraine and those aimed at the general population? 
Are different instruments and messages used to target these two audiences? 
9. To what extent is the reception of Russian narratives about international relations by 
audiences in Ukraine monitored and taken into account by Russian communications 
professionals? Are the insights gleaned from such research successfully fed back into the 
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